Although not for the reason most climate watchers anticipated, the 15th Conference of Parties (COP) to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the fifth Meeting of the Parties (CMP-5) to the Kyoto Protocol at Copenhagen marked an important moment in the history of the climate negotiations. Despite considerable political pressure, a much-anticipated legally binding instrument did not emerge from Copenhagen. But Copenhagen was remarkable nevertheless. Never before had an international negotiation attracted 125 heads of state and government, and expended as much political capital, yet failed to deliver in quite so spectacular a fashion. And never before had outcomes been this dramatically misaligned with popular expectations. There are many lessons to be learned from the Copenhagen experience, both substantively and in terms of process.
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1. In summary, a top-down approach takes as its starting point the science around climate changeand consequent constructions of concentration thresholds and emission targets, while a bottom-up approach privileges economic and institutional issues around implementation. Exploring themiddle ground requires serious attention to both aspects.This Special Issue contains some useful insights on the middle ground. Werksman argues thatthe ‘force of international law does not derive from the threat of enforcement … but from … agovernment’s express intent to comply.’ What, in turn, constitutes a government’s ‘intent tocomply’? Dai suggests that an important part of the answer lies in exploring the linkages betweendomestic action and international regimes. Her key insight is that domestic action itself can be aratchet mechanism when enabled by a suitably designed international regime.
2. Two examples illustrate this point. First, an international regime could create a system requiringnational governments to compile information. Such a system could play a catalytic role instimulating national policy action by forcing bureaucracies to generate information and place itin the public domain. Second, even weak international regimes empower beneficiaries of compliance(such as renewable energy industries) and victims of non-compliance (such as populations inlow-lying coastal areas) to exert pressure on their national governments. The impact of theseconstituencies, however, will inevitably be mediated by national, political, social and geographicalconfigurations. Notably, in both these examples the capacity for change derives from domesticaction, but is enabled and amplified by a suitable international regime. From this perspective, itis at least as important to strengthen the ratchet mechanism of domestic action enabled by aninternational regime, as it is to focus on the starting point of commitments or pledges.
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