

INDIA – VIETNAM RELATIONS: DEEPENING BILATERAL TIES FOR MUTUAL BENEFIT

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
Indian Development Cooperation Research (IDCR) Program, Centre for Policy Research

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ABSTRACT

The India-Vietnam bilateral relationship in the past has been supported by various commonalities including six decades of anti-colonial interests, pan-Asian nationalism and independent foreign policies. The first instance of India's development cooperation towards Vietnam predates India's 1991 'Look East Policy' by thirty years. Importantly, during the past decade, with India's rapid economic growth and its consequent desire for energy security, open trade through the South China Seas, and development partnership with South East Asia, the strategic and economic significance of Vietnam for India has grown manifold. Furthermore, increased cooperation with India also provides Vietnam with a crucial ally and a measure of counterbalance to China's increasing influence in the region as well as from the conflicting pressures coming from Russia and US. The significance of the bilateral relationship can be well noticed from the signing of crucial agreements in 2003, 2007 and 2011, directed towards enhancing overall cooperation between the two. Moreover, India's development cooperation towards Vietnam in form of credit lines and grants as well as the quantum of trade between the two has also experienced a major boost during the past decade or so. Thus, taking these factors into consideration, in this piece we have tried to analyze in detail strengthening India-Vietnam relationship with a special focus on the diverse forms of India's development cooperation directed towards this Southeast Asian nation which holds a pivotal position in India's 'Look East Policy'.



Map indicating locations of India and Vietnam

INTRODUCTION

For India, a decade of rapid economic growth has resulted in a considerably expanded search for natural resources and strategic partners. Continued growth will at least partly depend on whether New Delhi can field a greater global presence. These realities combined with the uncertainty surrounding Beijing's long-term ambitions in the Asia-Pacific dictate that India will benefit considerably by committing to deeper development partnerships beyond its immediate neighbourhood.

In this article the Indian Development Cooperation Research program (IDCR) will focus on the diverse forms of development assistance which have helped India strengthen its relationship with Vietnam – a nation that promises to play a key role in India's "Look East" policy. The India-Vietnam relationship, part of which is based on a set of historical commonalities, has been moving towards addressing shared strategic concerns of energy security, open Sea Lanes of Communication, and of ensuring an extended neighbourhood that is free to make policy choices without undue deference to potential regional and international hegemony. India's desire to realize these goals without alienating Vietnam's neighbours has kept the relationship focused more on capacity building and technical assistance, instead of on the supply of military hardware. [1]

Given India's broadening interests and Vietnam's desire for strategic independence, both seem to recognize that deeper development partnerships can promise considerable mutual benefit.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF BILATERAL RELATIONS

Indian development assistance to Vietnam is not a recent phenomenon. The first instance of India extending a government to government Line of Credit (LOC) to Vietnam

predates India's 1991 Look East policy by over 30 years. In 1958, India made a gift of books to Vietnam, and in 1974, India facilitated training of Vietnamese nationals in animal husbandry and advanced English. [2] Since 1976 - the year of Vietnam's accession to the Non Aligned Movement (NAM) - India has extended 17 Lines of Credit (LOCs), totalling approximately US\$ 165 million apart from grants and loans. [3]

Indo-Vietnamese bilateral relations of course have a longer history. The Hindu Kingdom of Cham Pa that existed along the southern and central coast of Vietnam from the 7th to 18th century saw considerable trade with India. [4] The Cham people adopted the ancient Indian language Sanskrit, and their writing seems closely derived from a script of Southern India. [5] Over the centuries, this Vietnamese civilization fostered an exchange of cultures and ideas with kingdoms in India, leaving an indelible mark on both peoples. [6]

Figure 1: Map of the Cham Empire, 1000-1100 CE



Source: Indian Development Cooperation Research (IDCR) Program at the Centre for Policy Research

At the advent of the 20th century, faced with similar concerns of colonial oppression, Indian and Vietnamese nationalists found themselves at the forefront of the independence struggles in Asia. Vietnamese revolutionary leader Ho Chi Minh was known to have contacts with Indian freedom fighters including Jawaharlal Nehru as early as 1927. [7]

India also played an important role overseeing France's withdrawal from Indochina. Though not officially party to the 1954 talks in Geneva, New Delhi assisted in supervising the separation of rival forces, dealing with refugees, and overseeing the proposed elections. [8]

During the 1950s, as the Cold War intensified, North Vietnam would continue to receive New Delhi's support. Both countries drew closer, building on the principles of pan-Asian nationalism and, after the 1976 reunification of North and South Vietnam at the end of the Vietnam War, on the principles of the Non Aligned Movement.

Ideological Difference

Yet ideological and political differences remain to this day between New Delhi and Hanoi. Over the years, the former has moved away from its socialist roots, while the latter is among the last remaining communist states in the world. However, despite the dissimilar models of governance, India and Vietnam continue to find many shared interests. And as the causes for mutual concern – namely China's growing investments in the vicinity of both nations and the tensions in the South China Sea – grow, deeper development partnerships between India and Vietnam are likely to prove rewarding for both.

Burgeoning Bilateral Trade


That both nations recognize the benefits of closer ties can be seen from the burgeoning bi-lateral trade, which went from US\$120 million in 1996 to US\$ 3.71 billion in 2010/11 and to US\$ 6.28 billion in 2012/13.

Moreover, granting market economy status to Vietnam in 2009 has begun to redress the trade balance, which was largely skewed in New Delhi's favor. And with the India - ASEAN Free Trade Agreement in place, [9] both nations seem to be on track to realizing the 2011 pledge to boost bi-lateral trade to \$7 billion by 2015. [10]

DEVELOPMENT PARTNERSHIPS - MOVING BEYOND SOUTH ASIA

As with Indian development assistance elsewhere, in engaging with Hanoi, New Delhi has sought to strengthen cultural and political relations, open trade and increase economic and strategic access to a part of the globe that

Figure 2: India- Vietnam Bilateral Trade (1996-2012)




Source: Indian Development Cooperation Research (IDCR) Program at the Centre for Policy Research

promises to considerably grow in importance. Though India gave varying amounts of development assistance to Vietnam periodically during the 1990s and early years of this century,

since 2004, assistance in the form of grants and open Lines of Credit has increased substantially, totalling US\$ 91.5 million in LOCs and INR 458 million in grants and loans. [11]

Figure 3: Indian Grants to Vietnam (2007/08-2013/14)



Source: Indian Development Cooperation Research (IDCR) Program at the Centre for Policy Research

Though the development cooperation and assistance to Vietnam does not amount to a large part of India's total development assistance budget, New Delhi can hope to strengthen bilateral ties far more than the dollar value of the LOCs and grants would suggest. As with Indian development cooperation with other countries, a dollar of development assistance coming from India is often viewed as worth more than a dollar coming from OECD donors. This is due

to Indian aid being historically demand driven [12] with little or no overhead charged for implementation as well as the purchasing power of, for example, US\$ 1 million of development assistance in the form training programs in India being able to provide more training than the equivalent in a developed country such as the U.S. The common centuries-old historical links, shared experience of colonial subjugation, and the fact that India is also a developing

country with whom Vietnam has a history of cooperation in organizations such as the NAM has led Hanoi to be less inclined to view New Delhi's investments and development cooperation with suspicion.

The fact that Indian development cooperation is attractive to other developing countries such as Vietnam, could allow for a deepening of the relationship between India and Vietnam. This could help both nations more effectively address China's growing power. It could also help India further its own economic and security interests in the region, which are not limited to checking an ascendant China. As David Brewster highlights, among the more consistent of New Delhi's interests has been keeping South East Asia free from the exclusive influence of a dominant power - whether it be the United State, Russia, China or France. [13] And though India's support to Vietnam in this regard has often been more moral than material, Vietnam's own desire to diversify its foreign relationships [14] presents New Delhi with an opportunity to move beyond South Asia and build up its Look East Policy, thereby better placing itself to address emerging geo-political realities in the Indo-Pacific, including balancing the impact of China in the Asia region.

However, as India seeks a deeper role in Southeast Asia, it will need to ensure that its engagement does not strain regional


bi-lateral relationships with Beijing. Which is perhaps why, requests for military hardware such as the short-range surface-to-surface Prithvi ballistic missile made in 2003 and for the Brahmos supersonic cruise missile (both of which can be supplied under the Missile Technology Control Regime) – remain unfulfilled. [15]

New Delhi has however deepened development partnerships through a host of other means, that range from setting up "High Performance Computing" [16] facilities to increasing training slots under the Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation program, to restoring monuments that reflect historical commonalities.

DIVERSE PARTNERSHIP

India's desire to build closer ties without alienating Vietnam's neighbours has kept the Indo-Vietnamese relationship focused more on capacity building (especially in the Information and Communications Technologies (ICT) sector), providing technical assistance, and on information sharing, instead of on the extensive supply of military hardware. [17] Outcomes Budgets 2008/09-2013/14, MEA, Govt of India. Indian capacity building efforts in Vietnam - which could garner considerable goodwill and would be a little harder for a wary neighbour to object to - has taken diverse forms.

Figure 4: Sector-wise Grant distribution (2007-2013)



Source: Indian Development Cooperation Research (IDCR) Program at the Centre for Policy Research

Broadly, these include:


i) Computing: Indian development cooperation with Vietnam has seen a strong focus on the computing sector. Between 2007 and 2013, 12 of the 19 grants extended to Vietnam have sought to boost High Performance Computing (HPC) capabilities. These grants include one extended in 2008 worth INR 130 million to set up a PARAM supercomputer facility.[18] With a peak computing speed of 524 Teraflops, the facility will assist with bioinformatics, climatology and seismic studies. [19] Another series of grants totalling INR 255.8 million were also extended to set up the Vietnam-India Advanced Resource Centre in Hanoi. Operational since 2011, [20] the centre has helped the Vietnamese education sector harness e-learning technologies, provided the requisite infrastructure for maintaining digital libraries and web-portals, and has spurred Geographic Information System application development. [21] A number of Indian IT companies have also set up nearly 80 training centres across Vietnam. [22] Additionally in 2008, India gifted computers worth INR 1 million to the Vietnam People's Navy. [23]

ii) Agriculture: Development assistance in agriculture began soon after Vietnam's reunification. The Government of India provided technical expertise and equipment to set up among Vietnam's first rice research institutes. [24] Established in 1977, the Cuu Long Delta Rice Research Institute (CLRRI) has released over 70 rice varieties of rice to producers across Vietnam. [25] Apart from maintaining a seed bank of 1800 rice varieties, the institute also develops agricultural implements and trains 1000 technicians every year. [26]

The efforts of the CLRRI and other institutes have helped Vietnam become the second largest exporter of rice. However, with the free-on-board[27] price of 25 percent broken rice - an Asian benchmark - dropping to US\$361 a ton in Vietnam, and rising to US\$418 in India (after the government increased the minimum price at which it purchases grain from farmers),[28] New Delhi could find itself at a disadvantage while seeking markets for its own grain. In the words of a civil servant at the Ministry of External Affairs, Indian development assistance has helped build up Vietnamese rice grain research and production to the point that Vietnamese rice exports compete with those from India.[29] Nevertheless, despite the potential disadvantages, India continues to offer agricultural assistance to Vietnam, especially in the form of M.Sc and PhD scholarships to promising CLRRI researchers [30] – a sign of the value New Delhi places on Vietnam as a strategic partner.


iii) Education: Vietnam has benefited considerably from development assistance in the field of education, especially through the Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation (ITEC) program and the General Cultural Scholarship Scheme (GCSS). The utility of these scholarships can be inferred from the marked increase in the number of slots offered under the two programs: 166 in 2012 compared to 90 offered the previous year. [31] Hanoi has additionally been offered 14 scholarships under the Education Exchange Programme and 10 undergraduate scholarships funded under the Mekong Ganga Cooperation (MGC). [32] Also, as part of its support for the Initiative for ASEAN Integration, New Delhi set up a Vietnam-India Center for English Language Training in Da Nang. [33]

Figure 5: Vietnam: Rice Production and Area under Cultivation (1987-2010)



Source: Indian Development Cooperation Research (IDCR) Program at the Centre for Policy Research

Figure 6: Electricity production in Vietnam



Source: Indian Development Cooperation Research (IDCR) Program at the Centre for Policy Research

iv) Hydropower: Hydropower plants generate over 30% of Vietnam’s electricity. [34] Among these, the 200 MW Nam Chien plant, for which the Indian Exim Bank gave a US\$ 45 million Line of Credit in 2008, is among the largest projects India is currently financing in Vietnam. [35] Executed by the public sector company, Bharat Heavy Electricals Limited (BHEL), the dam is expected to generate 814 million kWh of electricity per year that will be fed into to the national grid. [36] The 1st of the two turbines began generating electricity in January 2013. The 2nd turbine is expected to become operational soon. [37]

Aside from the obvious benefit of enhanced electricity generation, the many subsidiary advantages associated with such large-scale projects including income and infrastructure generation, promise to make the undertaking exceptionally rewarding. In addition, the reservoir formed by the dam will regulate flows in the Chien rivulet, making flood flows substantially smaller and more evenly distributed in the downstream region, where a substantial part of the flood plain is used to cultivate rice. [38]

There have also been criticisms of the project. An estimated 1100 people stand to be displaced during construction. [39]

However, the Vietnamese government has taken active measures to relocate those affected, helping ensure their losses will not render them without recourse to income, even in the short-term. Vietnamese legislation on construction activities requires investors to take measures that enhance the lives of the local populace. [40] In the case of the Nam Chien project, the necessary funds for constructing settlements with access to water, electricity, schools, hospitals etc. were included in the estimated cost of the project in order to ensure resettlement do not become a secondary concern. [41]

Vietnam’s preference towards India as a development partner in such projects is reflected by a fresh USD 19.5 million LOC offered in 2013, at an interest rate of 2 percent for setting up similar hydropower plants. [42]

v) Culture: With the aim of strengthening cultural links, India set up the India 2 Vietnam Cultural Centre (I2VCC) in Hanoi in 2010. [44] Among the conferences organized through the centre and through the Indian embassy, those on the Cham civilization [45] have allowed a greater appreciation of the similarities between the Cham Pa kingdom and the civilizations that flourished in what is India today – spurring

a deeper interest in both nations to highlight this shared history. The historical links between the two countries was further underscored through numerous events organized in 2012 - the India Vietnam Friendship Year, that marked 40 years of diplomatic relations (some of the events marking the occasion included the launch of the book *The Traces of Indian Culture in Vietnam* and a speech by Indian Vice President Hamid Ansari that highlighted the historical ties that continue to bind the two nations). [46]

Vietnam has about 200 ancient Hindu temples, and My Son, a UNESCO World Heritage site, has about 40. [47] Many of these were destroyed during the two decades of the Vietnam War. As of July 2013, there is a proposal for the Archaeological Survey of India to execute a conservation and restoration project of some of these monuments. [48] Technical assistance and funding of these restoration projects by the Government of India is viewed as an instrument for buttressing foreign relations between the two countries, with funding of this potential project coming from the Indian Ministry of External Affairs.

In addition, India has sought to strengthen cultural links with Vietnam by fostering people to people contact. Vietnam is now among a handful of nations to be offered a Visa on Arrival.

BROADENING INTERESTS AND A STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP OF MUTUAL BENEFIT

The move away from economic isolation which began in the mid-1980s for Hanoi, and the early 1990s for New Delhi saw the strategic interests of both nations broaden and realign. As Vietnam and India increasingly integrated with the global economy, both countries came to depend on energy security to feed their growing economies, on open Sea Lanes of Communication in order to ensure access to natural resources as well as the export and import of goods, and on the extended neighbourhood remaining free to make policy choices without undue deference to the potential hegemony, China. However, it remains a positive sign for stability in the region that the India-Vietnam relationship is not exclusively geared towards countering potential Chinese bellicosity, but seems more driven by a desire to foster trade and energy flows, while keeping Indochina free from the excessive influence of any one actor. [49]

Recognizing that some of these interests could be better realized collectively, India and Vietnam signed a Joint Declaration on the Framework of Comprehensive Cooperation in 2003. [50] Through the agreement, the two

sides sought to enhance information sharing between the respective maritime agencies in order to ensure the security of vital sea-lanes and to combat piracy. The declaration also included commitments to regular high-level meetings. Moreover, both sides further agreed to closer cooperation at the United Nations and in regional organisations (especially at the ARF and the MGC). [51]

In 2007 New Delhi and Hanoi signed a Strategic Partnership Agreement, proposing Joint Working Groups on Counter Terrorism, mechanisms to expand bilateral trade, and to enhance cooperation in science and technology and culture. [52]

The broad cooperation envisaged in these agreements highlights a mutual recognition that closer ties will likely be very rewarding. For Hanoi, enhanced ties with India could allow a greater degree of strategic independence, as the burgeoning relationship will not only “provide a measure of balance with China, but also provide a balance between the conflicting pressures coming from the US and Russia.” [53] For India, close ties with Vietnam could allow it to boost trade with ASEAN and East Asia. It could also allow New Delhi to better counter Chinese attempts to assert dominance in the South and East China Seas.

In addition to this, cordial relations with Vietnam have benefited India in a host of other ways. Vietnam continues to support New Delhi's position on the state of Kashmir being an integral part of India, India's status as a nuclear weapons state, and its bid for inclusion in the Asia-Europe Meetings (ASEM). [54] Hanoi also supports India's bid for a permanent seat on the Security Council. [55] And though a host of considerations – not all centered on India's interests - likely influenced Vietnam's decision to block Pakistan's membership to the ASEAN Regional Forum, this too proved beneficial for New Delhi. [56]

Additionally, in 2011 India and Vietnam signed an agreement for a joint oil and gas exploration project in the increasingly tense South China Sea. [57] India's Oil and Natural Gas Corporation won a 45 percent stake [58] in exploring blocks 127 and 128 in Vietnam's Exclusive Economic Zone. [59] Despite Beijing objecting to perceived infringements on its sovereignty, [60] New Delhi chose to partner with the state-owned Petro Vietnam, considerably boosting ties between the two nations. Given that 50 percent of India's trade with the Asia-Pacific passes through the South China Sea area, it is a positive sign that Vietnam and India could use convergent commercial interests to address larger strategic objectives in the region.

CONCLUSION

A shared history has often proved a good foundation for building trust. This has certainly been the case with Vietnam and India. Their relationship is underpinned by over six decades of anti-colonial interests, pan-Asian nationalism, and fiercely independent foreign policies. These shared perceptions have provided an unusually strong foundation for a bilateral relationship [61] and recent Indian development assistance efforts appear only to have strengthened ties between India and Vietnam.

Since India's growth has tempered in recent years, the importance of accessing new sources of cheap energy, assuring open trade through the South China Seas, and keeping friendly bilateral relations in a region also of great strategic significance has further highlighted the importance of good relations with countries like Vietnam to the Indian

economy. India's development cooperation with Vietnam has already borne fruit for India. For Vietnam, the mutual trust, Vietnam's own strategic imperatives, and its desire for latitude in foreign policy make it likely that Hanoi will continue to welcome the deepening development partnership with New Delhi. As far as India's search for resources, enhanced trade opportunities, and development partnerships in South East Asia is concerned, this is very good news.

Disclaimer: The values quoted in this article are based on initial calculations by IDCR from publicly available data sources and/or from IDCR's interactions with officials from the Government of India. These values are believed to be accurate, but not guaranteed. They may change as IDCR identifies and addresses discrepancies in the publicly available data. When quoting from this article, please indicate the date it was last updated.

END NOTES

1. David Brewster, "India's Strategic Partnership with Vietnam: The Search for a Diamond on the South China Sea?" *Asian Security* Vol. 5, no. 1 (2009), p.31. Though, at the time of writing, a report emerged that India has offered a US\$ 100 million Line of Credit (LOC) to Vietnam, for the purchase of four patrol boats, perhaps indicating a cautious shift in policy. Whether such a shift proves advantageous remains to be seen. See Sandeep Dikshit, *India Offers Vietnam Credit for Military Ware*, 28th July, 2013 (available at <http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/india-offers-vietnam-credit-for-military-ware/article4960731.ece>).
2. See for example, 'Annual Report 1958-59,' Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), Government of India, p.24, available at <http://mealib.nic.in/?pdf2485?000> (accessed on 2nd May 2014). Early loans were given to set up a Rice Research Centre and an In-site Buffalo Breeding Centre. See for example, 'Annual Report 1977-78,' Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), Government of India, p. 37, available at <http://mealib.nic.in/?2506?000> (accessed on 2nd May 2014).
3. Preliminary calculations by the Indian Development Cooperation Research (IDCR). Also see 'India Vietnam Relations,' Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, July 2013 (available at http://www.mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/Vietnam_Dec_2013.pdf). Lines of Credit weren't officially part of India's development assistance policy till 2004-05. We assume the loans referred to in the MEA's bilateral brief on Vietnam retrospectively fit the definition of a LOC.
4. See Heidi Tan, *Vietnam: from Myth to Modernity* (Asian Civilization Museum: Singapore, 2008), and *The Diplomatist Plus Special Report, 'India Vietnam: Broadening Frontiers'*, August 2012, p. 18. (available at www.peopleandmanagement.com/diplomatist2012august/Vietnam2012.pdf).
5. *The Diplomatist Plus Special Report* (available at www.peopleandmanagement.com/diplomatist2012august/Vietnam2012.pdf).
6. See for example, statement by Ambassador Rajeev Bhatia at the 'Conference on India-Vietnam Strategic Partnership: Future Directions,' Hanoi, Vietnam, 17th July, 2012. (available at <http://www.icwa.in/pdfs/dgspeech17july12.pdf>).
7. See for example S.D. Muni, 'The Turbulent South-China Sea Waters: India, Vietnam and China,' *Institute of South Asian Studies (ISAS) Insights* No. 140, 11th October, 2011 p. 5.
8. Brewster, "India's Strategic Partnership with Vietnam,' p. 24.
9. The agreement came into force on the 1st of January, 2010. Covering a market of nearly 1.8 billion people, the agreement proposes to gradually slash tariffs for over 4,000 products, and hopes to increase Indian trade with ASEAN from US\$40 billion in 2009 to US\$100 billion by 2015. For details see 'India ASEAN Free Trade Agreement: Implications for India,' Deloitte-FICCI White Paper, March 2011 (available at http://www.deloitte.com/assets/Dcom-India/Local%20Assets/Documents/India_ASEAN_FTA.pdf) and 'Agreement on Trade in Goods Under the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Between the Association of South East Asian Nations and the Republic of India,' 13th August, 2009 (available at [http://www.asean.org/images/2013/economic/afta/ASEAN%20India%20TIG%20-%20CTC%20scan%20\(complete\).pdf](http://www.asean.org/images/2013/economic/afta/ASEAN%20India%20TIG%20-%20CTC%20scan%20(complete).pdf)).
10. See 'Joint Statement on the Occasion of the Visit of the President of Vietnam,' October 12, 2011 (available at <http://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/5341/Joint+Statement+on+the+occasion+of+the+visit+of+the+President+of+Vietnam>).
11. Preliminary calculations by the IDCR based on Import-Export Data; 1996-97 to 2011-12; Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Government of India. For LOC value see, Exim Bank Press Release 'Exim Bank Extends USD 19.50 Million LOC To Vietnam For Financing Two Projects In Vietnam,' (available at <http://www.eximbankindia.com/press120713.asp>).
12. Indian aid being demand driven suggests that "India[n] [aid] aims to provide assistance according to the requirements and needs as defined by the affected government." See Claudia Meier, and C. S. R. Murthy (2011) "India's Growing Involvement in Humanitarian Assistance," GPRi Research Paper No. 13, January 2011, p. 8.
13. Brewster "India's Strategic Partnership with Vietnam" *Asian Security* Vol. 5, no. 1 (2009), pp.25-26.
14. Such a policy was voiced as early as 1988. See for eg Henry J. Kenny, *Shadow of the Dragon: Vietnam's Continuing Struggle with China and its Implications for U.S. Foreign Policy* (Washington, DC: Brassey's, 2002).
15. Brewster "India's Strategic Partnership." Though at the time of writing, India extended a \$100 million LOC for the purchase of four patrol boats, perhaps indicating a cautious shift in policy - the prudence of which, it is still too early to ascertain. See endnote 1.

16. High Performance Computing or Supercomputing facilities are facilities that house computer systems that perform at or near the fastest operational rate for computers. High Performance Computing has wide ranging applications from the aerospace industry to seismic modeling to medicine (see for example <http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/supercomputer>).
17. Brewster “India’s Strategic Partnership.” Though at the time of writing, India extended a \$100 million LOC for the purchase of four patrol boats, perhaps indicating a cautious shift in policy - the prudence of which, it is still too early to ascertain.
18. The PARAM Yuva II supercomputer was India’s second fastest, and 83rd on the global list of the fastest supercomputers (See list of fastest supercomputers at <http://www.top500.org/list/2013/11/>)Also see See Pranav Kulkarni ‘Param HPC to Launch in Three more Countries,’ Indian Express, 26th July, 2011 (available at <http://www.indianexpress.com/news/param-hpc-to-launch-in-three-more-countries/822397/>).
19. Kulkarni ‘Param HPC to Launch in Three more Countries,’ Indian Express, 26th July, 2011 (available at <http://www.indianexpress.com/news/param-hpc-to-launch-in-three-more-countries/822397/>).
20. Total based on preliminary calculations IDCR. Also see ‘EAM Visits Vietnam for 14th JCM,’ Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 16th September, 2011 (Available at <http://www.mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/467/EAM+visits+Vietnam+for+14th+JCM>).
21. Ibid.
22. ‘India Vietnam Relations,’ July 2013 (available at http://mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/India-Vietnam_Relations.pdf).
23. Though this project falls under the purview of the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of External Affairs acted as the co-ordinating agency.
24. ‘Annual Report 1977-78,’ p. 37 (available at <http://mealib.nic.in/?2506?000>).
25. See Cuu Long Delta Rice Research Institute website available at <http://www.clrri.org/ver2>.
26. Ibid.
27. According to the International Chamber of Commerce, the Free on Board price is the price of a particular good that includes “all transportation and insurance costs, once [the good] is delivered on board the ship by the seller.” (See International Chamber of Commerce ‘The New Incoterms® 2010 Rules,’ available at <http://www.iccwbo.org/products-and-services/trade-facilitation/incoterms-2010/> and <http://www.irupanabio.com/export/files/incoterms2010.pdf>).
28. ‘India Rice Sales to Fall on Vietnam, Pakistan Supplies: IRRRI,’ Live Mint, 17th May, 2013 (available at <http://www.livemint.com/Politics/36ESrIf5LL7Uyk6uQ9S2XM/India-rice-sales-to-fall-on-Vietnam-Pakistan-supplies-IRRRI.html>).
29. Interview with a civil servant at the Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, New Delhi, May 23rd, 2013.
30. See Cuu Long Delta Rice Research Institute website available at <http://www.clrri.org/ver2>.
31. ‘India Vietnam Relations,’ January 2013 (available at http://www.mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/Vietnam_Feb_2013.pdf).
32. Ibid. The Mekong Ganga Cooperation initiative was established in November 2000, with India and Thailand largely taking the lead. Other members are Burma, Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos. China, a major Mekong river state, is notably absent. Apart from educational co-operation, the initiative is meant to boost tourism, strengthen transportation and build cultural links through much of the Greater Mekong Subregion.
33. ‘India Vietnam Relations,’ January 2013 (available at http://www.mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/Vietnam_Feb_2013.pdf).
34. See Figure ‘Electricity Production in Vietnam.’
35. ‘India Vietnam Relations,’ August 2012, p. 2 (available at <http://meaindia.nic.in/meaxpsite/foreignrelation/vietnam.pdf>).
36. ‘Hydro Plant Begins Generating Electricity,’ Vietnam News, 16th January, 2013 (available at <http://vietnamnews.vn/Industries/235327/hydro-plant-begins-generating-electricity.html>).
37. Press Release by Bharat Heavy Electricals Limited ‘BHEL Achieves Milestone in the South-East Asian Region by Synchronizing Hydro Power Plant in Vietnam,’ 30th January, 2013 (available at http://www.bhel.com/press_release/press_pop.php?press_id=581).
38. Mykola K. Kaluzhny ‘Challenges of Nam Chien Hydro Project in Vietnam,’ Paper written for the Ukr hydroproject Consortium (available at <http://geotechpedia.com/Publication/Show/2675/CHALLENGES-OF-NAM-CHIEN-HYDRO-PROJECT-IN-VIETNAM>).
39. Ibid.
40. See Article 70 of ‘Law on Construction,’ Socialist Republic of Vietnam, 31st March, 2004 (available at [http://www.vietnamlaws.com/freelaws/Lw16na26Novo3Construction\[X2967\].pdf](http://www.vietnamlaws.com/freelaws/Lw16na26Novo3Construction[X2967].pdf)).
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