AN OVERVIEW OF THE SMART CITIES MISSION IN INDIA

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SUMMARY

The newly elected federal Government of India (GoI) launched the Smart Cities Mission (SCM) in 2015 with the stated purpose of improving the governance and infrastructural deficiencies that plague Indian cities. The Mission categorically states that there is no one definition of a 'smart city' and implies infinite liberty for cities to self-define their understanding of 'smartness'. Towards demystifying the Mission, the researchers utilised government documentation from the 99 cities to answer one question – What constitutes a smart city in India?

1. INTRODUCTION

The newly elected federal Government of India (GoI) launched the Smart Cities Mission (SCM) in 2015, amidst much fanfare, with the stated purpose of improving the governance and infrastructural deficiencies that plague Indian cities. The Mission categorically states that there is no one definition of a 'smart city' and implies infinite liberty for cities to self-define their understanding of 'smartness'. To gain clarity on the Mission, the researchers asked one question – What constitutes a smart city in India?

Towards answering this question, this report seeks to unpack the following components of the Mission

- 1. What kinds of projects are proposed under the SCM?
- 2. How are the projects financed under the SCM?
- 3. What forms of governance will the Smart City Mission promote?
- 4. What forms of citizen participation did the SCM utilise?

The brief seeks to provide an empirical reading of the Mission, based solely on documentation provided by the Indian state. The paper utilised a confluence of publicly available documents from the Smart Cities Mission website (See Table 2), in association with information from the 2011 Indian census and the official government press notifications. The research has created multiple datasets that provide a well-rounded understanding of the Indian Smart Cities Mission (see Table 1). The datasets provide 1) an overview of the 99 smart cities; 2) delineate the governance structure of 35 cities from the top 60 smart cities; 3) Provide information regarding the modalities of citizen participation employed in the top 60 smart cities; 4) provides detailed information of all the projects in the top 60 cities which includes over 2800 individual projects and identifies the development sector, geospatial location and budget; and 5) provide detailed financial details for the projects in the top 60 cities. However due to gaps in the information in the government documentation the sources of funding for individual projects is only available in 700 of the 2851 projects. This approach generated a database that facilitated the extrapolation of a definition of an Indian Smart City from the patterns that emerged within the Mission, despite its reluctance to commit to one.

Through a detailed reading of government documentation, the paper argues that 1) The idea of the smart city in India is iterative and, over a period of time, there has been a swing





TABLE 1: NO OF CITIES RESEARCHED

No.	Category of Research	No. Of cities Studied	Notes
1	Overview of Cities 99	99	The dataset has a detailed explanation of overarching city-based information
2	Governance Structure of SPVs	60/35 [*]	At the point of the study 59 cities had created SPVs and the team studied the SPV documents that were available in English
3	Citizen Participation	60	The team studied all 60 cities, although not all cities provided data
4	Projects under the Mission	60	The team studied the top 60 cities
5	Financial Details	99/60/17**	The team studied the top 60 cities, there are severe gaps in data on the sources of finance at the project level

SOURCE: CPR CALCULATIONS BASED ON GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTATION***

from city proposals with ambitious budgets and marketoriented sources of funding towards more cautious city proposals with smaller budgets that utilise more traditional sources of funding like government grants, 2) Opacity and vagueness in the sources of funding continue to plague the Mission, 3) The Mission could further skew urban inequality in the chosen cities, 4) the Smart Cities Mission focuses

on categories similar to earlier urban renewal schemes i.e. physical infrastructure with a significant focus on projects that could generate revenue, 5) the SCM recentralises power away from local bodies to state government and 6) the Mission attempts at citizen participation may afford urban elites greater voice in the process.

The team sought out the SPV data of the top 60 smart cities, however the details were provided in various languages and the team selected 35 cities that had presented the data in English as a sample.

The project had access to the overarching city-level financial data of 99 cities and selected a sample of the top 60 cities to study the project-level finances. However, the project-level financial details were only available for 17 cities.

^{***} See Table 2

TABLE 2: SOURCES FOR DATABASE

No	Research Area			Sources of Data					
	Category	Sub-category	Doc A 1	Doc B ²	Doc C ³	Doc D ⁴	Doc E ⁵	Doc F ⁶	
1	City-level	Original rank in Competition	Υ						
	information	Final rank		Υ					
		Name of State		Υ					
		Political Party in power ⁷						Y 8	
		Demographic Data					Υ		
		Size of Area-Based Development		Υ					
2	Governance	List of all political Rep				Υ		γ9	
ı	Structure of SPV	List of all bureaucrats				Υ		Y 10	
		Other appointees				Υ			
3	Participation	Modalities & population reached through social media		Υ					
		Feedback from people through social media		Υ					
		modalities & population reached through non-digital		Υ					
		feedback from people through non-digital		Υ					
4	Projects	All names of projects in city		Υ	Υ				
		Identify project sector		Υ	Υ			Y 11	
		Identify if the project has an IT component		Υ	Υ			Y 12	
		Project geospatial details		Υ	Υ				
		Budget for each project		Υ	Υ				
		Sources of finance for project		Υ					
5	Finances	City level budget		Υ	Υ				
		City-level source of finance		Υ	Υ				
		City-level Budget for ABD		Υ	Υ				
		City-level budget for Pan-City		Υ	Υ				
		Project level budget		Υ	Υ				
		Project level source of funding		Υ					

SOURCE: CPR CALCULATIONS BASED ON DOCUMENTS MENTIONED WITHIN THIS TABLE

 $^{1\,}Documents\,A-List\,of\,Winning\,Cities\,< http://smartcities.gov.in/upload/city_challenge/58dfa4cb13064582318f5d6d8eRankingofSmartCities(1).pdf>$

 $^{{\}tt 2\ Documents\ B-Proposals\ and\ Annexures\ <} http://smartcities.gov.in/content/city_challenge.php {\tt >}$

 $^{3\} Documents\ C-Project\ Data < http://smartcities.gov.in/content/innerpage/city-wise-projects-under-smart-cities-mission.php>$

⁴ Documents D - SPV 'Certificates of Incorporation' http://smartcities.gov.in/content/spvdatanew.php

⁵ Documents E- Census Data 2011 < http://www.censusindia.gov.in >

⁶ Documents F - Miscellaneous Documents (see footnotes 24-27)

⁷ When the city was successfully inducted into the Mission

⁸ State government websites

⁹ Municipal Acts of relevant cities

¹⁰ Municipal Acts of relevant cities

¹¹ Data sourced from Doc B&C and analysed by CPR

¹² Data sourced from Doc B&C and analysed by CPR

II. BACKGROUND TO THE SMART CITIES MISSION


The current SCM was first mentioned as greenfield developments in the BJP election manifesto in 2014 which promised the construction of '100 new cities; enabled with the latest in technology and infrastructure - adhering to concepts like sustainability, walk to work etc, and focused on specialized domains'. (Bharatiya Janata Party, 2014). In May 2014 the BJP formed its coalition government and by July 2014, they shifted from greenfield to, smart cities as "...satellite towns of larger cities and by modernizing the existing mid-sized cities'. (Ministry of Urban Development, 2015). In 2015 the smart cities draft was circulated with a larger focus on retrofitting projects in existing cities and moved further away from both greenfield and satellite cities. (Bharatiya Janata Party, 2014).

The GoI utilised a competitive structure and selected 98 cities that could be a part of the Mission.² These cities were not de facto provided with funding and were expected to submit proposals to compete for a position in a hierarchy of smart cities. While the government would provide uniform funding to all cities, irrespective of their rank in the Mission, a higher ranking offered cities symbolic prestige and could positively impact a city's ability to access market-based sources of capital.³ The only definite fiscal advantage to a higher ranking was earlier access to government capital. The number of cities competing in the Mission increased from 98 to 110 between 2015 and 2017 and 99 cities were chosen over 5 rounds of selection (See Figure 1)4

In terms of funding, each city would get INR 500 crore (INR 5 billion) from the central government. This would be provided over a period of 5 years and would need to be matched by the state government or the local urban body (ULB). Through the Mission each city could potentially access a corpus of INR 1000 crore (INR 10 billion), over a period of 5 years. (Ministry of Urban Development) The central government has budgeted for INR 48,000 crore (INR 480 billion) towards funding the Mission. The onus of raising funds at the state or local level has bolstered the need to create competitive cities that could raise funds for their own development projects. (ibid) (Ministry of Urban Development, 2015) These funds are channelled through a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) that is created, in each city, to manage the smart city projects. The Smart Cities Mission necessitates that each city create an SPV under the Companies Act (2013), a limited company, that will manage the implementation of the projects under the Mission. According to the Mission guidelines, the majority holdings of the SPV must be retained by the government bodies⁵ and the remainder of up to 40% of shareholdings could be held by private investors. (Ministry of Urban Development, 2015)

The Mission outlines three basic geographic modalities of development-area-based development (ABD), pancity and greenfield developments. (ibid) The Mission Guidelines view area-based development as select portions of the city that are enhanced as a more realistic means of urban development and has encouraged cities to concentrate their finances on this methodology of urban renewal. The Guidelines state that the '... focus is on sustainable and inclusive development and the idea is to look at compact areas, create a replicable model which will act like a light house to other aspiring cities.' (Ministry of Urban Development, undated) Pan-city developments are smart solutions that could enhance the entire city. Greenfield developments refer to extensions to an existing city that are built from scratch and require heavy capital investment. The significance of the economic investment has potentially reduced the enthusiasm for the third modality. (Hoelscher, 2016)

FIGURE 1 THE VARIOUS ROUNDS & NO. OF CITIES CHOSEN



III. ANALYSIS

The Smart Cities Mission is an urban regeneration programme and as we discussed in our methodology the paper has access to varying number of cities for data (see table 1). The Smart Cities Mission currently stands at INR 203314.6 Crore (over INR 2000 Billion) and consists of 99 cities across 28 states and 7 union territories in the country. The Mission was structured as a competition and cities were chosen over 2 years (2016-2018) based on the proposals they submitted (See Figure 1). Over the course of the selection rounds, certain patterns have become stable. This section will study the 99 smart cities and offer patterns on the quantum, modality and geo-spatial allocation of finance of the Mission.




REDUCTION IN CITY-BUDGETS AND MARKET-BASED SOURCES OF FINANCE OVER ROUNDS

The range of budgets for the top 99 cities vary between a little over INR 500 Crore (Kavarati, Lakshwadeep) to almost INR 6000 Crore (Chandigarh). Within this scale, cities primarily focused on budgets under INR 2000 crore (57 cities), followed by those between INR 2000 – 4000 Crore (38 cities) and only a handful opted for budgets above INR 4000 crore (see Graph 1).


On average, cities had a budget of INR 2051 Crore for the 99 cities. A reading of the budgets across the 5 rounds demonstrates that a greater emphasis was placed on reducing the size of the budgets across the rounds. The first round in 2016 had the most diverse set of budgets, after this round the budgets became more conservative with a stronger focus on smaller budgets (See Graph 2 & 3). The average budget for each city dropped with each round.

GRAPH 1: NO. OF CITIES ACCORDING TO BUDGET (ALL 99 CITIES)


■ INR 0.1-1999 Cr INR ■ INR 2000-3999 CrINR
■ 4000-5999 Cr INR



GRAPH 3: AVERAGE BUDGET BY ROUND IN INR CRORE (ALL 99 CITIES)




GRAPH 2: SIZE OF BUDGETS CHOSEN BY ROUND (ALL 99 CITIES)




The sources of finance for the SCM are varied and the study finds that the bulk (almost 70%) is sourced from public sources. The next largest contributor is the private sector through PPP initiatives and CSR (approximately 25%), followed by loans (under 5%) and user charges (under 1%). While earlier urban renewal programmes like the Jawaharlal Nehru Urban Renewal Mission (JNNURM) had also stipulated that user charges and greater private investment were possible sources of funding, a majority of the funding was still based on government grants. (Khan, 2017) The following graph (See Graph 5) demonstrates the sources of finance for all 99 cities by round, as an average. The act of averaging the finances by number of cities per round8 demonstrates a clear pattern of not only depending heavily on public funds for financing the mission, but a movement away from private sources of capital, both PPP and loans.


This is important at two levels, as it demonstrates that while the Mission exemplifies the notions of corporate governance and market-based financing of smart cities, in reality this constitutes only a fraction of the sources of funding. Furthermore, the reliance on market-based funding wanes as the Mission proceeds. (See graphs 4 & 5).

GRAPH 4: SOURCES OF FUNDING FOR SCM CITIES AS A PERCENTAGE (ALL 99 CITIES)





GRAPH 6: BUDGETS OF SMART CITIES WITH AVERAGE BUDGET, IN INR CRORE (ALL 99 CITIES)





SOURCE OF FUNDING FOR PROJECTS ARE NOT BE CLEAR


The first two rounds (Round I and Fast track) had some of the most ambitious budgets, both in terms of quantum of funding and the proportion dependent on private sources of funding (See Graph 5). While the top 60 cities have reported all their projects (over 2800) and the costs of most projects are stated in the project proposals (94%),9 only 17 cities10 can identify the sources of finance at the level of each project. Of these cities, 15 cities are from round II and have relatively low budgets (approx. between INR 1000 crore and INR 2500 Crore). It is interesting to note that there may have been greater leniency with cities in the first two rounds (Round I and Fast Track) and proposals that had larger budgets and with less clarity on the sources of the budgets were accepted. The following graph (see Graph 6) demonstrates the budgets of all the cities in the five rounds, along with the average budget of all these cities. It is interesting to note that the cities with the largest budgets (Bhubaneshwar, Jaipur, Indore, Raipur, Raipur, Faridabad and Thane) do not have detailed information about the source of funding for their projects. In fact, Bhubaneshwar, which topped the SCM list, did not give detailed information of the exact projects when they submitted their project proposal and has one of the largest budgets in the Mission. Thus, a smart city clearly does not need to have detailed information about its funding sources for proposed projects.




AREA BASED DEVELOPMENT AND INCREASED INEQUALITY

The Smart Cities Mission focused heavily on 'light house' or 'Area Based Development' where the Mission incentivised cities to focus the bulk of their funding on a small portion of the city. The underlying assumption is that this practical approach to development will allow cities the chance to complete the development projects in time and inspire other areas within the city to follow suit. This study finds that there is a correlation between the size of the city and the percentage allotted for area-based development in the city – the smaller the city, the larger the percentage of the city is allotted for areabased development (See Graph 8). Over the rounds, the Mission is selecting cities with smaller overall areas (see Graph 7). Nonetheless, this process of ABD could also result in severe inequalities. The report finds that on average the ABD is a little over 7 percent of the area of the 99 cities while the funding for ABD projects is over 80% of the city SCM budget. This means that, on average, over 90% of the city area is privy to under 20% of the SCM budget for the city. A further argument is made, that several of the ABDs in the chosen cities constitute parts of the city that are already better serviced thus potentially exacerbating existing inequalities in cities. (Hoelscher, 2016)









DEVELOPMENT SECTORS SIMILAR TO OLDER PROGRAMMES BUT WITH A STRONGER FOCUS ON ECONOMIC RETURNS

6.5

Misc

4.5

Covernance

A reading of the projects proposed under the smart cities Mission, in the top 60 cities, provides development sectors that are common with JNNURM, with a few additions. The top 5 development categories - Transportation, Energy and Ecology, Water and Sanitation, Housing and Economy – constitute almost 80% of the SCM budget and are similar to project headings undertaken under JNNURM. The categories IT, Governance, Culture and Heritage, and Health and Education are the newer additions within the ambit of smart cities in India and they constitute a little under 15% of the SCM funding. The rest of the projects are categorised as 'miscellaneous' and refer to projects that have components that are under water and sanitation, renewable, housing and IT and can thus not be placed under one category.

One of the primary takeaways is that several of the projects seek to build the financial corpus of the city, whether these are parking facilities under transportation, real estate development under housing, commercial real estate for economic growth, implementing meters to measure the usage of water and a host of other projects. While there are projects that focus primarily on the social welfare of the city, the SCM's focus on (speculative) economic growth is a movement away from earlier projects. For the purposes of this study, we will describe the top 5 development sectors which constitute 78.9% of the SCM budget for the top 60 cities. For a more comprehensive overview of the projects in the top 60 cities, refer to Annexure I.


4.3

Culture &

Heritage

GRAPH 9: BUDGETS OF DEVELOPMENT SECTORS AS A PERCENTAGE OF WHOLE BUDGET (TOP 60 CITIES)

25.3



SOURCE: CPR SMART CITIES DATABASE, 2018

3.7

2.2


Health and

Education



Transportation


This sector has a proposed budget of INR 32,600 Crore (INR 326 billion), almost a quarter of the entire budget for the top 60 cites. In keeping with the Smart City guidelines, the sector is primarily focused on the ABD as 71.6% of transportation projects are area-based projects. The IT component in this sector is higher than the average of the Mission at almost 30%, due to the focus on traffic systems and information systems in public transit. The bulk of transportation projects are focused on roads and parking lots (almost 40%), while only 20% of the budget is focused on public transportation, only 2% of the entire transportation budget is focused on buses themselves. The rest of public transit focuses on BRT systems, hard infrastructure and communication systems. The Mission focuses 13% of the budget on non-motorised transportation, the rest is largely devoted to supporting motorised transportation systems. Given that one of the purposes of the Smart Cities Mission is enhancing sustainability, this particular project is better suited for owners of private transportation. The materiality of the Mission seems to be in conflict with the goal of sustainability, and increasingly focused on economic returns.





Energy and Ecology


This sector has a budget of INR 22535.8 Crore and the bulk of these projects are area based at 77.5% In Energy and Ecology, the majority of funding is available for energy-based projects including renewable energy, gas, metering and distribution and constitutes 23.3% of the budget. The IT component of this project comes primarily from the metering, smart poles and allied projects. in terms of ecology, the project focuses on ecological restoration of land and water bodies. 'Beautification' is often considered a component of these projects and it is important to note that a few cities have budgeted slum demolitions under this initiative.





Water and Sanitation


The budget of this sector is INR 18861.1 Crore and is also largely area-based at 71.1%. The bulk of the projects focus on hard infrastructure, like sewerage, solid waste management and allied projects. IT involvement in this sector primarily consists of meters and other forms mechanisation of labour at 26%.





Housing


The housing sector is the third largest development category with a budget of INR 16381.2 crore. The very nature of this sector is area-based and thus Housing is 99.4% ABD, with only a smattering of projects with an IT component (0.2%). It is important to note that almost half the projects are devoted to real-estate development, while the other half is a motley of mixed and lower income housing. The rental market, hostels and night shelters play a very small role in this vision of smartness. In-situ and other forms of slum redevelopment have almost a fifth of the total value of the project. It is important to note, that redevelopment projects often result in significant dispossession as not all residents are able to prove tenure in the informal area and thus the project could result in making people homeless. (Dupont, V., et al., 2014) (Zérah, 2009) While this is one of the largest sectors in the Mission, in terms of the budget, the sector is unevenly distributed over the top 60 cities with 5 cities accounting for over 65% of all housing projects. 12





Economy

This sector focuses clearly on projects with a strong focus on economic returns and has a budget of INR 11275.4 Crore. The primary focus of economy is commercial and retail activity, with a strong focus on market redevelopment projects and the new construction of offices, homes and allied institutions. Like housing, almost the entire budget is devoted to area-based projects at 99.2% and only 0.3% of the projects have an IT component. Furthermore, 5 cities account for over 67% of all the projects under this sector. 13



SOURCE: CPR SMART CITIES DATABASE, 2018



RECENTRALISATION OF POWER

The Smart Cities Mission necessitates that each city creates a Special Purpose Vehicle under the Companies Act 2013, which is a limited company which will manage the implementation of the projects under the Mission. The SCM Guidelines and the Certificates of Incorporation of the SPV state that the 'rights and obligations' of the local municipality be transferred to the SPV. This is a problematic statement as the exact terms of the relationship and hierarchy between the SPV and the municipality is unknown. This ambiguity will be detrimental to collaborative efforts between SPVs and municipalities and to democratic processes. Currently 59 of the top 60 cities have created SPVs and of this, the project could access the registration certificates of 35 cities and categorised the members of these SPV according to certain indices – whether they were – bureaucrat or politicians and whether they were hired at the national, state and local level. There were some people in these SPVs who were not easily identifiable, and these have been denoted as 'unknown'.

The SPVs must have a majority state share between central and state government, the remainder could be held by municipal government or the private sector. At this point no more than 40% of shareholdings can be held by a private party. In practice however, the 35 cities had only one private individual hired and there was no private ownership in the SPVs. In fact, the primary powerhouse in the SPVs were bureaucrats from the state government (See Table 3) with only a small representation of political leadership in the SPVs. The SCM has a substantive city-budget and the decision making. Given that each city has a substantive SCM budget (relative to their own budget) the fact that much of the decision-making is being entrusted with bureaucrats and state government representatives and not elected officials is a clear movement away from the 74th amendment¹⁴ and the push to enhance decentralisation. This is an important point because much of the legitimacy of the Mission comes from the fact that it positions itself as a movement towards empowering local governments. (Taraporevala, 2017) It is interesting to note that of the various urban development Missions the federal government has launched, only the Smart Cities Mission necessitates the creation of an SPV that could rival the municipality. Had there been multiple SPVs for the multiple Missions, the power of the SCM SPVs might have been diffused and diminished the potential incursion into democratic governance.

TABLE 3: PARTICIPATION IN THE TOP 60 CITIES

No.	Category	Number of Cities	% of Cities	% of population
1	Non-Digital Outreach	40	66.7	20
2	Non-Digital Feedback	24	48.3	18.16
3	Social Media Outreach	22	36.7	NA
4	Social Media Feedback	39	65	NA
5	No feedback	10	16.7	NA

SOURCE: CPR SMART CITIES DATABASE, 2018



THE DISCOURSE OF CITIZEN PARTICIPATION AND THE LEGITIMISING OF THE MISSION

For the purposes of this report, the team studied the SCM proposals presented by the top 60 cities and analysed the available data on participation. This paper finds that the data provided in the proposals was negligible and insufficient to justify the claims of the Mission being a bottom-up process. In the top 60 cities only 40 could provide information on exactly how many people they reached out through non-digital processes (consultations and meetings in ward offices and public institutions and through newspapers). Only 24 could provide data on how many people provided inputs through these non-digital processes, the bulk of which were responses from students and through very limited public consultations.

In terms of digital outreach and feedback, there are two primary issues that arise. The first is digital literacy as only people with access to certain technological and language would have access to participate in these fora (MyGov websites, Facebook, Twitter, apps etc). This could potentially skew the opinions that are presented a representative of the

entire city. The second issue is linked to the quantum of responses from an individual as could hypothetically have one individual providing an infinite number of responses and thus would be a weaker form of determining the quality of participation. This could have been avoided with a more rigorous process of submitting recommendations and opinions, however the Mission did not create this nuanced interface. In terms of calculating the social media outreach and feedback, there was great ambiguity regarding what could be considered participation. For instance, anything from a 'like' to be a 'share' on social media and just 'twitter impressions' were considered positive responses to the Mission. This is highly flawed, as people can share the information put up on the city Facebook and twitter pages while being deeply critical of what they are sharing. Furthermore, the concept of using 'impressions' on twitter as a measure of participation is deeply troubling because it does not guarantee you that someone has seen the tweet, much less that the person who does see it is from the city in question or is the correct audience for the tweet. Using social media and new platforms to reach citizens is an interesting idea, however if it is not harnessed appropriately, social media is a fairly hollow means of engaging with people.

V. CONCLUSION

This paper finds that the Smart Cities Mission in India is an urban regeneration programme that draws heavily from JNNURM with a strong focus on physical infrastructure. In terms of its finances, the Mission encourages Indian cities to move towards market-based mechanisms of accessing funding. The 'smart city' need not provide detailed information while formulating financial capacities of the city as cities are expected to state the quantum of finance required for the city and the sources of funding. Smart Cities in India are not required to provide this data for each project in the city. The trends in the finances across rounds indicates a move towards more conservative budgets and greater reliance on public sources of funding. The Smart Cities mission re-centralises power with state governments and shifts power away from local democratic institutions. Furthermore, with the potential private investment in the city-level SCM governing body further skews power away from the local municipal body and weakens democratic processes. Finally, this study finds that the processes of citizen engagement are not recorded precisely in the proposals and indicate that despite the extensive rhetoric of public participation, most of the proposals do not provide a strong argument to justify the claims of citizen participation.

ENDNOTES

- 1 All authors in alphabetical order. The authors are immensely grateful to Marie-Hélène Zérah and Partha Mukhopadhyay for their valuable comments in the draft. Usual disclaimers apply. This work is part of the INDIA-URBAN RURAL BOUNDARIES AND BASIC SERVICES (IND-URBBS) research project, supported by the IRD (French National Research Institute for Sustainable Development).
- 2 This was later updated to 110 cities.
- 3 This is one of the new ways people were supposed to access funding
- 4 The initial 98 cities excluded several state capitals from competing in the Mission and increase to 110 cities allowed for the state capitals to enter the competition.
- 5 This is a combination of Federal, State and Local government.
- 6 99 cities for overview, 35 cities for SPV, 60 cities for participation, 60 cities for projects and finance
- 7 Meghalaya is the one state that does not have a city in the Mission
- 8 Dividing the absolute value of finances per source by number of cities per round – 20 for round I, 13 for fast track, etc
- 9 This report finds that approximately 171 projects of the total 2851 do not have values attributed to the cost of the project
- 10 Delhi (NDMC), Bhagalpur, Ranchi, Ujjain, Nagpur, Vellore, Rourkela, Kanpur, Madurai, Tumakuru, Kota, Thanjavur, Namchi, Shivamogga, Salem, Ajmer and Hubballi-Dharwad

- 11 INR 661 Crore for 18 projects
- 12 Thane, Bhubaneshwar, Indore, Jabalpur and Bhopal (In descending order of budgets for Housing Projects)
- 13 Chandigarh, Raipur, Salem, Davengere and Mangalore (In descending order of budgets for Economy Projects)
- 14 It is important to note that India has divided subjects of power between the Union and state governments to ensure a balance of power within the federal structure. Thus, there are three 'lists' known as the Union list, state list and concurrent list. The first two are, as their name designates, include the subjects that are purely under the governance of the union and then the state governments, while the third list consists of subjects that both the Union and state governments have a say in. Cities and their governance are under the purview of the 'state list' and thus while the legislative amendment or the 74th Amendment to the constitution was made in 1992, the enactment of this provision rests solely in the hands of the state governments and their willingness to devolve power from the state government down to the urban local bodies. At just a few years short of 3 decades after the enactment of this amendment, decentralisation has not taken deep root in the country and much power still rests with state governments. (Sivaramakrishnan, 2016) The SPV furthers this process of recentralization of power.

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