UP Elections 2017

CPR FACULTY ANALYSE

 

As the 2017 Legislative Assembly elections in India draw closer, Uttar Pradesh (UP) will to go to polls between February-March this year. In the run-up to the polling, find below a curated analysis by CPR faculty to-date.

  • Writing in Hindustan Times, Srinath Raghavan explains how the Samajwadi Party’s (SP) ongoing power struggle differs from the substantive political and ideological tussles of past socialist parties.
  • Neelanjan Sircar analyses the chances of a BJP win in Hindu Business Line given the split within the SP, and the corruption charges against Mayawati in the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP).
  • In The Lucknow Gambit, Sanjaya Baru discusses the various potential outcomes of the UP elections, contingent on who benefits from the politics of demonetisation, and argues how the results will impact 2019.
  • Writing in LiveMint, Srinath Raghavan compares the leadership and governance records of the SP in UP and the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) in Tamil Nadu.
  • In an op-ed in The Hindu, Neelanjan Sircar and Bhanu Joshi analyse religious polarisation and voting behaviour in the Upper Doab region of UP.
  • In another piece in Hindi in Firstpost, Bhanu Joshi and Ashish Ranjan write on how the political volitility and changing equations of Western UP could swing the outcome of the state elections in any direction.

Unpacking the ‘informal’ summit at Wuhan between India and China in April, 2018

CPR FACULTY ANALYSE THE SUMMIT AND THE WAY FORWARD

 

With growing tensions between India and China, which reached a critically low point with the prolonged military stand-off at Doklam in the summer of 2017, the ‘informal’ summit between Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President Xi Jinping held on 27-28 April, 2018, raised considerable interest. Especially since Jinping invited Modi to his hometown in China in an unprecedented manner. CPR faculty analyse the summit and the way forward in the curated media commentary below.

  • Shyam Saran writes in the Scroll that the summit indicates that ‘Doklam may have triggered a rethink on India-China relations going beyond tactical compulsions.’ According to Saran, even though the summit is a response to ‘growing uncertainty in both the regional geopolitical landscape in Asia and the world’, it is only likely to provide a ‘brief breathing space’ to India, unless India builds up her economic and military abilities rapidly.
  • Zorawar Daulet Singh published a series of articles and appeared in media interviews on the summit. In The Hindu, he writes that the summit is ‘a mutual recognition in both India and China that a posture of hostility has undermined their interests.’ He reiterates this in an interview for The Wire, also unpacking in detail how the geopolitical uncertainty negatively impacted both countries at different levels spurring this course correction, even though it may not mean the end of all hostilities. He also made a television appearance on CGTN America, one of the international language channels run by Chinese state broadcaster, and wrote in Hindi in Live Hindustan.
  • G Parthasarathy writes in The Hindu Business Line that the Wuhan summit has come in the wake of growing international pressures on China, and India must use the opportunity to resolve border issues and secure market access, while continuing to strengthen its military preparedness.

Unpacking India’s Second COVID-19 Wave and Vaccination Strategy

India’s vaccination drive began in January 2021. The recent rise in daily COVID-19 cases and deaths however, has been worrying. What led to the second surge in the country? How has the vaccination drive fared so far? Is India’s vaccination strategy the correct one? As certain states account for majority of the cases, how should the government alter its approach to contain the spread of the virus? Partha Mukhopadhyay, Senior Fellow at CPR, who has been closely tracking the pandemic, sheds light in this interview.

What according to you are the reasons for India’s second surge? A few months ago, we witnessed a steady decline in new cases. What has happened?
The short answer is: we don’t know. The other answer is: it had to happen. The surprise in India was that cases were going down steadily since mid-September, even as behaviour was becoming less and less CoVID-appropriate. It had to happen sometime and it happened in early to mid-February.

If the nature of CoVID infections is heterogeneous, i.e., (i) a few people mix with a lot of people and most people mix with few people and (ii) a few infected people infect a lot of people and lot of infected people do not infect others (or very few), then, it is the case that these kinds of localised spurts in infections can happen as part of the evolution of the pandemic. This is one of the results that we showed in our paper. So, from that perspective, this is not unusual.

There can be other, more deterministic, explanations, such as a variant, infective strain such as the B.1.1.7 variant that appears to dominate samples from Punjab or super-spreader events like election gatherings. Not enough information is being released about variants and genomic sequencing to answer this question, but it is odd that the Maharashtra surge started away from the major metros of the Golden Triangle (Nashik, Pune, Mumbai) in the smaller towns of Vidarbha, which is less likely to have imported variants. These areas were holding Gram Panchayat elections and celebrations took place in late January, but this also sounds a little over-determined since a lot of gatherings have been taking place around the country. A number of cases in Maharashtra were also reported from school hostels, after re-opening.

There is no particular evidence that testing in some states were low relative to other states, though it did decline for all states. Nor are there striking differences in mobility across states. But, wherever it started, it is now clear that the spread is much wider, as seen in Figure 1. In panel A, it is seen that the positivity (people testing positive as a share of people tested) in February 10 – March 10 of 2021 is much less than that over the period November 10, 2020 – February 10, 2021, except for Maharashtra, which had already started rising by this time. However, when we look at March 10-25, compared to the Feb – March period, in panel B, we see a striking increase in positivity in many states, indicating the spread of the second surge.

It is perhaps useful here to address the issue of sero-positivity surveys and herd immunity. Some commentators attributed the decline that occurred over September to January, to growing herd immunity, pointing to the high level of sero-positivity found in many surveys. However, these surveys seem to be at odds with the current experience, for example, one of the worst hit cities at the moment is Pune, which also had some of the highest sero-positivity numbers reported. It is the same for Bangalore and, also to some extent for Mumbai. It is possible that the current cases are concentrated in particular social classes and age-groups, while the sero-positivity were in other social classes, e.g., slum residents, but this is not something we know without more information.

Even if this sero-positivity hypothesis is accurate, an unexplained part of the hypothesis was the large number of unreported infections – indicating that these were most likely asymptomatic or very mildly symptomatic, also explaining why there was such limited reporting and relatively little pressure on hospitals. In this surge too, a very high proportion of asymptomatic cases is being reported, well over 80% in Mumbai. There has been no explanation for why Indian cases should be so asymptomatic. It is not that infected persons are much younger, though the share of 50+ is about 7% lower.

Another pattern that seems to be repeated from the early days of the pandemic is that a large number of the deaths, while fewer, are happening relatively soon after coming to hospital, implying that they are reporting late or the progression of the disease is suddenly taking a very bad turn for the worse.

India started its vaccination drive in January 2021. How do you think it has fared so far?
We took our time. We first started vaccinating healthcare workers (HCW) in mid-January, then added frontline workers (FLW) in early February and did not open up to the broader population until March. This may have allowed our core vaccination application – CoWIN – to stabilise and be tested on HCWs and FLWs, so as to iron out any glitches before it was rolled out to the general population. We also expanded the range of places that were allowed to vaccinate, including private hospitals and clinics, for a relatively small fee.

On the positive side, apart from a few starting glitches, we seem to not have had the kind of chaos seen in the United States in terms of arranging appointments for vaccination (people who were unable to engage with the web or the app were able to walk in to vaccination centres where they were assisted to enrol and get vaccinated). On the negative side, we seem to be vaccinating below capacity (actual vaccinations well below peak vaccinations, no vaccinations on Sunday, etc.) and possibly focusing more on the urban and peri-urban areas.

Also, we are only using two vaccines, Covishield and Covaxin (about 10% of the vaccines administered). We may have been able to expand capacity if we had allowed import of other vaccines like Pfizer-BioNTech and Moderna, which may not have been usable in many areas but which could have expanded supply in larger cities and private hospitals. We could have also imported other, less expensive, vaccines proposed to be manufactured in India, such as Sputnik V, which could be administered more widely (though with trained vaccination personnel because of the need to reconstitute, like Pfizer-BioNTech). But, we may have been prevented from doing so due to supply limitations.

The final concern that I have is that there is almost no outreach, no exhortation to get vaccinated, none of the saturation do gaz ki doori, mask hai zaroori that we saw for non-pharmaceutical interventions during the pandemic. There is also no concerned effort to bring vaccination centres closer to the people, though this is happening at a local level in some places, e.g., vaccination camps in community centres, apartment complexes, etc.

We were fortunate to begin the vaccination drive at a time when CoVID cases were dipping. On 1st April, we opened up the drive to all individuals above 45, amidst a second surge. Do you think we should have inoculated as many people as possible earlier, while cases were low, to avoid this situation? Is this a missed opportunity of sorts?
Yes, we could have vaccinated over 100 million people by now, if we had been able to advance the vaccination process by a month, starting the general population in February instead of March, if the app and web platform was operational and the supplies in place. Broadly speaking our most vulnerable are the persons over 60 who account for over half our deaths and those between 45 and 59 who account for another one-third. Among these, the most exposed are those living in urban areas. There are about 40 million people in urban areas above 60 years of age and another 60 million between 45 and 59. So, by now, we could have given all of these people at least one dose of the vaccine, if they had chosen to come forward to be vaccinated.

Since we do not know the rural / urban mix of people vaccinated (even roughly, estimated, for example, by the location of the vaccination centre), we cannot estimate how many people in the target population chose to get vaccinated and how many did not, because of vaccine hesitancy (they do not want to be vaccinated) or vaccine inaccessibility (they would like to be vaccinated but the centre is inaccessible). This is a major shortcoming.

Already, from the data on both the continuing uptake of first doses among HCW and FLW, which should have been completed by February and the share of eligible HCW and FLW who have come back for their second dose, we can see that a significant minority may not be enthusiastic about vaccination.

India’s vaccination strategy has so far been to vaccinate the vulnerable age groups. However given that we see increased mobility (to workplaces, socialising etc.) in younger age groups, would it be fair to assume that they act as super spreaders? In such a scenario, shouldn’t the vaccination strategy target this age group to avoid the spread of the infection between them and from them to older, more vulnerable groups?
Actually, the assumption that younger people infect other people more does not have any empirical support – it is not that it is false, just that there is no evidence for it either way. Indonesia is trying out such a strategy of vaccinating the younger population first (including allowing the private sector to import vaccines and vaccinate its workers), but there are two critical differences to be noted, of vulnerability and feasibility.

As noted earlier, about 85% of the deaths are of people more than 45 years old. This is therefore, the more vulnerable population (in advanced countries, the share of deaths in the 45-59 age group is much lower; less than 5% in Europe, compared to more than 30% in India).
The age group of 45 to 59 comprise 14% of the urban population and that of 60+ comprise another 9%, whereas the 18 to 44 age group makes up 46% of the population, i.e., more five times the number of 60+ people. So, starting with this group is much more feasible.
The vaccination drive has been fairly centralised, with the government exercising strict control. Given certain states like Maharashtra account for the majority of the cases in the country, do you think different states need a different vaccination strategy?
States should definitely have discretion as to where they locate the vaccination centres, etc. and it is my understanding that they do have that flexibility. However, it is more difficult to start vaccinating certain groups in certain locations, earlier, e.g., 30 year olds in Maharashtra compared to other states. It should definitely be possible to do so, in a consultative manner with other states indicating that stopping the surge in Maharashtra is to the benefit of all states, but it is not clear whether that degree of trust and maturity in the federal system has been nurtured by the Union government, and I am not pointing just to this government.

If we had this level of trust and co-operation, we could have definitely prioritised one geography over another. There is some disagreement over which geography should be prioritised, whether it should be the one experiencing a surge, that I would advocate or the one that is vulnerable but not yet infected, e.g., Bihar, but that is a different debate.

This would also help us in deciding when we should expand deeper into rural areas, beyond the urban and urban periphery. Implementing a two-dose vaccination programme in such areas is administratively complex, especially since people are difficult to reach for their second dose, due to shared phones, etc. In such a situation, it may be better to wait for a single-dose vaccine like the Janssen (Johnson and Johnson) vaccine, which will also be manufactured in India, especially since much of rural India has not been touched by the pandemic (though it can be argued that it leaves them more vulnerable).

Unpacking the IT Rules, 2021

READ THE BLOG BY ARCHANA SIVASUBRAMANIAN AND MANISH
TECHNOLOGY

The recently notified Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021 (“IT Rules”) are the result of multiple calls over the last few years for the regulation of digital content platforms, particularly social media intermediaries, OTT platforms and digital news services. Three particular strands of concern have coalesced into these calls: the growing menace of fake news, that has on occasion even resulted in deaths; the proliferation of online streaming platforms carrying un-moderated content that on other media (cinemas, television) has been subject to reasonably stringent regulation; and the increasing anxieties expressed over the power of “big tech” firms such as Twitter and Facebook, raising the need for regulations to curb their influence.

The IT Rules have come under criticism since their launch, with complaints of regulatory over-breadth and overreach. As many as five petitions have been filed in court challenging the Rules. Common objections include traceability, automated content removal, and takedown requirements for intermediaries; and the role of the government in grievance redressal for digital media and online curated content providers. Most of these objections have been articulated procedurally: that in seeking to impose these regulations, the rules are ultra vires the parent Act because they exceed the scope of what it permits, especially in terms of content blocking and takedown, and regulation of digital media platforms. These procedural objections are important, because delegated legislation is legally enforceable only when it is within the ambit of what is permitted under the parent law. However, while adherence to process is essential, there is a need for a strong substantive argument as well.

Recent experiences have shown us that a government that has Parliamentary majority can easily overcome procedural hurdles. And Parliamentary approval is not a guarantee for better regulations: take the Cable Television Networks (Regulation) Act, 1995, enacted in response to judicial observations regarding the regulation of cable TV, which as a medium was as new to the country then as digital media and online curated content are today. It resulted in a Programme Code that is applicable to all TV content, which does not seem to have been subject to any serious scrutiny despite several provisions being extremely vague and problematic. It is this Programme Code that the IT Rules extend to online content as well.

The key to good regulation is taking a principled approach to the issue at large, rather than knee-jerk reactions to an immediate problem. In the past, courts have asked for stringent internet regulation only in response to PILs that have highlighted an immediate crisis: ads for pre-natal sex determination, rape videos circulating online, online content accused of hurting religious sentiments, etc. Even with the IT Rules, the apex court mentioned that the rules have “no teeth” and has called for a legislation as instead. The argument that the IT Act does not permit regulation of digital media and the same should be done through Parliament is necessary but not sufficient, because while it may stymie the present Rules, it does not consider the consequences of their provisions being translated into a law. Hence, it is fundamental to scrutinise these Rules on first principles.

What would this look like? Substantively, it would involve a nuanced exploration of Fundamental Rights, especially Article 19(1)(a) on freedom of speech and expression and look at whether restrictions being placed on them through the regulations are necessary, reasonable, and proportionate. Procedurally, they would engage with tenets of participatory democracy: wide-ranging consultations, with all stakeholders being given the opportunity to comment and all concerns being taken on board. Neither process seems to have been followed while drafting the present IT Rules.

If we look at the regulatory aspects of the IT Rules, they require firms to submit and comply, rather than appropriately incentivise conduct. This has also revealed new fears about how this regulatory approach can deter the exercise of individual rights, for the current course seems to indicate that the government is attempting – similar to its attempts with the Personal Data Protection Bill (“PDP Bill”) –to eliminate the power of digital firms through its regulatory muscle, instead of creating a stable Indian internet ecosystem that incorporates independent checks and balances. It is also important to note here that the new rules have been enforced without a strong data governance framework. Moreover, the I&B Ministry’s claim to regulate content under the IT Rules is contrary to modern practice, including the Indian experience, of having regulatory bodies independent from the Government.

The IT Rules are symptomatic of a new kind of regulatory ecosystem emerging in India, also reflected in the PDP Bill’s call for data localisation. Besides being devoid of a principle-based approach, they make it clear that political economy is at the heart of India’s internet regulation. Are they preliminary markers to a digital nationalism – an “aatmanirbhar bharat” that runs the risk of eliding the difference between the nation and the government in power? Should power over the internet be concentrated in the hands of the state, rather than individual users? Answers to these larger questions will come only from a deeper understanding of the political economy of the state. To get them, we must argue on first principles, and not just on procedure.

Unpacking the 2019 Interim Budget

CPR FACULTY ANALYSE

The Narendra Modi government recently delivered the 2019 interim budget. As the last budget before the Lok Sabha elections, it included various pre-poll promises and big announcements such as a pension programme for workers, an income support scheme for farmers and tax rebate for middle class taxpayers. While the budget was criticised for being populist, it is also necessary to examine how it impacts key areas of concern such as health, unemployment, and education, especially in a post-demonetisation and GST economy. In this curated media commentary below, CPR faculty analyse the 2019 Interim Budget.

  • Yamini Aiyar comments in the ‘Hindustan Times ’ on the politics of the interim budget 2019 and the long term implications of the shift towards income transfers as a model for welfare.
  • Avani Kapur of the Accountability Initiative  at CPR writes in ‘IndiaSpend ’ that a look at the government’s financial commitments to the social sector suggests that ‘it still has no clear idea on how to realise its vision.’ Kapur compares allocations for flagship welfare schemes between 2018-19 and the latest interim budget and finds that rural development, health and maternal welfare schemes have been underfunded. She further reiterates this in ‘Deccan Herald ’ highlighting that ‘the Budget speech also made no mention of education.’ Kapur writes in ‘ThePrint ’ that despite a focus on rural development, allocations in this area saw a marginal increase. She also appeared on an interview with ‘The Wire ’ discussing the health budget and how Ayushman Bharat got a silent boost.
  • Kiran Bhatty writes in ‘The Wire ’ about how how critical areas of education and unemployment were left out of the interim budget. She highlights how the vision of the government ‘systematically excludes the poorest and most marginalised and avoids confronting one of the biggest crisis in the economy: that of employment and the employability (and education) of the youth.’

Union Budget 2018

CURATED ANALYSIS BY CPR FACULTY

 

As Budget 2018 was announced by the Union government on 1 February, find below a curated analysis by CPR faculty.

  • Yamini Aiyar writes in Live Mint  that while the budget is a new and evolving political statement, it is unlikely to improve Indians’ ‘ease of living’.
  • Kiran Bhatty writes in The Wire  that even though education is mentioned as a priority area in the Budget is an improvement, the averments are not matched by a commensurate allocation of resources.
  • Yamini Aiyar and Avani Kapur write in The Wire  that, even as schemes have received minimal allocations, this budget signals an important shift in the political narrative.
  • Avani Kapur writes in IndiaSpend  on how the ‘pro-poor’ messaging around the budget does not add up to the numbers, indicating a decline in funding for programmes for the poor.
  • In an interview  with The Wire, Yamini Aiyar discusses the implications of the budget on India’s social sector spending.
  • In the Deccan Herald, Avani Kapur takes a closer look at the Budget 2018 and critical questions on social sector allocations.
  • Sanjoy Hazarika writes in Economic Times on why the Budget 2018 is a missed opportunity for Modi’s ‘Act East’ policy.

Unpacking the Processes Involved in Declaring Udaipur Open Defecation Free

NEW STUDY BY ACCOUNTABILITY INTIATIVE AT CPR

 

On the request of the Udaipur district administration, the Accountability Initiative at the Centre for Policy Research undertook a sample survey of recently declared and verified Open Defecation Free (ODF) Gram Panchayats (GPs) in the district, in 2017. The study found significant gaps in the processes involved in achieving ODF, and resultantly found less than 100% toilet coverage and even lower usage, bringing into question the veracity of the ODF status.

While there have been a number of recent studies seeking to understand the status of sanitation in India, relatively fewer studies attempt to examine the processes involved in declaring villages or GPs as ODF. This study aimed at filling this lacuna by undertaking a detailed process evaluation of the recent sanitation efforts in Udaipur.

The study was conducted in a limited setting, and was designed to be representative only of the ODF GPs in Udaipur. However, the structural and systemic infirmities in the bureaucratic apparatus are not unique only to Udaipur administration. With Rs 30,973 crores allocated to rural sanitation by Government of India and over 4 lakh villages having been declared ODF, these findings therefore assume a national significance, especially as the Swachh Bharat Mission Period draws to a close. At the very least, it evidences the need to conduct similar assessments in other parts of the country, which have seen rapid ODF declarations since 2014.

The full case study can be accessed here.

Unpacking ‘Net-Zero’ Emissions, and a New Climate Agenda for India

TWO-PART SERIES IN HINDUSTAN TIMES BY NAVROZ K DUBASH

 

The year 2021 promises to be a blockbuster for global climate politics. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) will release its report this year, updated national pledges on emission limits are expected, and all this is on the table at a climate Conference of Parties in the United Kingdom (UK) in November. Not least, a re-invigorated Joe Biden-led United States (US) has placed the climate crisis near the top of its foreign policy agenda.

There is plenty at stake for India, including diplomatic, economic and climate outcomes. There is global pressure on India to telegraph its intentions as early as the US-hosted Climate Leaders Summit in April, or a UK-hosted G-7 Summit in June.

What should India say, and do? We are pleased to share a new two-part series in the Hindustan Times by Navroz K. Dubash which outlines a new approach to Indian climate policy, action, and leadership. We also include links to relevant blog posts, and selected quotes in the press.

In the Hindustan Times:

Part 1: Net-zero emission targets are a hollow pledge

By Navroz K. Dubash

India needs to define its climate policies in ways that meet diplomatic, developmental and climate interests simultaneously. A net-zero pledge by 2050, particularly if bound in law, would likely win us diplomatic credit, but will risk our development future, and ironically, may not, in practice, accelerate our transition to a low-carbon future.

Part 2: Proposing a new climate agenda for India

By Navroz K. Dubash

In India, a focus on development pathways requires three steps: sectoral transition plans for key areas of the economy; strong institutions for climate governance; and economy-wide targets that emphasise near-term actions.

In Environmentality, a blog by the Centre for Policy Research:

Blog: Should India consider a net-zero climate pledge?

By Navroz K. Dubash

Instead of uncritically joining the net-zero bandwagon, India could usefully advocate broadening of what counts as desirable climate action to include not just ambition, but also implementation.

Excerpt: Durable national institutions for climate governance

By Navroz K. Dubash 
In a recent contribution to MIT Technology Review, Dubash highlights the role of institutions in our collective response to climate change.

Quick Takes in the Press

  • “We don’t know exactly how we will do it and what are the potential trade-offs with development objectives. […] For countries such as India, the most important thing is to achieve the greatest development for the fewest additional emissions,” says Dubash. “Instead of setting a distant net-zero goal, India should figure out ways to avoid locking in high-carbon infrastructure.” In Bloomberg on March 17.
  • “A climate change commission is useful, but not one articulated solely or even mostly around carbon budgets,” says Dubash. “Meeting carbon budgets does not animate Indian politics and policy, transformational sectoral change does.” In Climate Home News on March 18.
  • “For the industrialised countries, the language of net zero seems to be very big. But I would welcome them telling us what that translates to in the next 10 years, and how are you going to get there? While we talk about an ‘ambition gap’ regarding emissions reductions,” says Dubash, “we also need to address the ‘implementation gap.'” In Mint Lounge on March 19.
  • “I’m completely in favor of having a focal point for global policy, but I sometimes worry that the tail shouldn’t wag the dog here,” says Dubash. “We want to not just have countries saying that they’re going to do something very progressive, we want to have hard evidence that they will actually do it.” In Lights On: The Weekend Read on February 21.

Unpacking India-China Relations

FULL VIDEO OF DISCUSSION
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

Watch the full video (above) of the discussion between Ambassador Shyam Saran, Srinath Raghavan and Zorawar Daulet Singh, where they analyse the complicated relationship between India and China.

As the dust settles from the last year’s Doklam Standoff between India and China, relationship between the two neighbours has entered a state of flux. Even as domestic political priorities have come to the fore in both countries, India and China are discovering new spots of friction and struggling to evolve a sustainable framework of cooperation.

Against the backdrop of the latest diplomatic efforts by both sides to put the relationship on an even keel, Centre for Policy Research’s (CPR) in-house experts on Chinese and Indian foreign policy consider the geopolitics, strategy and economics underpinning this new conjuncture in India-China relations and its implications for the two countries, for Asia and beyond.

Ambassador Shyam Saran is a senior fellow at CPR, a former foreign secretary and has served as the Prime Minister’s Special Envoy for Nuclear Affairs and Climate Change, as well as chairman of the National Security Advisory Board.

Srinath Raghavan is a senior fellow at CPR. He is also a senior research fellow at the India Institute at King’s College, London.

Zorawar Daulet Singh is an author and foreign affairs analyst. He is a Fellow at the CPR. He is also an Adjunct Fellow with the Institute of Chinese Studies and a Visiting Fellow at the Forum for Strategic Initiative.

The question and answer session that followed can be accessed here.

Unpacking the Implications of the National Register of Citizens (NRC) Exercise in Assam

READ THE CURATED ANALYSIS BY CPR SCHOLARS

 

The final list of the National Register of Citizens (NRC) in Assam was published in August this year. The objective of the list was to identify illegal immigrants in the state. On publication, it was discovered that nearly 2 million people have been excluded from the list, thus making them vulnerable to the threat of statelessness.

Scholars at CPR have closely followed the NRC exercise and analysed its implications. In July 2018, Honorary Research Professor, Sanjoy Hazarika, wrote in Economic & Political Weekly, about defining citizenship in Assam. He points that the publication of the NRC is unlikely to resolve the controversy over illegal immigration from Bangladesh, which spans over four decades. His article can be read here.

In the curated analysis below, CPR scholars unpack the implications of this exercise, raising critical questions about citizenship, rights and the role of bureaucracy:

Yamini Aiyar writes in Hindustan Times about how the NRC has brought to light the challenges to the ‘construction of citizenship in contemporary India.’ Aiyar highlights that the NRC ‘is illustrative of the ways in which the politics of religion has increasingly begun to intersect with institutional processes to shape understandings of who is a ‘legal’ citizen.’ She states that the flawed NRC process has provided the political fuel to push the demand for The Citizenship Amendment Bill, a bill that can have dangerous consequences as it fundamentally remakes citizenship in India.

In August 2018, Yamini Aiyar wrote in Hindustan Times about how the State’s excessive reliance on papers and documents for proving citizenship has become an instrument of state coercion and politically driven exclusion. Aiyar highlights how a combination of bureaucratic failure and vulnerability to corruption, made the NRC exercise arbitrary and disempowering.

Yamini Aiyar also appeared on an episode of Hindustan Times’ The Big Picture to discuss the various facets of the NRC exercise, including questions about the idea of Indian citizenship, politics of religion, judicial intervention and bureaucratic capacity.

Sanjib Baruah writes in The Indian Express about how ‘defining hundreds and thousands of people living in the country as non-citizens will create a new form of precarious citizenship — people with fewer rights and entitlements.’ Baruah highlights that while India is unlikely to deport those who fail the NRC test, creation of such a citizenship is ‘uncharted and potentially dangerous territory for a democracy.’

Sanjoy Hazarika writes in The Hindu about concerns over how the State government plans to solve the issue of stateless citizens after the NRC exercise. He questions if there is a detailed process in place while such individuals apply to tribunals and courts for relief, and how the government will deal with those who are declared non-citizens, especially if Bangladesh refuses to take them. Hazarika highlights that the basic dignity of the weak, voiceless and vulnerable is at stake, pointing out that ‘many of those who are off the list are poor, cannot afford lawyers and may not even know of their right to legal aid.’

In July 2018, Sanjoy Hazarika wrote in The Tribune about the implications of the NRC exercise post the publication of the second draft list. Hazarika highlights that ‘the Centre and the state have become unnerved by the specter of looming statelessness that they have neither the skills, understanding or will to deal with.’

Sanjoy Hazarika writes in Al Jazeera about how the campaign to update the NRC has upset everyone, including its proponents. He sheds light on the challenges that those who will have to seek legal recourse due to exclusion from the list will face, highlighting, ‘this is a thankless and frightening prospect of prolonged litigation for even the well-to-do, which a large number of those off the NRC are not. How will they sustain their lives and families, not just the litigation?’