

How can India Create More Jobs?

*Unleashing the 1.4 billion: A
Blueprint for India's Job-Led
Resurrection*

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This working paper is part of a series on Viksit Bharat, which will address different aspects of this multi-generational challenge. More information on the series can be obtained from <https://cprindia.org/project/the-viksit-bharat-series/>

ABSTRACT

India stands at a historic threshold. With a median age of 28.8, we are the world's youngest nation, yet we face a sobering paradox: a "Great Decoupling" where soaring GDP growth no longer translates into enough livelihoods. To achieve *Viksit Bharat 2047*, India must create 10–12 million new jobs every year—a feat that requires moving beyond the myth that only large industrial giants can save us.

This paper reveals a startling truth: while mature firms are becoming "net job destroyers" as they automate, it is the young, agile "Ojazelles"—firms less than five years old—that are currently breathing life into the economy, creating 45% of all new jobs. Yet, these young job-creators are being strangled by "Structural Brakes": a Collateral Trap that prizes ancestral land over fresh ideas, and a Regulatory Tax that punishes firms for growing.

We propose a New Social Compact to release these brakes. By leveraging India's world-leading Digital Public Infrastructure (DPI), we can bypass the old "Land-Finance Nexus" and move to Information-Based Lending, where a young person's talent and data become their new collateral. We argue for a "Mobility Shield" to ensure social security follows the worker, not the PIN code, and a radical pivot to Green and AI-ready skills to bridge the "Paper Ceiling" of hollow degrees.

This is more than an economic roadmap; it is a mission to shift the State from a regulator that "controls" to a partner that "trusts." The choice is clear: we must stop managing unemployment and start financing the future. The path to 2047 belongs to the entrepreneurs, the builders, and the dreamers. It is time for the Indian Phoenix to fly.

Keywords: Job Creation, Demographic Dividend, Factor Market Misallocation, Digital Public Infrastructure, Firm Age, Information-Based Lending, Gender Gap.

JEL Classification: O14, J21, L26, O43, G21.

SECTION 1: THE THESIS OF THE 2047 PARADOX – AN ANALYTICAL DEEP-DIVE

India is currently navigating a "middle-income trap" of a unique variety—a structural decoupling where high-velocity GDP growth no longer serves as a reliable proxy for labor absorption. As we approach the centenary of independence, the central inquiry of Indian political economy must be the resolution of the "2047 Paradox": How can a nation be the world's fastest-growing major economy while its "Demographic Dividend" remains trapped in low-productivity, informal, or non-existent employment?

THE MACRO-STRUCTURAL DIVERGENCE

For decades, the standard Solow-Swan growth models suggested that capital deepening and technological catch-up would inevitably pull labor from agriculture into higher-productivity manufacturing and services. However, India's transition has bypassed the traditional Lewisian turning point. We see a "Premature Deindustrialization" of sorts, where the share of manufacturing in GDP has remained stubbornly stagnant at approximately 16-17%, while the services sector has become hyper-capital-intensive.

The paradox is quantified by the Employment Elasticity of Growth. In the 1990s, every 1% of GDP growth generated roughly 0.4% growth in employment; today, that figure has plummeted to near zero, and in some capital-heavy sectors, it is negative. This suggests that the "Indian Engine" is not just running on half its cylinders—it is running on a different fuel altogether, one that prioritizes Total Factor Productivity (TFP) gains for incumbents over the marginal productivity of new labor entrants.

THE DEMOGRAPHIC TICKING CLOCK

With a median age of 28.8, India is currently in the "sweet spot" of its demographic transition. However, this window is not indefinite. Unlike East Asian "Tigers" that utilized this period to build labor-intensive manufacturing hubs, India's "Structural Brakes" (Land, Finance, and Regulatory friction) are creating a bottleneck.

If these brakes are not released, the "Dividend" will transition into a "Social Tax." High graduate unemployment (specifically the 20.1% rate among women) creates a reserve army of underemployed youth, leading to what I term "Human Capital Erosion." When skills are not utilized during the peak productive years, they atrophy, leading to a permanent reduction in the nation's potential output.

THE BLUEPRINT FOR A NEW SOCIAL COMPACT

This paper argues that the solution is not more "Schemes" or "Subsidies" (Blueprint A), but a fundamental re-engineering of the Factor Markets (Blueprint B). To achieve a \$30 Trillion GDP by 2047, we must move from "Managing Unemployment" to "Unleashing the Entrepreneur." This requires:

1. Dismantling the Collateral Trap to democratize capital.
2. Dissolving Regulatory Dwarfism to allow firms to scale.
3. Formalizing the Care Economy to unlock the 50% gender dividend.
4. Implementing a Mobility Shield to make labor truly national.

This is not merely a policy agenda; it is a New Social Compact where the state shifts from an *ex-ante* regulator of outcomes to an *ex-post* enabler of opportunities.

SECTION 2: THE MYTH OF THE INDUSTRIAL ENGINE – A MACRO-MICRO DIAGNOSIS

For nearly two centuries, the iron law of economic development, from the Industrial Revolution to the rise of the East Asian "Tigers," has been predicated on the "Industrial Engine." This conventional wisdom posits that large-scale, labor-intensive manufacturing is the only reliable route to rapid economic transformation and mass employment. However, a forensic examination of the Indian landscape reveals that this engine has stalled, becoming a historical myth in the contemporary era.

THE NET VS. GROSS DIVERGENCE

The central empirical challenge to the industrial engine narrative lies in the divergence between headline headcount and net job creation. While large, mature industrial firms—the "National Champions"—remain high-volume employers, they have increasingly become net job destroyers. Longitudinal research indicates that establishments older than ten years in India exhibit a startling net job creation rate of -3.5%¹.

This phenomenon is driven by a rational micro-economic response to globalized competition: legacy incumbents prioritize automation, capital deepening, and deleveraging over labor expansion to protect margins. In sharp contrast, the true vitality of the Indian economy resides in its youngest segment. Firms less than five years old—the "Ojazelles"²—are responsible for over 45% of net new job creation¹. Policy frameworks that remain tailored to the needs of large incumbents are essentially taxing the future of work to protect the monopolies of the past.

PREMATURE DE-INDUSTRIALIZATION AND THE SERVICE PARADOX

India's manufacturing sector generates just 16% of GDP, a figure that has remained stagnant while the services sector has ballooned to 55%.³ This "premature de-industrialization" in the formal sector is a worrying sign for a nation that needs to generate nearly 1 million new jobs every month for its demographic dividend.

Interestingly, much of the manufacturing employment growth that has occurred since 1989 has been concentrated in informal tradable industries, particularly one-person establishments. This group expanded from 19% of manufacturing employment in 1989 to 39% by 2010³. This shift towards informal micro-enterprises suggests that growth in traded industries is not being driven by firms achieving economies of scale, but by a fragmented ecosystem of self-employed manufacturers.

AGGLOMERATION AND THE URBAN ENGINE

The data further reveals that nearly all net employment growth in Indian manufacturing over the past two decades occurred in urban areas. While the formal sector has begun migrating towards rural areas of districts, the informal sector is moving towards urban centres, particularly in tradable industries. This rapid urbanization of the informal sector is the strongest predictor of employment growth.

¹ Ghani, E., Kerr, W. R., & O'Connell, S. D. (2014). *Spatial Determinants of Entrepreneurship in India*. *Regional Studies*, 48(6), 1071–1089 https://www.hbs.edu/ris/Publication%20Files/Ghani_Kerr_OConnell%20RS14_IndiaSpatial_88f6ab25-6172-4be4-a7a4-4a864c4d2e0b.pdf

² The word "Ojazelle" combines the Sanskrit word ओजस (ojas, meaning vigor/ life-force) with gazelle, denoting speed and grace. The reference to high-energy startups who may lack assets but act on superior ideas and account for much of the employment growth.

³ Ghani, E. (2015, June 10). *Where is the growth in Indian manufacturing jobs?* World Economic Forum. <https://www.weforum.org/stories/2015/06/where-is-the-growth-in-indian-manufacturing-jobs/>

However, India's lopsided urbanization—where engines of growth are concentrated in mega-cities while intermediate-sized cities remain mired in joblessness⁴—constrains the entrepreneurial engine. To move from a "Firm-Chasing" mentality to a "Market-Creating" one, India must foster an entrepreneurial foundation that provides for local growth and regeneration across its entire spatial landscape.

SECTION 3: DIAGNOSIS – THE "MISSING MIDDLE" AND THE REGULATORY TAX

The economic pathology of the "Missing Middle" represents perhaps the most significant structural barrier to India's long-term manufacturing competitiveness and employment elasticity. While successful developing economies typically exhibit a "bell curve" of firm size—where small startups mature into mid-sized enterprises and eventually large conglomerates—India's industrial landscape is characterized by a stark, bimodal distribution. On one end lies a vast sea of tiny, unproductive micro-enterprises; on the other, a handful of hyper-capital-intensive giants. The centre of this distribution—the efficient, medium-sized firm—is virtually absent.

THE ANATOMY OF REGULATORY DWARFISM

In India, firms don't just stay small; they are "pre-emptively stunted." Approximately 98% of Indian manufacturing firms employ fewer than five workers⁵. This is not a transitory stage of growth, but a terminal condition I term "Regulatory Dwarfism."

This stunted growth is a rational microeconomic response to a perverse incentive structure. As a firm scales, it encounters a "Regulatory Tax" that increases not linearly, but exponentially. Crossing key labor thresholds—most notably the 50-employee mark (where many states trigger the Apprentices Act and health safety mandates) and the 100-employee mark (where the Industrial Disputes Act, until recent reforms, made retrenchment nearly impossible)—triggers a surge in compliance costs and administrative friction. For an entrepreneur, hiring the 51st worker can quadruple the "Governance Tax" on their time and capital, making it more profitable to remain a "dwarf" than to become "small."

TFP LOSS AND THE MISALLOCATION OF TALENT

The macroeconomic consequences of this dwarfism are catastrophic for Total Factor Productivity (TFP). Seminal research by *Hsieh and Klenow (2009)* and our own longitudinal studies at the World Bank suggest that if the misallocation of resources in Indian manufacturing were reduced to levels seen in the United States, TFP would surge by 40% to 60%⁶.

The "Missing Middle" ensures that capital and talent are trapped in firms that lack the economies of scale to invest in R&D, worker training, or global supply chain integration. In India, a 35-year-old firm is often the same size it was at birth. In contrast, a 35-year-old firm in the U.S. or Mexico is typically ten to thirty times larger⁵.

⁴ Desmet, Klaus; Ghani, Ejaz; O'Connell, Stephen; Rossi-Hansberg, Esteban (2013). *India's Spatial Development*. Economic premise; no. 124. The World Bank. <http://hdl.handle.net/10986/22615>

⁵ Ghani, E., Kerr, W. R., & O'Connell, S. D. (2013). *The exceptional persistence of India's unorganized sector* (World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 6454). The World Bank. <https://d-nb.info/1221064592/34>

⁶ Hsieh, C.-T., & Klenow, P. J. (2009). *Misallocation and manufacturing TFP in China and India* (CES Working Paper No. 09-04). University of Chicago, Center for Economic Studies, U.S. Census Bureau. <https://www2.census.gov/ces/wp/2009/CES-WP-09-04.pdf>

This lack of "Up-or-Out" dynamism means that inefficient firms (the "Zombies") never exit the market, while high-potential startups (the "Ojazelles") are prevented from scaling into firms that drive mass employment⁵.

THE "PAPER" CEILING OF INFORMALITY

The regulatory tax does more than just limit size; it enforces informality. By staying below the radar of the "Inspector Raj," firms avoid the formal credit market, high-quality power grids, and legal protections. This creates a "Paper Ceiling" where the lack of formal records prevents these firms from accessing the very capital they need to grow. The result is a cycle of low-productivity traps: firms are small because they are unproductive, and they are unproductive because the regulatory environment prevents them from reaching the scale required for productivity. To achieve *Viksit Bharat 2047*, India must dismantle this ceiling. We must replace a system of *ex-ante* control (stopping growth before it happens) with a system of *ex-post* enabler (facilitating growth while maintaining accountability).

SECTION 4: THE COLLATERAL TRAP AND THE LAND-FINANCE NEXUS

The structural inability of young, agile firms to achieve scale in India is frequently traced back to a fundamental misallocation of capital that I term the "Collateral Trap." While the "Missing Middle" describes the regulatory ceiling, the Collateral Trap describes the financial floor—a floor that is built almost exclusively on the ownership of ancestral or legacy land. In the Indian financial landscape, credit availability is historically and pathologically tethered to physical assets rather than innovative potential, intellectual property, or future cash flows.

THE ARCHITECTURE OF CREDIT APARTHEID

In most developed economies, the transition from a developing to a high-income status was facilitated by the evolution of "reputational" and "information-based" credit. In India, however, we remain mired in a Land-Finance Nexus. Banks, particularly public sector entities that dominate the lending landscape, operate under a regime of extreme risk-aversion where the primary prerequisite for a business loan is the pledge of clear, undisputed land titles as collateral.

This creates a systemic "Credit Apartheid." Legacy incumbents—often third- or fourth-generation conglomerates—possess vast historical land holdings that serve as a perpetual "ATM" for capital. Conversely, the landless entrepreneur, the first-generation graduate, or the tech-innovator from a non-urban background is effectively starved of oxygen. By demanding physical land as a proxy for trust, the banking system essentially subsidizes inefficient, asset-heavy "Zombie" firms while penalizing the very "Ojazelles" that are the primary engines of net job creation.

THE DEAD CAPITAL PROBLEM

The gravity of this trap is exacerbated by the state of India's land records. Based on our NBER research (*Duranton, Ghani, et al., 2015*), the misallocation of land is the single largest driver of factor misallocation in the Indian economy. We estimate that an astronomical amount of wealth—potentially exceeding ₹100 lakh crores—is locked up as "Dead Capital" due to clouded, fragmented, and disputed titles⁷.

⁷ Duranton, G., Ghani, E., Grover Goswami, A., & Kerr, W. R. (2015). *The misallocation of land and other factors of production in India* (NBER Working Paper No. 21190). National Bureau of Economic Research.

https://conference.nber.org/confer/2015/SI2015/URB/Duranton_Ghani_Kerr.pdf

Approximately 70% of all civil litigation in India is related to property disputes⁸. Because land titles in India are "presumptive" rather than "conclusive," a bank accepting a land deed as collateral is often stepping into a legal minefield that can last decades. This creates a massive Risk Premium on lending. Even when an entrepreneur *has* land, the lack of a government-guaranteed title makes that land "illiquid" for the purposes of formal finance. The result is a paradox: India is land-rich but capital-poor because its primary asset cannot be efficiently "financialized."

THE VELOCITY GAP: HERITAGE VS. POTENTIAL

The Collateral Trap ensures that the velocity of capital in India remains sluggish. Capital does not flow to the most productive firm (the one with the highest marginal return on investment); it flows to the firm with the oldest land deed. This leads to what economists call "Resource Misallocation," where capital is trapped in low-productivity, stagnant industries while high-productivity, high-growth sectors remain underfunded.

To achieve *Viksit Bharat 2047*, India must dismantle this nexus. We must move toward a financial architecture where Information replaces Land as the primary currency of trust. If we fail to resurrect this "Dead Capital" and bridge the credit gap for the landless, the demographic dividend will continue to be a missed opportunity, as millions of potential job creators remain sidelined by a system that prizes where they come from over where they are going.

SECTION 5: THE GENDER JOBS PARADOX AND THE TRIPLE TAX

A critical, yet often overlooked, dimension of the Indian jobs challenge is the profound "Gender Jobs Paradox." In most developing economies, rising levels of female education and declining fertility rates are historically correlated with a surge in female labor force participation (FLFPR). India, however, presents a counter-intuitive and troubling outlier: as female literacy has climbed and the "care burden" per household has theoretically shrunk, the FLFPR has remained stubbornly low, and in some decadal cohorts, it has actually declined. This is not merely a product of cultural preference; it is the result of a systemic market failure that imposes a "Triple Tax" on women, making their workforce participation economically and socially irrational.

THE GRADUATE PARADOX: ROI FAILURE ON HUMAN CAPITAL

The data reveals a startling "U-shaped" relationship between education and employment for Indian women.⁹ While the very poor work out of necessity and the ultra-elite work for career fulfillment, the educated middle class is largely missing from the workforce. Female unemployment is highest among the most educated, reaching a staggering 20.1% for graduates.¹⁰

This represents a massive failure to realize the Return on Investment (ROI) of India's state and private spending on education. We are effectively training millions of women for the high-productivity "Knowledge Economy," only to have them retreat into the domestic sphere due to structural friction. This is "Human Capital Erosion" on a national scale. Closing this gender gap is not just a social imperative; it is a macroeconomic necessity. Research suggests that achieving gender parity in the workforce could boost

⁸ Centre for Policy Research (CPR). (2016). *Land rights initiative: Understanding land conflict in India and suggestions for reform*. <https://cprindia.org/land-rights-initiative/>

⁹ Chatterjee, E., Desai, S., & Vanneman, R. (2018). Indian paradox: Rising education, declining women's employment. *Demographic Research*, 38(31), 855–878. <https://doi.org/10.4054/demres.2018.38.31>

¹⁰ Directorate General of Employment, Ministry of Labour & Employment, Government of India. (2024). *Annual Report: Periodic Labour Force Survey 2023–24*. https://dge.gov.in/dge/sites/default/files/2024-10/Annual_Report_Periodic_Labour_Force_Survey_23_24.pdf

India's GDP growth by an additional 1.5 to 2 percentage points annually¹¹, potentially adding \$2.7 trillion to the economy by 2047.

THE ANATOMY OF THE TRIPLE TAX

The systemic exclusion of women is driven by three distinct, compounding "taxes" that reduce the net return on female labor:

1. The Safety and Mobility Tax: For many women, the "cost of work" includes the financial and psychological toll of navigating unsafe or inefficient transit systems. If a woman spends 20–30% of her salary on safe private transport or loses 3 hours a day to unreliable public transit, the "economic net wage" falls below her reservation wage. Safety is not just a social issue; it is a labor market barrier.
2. The Social and Care Tax: India's care economy remains largely informal and home-bound. Women bear a disproportionate burden of unpaid care work—childcare, elderly care, and domestic management. In the absence of a professionalized, affordable care infrastructure, the "marriage penalty" or the "motherhood penalty" forces women to choose between career and family. Unlike men, women's mobility is often "tethered" to the household.
3. The Institutional and Regulatory Tax: There is a persistent "Institutional Bias" in factor markets. Women-led startups receive less than 2% of venture capital¹², and women entrepreneurs face higher hurdles in the "Collateral Trap" because they rarely have ancestral land titles in their names. Furthermore, labor laws—while designed to protect women (e.g., maternity benefits)—often inadvertently lead to "Statistical Discrimination," where firms avoid hiring women to bypass perceived compliance costs.

FROM SOCIAL POLICY TO INFRASTRUCTURE

To break this paradox, India must stop treating gender as a "Social Welfare" issue and start treating it as an "Infrastructure" issue. The Care Economy should be recognized as a core professional sector, capable of creating millions of formal jobs for caregivers while simultaneously unlocking the productivity of millions of professionals.

Formalizing the care economy, investing in "Gender-Smart" urban mobility, and dismantling the land-based credit bias are the prerequisites for the Phoenix Mandate.¹³ Without the full participation of 50% of its population, India is essentially "flying on one engine." Releasing the Triple Tax is the only way to ensure that the 2047 destination is reached with the full force of the nation's talent.

¹¹ Das, S., Jain-Chandra, S., Kochhar, K., & Kumar, N. (2015). *Women workers in India: Why so few among so many?* (IMF Working Paper No. 15/55). International Monetary Fund. <https://doi.org/10.5089/9781498315005.001>

¹² Al Saleh, H. (2023, December 28). *How we can close the venture capital gender gap*. World Economic Forum. <https://www.weforum.org/stories/2023/12/how-we-can-close-the-venture-capital-gender-gap/>

¹³ The **Phoenix Mandate** is a strategic framework designed to address the "Great Jobs Transition" by treating employment not as a byproduct of growth, but as the primary metric of national success. In the context of a 2026 India, it argues that for the economy to "rise from the ashes" of jobless growth and the "Dwarf Firm" syndrome, the private sector and the State must enter into a new, performance-based compact.

SECTION 6: INSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION – BREAKING THE NEXUS WITH CONCLUSIVE LAND TITLING

To dismantle the structural brakes of the Collateral Trap, India must embark on an institutional revolution centred on Conclusive Land Titling. The current "presumptive" titling system—a colonial legacy where a registered deed is merely a record of a transaction and not a government-guaranteed proof of ownership—is the primary source of the friction that prevents land from being used as a fluid, modern economic asset. In the absence of a state-backed guarantee, every land transaction is a potential lawsuit, and every land-based loan is a high-risk gamble for the financial sector.

THE "PRESUMPTIVE" BOTTLENECK

In India, the onus of proving title ownership lies entirely with the individual, not the state. This "presumptive" nature means that even if you possess a registered sale deed, it can be challenged by any claimant who asserts a prior right, an inherited interest, or a procedural flaw in a transaction that occurred decades ago. This uncertainty is why an estimated ₹100 lakh crores in capital remains "dead." Banks, unable to verify the ultimate sanctity of the title, apply a massive "risk discount" to land values or, more often, refuse to lend to anyone without a multi-generational "clean" lineage of property.

This institutional failure effectively "freezes" the factor market for land. High-productivity firms cannot expand because they cannot secure clear sites, and small-scale entrepreneurs cannot leverage their only significant asset for business expansion. Transitioning to a "Conclusive Titling" system—where the state guarantees the title and provides compensation for any errors—is the only way to turn land from a source of litigation into a reliable instrument of credit.

THE "GST-STYLE" LAND REFORM COUNCIL

The primary hurdle to land reform is federalism. Under the Indian Constitution, land is a state subject, leading to a fragmented landscape of varying digitization levels and legal frameworks. To solve this, I propose the creation of a National Land Reform Council (NLRC), modeled after the successful GST Council.

This body would serve as the platform for a grand bargain between the Centre and the States. While the States execute the administrative task of surveying and digitizing records, the Centre must provide the technological backbone—utilizing high-resolution geospatial mapping and blockchain-based immutable ledgers. To overcome political inertia, the Centre should deploy a Land Reform Incentive Fund (LRIF), offering direct fiscal transfers and infrastructure grants to states that achieve specific milestones in transitioning to conclusive titles.

RESURRECTING DEAD CAPITAL FOR THE 1.4 BILLION

The impact of this reform would be a "big bang" for the Indian economy. By providing a government guarantee, we lower the risk premium for banks, leading to a surge in credit velocity. Suddenly, a small-scale farmer or a micro-entrepreneur in a semi-urban cluster has a liquid asset. This is not just about making it easier for large factories to buy land; it is about equalizing the playing field. Conclusive titling allows the landless and the smallholder to participate in the formal financial system for the first time. It dismantles the "Heritage-based" credit model and replaces it with an "Asset-based" model that is accessible to all. As Hernando de Soto argued, the difference between a developed and a developing nation is the ability to turn "physical house" into "legal capital." By fixing the Land-Finance Nexus, India can finally resurrect its dead capital and fuel the "Ojazelles" required for 2047.

SECTION 7: THE TECHNOLOGICAL BYPASS – LEVERAGING DPI FOR INFORMATION-BASED LENDING (IBL)

While the institutional reforms of land titling are essential for long-term structural stability, their gestation period—entailing legal shifts, geospatial surveys, and federal negotiations—is inherently long. India cannot wait two decades for its factor markets to modernize. Consequently, the nation must simultaneously execute a "Technological Bypass" by leveraging its world-leading Digital Public Infrastructure (DPI). The objective is to engineer a paradigm shift in the financial sector: moving from Asset-Based Collateral (which favors the landed elite) to Information-Based Lending (IBL) (which favors the productive entrepreneur).

THE DIGITAL TRUST ARCHITECTURE

In the traditional banking model, "trust" is a function of physical history—ancestral land, brick-and-mortar presence, or years of audited balance sheets. This model is fundamentally exclusionary for the 63 million MSMEs and the millions of young entrepreneurs who operate in the informal or semi-formal "digital-first" economy¹⁴. The Information-Based Lending (IBL) model replaces physical collateral with a "Digital Trust Architecture."

By utilizing the high-frequency data trails generated by Aadhaar, the Unified Payments Interface (UPI), and the Goods and Services Tax Network (GSTN), the "trust deficit" can be bridged digitally. In this ecosystem, a small merchant's verified cash-flow history, their utility bill payment records, and their GST invoice velocity serve as "Digital Collateral." Algorithms can assess the creditworthiness of a firm with higher precision and lower cost than a manual inspection of a physical land deed.

OCEN AND THE DEMOCRATIZATION OF CAPITAL

The transmission fluid for this revolution is the Open Credit Enablement Network (OCEN). OCEN acts as a common language between "Loan Service Providers" (apps that merchants already use, like KhataBook or PhonePe) and "Lenders" (Banks and NBFCs). This bypasses the archaic Land-Finance Nexus and democratizes access to capital. Crucially, IBL addresses the "Cost of Trust." In the legacy system, the administrative cost of processing a ₹50,000 loan for a small tailor is almost the same as processing a ₹5 crore loan for a large factory, making small-ticket lending unviable for banks. DPI reduces the cost of customer acquisition (KYC) and credit assessment to near-zero. This "Efficiency Dividend" allows for "sachet-sized" credit, enabling the smallest "Ojazelles" to bridge working capital gaps and scale their operations. For the landless entrepreneur, their smartphone becomes their bank branch, and their transaction history becomes their title deed.

BYPASSING THE INFORMAL TRAP

The "Technological Bypass" does more than just provide credit; it creates a powerful incentive for formalization. When a firm realizes that being part of the GST network or using digital payments is the only way to unlock cheap, formal credit, the transition from informal to formal becomes a rational business choice rather than an administrative burden.

By bringing the informal sector into the formal credit fold through IBL, India effectively lowers the national cost of capital. This is the "Data Dividend" that can fuel India's transition to a high-productivity economy. As data replaces land as the primary currency of growth, the "Credit Apartheid" that has historically favored the

¹⁴ They are estimated to employ around 111 million people, contributing 28.77% to the GDP. The total contribution of MSMEs in country's export is estimated at 45%. See <https://ficci.in/sector/micro-small-and-medium-enterprises-msme>

landed incumbents will begin to dissolve, paving the way for a truly competitive and meritocratic entrepreneurial landscape by 2047.

SECTION 8: LABOR MOBILITY AND THE PORTABLE SOCIAL SECURITY SHIELD

The generation of high-quality jobs is only one-half of the economic equation for *Viksit Bharat*; the other half is ensuring that labor can move seamlessly to where those jobs are being created. In the Indian context, a significant "Labor Friction" exists that prevents the efficient matching of workers to opportunities. This friction is not merely a matter of geography or language; it is a direct consequence of a localized, non-portable social safety net—a phenomenon I term the "PDS Trap."

THE ARCHITECTURE OF THE PDS TRAP

Historically, India's welfare systems—subsidized food grains through the Public Distribution System (PDS), state-specific healthcare schemes, and localized housing subsidies—have been "static" and place-bound. Eligibility for these essential benefits is frequently tied to a worker's permanent place of residence or "domicile." Consequently, when a worker migrates from a low-productivity rural region in the North to a high-productivity industrial cluster in the South, they often effectively "forfeit" their social security shield.

For a family living on the margins, migration becomes an act of unacceptable economic risk. If moving for a higher-wage job means losing access to subsidized food or the "safety net" of local community support systems without a formal replacement, the "opportunity cost" of migration becomes too high. This keeps labor "trapped" in low-productivity agricultural roles, leading to a massive Misallocation of Human Capital. Workers remain where they are safe, rather than moving to where they are productive.

THE "MOBILITY SHIELD": INTEROPERABLE WELFARE

To achieve the spatial transformation required for 2047, India must operationalize a "Mobility Shield"—a fully portable, interoperable social security framework. The goal is simple: Benefits must follow the person, not the PIN code. This requires the digital integration of multiple silos—EPFO (pensions), ESIC (health insurance), PDS (food), and state-specific welfare transfers—into a single, Aadhaar-linked "Digital Benefit Account." The successful implementation of "One Nation, One Ration Card" (ONORC) serves as the foundational proof of concept. By ensuring that a worker from Bihar can access their food entitlements in Tamil Nadu as easily as in their home village, we significantly lower the "Migration Tax."

Furthermore, the e-Shram portal, which has already registered over 290 million informal workers, must be evolved from a registry into a delivery platform. A "Mobility Shield" would allow for the seamless transfer of health records and insurance coverage, ensuring that a health shock in a new city doesn't push a migrant family back into poverty or force a return to their home state.

TALENT FLUIDITY AND REGIONAL CONVERGENCE

The macroeconomic impact of labor portability is profound. Economic dynamism requires Talent Fluidity—the ability of the labor market to respond rapidly to shifting industrial demands. When labor is mobile, it facilitates "Regional Convergence," where the high wages of growth engines are remitted back to poorer states, fueling a secondary wave of development. A national labor market, protected by a portable shield, allows for the emergence of specialized industrial clusters. It reduces the "congestion costs" of forced, distress-driven migration and replaces it with "aspiration-driven" migration. By making the social safety net digital and

portable, India removes the final structural barrier to labor market efficiency, ensuring that its demographic dividend is not just a static number on a census, but a dynamic force of productivity moving toward the 2047 horizon.

SECTION 9: HUMAN CAPITAL AND FUTURE-FIT SKILLS FOR A JUST TRANSITION

While institutional deregulation and factor market reforms remove the structural disincentives to growth, only a massive, qualitative injection of human capital provides the actual *ability* to grow. India currently faces a profound human capital mismatch: a paradoxical surplus of degree-holders coexisting with a chronic shortage of the "future-fit" talent required for the twin transitions of the 21st century—the Green Shift and the Digital Revolution. To achieve *Viksit Bharat*, the nation must move beyond a "degree-centric" education model toward a "competency-centric" vocational ecosystem that bridges the "Paper Ceiling."

THE "PAPER CEILING" AND DEGREE INFLATION

For decades, the Indian middle class has viewed the university degree as the ultimate signal of social and economic mobility. However, this has led to a massive "Degree Inflation" where the credential has decoupled from actual competency. Industry reports consistently suggest that over 50% of Indian graduates are "unemployable" in high-value roles. This "Paper Ceiling" traps millions of youths in a cycle of underemployment—possessing the certificate for a white-collar job that doesn't exist, while lacking the precision technical skills for the high-end manufacturing and service roles that do.

To break this, we must de-stigmatize vocational training and legitimize micro-certifications. The current "second-class" status of technical education must be replaced by a system where industry-embedded apprenticeships carry the same social and economic weight as a traditional degree. By prioritizing "skills-first" hiring, we align the labor supply with the high-velocity demands of the modern economy.

THE PHOENIX DIVIDEND: SKILLS FOR THE GREEN SHIFT

The Phoenix Mandate identifies the Green Transition as the primary engine for job creation in the next two decades. Unlike the IT boom, which was largely restricted to the English-speaking urban elite, the Green Industrial Revolution—spanning EV architecture, green hydrogen logistics, solar photovoltaics, and circular waste management—requires a "Vocational Technicality" that can be taught at scale across rural and semi-urban India.

Research estimates that the green transition could create 35 million new jobs in India.¹⁵ However, these are not "old-world" industrial jobs; they require a workforce that understands carbon accounting, precision power electronics, and decentralized grid maintenance. This requires a radical redesign of the Industrial Training Institutes (ITIs). We must move from a generic curriculum to one that is co-created with global value chain leaders, ensuring that an ITI graduate in a Tier-2 city is "mission-ready" for a global EV plant.

AI-RESILIENCE AND THE "JUST TRANSITION"

Simultaneously, the rise of Artificial Intelligence necessitates a "Just Transition" for the existing workforce. The threat of automation is real, but so is the opportunity for productivity gains. We must train the Indian

¹⁵ Anantha Nageswaran, V., & Natarajan, G. (2019). *India's quest for jobs: A policy agenda*. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. <https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2019/10/indias-quest-for-jobs-a-policy-agenda?lang=en>

workforce to treat AI as a "Co-pilot" rather than a competitor. This involves embedding AI-literacy modules across all levels of vocational training—not to turn everyone into coders, but to ensure that a logistics manager or a healthcare worker can use AI-tools to augment their own productivity. Furthermore, a "Just Transition" must include the formalization of the Care Economy. By professionalizing childcare and elderly care, we create millions of "Future-Fit" roles that are inherently resilient to automation while simultaneously releasing the "Triple Tax" on women. By aligning human capital with these sunrise sectors, India ensures that its demographic dividend is not displaced by the future, but is instead the primary architect of it.

SECTION 10: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF FRICTION AND THE NEW FEDERAL COMPACT

The inertia preventing the release of India's structural brakes is not primarily a technical or intellectual deficit; it is a deeply embedded Political Economy of Friction. For decades, India's economic governance has been characterized by a "Coalition for Stagnation," where various stakeholders—ranging from legacy industrial incumbents to sub-national political entities—derive short-term stability from the very distortions that stifle long-term growth. To achieve *Viksit Bharat*, we must dismantle this "Incumbent Capture" and forge a New Federal Compact.

INCUMBENT CAPTURE AND THE COLLATERAL ADVANTAGE

The Collateral Trap is not merely an administrative oversight; it is a formidable entry barrier that protects legacy firms from the disruptive competition of younger, more agile startups. Large, land-rich conglomerates benefit from a "rigged" factor market where their historical assets grant them a near-monopoly on formal credit. In this environment, "Animal Spirits" are replaced by "Asset Extraction."

Incumbents are often incentivized to lobby for the maintenance of opaque land records and rigid credit norms because these frictions effectively starve potential competitors—the "Ojazelles"—of the capital required to scale. This Incumbent Capture of the financial system ensures that capital remains "lazy," flowing into established firms with low marginal productivity rather than into high-potential entrants that could catalyze mass employment.

THE SUB-NATIONAL "WELFARE TRAP"

At the sub-national level, a different form of friction exists. Many State governments are incentivized to maintain a "Localized Welfare Model." By keeping essential benefits (PDS, housing, and state-specific subsidies) tethered to the local domicile, political leaders create a stable, dependent "vote bank." While this provides a local safety net, it inadvertently creates the "PDS Trap" mentioned earlier, discouraging labor mobility.

States often view the outward migration of their workforce as a loss of political leverage or a "brain drain," rather than as a mechanism for regional convergence through remittances and skill-sharing. This leads to a fragmented national labor market where workers are "trapped" in low-productivity regions by the very benefits meant to protect them.

THE "JOBS COUNCIL": A BLUEPRINT FOR CO-OPERATIVE FEDERALISM

To break this deadlock, India requires a New Federal Compact modeled after the successful GST Council. Because land and labor are primarily State subjects, while credit, digital infrastructure, and national goals are Central, a "National Jobs Council" is imperative.

This body would facilitate a grand bargain based on Fiscal Federalism:

1. The "Carrot": The Centre must provide performance-linked fiscal incentives and infrastructure grants to States that execute the "hard" reforms—specifically conclusive land titling and the adoption of the "Mobility Shield" for portable welfare.
2. The "Bridge": The Council would serve as a platform for standardizing regulatory frameworks, ensuring that a "Scale-Up Sandbox" in one state is recognized across borders, reducing the compliance burden for firms operating nationally.
3. The "Mirror": A state-wise "Job Dynamism Index" should be established, creating a healthy competition among states to attract "Ojazelles" by offering the most frictionless factor markets.

By aligning the political incentives of the States with the national mission of a \$30 trillion economy, India can move from a "Firm-Chasing" mentality (where states compete with subsidies for a few large plants) to a "Market-Creating" mentality (where states compete to offer the best ecosystem for young job creators). This is not just about economic reform; it is about re-engineering the very DNA of Indian federalism to prioritize the dignity of work and the velocity of opportunity.

SECTION 11: ADDRESSING THE CRITICS OF THE NEW COMPACT

The "Phoenix Mandate" represents a fundamental departure from the *dirigiste* traditions of Indian economic planning. As such, it naturally invites scrutiny from the traditional "Manufacturing-First," "Subsidy-Led," and "Labor-Protectionist" schools of thought. A forensic engagement with these counter-arguments is needed to demonstrate the robustness of our "Blueprint B."

1. THE "MANUFACTURING SKIP" VS. "NEW INDUSTRIALISM"

The Critique: Skeptics argue that India cannot bypass the classic labor-intensive manufacturing stage seen in post-war East Asia. They contend that services alone cannot absorb hundreds of millions of low-skilled workers, and thus, the state must double down on large-scale manufacturing via "National Champions" and high-subsidy Production Linked Incentives (PLI).

The Rebuttal: This critique fails to acknowledge that modern global manufacturing is no longer the "labor-sponge" it was in the 1970s. Automation, 3D printing, and AI-driven robotics have fundamentally altered the capital-labor ratio. Subsidizing a billion-dollar semiconductor plant creates only a few thousand high-end jobs while diverting billions in fiscal resources that could have fueled 100,000 "Ojazelles."

Our blueprint does not advocate for a "Manufacturing Skip." Instead, it advocates for a "New Industrialism." We believe the manufacturing engine is not dead, but its *form* has changed. The future of Indian manufacturing lies in a fragmented but hyper-connected ecosystem of young, agile firms specializing in green tech, EV components, and precision engineering. By fixing the "Missing Middle" and the "Collateral Trap," we build a manufacturing base that is labor-intensive by design, not by subsidy.

2. THE "DIGITAL DIVIDE" IN INFORMATION-BASED LENDING (IBL)

The Critique: Organizations like the ILO and certain civil society groups warn that shifting from asset-based collateral to IBL could create a new "Digital Divide." They argue that millions of informal workers and rural micro-entrepreneurs lack a digital footprint and would be further excluded from the formal credit market.

The Rebuttal: This argument is a "nirvana fallacy." It compares the imperfect digital system of tomorrow with an idealized version of today's land-based system. In reality, the current Land-Finance Nexus is the ultimate exclusion; it is a system that denies 100% of credit to anyone without clear land titles.

IBL is not a barrier; it is an inclusive bypass. By using the UPI-Credit Bridge and GST records, we are giving the landless their first-ever "Digital Asset" to leverage for growth. For those yet to enter the digital fold, the IBL framework provides a massive incentive for formalization. The "Digital Divide" is a temporary hurdle that can be solved with literacy; the "Collateral Trap" is a structural wall that can only be solved with a new paradigm.

3. LABOR LAWS VS. FACTOR MARKET DISTORTIONS

The Critique: Standard orthodox economics often blames India's restrictive labor laws—specifically those related to firing and retrenchment—as the primary cause of "Jobless Growth." They argue that without "Hire and Fire" flexibility, firms will never scale.

The Rebuttal: While labor law simplification is necessary, our research shows that distortions in Land and Credit markets are far more prohibitive structural brakes. A firm might survive a labor dispute, but it cannot survive being starved of credit because it lacks land as collateral.

Furthermore, the "labor rigidity" argument ignores the "Regulatory Tax" on scale. Firms stay small not just because they fear firing workers, but because they fear the Compliance Spike at the 50-employee threshold. By shifting focus to a "Scale-Up Sandbox" and portable social security, we address the *reasons* why firms fear labor, rather than just the *regulations* of labor. We turn labor from a "liability to be managed" into an "asset to be mobile."

4. IS "SMALL" ALWAYS BEAUTIFUL?

The Critique: Critics of MSME-led growth argue that "Small is not Beautiful"—that small firms are inherently unproductive and that only large firms can achieve the economies of scale required for exports and R&D.

The Rebuttal: We agree. "Small" is not beautiful; it is often a trap. However, the solution is not to favor only the "Big." We must distinguish between "Dwarves" (firms that are old and small) and "Ojazelles" (firms that are young and small). Our blueprint is not a defense of smallness; it is a plan to remove the ceiling on growth. We want young firms to have the oxygen (credit) and the space (regulation) to become the medium and large firms of 2047. We aren't subsidizing the "Micro"; we are liberating the "Scale-Up."

SECTION 12: THE 100-DAY STRATEGIC ROADMAP

To bridge the chasm between high-level economic theory and tangible street-level job creation, the Prime Minister's Office (PMO) may wish to orchestrate a "100-Day Jobs Sprint." This is not a proposal for new government spending, but a surgical intervention designed to dismantle the structural brakes with administrative precision. The objective is to shift the state's role from a suspicious regulator to a strategic enabler, creating the institutional "rails" required to generate two million high-quality jobs every month.

PHASE 1 (DAYS 1–30): DISMANTLING THE COLLATERAL TRAP

The first month must focus on "liquefying" trust for the landless entrepreneur.

- The UPI-Credit Bridge: Launch an integrated protocol through the Udyam Assist Platform (UAP) that allows FinTechs and Banks to use verified UPI and GST transaction data as "Live Collateral." By 2025, over 1.5 crore Informal Micro Enterprises (IMEs) have already been onboarded onto UAP; the goal

now is to mandate that UAP certificates be treated as high-grade security for Priority Sector Lending (PSL).

- Digital Trust mandate: Direct the RBI to finalize the FIT Rank (Financial Inclusion and Technology Rank) framework, ensuring that a firm's digital footprint—rather than its land deed—determines its creditworthiness.

PHASE 2 (DAYS 30–60): SCALING THE "MISSING MIDDLE"

The second month addresses the regulatory fear that prevents firms from "growing up."

- The Scale-Up Sandbox: Establish a 3-year Regulatory Safe Harbor for any MSME that expands its workforce from 10 to 100 employees. During this window, firms receive a "holiday" from non-critical labor inspections and administrative filings, allowing them to focus on scaling without the immediate friction of the "Governance Tax."
- Interoperable "Mobility Shield": Fully integrate the e-Shram portal (which now hosts over 31 crore workers) with the One Nation One Ration Card (ONORC) and the Ayushman Bharat health database. This ensures that the social safety net is truly portable, removing the "Migration Tax" that keeps labor trapped in low-productivity rural clusters.

PHASE 3 (DAYS 60–100): UNLOCKING THE GENDER AND GREEN DIVIDENDS

The final phase focuses on the "Phoenix" sectors of the 21st century.

- The Safety-Mobility Fund: Operationalize a dedicated urban transit fund to subsidize "Gender-Smart" infrastructure—enhanced street lighting, AI-monitored "last-mile" connectivity, and frequency-based bus services for women. This addresses the "Triple Tax" on female labor by lowering the cost and risk of the commute.
- Green-Collar Upskilling: Launch an industry-led apprenticeship mission targeting 5 million roles in the Phoenix Economy (EV manufacturing, solar maintenance, and circular waste). These must be "Earn While You Learn" models where technical competency on the factory floor outweighs the "Paper" credential of a university degree.
- By the 100th day, the PMO must move beyond "Firm-Chasing" (subsidizing a few large plants) to "Ecosystem-Building." The success of this sprint will be measured by a single metric: the velocity at which a landless, first-generation entrepreneur can hire their tenth employee. This is the new "Social Compact" for a Viksit Bharat.

SECTION 13: CONCLUSION – THE PATH TO 2047 AND THE CHOICE BEFORE US

The roadmap to 2047 is not merely an exercise in economic forecasting; it is a fundamental choice between two diverging futures for the Indian republic. As we stand at this centenary threshold, the "Jobs Paradox" serves as a final warning that the old paradigms of development—top-down, capital-heavy, and asset-tethered—have reached their structural limits. India can continue down its current path of "Industrial Incrementalism," subsidizing a few capital-intensive giants while the demographic dividend slowly curdles

into a demographic crisis—or it can embrace a New Social Compact that unleashes the latent entrepreneurial energy of its 1.4 billion citizens.

THE SOVEREIGN MISSION: TRUST OVER FRICTION

The central thesis of this blueprint is that India's primary economic constraint is not a lack of capital, but a Pathology of Friction. By decisively dismantling the Collateral Trap through Digital Public Infrastructure, removing the Triple Tax on women, and replacing localized welfare traps with a Portable Social Security Shield, India can build an economy where talent, not land, is the primary currency of growth.

This transition requires a radical reimagining of the State's role. In the 20th century, the state was the "Catcher"—a suspicious regulator focused on monitoring compliance and preventing failure. In the 21st century, to achieve Viksit Bharat, the state must become the "Pitcher"—a strategic enabler that provides the platform, the trust, and the "Digital Rails" upon which citizens can build their own prosperity.

THE FINAL MANDATE: THREE PILLARS OF INSPIRATION

To move the needle for millions of Indians, our strategy must be distilled into three non-negotiable truths:

1. STOP FINANCING THE PAST; START FINANCING THE FUTURE

For too long, the Indian financial system has been a rearview mirror, rewarding those who already possess assets while ignoring those who possess ideas. We have spent decades subsidizing "Zombies"—mature firms that are net job destroyers—while starving the "Ojazelles" that actually expand the employment frontier. Achieving Viksit Bharat requires a courageous pivot. We must stop pouring fiscal resources into the legacy industries of the 20th century and start providing the liquidity required for the Green, Digital, and AI-driven industries of the 21st. The status quo is a tax on the future; the "Digital Bypass" is our path to liberation.

2. WEALTH SHOULDN'T BE A PREREQUISITE FOR WORK; TALENT SHOULD BE THE ONLY COLLATERAL

We must dismantle the "Credit Apartheid" that defines our current banking DNA. In a truly developed India, a young person's ambition should not be held hostage by their lack of ancestral land. By shifting from land-based collateral to Information-Based Lending (IBL), we are essentially democratizing trust. When a small-town entrepreneur's digital transaction trail becomes as valuable as a South Delhi property deed, we don't just fix the credit market—we fix the social contract. Talent is the most abundant resource in India; it is time our financial system treated it as the ultimate security.

3. A VIKSIT BHARAT ISN'T BUILT BY A FEW GIANTS, BUT BY MILLIONS OF OJAZELLES

The myth of the "Industrial Savior" is dead. Headcount in large firms is being optimized away by automation and AI, yet the national obsession remains focused on "National Champions." We must recognize that the weight of 1.4 billion people cannot be carried by a handful of conglomerates. A resilient, inclusive India is built on the backs of millions of high-growth young firms—the Ojazelles. These are the true engines of mass employment. Our mission is to remove the "Regulatory Tax" and the "Paper Ceiling" that keep these firms small, allowing them to scale into the global gazelles of tomorrow.

THE PATH FORWARD

The choice is clear: we must trust the 1.4 billion, or continue to pay the price of friction. We are moving from a "Firm-Chasing" economy to an "Ecosystem-Building" sovereign power. As the world watches, India has the opportunity to prove that a job-led resurrection is possible when a state stops "controlling" and starts "trusting." The path to 2047 is open; it is time for the Indian Phoenix to fly.

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