BLOG ON FINDINGS OF JOURNAL ARTICLE (BASED ON A STUDY IN SMALL TOWNS OF ANGUL AND DHENKANAL, ODISHA IN THE YEAR 2016-17) BY RANJITA MOHANTY AND ANJU DWIVEDI
A global study at the beginning of the decade indicated that one billion people—15% of the world’s population—practice open defecation (OD), of whom 626 million live in India. OD, however, is not only practised by those lacking toilet facilities. Even among those who have toilets, some prefer OD. Data shows that the practice of OD is related neither to education and literacy status nor to poverty. The reluctance of the Indian poor to use toilets, and their preference for OD, poses a sanitation puzzle.
The Swachh Bharat Mission (SBM-U), launched in 2014, strived to make urban India open defecation-free by 2019. It aimed to provide sanitary toilets to all urban households. In Oct 2019, India has been declared Open Defecation Free by Prime Minster, Narendra Modi. But does construction of toilets necessarily promote usage? Why do people in urban slums show reluctance to use toilets? To what extent, and in what ways, do sociocultural norms, behaviours, and practices influence the toilet behavior?
Purity and Pollution
Traditional norms of purity and pollution are crucial in determining sanitation practices in India. Hindu norms of pollution and purity have many dimensions that centre on connotations of dirt and pollution, purity and cleanliness, physical spaces as pure or impure, and the human body as a site of purity and impurity.
Dirt: Viewed as polluting and disorderly, there are two connotations of dirt: physical dirt, such as human excreta and garbage, and cultural dirt, such as that associated with menstruation, birth, and death. Sometimes, the boundary between physical and cultural dirt is thin. Human excreta is considered physical dirt, but even when modern toilet technologies make the dirt invisible and destroy its toxic potential, toilets are still considered ‘unclean’ by Hindu households. Therefore, toilets are built at a distance so as not to pollute the pure, such as food cooked in the kitchen, and sacred spaces where deities are kept for household worship. Not only is human waste considered defiling and impure, the body also becomes impure during the process of defecation, which is a release of dirt. Both men and women are required to bathe after defecation so that their bodies are purified.
Space: The purity of the inner space of the house must be guarded by assigning separate spaces to different kinds of dirt: the toilet is kept outside the house, shoes are left outside the entrance, and menstruating women stay away from spaces of worship and cooking. The inner space is ritually purified following the pollution of birth or death. Similarly, the body has to be purified through a ritual bath after menstruation. As women are assigned the responsibility of maintaining the purity of the inner space, they have to bathe in the morning before their household chores so that they are ritually pure to worship or to cook.
Caste: The castes that deal with materials considered polluting—human waste, dead bodies, dirty clothes, human hair, and the hide of dead animals—are considered impure and untouchable. Those who deal with human waste and dead bodies are considered the ‘lowest of the low’ and work as sweepers and scavengers, and are the traditional bearers of night soil. The castes rendered untouchable live in hamlets on the outskirts of villages, away from the upper castes. In cities, they live in peripheral, common places such as railway lines and riverbanks, close to morgues and slaughterhouses. The casteist notion of cleanliness is thus more social than physical. Social order is maintained through ritual cleanliness, which may not necessarily be a matter of hygiene.
Tradition, Modernity and the ‘Non Negotiable’
The connotations of physical dirt and ritual dirt influence sanitation behaviours in urban spaces with varying degrees of compromise and adaptation. However, even the urban environment cannot make people compromise on what can be called the ‘non-negotiable’ aspects of culture. For example, when a toilet is constructed within the house and it coexists with the pure spaces, the place for defecation is barricaded from the living inner space of the house. While the middle class can separate some rooms, such as puja ghar (place of worship), kitchen, and living space from the toilet, the poor do not have sufficient space to construct separate, barricaded spaces for what is considered pure.
Regardless of their location and technology, toilets carry the connotation of ritual impurity. Hence, toilet behaviours remain the same in middle-class as well as poor households. All castes, whether rich or poor, employ manual scavengers from the untouchable castes to clean their septic tanks and pits.
Traditionally, women are considered the custodians of the purity of the inner, private space of the house. In slums, women continue to perform that role. They keep the space physically clean by removing dirt and household garbage. They change into separate clothes during defecation, regardless of whether they practise OD or use a toilet. Women refrain from performing puja when their bodies are considered impure, such as during menstruation and after delivery. The inner space is not only the space inside the house; it includes the outer space attached to the house. Every Hindu household worships the tulsi plant grown outside.
Why Open Defecation?
OD is a common practice despite its inconvenience and physical and health risks. It is practised not only by those who do not have toilets. Those who have toilets use them selectively: at night, during illness, and in the rainy season; in addition, old people and women, particularly pregnant women, old women, and adolescent girls often use toilets.
There are many reasons why those who have toilets do not use them: the fear that the pit will get filled too soon; the high cost associated with cleaning the pit; the feeling that the dirt, though underground, is too close to living, cooking, and worship spaces in small dwellings; cultural notions of purity and pollution; and social norms of shame and avoidance that regulate defecation in the presence of the elderly, males (in the case of women), and guests. Water is also a significant constraint in the use of toilets at home, since water supply in slums is erratic and inadequate.
Infrastructural Constraints
The majority of slum households use pit and improved pit toilets. Many of these toilets are poorly designed and lack adequate technology. Some households have toilets that are connected to drains and canals, where they discharge their effluents. Not all toilets used for defecation have a superstructure. Some are without the superstructure altogether, while others have half-erected ones covered with clothes, rags, and plastic bags.
Slum dwellers prefer to spend their money on houses rather than on toilets because they see houses as necessary for safety and shelter, but toilets as replaceable with alternatives. The construction of a toilet at home is determined by many factors, such as financial resources; the availability of physical space; the needs of the old, the sick, and the women in the family; and considerations of purity and pollution that become particularly constraining in small houses.
Having a toilet in the house does not mean that the household members’ defecation practice is hygienic, as most people use unsanitary toilets. These, along with spatial constraints, blur the lines between ritual and physical dirt for the urban poor. The poor, therefore, prefer to construct toilets outside the living space. When a toilet is located inside a very small house, people are more likely to refrain from using it.
Bridging the Gap
Culture does not operate alone, but interacts with a host of other factors: the availability of physical space, financial resources, and access to infrastructure and technology. Behavioural change is conceptualised as the shift required in practices of purity and pollution that deter Hindus from using toilets. But behavioural change does not take into account these factors. Hence, we find that among households with toilets, their use is determined by existing technology and the availability of physical space and water.
Due to the SBM-U’s emphasis on the physical target of a specific number of toilets that need to be constructed within a specified time period, any localised, complex, or nuanced understanding of culture escapes the current policies. There is no scope in the policies to accommodate how culture manifests in the local context. A lack of community consultation and participation further limits information about the specific needs of people. The failure to adapt to local requirements also restricts implementers from customising policies. Women play a significant role in both private and public sanitation but are seldom consulted about their needs and choices.
It is imperative that policies expand their scope to include understanding culture. It is likely that the governance of sanitation at the local level will follow.
LISTEN TO FULL TALK AND DISCUSSION
URBAN GOVERNANCE URBAN SERVICES
Listen to guest speaker Tripta Chandola’s full talk (above) about using the methodology of listening to study the everyday experiences and encounters of slum dwellers in relation to the space they inhabit, and how this shapes their sense of self and identity. While her research situates the position of the slums within the broader urban ecology affected by economic liberalisation, political movements, and evolving cultural practices, it also intends to highlight the sub-cultural practices of slum-dwellers negotiating their own space and self amid these transformations.
To listen to the lively discussion that followed, tune in to the Q&A session here.
This is the 65th in a series of urban workshops organised by the Centre de Sciences Humaines (CSH), New Delhi, and Centre for Policy Research.
AS PART OF ‘POLICY CHALLENGES – 2019-2024: THE BIG POLICY QUESTIONS FOR THE NEW GOVERNMENT AND POSSIBLE PATHWAYS’
CPR BUREAUCRACY SOCIAL SECTOR SCHEMES
By Avani Kapur
A unique feature in India’s federal architecture is the pivotal role played by the Union government in financing and monitoring social welfare programmes, and in ensuring that all states have adequate resources and are held accountable for meeting social policy goals. During 2000-2018, the Government of India (GoI) spent over Rs 14 lakh crores on social services.1 A significant proportion of this expenditure is met through Centrally Sponsored Schemes (CSSs) – a specific purpose transfer from the Union to states, usually in the form of schemes.
While the practice of using specific purpose transfers dates to the pre-Independence era, over time, CSSs have emerged as the primary vehicle through which the GoI finances and directs state expenditure towards national priorities. Their dominance can be seen in their sheer numbers and the quantum of money flowing through them. During the 11th Five Year Plan (2007-2011), there were 147 scheme specific transfers accounting for over 40% of total central transfers to states.2 This increased signifcantly in the 12th Plan period. Of the total Rs 8.61 lakh crore transferred by the Union government to states between 2012 and 2015, Rs 5.88 lakh crore (68%) was released as assistance under CSSs.3
The importance of CSSs as a fiscal instrument lies in the fact that they are the primary source of non-wage, uncommitted funds available to states. With a majority of states’ own resources tied to wages, pensions and other committed liabilities (sometimes over 80-90%4), CSSs were designed as a top-up to augment state expenditure, allowing them to address infrastructure and human development deficits.
In principle, the rationale for CSSs is sound and in keeping with first principles: fiscal equalization to ensure that minimum standards of public services are provided to all citizens. Over time, however, the design and proliferation of CSSs have undermined this very rationale. Richer states with better administrative capacities have been able to capture a larger share of CSS funds, resulting in a significant misallocation of resources. Analysis by the Economic Survey 2016-17 of the six top CSSs – Pradhan Mantri Awaas Yojana (PMAY), Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan (SSA), Mid-Day Meal (MDM), Pradhan Mantri Gram Sadak Yojana (PMGSY), Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (MGNREGS) and Swachh Bharat Mission (SBM) – found that under no scheme did the poorest district receive even 40% of the total resources. In fact, for the MDM and SBM, the share was under 25%.5 Other studies of the SSA and National Health Mission (NHM) found similar results – that is, states with poorer health indicators did not necessarily get larger per capita transfers.6
Moreover, the centralized nature of CSSs often makes them an inefficient tool to address state-specific needs and has undermined the autonomy of states to undertake expenditure decisions based on their local needs.
Recognizing these limitations, numerous attempts have been made to restructure schemes and restore them to their rightful place – the states. The last major impetus came with the adoption of the recommendations of the 14th Finance Commission, which increased state governments’ share in tax devolution by 10 percentage points. The resultant decrease in the fiscal space available with the GoI reiterated the need to significantly decrease and restructure CSSs. This led to the constitution of a committee of chief ministers under the aegis of the NITI Aayog. The committee made several recommendations including scheme rationalization, determination of a transparent criterion for interstate allocation, and greater flexibility in and creation of an institutional mechanism for Centre-state negotiation.
The changes that followed were minimal. While schemes were reordered under ‘umbrella’ programmes, within each umbrella programme, sub-schemes continued as before. As per the Union Budget 2016-17, even after the creation of 28 umbrella programmes, there were 950 Central Sector and CSS sub-schemes accounting for about 5% of the GDP and 9% of the total GoI expenditure.7 Three years later, in the interim budget for 2019-20, Central Sector Schemes constituted 12% of GoI expenditure, up from 9% in 2016-17; CSSs accounted for another 9%.8
More importantly, there was no real change in the design or implementation of the schemes. Meetings for the planning of of education and health programmes continued as before, and the notification to allocate 25% as flexible, discretionary funds was not reflected in many of the scheme planning documents. Instead, the disbandment of the Planning Commission has resulted in an institutional vacuum with respect to planning. CSSs now fall under the domain of central ministries, leading to further centralization of social policy financing.
A call for rationalizing CSSs, however, has again gained momentum. The GoI recently committed to evaluating all CSSs before fresh appraisals are made and making scheme approval coterminus with the Finance Commission cycle. Accordingly, the Development Monitoring and Evaluation Office (DMEO) under the NITI Aayog has invited proposals to evaluate 28 umbrella CSSs under 10 sectors. Real change in social sector financing, however, will only be visible if the current design of CSSs is completely overhauled, in addition to scheme rationalization being carried out.
Before I offer some indicative steps on how this can be achieved, it is useful to highlight some of the main inefficiencies in the current design of CSSs. Broadly, these can be classified into four interrelated areas: planning failures, implementation failures, fiscal inefficiencies and administrative red tape. Each of these is described below.
Planning Design Failures
Budgets for CSSs are determined based on incremental plans prepared by the respective state governments and approved by a committee at the central level. This has given individual ministries significant discretion in determining scheme design and approving state-specific plans and budgets. There is often an inherent tension between central government priorities and states’ perceived needs. However, since the Centre controls the purse strings, central priorities dominate. To illustrate: in 2010, the Bihar chief minister had launched several state entitlement schemes for education, such as cycles, uniforms, etc. In its SSA budget, thus, the state proposed a low allocation for entitlement. However, the GoI’s own prioritization of entitlements meant that despite no demand, Bihar’s entitlement budget under SSA was enhanced by over 200%. In another example, in 2013–14, one state government wanted to use the SSA budget to provide vehicles for block-level officials to improve school-level monitoring. The approval board at the Centre, however, denied this request as purchase of vehicles was not permitted under SSA rules.9
Implementation Failures
CSSs are typically designed by the central government but implementation rests with the state and local governments. Most CSSs come with rigid guidelines for execution which privilege a top-down, ‘one size fits all’ model with fixed norms and unit costs. For the NHM, for instance, the guidelines lay down fixed population norms to set up health facilities. These, however, underestimate requirements in states such as Rajasthan and Madhya Pradesh which have a population density lower than the national average.
More importantly, even granular implementation details such as hiring processes, training modules and schedules, communication strategies, etc. are laid down by the Centre. Consequently, states and local governments have very little flexibility in adapting implementation based on their specific jurisdiction. The problem is even more acute at the point of service delivery. In education, for instance, if a school wants to spend more money on buying teaching material rather than painting walls, the norms simply don’t allow it. Similarly, a survey conducted by Accountability Initiative in 2013 found that the pressure to meet RTE infrastructure requirements resulted in money for boundary walls being sent to all schools in Himachal Pradesh even though construction couldn’t be undertaken due to land unavailability.10
Fiscal Inefficiencies
Most CSSs are designed as a cost-sharing programme between the Union and the states. With the division of CSSs into ‘core’, ‘core of the core’ and ‘optional’, states are expected to contribute 50-60% of the total approved budgets from their own plan funds.11
Within a scheme, however, the matching ratio is uniform across states irrespective of their fiscal capability. Release of funds by the GoI is contingent on states releasing their own share and meeting other conditionalities such as the submission of Utilisation Certificates (UCs). This has three important consequences with respect to distribution of resources. First, the uniform fund-sharing ratio often makes it difficult for the low-income states to put in their requisite share. As subsequent fund release is contingent on states submitting their share, this has an effect on the total quantum of money received by fiscally weaker states. Thus, while Karnataka may perform better than Bihar on most development indicators, it may also be able to avail of the CSS grant by making its matching contribution, while Bihar may find it difficult to put in its share. Second, the presence of conditionalities for fund release means that there is a considerable difference between the approved allocation and actual grants. In 2016-17, for instance, only 85% of total NHM approved budgets were released. These differences are amplified at the state level. Thus, while Bihar (one of the poorest states) received 79%, Gujarat and Haryana (fiscally stronger states) received over 100%.12 This creates uncertainty in implementing schemes and invariably states with greater shortfall in services levels suffer the most. Finally, the fixed fund-sharing ratios also creates perverse incentives for states which may not need the additional CSS fund to try and get it.
Layered Bureaucracy and Administrative Red Tape
Finally, detailed and rigid guidelines, complex paperwork and numerous conditionalities for fund release under CSSs have also created considerable administrative red tape, resulting in inefficiencies in approvals and fund flows. The situation is exacerbated by the fact that for some CSSs, the central government has set up parallel institutional structures responsible for CSS implementation in states, thereby creating a new stakeholder in the implementation process. Under the SSA and NHM, for instance, scheme planning and implementation rests with autonomous bodies known as State Implementation Societies.13 The multiplicity of roles means that even simple tasks require approval and technical sanctions from different authorities. A study of the NHM in Uttar Pradesh conducted by Accountability Initiative found that it took a minimum of 22 desks through which the file had to pass for the release of funds from Treasury to the State Health Society (SHS). Other studies have found that the figures for Bihar and Maharashtra stood at 32 desks and 25 desks, respectively.14 Possibly as a consequence, release of funds from the SHS to the Treasury took as long as five months in Maharashtra and over three months in Bihar and Uttar Pradesh.15 Delays at one level have a knock-on effect and often funds reach the last mile in the last quarter of the financial year.
Five-step Process in Reforming the CSS Design
These challenges highlight the need to move away from past reform efforts (which have focused on minor tweaks in CSSs) towards the first principles of the rationale behind specific purpose transfers. This will require a five-step process.
Moving from a Schematic to a Sectoral Approach
The first step is to limit the number of schemes. One way of doing this is to link finances to ‘national goals’. The committee of CMs on restructuring CSSs laid out nine key areas as part of the National Development Agenda for Vision 2022. It recommended that instead of the previous government’s strategy of bundling schemes under 22 umbrella programmes, funds could be released specifically for priority areas rather than multiple sub-schemes. This would give states the flexibility to plan activities within each priority area as per their own development needs. Steps in this direction have already been taken. The recently launched Samagra Shiksha – an overarching programme for school education extending from pre-school to class 12 – merged three previously independent CSSs. In theory the scheme allows states to prioritize interventions and sectors as per their need. Preliminary analysis of the scheme budget shows that indeed states are making decisions in keeping with their specific needs (albeit still guided by the GoI). Thus, while Uttar Pradesh and Bihar – which continue to lag behind in elementary education – allocated over 80% of their Samagra Shiksha budget for elementary education, states such as Haryana and Himachal Pradesh have focused on secondary education, allocating over 40% to the same. Similar steps should be taken in other sectors.16
Moving towards Block Grants
Having identified priority areas, the next step would be to ensure states have enough resources to fund these areas. Instead of allocations being linked to detailed and cumbersome planning and budgeting processes with restrictive, centralized guidelines, block grants could be given to states. This would allow for prioritization of different inputs and secure greater ownership by state governments. An example of this can already be seen in the Rashtriya Krishi Vikas Yojana (RKVY), a CSS established in 2007 to rejuvenate falling agricultural growth rates. Unlike most other CSSs, RKVY offers the flexibility to a state to choose activities under the scheme that most suit its requirements. Projects are prepared by the departments concerned and then scrutinized by a committee under the the state government’s Agricultural Production Commissioner. Most importantly, approval of the project is not done by the GoI but by the State Level Sanctioning Committee (SLSC), chaired by the Chief Secretary and with representatives from the Ministry of Agriculture and NITI Aayog as members.
Ensuring Equitable Interstate Distribution
Third, interstate distribution of the normative block grant portion of funding amongst states can be based on a formula that takes into account aspects like population, area and proportion of difficult areas, along with sector-specific needs. Differential cost-sharing norms that take note of the shortfall in service levels could further assist in ensuring that the distribution of funds fulfils the criteria of need and equality. Moreover, the formulaic nature of the grants will ensure predictability of fund flows and allow for better planning.
Reforming the Public Finance Management System
The fourth step is streamlining inefficiencies in the approval and fund flow process. This can be done by building a just-in-time Expenditure Information Network (EIN) which brings all expenditure units under one system. The first step in this process was undertaken in 2017, when the GoI mandated all CSS expenditure to be routed through the Public Finance Management System (PFMS). The system envisages each implementation unit to be under one system, thereby allowing the Centre and states to monitor funds at different levels. The problem, however, is that the system still functions as a push system, with funds being routed through multiple levels requiring approvals at every stage. By moving towards a pull system, each implementing unit could have the ability to automatically withdraw funds as needed. A defined resource envelope and appropriate access codes would ensure that funds are not misused.
Augmenting Capacity of the Evaluation Office
Finally, instead of focusing on monitoring the nuts and bolts of implementation, the GoI must build its capacity to develop a credible database on monitoring outcome indicators on a real-time basis. Currently, an inherent weakness in the CSS design is its focus on inputs. This creates perverse incentives for the entire administrative machinery to focus on ensuring adequate inputs, or at best, meeting output targets. Here, the DMEO’s role could be expanded by investing in systems to generate regular, credible and granular data on various outcome indicators and to conduct concurrent evaluations of key programmes. Over time, performance on outcomes could be linked to additional financial incentives available to states.
Other pieces as part of CPR’s policy document, ‘Policy Challenges – 2019-2024’ can be accessed below:
The Future is Federal: Why Indian Foreign Policy Needs to Leverage its Border States by Nimmi Kurian
Rethinking India’s Approach to International and Domestic Climate Policy by Navroz K Dubash and Lavanya Rajamani
India’s Foreign Policy in an Uncertain World by Shyam Saran
Need for a Comprehensive National Security Strategy by Shyam Saran
A Clarion Call for Just Jobs: Addressing the Nation’s Employment Crisis by Sabina Dewan
Time for Disruptive Foreign and National Security Policies by Bharat Karnad
Multiply Urban ‘Growth Engines’, Encourage Migration to Reboot Economy by Mukta Naik
Schooling is not Learning by Yamini Aiyar
Clearing Our Air of Pollution: A Road Map for the Next Five Years by Santosh Harish, Shibani Ghosh and Navroz K Dubash
Protecting Water while Providing Water to All: Need for Enabling Legislations by Philippe Cullet
Interstate River Water Governance: Shift focus from conflict resolution to enabling cooperation by Srinivas Chokkakula
Managing India-China Relations in a Changing Neighbourhood by Zorawar Daulet Singh
Beyond Poles and Wires: How to Keep the Electrons Flowing? by Ashwini K Swain and Navroz K Dubash
Regulatory Reforms to Address Environmental Non-Compliance by Manju Menon and Kanchi Kohli
The Numbers Game: Suggestions for Improving School Education Data by Kiran Bhatty
Safe and Dignified Sanitation Work: India’s Foremost Sanitation Challenge by Arkaja Singh and Shubhagato Dasgupta
Safeguarding the Fragile Ecology of the Himalayas by Shyam Saran
Female Labour Force Participation: Asking Better Questions by Neelanjan Sircar
Understanding Land Conflict in India and Suggestions for Reform by Namita Wahi
1 ‘Reserve Bank of India Handbook of Statistics on the Indian Economy’, Public Finance Statistics, https://dbie.rbi.org.in/BOE/OpenDocument/1608101727/OpenDocument/opendoc…
2 B.K Chaturvedi, ‘Report of the Committee on Restructuring of Centrally Sponsored Schemes (CSS)’ (New Delhi: Planning Commission, Government of India, 2011).
3 NITI Aayog, ‘Report of the Sub Group of Chief Ministers on Rationalisation of Centrally
Sponsored Schemes’ (New Delhi: NITI Aayog, 2015), http://niti.gov.in/writereaddata/files/ Final20Report20of20the20Sub-Group20submitter20to%20PM.pdf.
4 See, for instance, Y. Aiyar and A. Kapur, ‘The Centralization Vs Decentralization Tug of War and the Emerging Narrative of Fiscal Federalism for Social Policy in India’, Journal of Regional and Federal Studies 29(2) (2018): 187-217.
5 Ministry of Finance, ‘Universal Basic Income: A Conversation With and Within the Mahatma’, Economic Survey 2016-17, Chapter 9, https://www.indiabudget.gov.in/es2016-17/echapter.pdf.
6 M.G. Rao, ‘Central Transfers to States in India: Rewarding Performance While Ensuring Equity’ (New Delhi: NITI Aayog, 2017).
7 Ministry of Finance, ‘Universal Basic Income’.
8 Rathin Roy, ‘Changing Fiscal Dynamics’, Seminar Magazine 717 (2019)
9 Aiyar, et al. ‘Rules versus Responsiveness: Towards Building an Outcome-Focussed Approach to Governing Elementary Education Finances in India’, Accountability Initiative Working Paper (New Delhi: Centre for Policy Research, 2015).
10 Accountability Initiative, ‘District Report Cards, 2014’ (New Delhi: Centre for Policy Research, 2014).
11 For the North East and Himalayan states the Centre usually provides 90%.
12 Accountability Initiative, ‘National Health Mission, 2017-18’, Budget Briefs (New Delhi: Centre for Policy Research, 2018).
13 In NHM it is known as State Health Society.
14 See, for instance, M. Choudhury and R.K Mohanty, ‘Utilisation, Fund Flows and Public Financial Management under the National Health Mission’, NIPFP Working Paper Series (New Delhi: National Institute of Public Finance and Policy, 2018), https://www.nipfp.org.in/media/medialibrary/2018/05/WP_2018_227.pdf.
15 Accountability Initiative, ‘National Health Mission’.
16 Accountability Initiative, ‘Interim Budget 2019-20’, Samagrah Shiksha Budget Briefs (New Delhi: Centre for Policy Research, 2019).
Ideas for India organised a panel discussion featuring Pratap Bhanu Mehta from CPR, Pranab Bardhan from the University of California, and Mihir Sharma from Bloomberg View/ORF, moderated by Ideas for India editor Parikshit Ghosh. The discussion spanned a range of topics (videos hyperlinked below):
PART 2 OF A BLOG SERIES BY THE CENTRE FOR POLICY RESEARCH (CPR) AND PRAYAS (ENERGY GROUP)
ENERGY RESEARCH
The series is titled Plugging in: Electricity consumption in Indian Homes.
Electricity consumption in Indian homes has tripled since 2000. The percentage of households with access to electricity has increased from 55% in 2001 to more than 80% in 2017. In 2014, an electrified Indian household consumed about 90 units (kWh) of electricity per month on an average; enough to run four tube-lights, four ceiling fans, a television, a small refrigerator, and small kitchen appliances with typical usage hours and efficiency levels in India. This is three-fourths of the average monthly household consumption in China, a tenth of that in the USA, and a third of the world average. In this post, we take a closer look at data on India’s residential electricity and the disparities in access and consumption across states. We also reveal some inconsistencies between different sources, pointing to the need for better data.
All states show considerable increase in total residential electricity consumption in recent years according to data compiled by the Central Electricity Authority (CEA) from distribution companies (see Figure 1). Between 2004 and 2015, states like Assam, Bihar, Chhattisgarh, and Jharkhand with low initial household electrification showed a high growth rate of their residential electricity use (about 11%-16%). States with higher household electrification like Delhi, Punjab, Haryana, and Tamil Nadu grew at lower, but still substantial, rates (6%-8%), with high absolute numbers.
Figure 1: Residential Electricity Consumption growth in selected states (2004-2015)
Source: Annual General Reviews for individual years (CEA).
The CEA data along with the census data and the rural electrification data can be used to estimate average monthly electricity consumption of an electrified household in different states. We validate this against the tariff orders issued by state regulators and find interesting results (see Figure 2).
Three insights emerge:
One, an electrified household in Delhi consumes about 250-270 units or kWh of electricity per month on average, approximately the same average amount consumed by an electrified household in Germany. At the same time, such an electrified household in Delhi consumes significantly more than other Indian cities (Chandigarh: 208 units; Ahmedabad: 160 units; Puducherry: 150 units; and Mumbai: 110 units). This is in part due to high ownership of air-conditioners (12% of total households) and air-coolers (70%), and tariff subsidies in Delhi. Yet, other socio-economic reasons still need to be examined.
Two, electrified households in larger states like Maharashtra, Gujarat, and Tamil Nadu, with higher rates of electrification, consume on an average a lower amount of about 80-90 units per month. Karnataka is on the lower end with about 60 units. On the other hand, households in Punjab (about 150 units) and Haryana (about 110 units) consume much more. . While there may be some discrepancies in the data due to incorrect reporting on use and number of consumers by distribution companies, the scale of these discrepancies is likely to be small given the limited number of un-metered and illegal connections in the residential sector.
Three, states like Uttar Pradesh (UP), Jharkhand, and Chhattisgarh show high monthly household electricity consumption. It is unlikely that states with a high share of newly electrified households and low reliability of power supply consume as high as an average household in Chandigarh or Mumbai. The reported household consumption is high possibly due to metering issues. For instance, 40% of the total residential connections in UP are rural un-metered connections. As their actual consumption is not metered, the distribution companies estimate their consumption based on norms approved by the regulator (currently the norm is 144 kWh/kW/month, a high number). Distribution companies have not conducted any sample studies to justify this norm despite being asked by the regulators. High estimation of consumption from un-metered connections as well as measurement issues in metered connections can mask the actual consumption.
Finally, the electricity consumption within states also exhibit significant inequity at the household level. According to the National Sample Survey Office (NSSO)’s surveys, about 20% of electrified households consume less than 30 units of electricity per month, while about 80% consume less than 100 units per month. In rural areas, 90% of the electrified households consume less than 100 units. This distribution varies with states. In most states, about 15-20% of all the households consume less than 30 units per month. The states consuming the least electricity are Karnataka, West Bengal, Bihar, and Jharkhand. For more details on results see our recent report.
Understanding the factors that lead to such variation in consumption patterns across states and households is important for managing future electricity demand (and to monitor the performance of schemes such as UDAY for the financial revival of distribution companies, and Saubhagya for providing electricity connections to all un-electrified homes). This requires accurate and comprehensive data on electricity consumption which, at present, is a serious area of concern (particularly the limited reporting by distribution companies).
In the next two posts, we look at the most basic use of electricity in Indian homes – lighting – and how the provision of lighting services are changing in the country.
This piece is authored by Aditya Chunekar and Sanjana Mulay from Prayas (Energy Group).
This blog series is also available on the Prayas website here.
This article was republished in Eklavya Magazine in Hindi under ‘स्रोत विज्ञान एवं टेक्नॉलॉजी फीचर्स’, and can be accessed here.
To subscribe to email updates on the series, click here.
Other posts in this series:
Electricity Consumption in Indian Homes
India’s LED Lighting Story
Illuminating Affordable Homes
The Efficiency of Appliances
Appliances used in Affordable Housing
Electrifying the National Capital Region
Exploring the different uses of household appliances
Role of human behaviour in driving electricity use
As an international tribunal in The Hague rejected China’s claim to sovereignty over most of South China Sea, ruling instead in favour of the Philippines, and China refused to abide by the decision, CPR faculty comment on it:
In an interview to Rajya Sabha TV (above), Shyam Saran unpacks the various aspects of China’s claims over the waters of the South China Sea; deconstructs the tribunal ruling and its impact; and contextualises China’s response geopolitically.
G Parthasarathy in an interview on NDTV analyses China’s dismissal of the tribunal decision rejecting its claims to the South China Sea and how this is likely to lead to increased tensions internationally, including commenting on how India should respond.
In China’s Challenge to the Law of the Sea, Brahma Chellaney writes that China’s refusal to accept the decision of the tribunal is indicative of its ‘incremental approach to shaping the region according to its interests’ through ‘confounding, bullying and bribing adversaries’.
A CONVERSATION BETWEEN SENIOR FELLOW NEELANJAN SIRCAR AND RICHA BANSAL
PODCAST INTERNATIONAL POLITICS
On November 8, the American electorate voted in Donald Trump as the 45th president of the United States, a phenomenon that the world is trying to deconstruct.
In the third episode (above) of CPR’s podcast, ThoughtSpace, Richa Bansal talks to Neelanjan Sircar, a Senior Fellow at CPR and an in-house election expert, who was born and raised in the US, to unpack the results of these presidential elections. Sircar both contextualises Donald Trump’s victory historically and analyses it by interpreting the data available.
A CONVERSATION BETWEEN D SHYAM BABU AND RICHA BANSAL
PODCAST IDENTITY DISCRIMINATION POLITICS
Listen to the full CPR podcast, ThoughtSpace (above) featuring Senior Fellow, D Shyam Babu, where he discusses the Lok Sabha bill that aims to provide 10 percent reservation in government jobs and education to the economically backward section in the general category.
Through the amendment of Articles 15 and 16 of the Constitution, the bill seeks to allow states to make ‘special provision for the advancement of any economically weaker sections of citizens’.
In an article in ‘Times of India’, D Shyam Babu questioned whether ‘one should treat the exercise as a bold attempt at social reform, or as a cynical politics of divide and rule?’ Shedding light on the ironies of the policy, he highlighted that ‘the same social groups who ridiculed the quota system as ‘vote-bank politics’ have now become the recipients of quota benefits.’
Incomplete and inconclusive land titling in India poses serious challenges to the conduct of business, and often creates situations of injustice by facilitating dispossession and displacement. This leads to disputed ownership with many cases under litigation for decades.
Listen to the talk (above) by Deepak Sanan where he reviews the reasons for such infirmities in land titles in India, and also explains how the government typically deals with these. He particularly highlights why the government’s approach is insufficient to deal with the issue systematically.
A CONVERSATION BETWEEN SENIOR FELLOW SHYAM SARAN AND RICHA BANSAL
PODCAST INTERNATIONAL POLITICS
Relations between India and China have changed considerably over the past decade as China’s growth rate outpaced India’s, placing both countries in unique and different positions in the current global geopolitical context.
This has been most evident in recent times with China’s open opposition to India’s NSG membership bid; its blocking India’s move to ban Masood Azhar; and pledging large aid packages to other South Asian countries at the recent BRICS summit. India, on the other hand, has grown increasingly closer to the US; attempted to take on China over the South China sea dispute; and not shied away from a muscular response to terrorism emanating from Pakistani soil, notwithstanding China’s proximity to Pakistan. Add to this Donald Trump’s victory in the recent US elections and what this posits for the future.
In the fourth episode (above) of CPR’s podcast, ThoughtSpace, Richa Bansal talks to Shyam Saran, a Senior Fellow at CPR and a career diplomat, who is a respected authority on India-China relations, on the evolving India-China relations and what the future holds.
STATEMENT
January 17th, 2024
On 10th January 2024, CPR received a notice from the Ministry of Home Affairs cancelling its FCRA status. The basis of this decision is incomprehensible and disproportionate, and some of the reasons given challenge the very basis of the functioning of a research institution. This includes the publication on our website of policy reports emanating from our research being equated with current affairs programming.
During the tenure of our suspension, we sought and obtained interim redress from the honourable Delhi High Court and will continue to seek recourse in all avenues possible.
This cancellation comes after a decision to suspend the FCRA status in February 2023. These actions followed an Income Tax “survey” that took place in September 2022. The actions have had a debilitating impact on the institution’s ability to function by choking all sources of funding. This has undermined the institution’s ability to pursue its well established objective of producing high quality, globally recognised research on policy matters, which it has been recognised for over its 50 years’ existence. During this time the institution has been home to some of the country’s most distinguished academics, diplomats and policymakers.
CPR firmly reiterates that it is in complete compliance with the law, and has been cooperating fully and exhaustively at every step of the process. We remain steadfast in our belief that this matter will be resolved in line with constitutional values and guarantees.
