Urbanisation, Demographic Transition, and the Growth of Cities in India

FULL VIDEO OF TALK
URBAN GOVERNANCE URBAN ECONOMY

Watch the full video of the workshop (above), where Chinmay Tumbe speaks about his paper examining the nature of urbanisation and urban growth in India since the late 19th century, against the backdrop of the unfolding demographic transition.

Through this talk, Tumbe seeks to address various factors that affect India’s relatively slow pace of urbanisation, such as the inter-city variation in population growth rates, and the paradox of faster urban growth in the North combined with slower urbanisation in the South.

The question and answer session that followed can be accessed here. More information about the talk can be found on the event page.

Union Budget 2018

CURATED ANALYSIS BY CPR FACULTY

 

As Budget 2018 was announced by the Union government on 1 February, find below a curated analysis by CPR faculty.

  • Yamini Aiyar writes in Live Mint  that while the budget is a new and evolving political statement, it is unlikely to improve Indians’ ‘ease of living’.
  • Kiran Bhatty writes in The Wire  that even though education is mentioned as a priority area in the Budget is an improvement, the averments are not matched by a commensurate allocation of resources.
  • Yamini Aiyar and Avani Kapur write in The Wire  that, even as schemes have received minimal allocations, this budget signals an important shift in the political narrative.
  • Avani Kapur writes in IndiaSpend  on how the ‘pro-poor’ messaging around the budget does not add up to the numbers, indicating a decline in funding for programmes for the poor.
  • In an interview  with The Wire, Yamini Aiyar discusses the implications of the budget on India’s social sector spending.
  • In the Deccan Herald, Avani Kapur takes a closer look at the Budget 2018 and critical questions on social sector allocations.
  • Sanjoy Hazarika writes in Economic Times on why the Budget 2018 is a missed opportunity for Modi’s ‘Act East’ policy.

Unpacking ‘Net-Zero’ Emissions, and a New Climate Agenda for India

TWO-PART SERIES IN HINDUSTAN TIMES BY NAVROZ K DUBASH

 

The year 2021 promises to be a blockbuster for global climate politics. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) will release its report this year, updated national pledges on emission limits are expected, and all this is on the table at a climate Conference of Parties in the United Kingdom (UK) in November. Not least, a re-invigorated Joe Biden-led United States (US) has placed the climate crisis near the top of its foreign policy agenda.

There is plenty at stake for India, including diplomatic, economic and climate outcomes. There is global pressure on India to telegraph its intentions as early as the US-hosted Climate Leaders Summit in April, or a UK-hosted G-7 Summit in June.

What should India say, and do? We are pleased to share a new two-part series in the Hindustan Times by Navroz K. Dubash which outlines a new approach to Indian climate policy, action, and leadership. We also include links to relevant blog posts, and selected quotes in the press.

In the Hindustan Times:

Part 1: Net-zero emission targets are a hollow pledge

By Navroz K. Dubash

India needs to define its climate policies in ways that meet diplomatic, developmental and climate interests simultaneously. A net-zero pledge by 2050, particularly if bound in law, would likely win us diplomatic credit, but will risk our development future, and ironically, may not, in practice, accelerate our transition to a low-carbon future.

Part 2: Proposing a new climate agenda for India

By Navroz K. Dubash

In India, a focus on development pathways requires three steps: sectoral transition plans for key areas of the economy; strong institutions for climate governance; and economy-wide targets that emphasise near-term actions.

In Environmentality, a blog by the Centre for Policy Research:

Blog: Should India consider a net-zero climate pledge?

By Navroz K. Dubash

Instead of uncritically joining the net-zero bandwagon, India could usefully advocate broadening of what counts as desirable climate action to include not just ambition, but also implementation.

Excerpt: Durable national institutions for climate governance

By Navroz K. Dubash 
In a recent contribution to MIT Technology Review, Dubash highlights the role of institutions in our collective response to climate change.

Quick Takes in the Press

  • “We don’t know exactly how we will do it and what are the potential trade-offs with development objectives. […] For countries such as India, the most important thing is to achieve the greatest development for the fewest additional emissions,” says Dubash. “Instead of setting a distant net-zero goal, India should figure out ways to avoid locking in high-carbon infrastructure.” In Bloomberg on March 17.
  • “A climate change commission is useful, but not one articulated solely or even mostly around carbon budgets,” says Dubash. “Meeting carbon budgets does not animate Indian politics and policy, transformational sectoral change does.” In Climate Home News on March 18.
  • “For the industrialised countries, the language of net zero seems to be very big. But I would welcome them telling us what that translates to in the next 10 years, and how are you going to get there? While we talk about an ‘ambition gap’ regarding emissions reductions,” says Dubash, “we also need to address the ‘implementation gap.'” In Mint Lounge on March 19.
  • “I’m completely in favor of having a focal point for global policy, but I sometimes worry that the tail shouldn’t wag the dog here,” says Dubash. “We want to not just have countries saying that they’re going to do something very progressive, we want to have hard evidence that they will actually do it.” In Lights On: The Weekend Read on February 21.

Unpacking India-China Relations

FULL VIDEO OF DISCUSSION
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

Watch the full video (above) of the discussion between Ambassador Shyam Saran, Srinath Raghavan and Zorawar Daulet Singh, where they analyse the complicated relationship between India and China.

As the dust settles from the last year’s Doklam Standoff between India and China, relationship between the two neighbours has entered a state of flux. Even as domestic political priorities have come to the fore in both countries, India and China are discovering new spots of friction and struggling to evolve a sustainable framework of cooperation.

Against the backdrop of the latest diplomatic efforts by both sides to put the relationship on an even keel, Centre for Policy Research’s (CPR) in-house experts on Chinese and Indian foreign policy consider the geopolitics, strategy and economics underpinning this new conjuncture in India-China relations and its implications for the two countries, for Asia and beyond.

Ambassador Shyam Saran is a senior fellow at CPR, a former foreign secretary and has served as the Prime Minister’s Special Envoy for Nuclear Affairs and Climate Change, as well as chairman of the National Security Advisory Board.

Srinath Raghavan is a senior fellow at CPR. He is also a senior research fellow at the India Institute at King’s College, London.

Zorawar Daulet Singh is an author and foreign affairs analyst. He is a Fellow at the CPR. He is also an Adjunct Fellow with the Institute of Chinese Studies and a Visiting Fellow at the Forum for Strategic Initiative.

The question and answer session that followed can be accessed here.

Unpacking India’s Second COVID-19 Wave and Vaccination Strategy

India’s vaccination drive began in January 2021. The recent rise in daily COVID-19 cases and deaths however, has been worrying. What led to the second surge in the country? How has the vaccination drive fared so far? Is India’s vaccination strategy the correct one? As certain states account for majority of the cases, how should the government alter its approach to contain the spread of the virus? Partha Mukhopadhyay, Senior Fellow at CPR, who has been closely tracking the pandemic, sheds light in this interview.

What according to you are the reasons for India’s second surge? A few months ago, we witnessed a steady decline in new cases. What has happened?
The short answer is: we don’t know. The other answer is: it had to happen. The surprise in India was that cases were going down steadily since mid-September, even as behaviour was becoming less and less CoVID-appropriate. It had to happen sometime and it happened in early to mid-February.

If the nature of CoVID infections is heterogeneous, i.e., (i) a few people mix with a lot of people and most people mix with few people and (ii) a few infected people infect a lot of people and lot of infected people do not infect others (or very few), then, it is the case that these kinds of localised spurts in infections can happen as part of the evolution of the pandemic. This is one of the results that we showed in our paper. So, from that perspective, this is not unusual.

There can be other, more deterministic, explanations, such as a variant, infective strain such as the B.1.1.7 variant that appears to dominate samples from Punjab or super-spreader events like election gatherings. Not enough information is being released about variants and genomic sequencing to answer this question, but it is odd that the Maharashtra surge started away from the major metros of the Golden Triangle (Nashik, Pune, Mumbai) in the smaller towns of Vidarbha, which is less likely to have imported variants. These areas were holding Gram Panchayat elections and celebrations took place in late January, but this also sounds a little over-determined since a lot of gatherings have been taking place around the country. A number of cases in Maharashtra were also reported from school hostels, after re-opening.

There is no particular evidence that testing in some states were low relative to other states, though it did decline for all states. Nor are there striking differences in mobility across states. But, wherever it started, it is now clear that the spread is much wider, as seen in Figure 1. In panel A, it is seen that the positivity (people testing positive as a share of people tested) in February 10 – March 10 of 2021 is much less than that over the period November 10, 2020 – February 10, 2021, except for Maharashtra, which had already started rising by this time. However, when we look at March 10-25, compared to the Feb – March period, in panel B, we see a striking increase in positivity in many states, indicating the spread of the second surge.

It is perhaps useful here to address the issue of sero-positivity surveys and herd immunity. Some commentators attributed the decline that occurred over September to January, to growing herd immunity, pointing to the high level of sero-positivity found in many surveys. However, these surveys seem to be at odds with the current experience, for example, one of the worst hit cities at the moment is Pune, which also had some of the highest sero-positivity numbers reported. It is the same for Bangalore and, also to some extent for Mumbai. It is possible that the current cases are concentrated in particular social classes and age-groups, while the sero-positivity were in other social classes, e.g., slum residents, but this is not something we know without more information.

Even if this sero-positivity hypothesis is accurate, an unexplained part of the hypothesis was the large number of unreported infections – indicating that these were most likely asymptomatic or very mildly symptomatic, also explaining why there was such limited reporting and relatively little pressure on hospitals. In this surge too, a very high proportion of asymptomatic cases is being reported, well over 80% in Mumbai. There has been no explanation for why Indian cases should be so asymptomatic. It is not that infected persons are much younger, though the share of 50+ is about 7% lower.

Another pattern that seems to be repeated from the early days of the pandemic is that a large number of the deaths, while fewer, are happening relatively soon after coming to hospital, implying that they are reporting late or the progression of the disease is suddenly taking a very bad turn for the worse.

India started its vaccination drive in January 2021. How do you think it has fared so far?
We took our time. We first started vaccinating healthcare workers (HCW) in mid-January, then added frontline workers (FLW) in early February and did not open up to the broader population until March. This may have allowed our core vaccination application – CoWIN – to stabilise and be tested on HCWs and FLWs, so as to iron out any glitches before it was rolled out to the general population. We also expanded the range of places that were allowed to vaccinate, including private hospitals and clinics, for a relatively small fee.

On the positive side, apart from a few starting glitches, we seem to not have had the kind of chaos seen in the United States in terms of arranging appointments for vaccination (people who were unable to engage with the web or the app were able to walk in to vaccination centres where they were assisted to enrol and get vaccinated). On the negative side, we seem to be vaccinating below capacity (actual vaccinations well below peak vaccinations, no vaccinations on Sunday, etc.) and possibly focusing more on the urban and peri-urban areas.

Also, we are only using two vaccines, Covishield and Covaxin (about 10% of the vaccines administered). We may have been able to expand capacity if we had allowed import of other vaccines like Pfizer-BioNTech and Moderna, which may not have been usable in many areas but which could have expanded supply in larger cities and private hospitals. We could have also imported other, less expensive, vaccines proposed to be manufactured in India, such as Sputnik V, which could be administered more widely (though with trained vaccination personnel because of the need to reconstitute, like Pfizer-BioNTech). But, we may have been prevented from doing so due to supply limitations.

The final concern that I have is that there is almost no outreach, no exhortation to get vaccinated, none of the saturation do gaz ki doori, mask hai zaroori that we saw for non-pharmaceutical interventions during the pandemic. There is also no concerned effort to bring vaccination centres closer to the people, though this is happening at a local level in some places, e.g., vaccination camps in community centres, apartment complexes, etc.

We were fortunate to begin the vaccination drive at a time when CoVID cases were dipping. On 1st April, we opened up the drive to all individuals above 45, amidst a second surge. Do you think we should have inoculated as many people as possible earlier, while cases were low, to avoid this situation? Is this a missed opportunity of sorts?
Yes, we could have vaccinated over 100 million people by now, if we had been able to advance the vaccination process by a month, starting the general population in February instead of March, if the app and web platform was operational and the supplies in place. Broadly speaking our most vulnerable are the persons over 60 who account for over half our deaths and those between 45 and 59 who account for another one-third. Among these, the most exposed are those living in urban areas. There are about 40 million people in urban areas above 60 years of age and another 60 million between 45 and 59. So, by now, we could have given all of these people at least one dose of the vaccine, if they had chosen to come forward to be vaccinated.

Since we do not know the rural / urban mix of people vaccinated (even roughly, estimated, for example, by the location of the vaccination centre), we cannot estimate how many people in the target population chose to get vaccinated and how many did not, because of vaccine hesitancy (they do not want to be vaccinated) or vaccine inaccessibility (they would like to be vaccinated but the centre is inaccessible). This is a major shortcoming.

Already, from the data on both the continuing uptake of first doses among HCW and FLW, which should have been completed by February and the share of eligible HCW and FLW who have come back for their second dose, we can see that a significant minority may not be enthusiastic about vaccination.

India’s vaccination strategy has so far been to vaccinate the vulnerable age groups. However given that we see increased mobility (to workplaces, socialising etc.) in younger age groups, would it be fair to assume that they act as super spreaders? In such a scenario, shouldn’t the vaccination strategy target this age group to avoid the spread of the infection between them and from them to older, more vulnerable groups?
Actually, the assumption that younger people infect other people more does not have any empirical support – it is not that it is false, just that there is no evidence for it either way. Indonesia is trying out such a strategy of vaccinating the younger population first (including allowing the private sector to import vaccines and vaccinate its workers), but there are two critical differences to be noted, of vulnerability and feasibility.

As noted earlier, about 85% of the deaths are of people more than 45 years old. This is therefore, the more vulnerable population (in advanced countries, the share of deaths in the 45-59 age group is much lower; less than 5% in Europe, compared to more than 30% in India).
The age group of 45 to 59 comprise 14% of the urban population and that of 60+ comprise another 9%, whereas the 18 to 44 age group makes up 46% of the population, i.e., more five times the number of 60+ people. So, starting with this group is much more feasible.
The vaccination drive has been fairly centralised, with the government exercising strict control. Given certain states like Maharashtra account for the majority of the cases in the country, do you think different states need a different vaccination strategy?
States should definitely have discretion as to where they locate the vaccination centres, etc. and it is my understanding that they do have that flexibility. However, it is more difficult to start vaccinating certain groups in certain locations, earlier, e.g., 30 year olds in Maharashtra compared to other states. It should definitely be possible to do so, in a consultative manner with other states indicating that stopping the surge in Maharashtra is to the benefit of all states, but it is not clear whether that degree of trust and maturity in the federal system has been nurtured by the Union government, and I am not pointing just to this government.

If we had this level of trust and co-operation, we could have definitely prioritised one geography over another. There is some disagreement over which geography should be prioritised, whether it should be the one experiencing a surge, that I would advocate or the one that is vulnerable but not yet infected, e.g., Bihar, but that is a different debate.

This would also help us in deciding when we should expand deeper into rural areas, beyond the urban and urban periphery. Implementing a two-dose vaccination programme in such areas is administratively complex, especially since people are difficult to reach for their second dose, due to shared phones, etc. In such a situation, it may be better to wait for a single-dose vaccine like the Janssen (Johnson and Johnson) vaccine, which will also be manufactured in India, especially since much of rural India has not been touched by the pandemic (though it can be argued that it leaves them more vulnerable).

Unpacking the ‘informal’ summit at Wuhan between India and China in April, 2018

CPR FACULTY ANALYSE THE SUMMIT AND THE WAY FORWARD

 

With growing tensions between India and China, which reached a critically low point with the prolonged military stand-off at Doklam in the summer of 2017, the ‘informal’ summit between Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President Xi Jinping held on 27-28 April, 2018, raised considerable interest. Especially since Jinping invited Modi to his hometown in China in an unprecedented manner. CPR faculty analyse the summit and the way forward in the curated media commentary below.

  • Shyam Saran writes in the Scroll that the summit indicates that ‘Doklam may have triggered a rethink on India-China relations going beyond tactical compulsions.’ According to Saran, even though the summit is a response to ‘growing uncertainty in both the regional geopolitical landscape in Asia and the world’, it is only likely to provide a ‘brief breathing space’ to India, unless India builds up her economic and military abilities rapidly.
  • Zorawar Daulet Singh published a series of articles and appeared in media interviews on the summit. In The Hindu, he writes that the summit is ‘a mutual recognition in both India and China that a posture of hostility has undermined their interests.’ He reiterates this in an interview for The Wire, also unpacking in detail how the geopolitical uncertainty negatively impacted both countries at different levels spurring this course correction, even though it may not mean the end of all hostilities. He also made a television appearance on CGTN America, one of the international language channels run by Chinese state broadcaster, and wrote in Hindi in Live Hindustan.
  • G Parthasarathy writes in The Hindu Business Line that the Wuhan summit has come in the wake of growing international pressures on China, and India must use the opportunity to resolve border issues and secure market access, while continuing to strengthen its military preparedness.

Unpacking the 2019 Interim Budget

CPR FACULTY ANALYSE

The Narendra Modi government recently delivered the 2019 interim budget. As the last budget before the Lok Sabha elections, it included various pre-poll promises and big announcements such as a pension programme for workers, an income support scheme for farmers and tax rebate for middle class taxpayers. While the budget was criticised for being populist, it is also necessary to examine how it impacts key areas of concern such as health, unemployment, and education, especially in a post-demonetisation and GST economy. In this curated media commentary below, CPR faculty analyse the 2019 Interim Budget.

  • Yamini Aiyar comments in the ‘Hindustan Times ’ on the politics of the interim budget 2019 and the long term implications of the shift towards income transfers as a model for welfare.
  • Avani Kapur of the Accountability Initiative  at CPR writes in ‘IndiaSpend ’ that a look at the government’s financial commitments to the social sector suggests that ‘it still has no clear idea on how to realise its vision.’ Kapur compares allocations for flagship welfare schemes between 2018-19 and the latest interim budget and finds that rural development, health and maternal welfare schemes have been underfunded. She further reiterates this in ‘Deccan Herald ’ highlighting that ‘the Budget speech also made no mention of education.’ Kapur writes in ‘ThePrint ’ that despite a focus on rural development, allocations in this area saw a marginal increase. She also appeared on an interview with ‘The Wire ’ discussing the health budget and how Ayushman Bharat got a silent boost.
  • Kiran Bhatty writes in ‘The Wire ’ about how how critical areas of education and unemployment were left out of the interim budget. She highlights how the vision of the government ‘systematically excludes the poorest and most marginalised and avoids confronting one of the biggest crisis in the economy: that of employment and the employability (and education) of the youth.’

Unpacking the central concepts and guiding principles of the Paris Agreement

TWO NEW BOOK CHAPTERS BY LAVANYA RAJAMANI.
PARIS AGREEMENT CLIMATE RESEARCH

Recently published by the Oxford University Press, The Paris Agreement on Climate Change features two book chapters written by Lavanya Rajamani, including i) Central Concepts in the Paris Agreement and How They Evolved and, ii) Guiding Principles and General Obligation (Article 2.2 and Article 3).

An edited volume of essays, the book provides an analysis of the legal requirements of the Paris Agreement, and clarifies the content of the provisions, placing them in context and elaborating on key issues surrounding the Agreement.

In the first of the two chapters, Rajamani charts the evolution of the central concepts in the Paris Agreement. She and her co-author argue that the Paris Agreement relies on a few key concepts to ensure its acceptability, namely those of ambition of a global effort to reduce the emission of greenhouse gases, differentiation between developed and developing countries, and, the provision of support towards climate change efforts.

These concepts underpinned the four years of negotiations that led up to the Paris Agreement. An examination of these concepts, and how they play out in the text of Agreement, reveals the delicate balance the Agreement manages between a sincere commitment to climate change efforts while remaining sensitive to political, scientific and technical advances, and national circumstances and capabilities.

In the second chapter, Rajamani focuses more specifically on guiding principles of the Agreement articulated in Article 2.2 and Article 3 of the Paris Agreement. These include equity and common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities in light of different national circumstances.

The chapter traces the difficult history of these principles at previous negotiations, and provides insight into the carefully chosen language that has critical significance. It also analyses how these principles have been operationalised across mitigation, adaptation, transparency, and, support.

For more details on the book, please visit the publisher page.

Additionally, Lavanya Rajamani has written extensively on the Paris Agreement for Annuaire Français De Droit International, the Journal of International Environmental Law, and, International and Comparative Law Quarterly, to name a select few. Her co-authored book, International Climate Change Law, published in May this year, discusses the Paris Agreement in depth.

Watch out for her article with Jutta Brunnée on ‘The Legality of Downgrading Nationally Determined Contributions under the Paris Agreement: Lessons from the US Disengagement’, which will be out in the next issue of the Journal of Environmental Law.

More information on her work can be accessed here.

Unpacking the Citizenship Amendment Act

READ THE CURATED MEDIA COMMENTARY BY SCHOLARS AT CPR

 

The Upper and Lower Houses of the Indian Parliament recently passed the The Citizenship Amendment Bill (CAB). The Bill seeks to fast track citizenship for persons belonging to specified minority communities, namely Hindus, Sikhs, Jains, Parsis and Christians from a specified list of neighbours – Afghanistan, Bangladesh and Pakistan. The passing of the Bill led to protests across the country, particularly in the northeast. In this curated media commentary below, scholars at CPR unpack the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA), examine reasons behind why it is being met by such opposition and shed light on what the Act means for notions of citizenship and who is an ‘Indian’.

Sanjib Baruah writes in Frontline about how the CAB marks a historic departure from India’s long-standing disavowal of the Two Nation Theory – the narrative behind the creation of Pakistan. Baruah highlights that the CAB radically changes the meaning of Indian citizenship and introduces a distinction between Hindu and Muslim immigrants crossing Partition borders.

Sanjoy Hazarika writes in The Quint about how the CAB’s ad hoc approach ignores complexities, calling for introspection, immense patience and dialogue. Hazarika underscores that the Bill ‘scraps’ the 1985 Assam Accord, an agreement that brought an end to a six-year agitation, which had taken thousands of lives, disrupted the economy, and toppled several state governments.

Sanjoy Hazarika writes in Outlook India about why Assam and adjoining states in the northeast have erupted in protest against the CAB. Hazarika points that much anger was simmering after the National Register of Citizens (NRC) in Assam turned up an ‘excluded list’ of 1.9 million (majority of whom were Hindu and remain unsure of their future). The CAB appeared to be dismissive of Assam’s concerns with several fearing that granting citizenship to people who have come illegally over the decades from Bangladesh, Afghanistan and Pakistan could change the state’s demography. Hazarika questions the possibility of the CAB triggering violence against minority groups in other countries whom India seeks to protect, highlighting that ‘asserting the trinity of liberty, equality and inclusivity could help even at this very late hour’.

Sanjoy Hazarika writes in CNBCTV18 analysing the situation in Assam. He points that while the CAB and NRC are different exercises and will be rolled out that way in other parts of the country – the same isn’t true for Assam or other northeastern states. Hazarika writes that ‘the doors to dialogue must be kept open and those opposing the government and its plans must do so peacefully, constitutionally and democratically’.

Neelanjan Sircar writes in Hindustan Times about the similarities between today’s Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and the Congress under Indira Gandhi in the 60s and 70s. Sircar highlights that while the BJP looks like it will be in control for the foreseeable future, politics can change in a moment’s time, with one rarely seeing the downfall coming. He writes, ‘when people are angry and frustrated enough, no amount of social control can hem them in’.

Yamini Aiyar writes in Hindustan Times about how India is weakened when secularism is threatened, threatening the country’s multiple identities. She writes, ‘the real challenge that protests and resistance to the CAA and NRC face today is that they are bereft of a vocabulary to defend secularism’s cause even though it is the threat to secularism that sparked these protests’. Aiyar stresses on the urgent need for India to wrest and reclaim secularism, anchoring it in a new vocabulary that redeems its credibility.

In October 2019, Yamini Aiyar wrote in Hindustan Times about how given the import of the CAB, real resistance to the Bill necessitates a robust defence of secularism. She highlights that the failure of the Opposition to mobilise political resistance to the CAB is worrying, and has pushed secularism to the margins of our polity.

Sanjib Baruah writes in Indian Express about the experiences of other countries that had, in the past, adopted an ideology-driven refugee policy. Baruah however laments that ‘our country’s current snap, uninformed, and policy-illiterate style of law-making does not allow for learning from the experience of others’. He states that those protesting against the law have just fears founded on history and past accumulated experience.

Shylashri Shankar writes in Open, The Magazine how the CAA-NRC combine inflicts a deep wound on the Constitution’s fabric. She illustrates how the threat of these moves could play out by creating a fear psychosis among document-less Muslim citizens of India about their citizenship rights and about their ability to remain in their religion.

G Parthasarathy writes in The Hindu Business Line about how Pakistan can use the CAA to run down India in neighbouring Islamic countries and across its Indian Ocean neighbourhood. He highlights the need to acknowledge the adverse criticism from the media, think tanks and civil society organisations from across the world on developments in India, cautioning that ‘we should not take all criticism abroad as being deliberately, or maliciously, hostile’. He further stresses on the importance of ensuring that the population along the north-eastern borders are at peace with themselves and the rest of the country.

Citizenship (Amendment) Act: Some facts vs Mythbusters by Sanjoy Hazarika

Sanjoy Hazarika writes in The Economic Times about how answers given in government statements regarding the CAA have only muddled waters. While the government’s effort at reaching out those opposing the legislation is important, Hazarika writes, ‘this should have been done much earlier, when the build-up of support and opposition to the Act was clear’.

In an episode of The Big Picture by Hindustan Times, Sanjoy Hazarika highlights reasons behind why the CAA has been met with sharp resentment in the northeast.

In an episode of The Big Fight by NDTV, Yamini Aiyar analyses the goverment’s reaction to the protests against the CAA and NRC. She highlights that the state as an entity has always had a monopoly over violence but India holds on to its democracy very closely and dearly, and hence whenever the state pushes the envelope and uses violence, people come out on the street to protect their rights. Aiyar says that this is a testament to both democracy and to the insecurity of the state. She further cautions that playing with the secular core of the country will result in deep division.

In an interview with Rediff.com, Sanjoy Hazarika sheds light on the fears of the northeast with respect to the CAA. Hazarika says, ‘the reaction to CAA is the resentment of people that they really have not been consulted on this, that their concerns have not been taken into consideration’. He further says that the government must never close the door on dialogue.

Yamini Aiyar writes in Hindustan Times several states are opposing the CAA, thus taking a stand against the BJP’s majoritarian push. She calls the protests against the CAA-NRC combine ‘a reclamation of India’s pluralism’ and highlights that ‘it is through this reclamation that India’s federal aspiration is witnessing a resurgence.’ Aiyar however cautions that these early signs of resurgence must be viewed with cautious optimism. She analyses that the BJP is likely to harden its ideological stance and deepen its centralising instincts in the fiscal and administrative arena, leaving states with little room for manoeuvre, given the resistance it is facing. Further, ‘states will have to take a principled stance against the BJP’s attempts to consolidate majoritarian identity, and articulate a convincing ideological alternative anchored in federalism and secularism even as it risks vote banks.’

Rajshree Chandra writes in The Wire about Jaggi Vasudev Sadhguru’s defence of the CAA-NRC combine. She highlights that his speech contained several untruths and writes ‘he missed facts, history and law, and he missed their connections. But above all he missed what he beseeches us all to have – compassion.’ Chandra goes on to explain why the CAA and the NRC are discriminatory and highlights, ‘for someone who understands the law so insufficiently, Sadhguru really treads where angels fear to tread.’

Asaf Ali Lone writes in The Wire, examining the CAA-NRC combine through the lens of urbanisation, highlighting the intersection between identity, spaces, religion and politics. He writes, ‘the processes of ‘partition’ are witnessed in the everyday life of the ordinary Muslim resident of the city when a building, street, language, ritual or attire becomes associated exclusively with Muslim identity’. Lone highlights how the CAA and the NRC represent the lethal move to make India a Hindu rashtra, by weeding out Muslims. He further writes, that much depends on the ‘Hindu’ majority – whether it will say yes to a majoritarian consensus or not as the state cannot rule without it.

Shyam Saran writes in The Tribune about how the constitutional benchmarks India had set for itself are being questioned, derided and violated. He highlights that the CAA ‘announces an imagining of India starkly different from what the Constitution envisioned.’ Saran writes that ‘the alternative imagining of India is a country that privileges the adherents of the Hindu faith. It is based on the as yet untested assumption that an overarching Hindu identity, ranging across sectarian, caste, regional and linguistic differences can be constructed on a Hindu-Muslim binary.’ He highlights that government action must imbibe the spirit of the Indian Constitution, in the same spirit as the government’s slogan of ‘Sabka Saath, Sabka Vikas, Sabka Vishwas’.

Neelanjan Sircar writes in Hindustan Times how the protests against the CAA-NRC combine have crossed a threshold and acquired a mass character, which will lead to an  economic impact, raising problems for the BJP. He highlights how Internet shutdowns and curfews cripple basic economic activities. Additionally, the costs of stationing police, paramilitary and military forces are very high. Sircar also points to the indirect costs that are more severe, which include a decrease in investments due to an unfavourable sentiment. He writes, ‘the ruling dispensation will need to start negotiating with its citizens, rather than ramming through big bang reforms, backed by repression.’

Shyam Saran writes in The Tribune about the incident in the Regional Passport Office, Chandigarh, where an official demanded ‘citizenship certificates’ of two young applicants as he thought they ‘looked Nepali’ and hence may not be Indian citizens. He observes that the citizenship prerequisite is being taken to an absurd level. Saran highlights that the State, in a democracy, has no right to make its citizens abject supplicants for what is their inherent right and thus cannot, in effect, put in place a system which in its practice puts the burden of proving citizenship on the citizen himself. He calls this an abdication of responsibility by the State. Saran calls for a genuine dialogue between the government and political parties, civil society, students and other segments of society to understand the widespread concerns that the recent legislation.

Sanjib Baruah writes in Indian Express about how ‘India’s new official narrative is, at complete variance with the understanding that has informed Indian foreign policy so far.’ He questions why India even bothered to intervene in the war of liberation if Hindus were equally persecuted in East Pakistan/Bangladesh both before and after it broke away from Pakistan. Baruah highlights that is not surprising that people in all three CAA-covered countries — including leaders of minority organisations — reject the new Indian narrative.

Yamini Aiyar writes in Hindustan Times about how through the protests against the CAA, secularism has found its way back into the public discourse as a constitutional value worth fighting for. She illustrates how ordinary individuals are finding ways to articulate what secularism means to them, on Delhi’s streets, giving the word a more robust meaning, one that has deep roots in everyday Indian life. Aiyar questions whether this spontaneous, protest-led reclamation of secularism holds the possibility of translating into a new politics, in the long term, especially given the failure of the Opposition to generate a new discourse around secularism and democracy. She writes, ‘what we are witnessing today is democracy in its truest sense. It may not disrupt the status quo immediately, but it holds the promise of a better future.’

Sharonee Dasgupta and Fathima M write in The Daily Star, an account of their visit to Shaheen Bagh, a place that has become synonymous with resistance against the CAA-NRC combine.They write, ‘the most striking feature is perhaps the peaceful nature of the protests. Women there are well-informed about what they want and they stick to it. Their fight is with the ideology of fascism, not with individuals.’ Dasgupta and Fathima highlight how Shaheen Bagh will be remembered for its strength, tolerance and the subversion of stereotypes associated with minorities. Calling their trip educational and an eye-opening experience, they point out that it was a fierce reminder of the tenets of our constitution and the strength of our womenfolk.

Unpacking the Consequences of Donald Trump’s Multiple Trade Wars

CPR FACULTY ANALYSE THE US TRADE POLICY
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

In what was seen as the beginning of a trade war, US President, Donald Trump recently imposed tariffs on goods from countries including Canada, Mexico, China and the European Union. The move saw immediate retaliation from US allies, with countries imposing heavy duties on a number of imports from the US. This policy of protectionism reflected Trump’s ‘America First’ agenda, however it derailed trade relations with several allies. CPR faculty analyse this move of the US President in the curated media commentary below.

Brahma Chellaney writes in the ‘Asian Review’ about the risk of alienation India faces as the US imposes punitive sanctions on Iran and Russia, both of which have been ‘long-standing economic and political partners for India’. The challenge for New Delhi is going to be ‘how to balance those interests with its growing strategic partnership with the US, a top trading and defence partner of India’. Chellaney reiterates this in the ‘Times of India’, detailing how India should safeguard its interests by partnering with other key democracies in order to push back with full diplomatic strength. In an interview with ‘Radio Sputnik’ he details the effects of the sanctions imposed on Iran.

Shyam Saran writes in the ‘Hindustan Times’ analysing the trade war between the US and China, detailing how by alienating allies, Trump’s China policy has failed as China gets an opportunity ‘to make common cause with American allies both in Asia and Europe’. He writes in ‘India Today‘ about the tumultuous relationship of the US with China, Korea, Canada and Russia and the implications this has for India, highlighting that ‘spaces have opened up for India to enhance its external position’.

G Parthasarathy writes in ‘The Indian Panorama’ highlighting the destabalising impacts of Trump’s ‘America First’ approach. He further elaborates on this in ‘The New Indian Express’ detailing how the US President has completely turned the foreign policy upside down, from his UK visit where he was critical of Theresa May, to his behaviour at the G7 Summit and his trade policies that have warranted retaliation from allies.