Author: cprindia

In this series, T R Raghunandan (referred to as Raghu hereon) unpacks the successes and failures of accountability measures in the public housing sector in India, through studying these in Karnataka. He does this by investigating how housing policies are designed, passed on to finally reach the beneficiary.

• In the blog The Public Housing Sector- a Case Study of Karnataka, Raghu establishes the political importance of programmes for subsidised housing and sheds light on the reasons behind the high degree of competition amongst politicians and officials for assuming planning and execution responsibilities for delivering houses to beneficiaries.
• In the next blog, taking off from the introductory one, Raghu details the process of Beneficiary Selection for Housing Programmes, drawing a distinction between ‘identification’ and ‘selection’ of a beneficiary, and the authorities at the local and state levels that have the power to do so.
• The third blog, Rural Housing Wars in Karnataka; The Empire Strikes Back and Gets Shot Down, encapsulates the battle between the Members of Legislative Assemblies (MLAs) and the Gram Panchayats in Karnataka, detailing how the former tried to amend The Panchayat Raj Act of Karnataka, in order to dilute the power of the latter, but eventually failed to do so.
• In the subsequent two blogs, Frontal Assault turns to Stealth: MLAs Sneak Back and Law, Technology and Tensions, Raghu highlights the implications of the decision of the government to give MLAs the power to decide how many houses could be allocated to each village and the mixed impact of technology on the governance of the housing programme.
• In his final blog, Saturation and Collaborative Construction; a Way Out of the Conundrum, Raghu concludes the series by sharing learnings on the entire exchange between and within the different levels of the government that eventually led to the way in which this programme was delivered at the last mile and the challenges that one can expect in the future.

Accountability Initiative’s blog and social media series deals with terms often heard in government offices which have come to be associated with the bureaucracy. Using wit and acute observation, the series unpacks some of the factors that drive government officials at work, and touches upon root causes that build a perception of the bureaucracy in the eye of the public.

Of Authorisation Letters, Samosas And Chai explores the conundrum of almost absolute obedience to authority based on ranks. It also observes how being hauled up for questioning by seniors, having a red mark on a permanent record, salary cuts, or possible suspension orders issued for deviating from norms hold officials back.

B is for Babu discusses how “Babu ki kami hai!” (there’s a shortage of clerks!) is an all too familiar concern shared by government staff in the middle and lower level offices. Babus are integral to the smooth functioning of government offices, and yet a sneak peek into their work lives and challenges (which this blog provides) has been elusive so far.

A Circuitous Journey delves deep into the all-important bureaucratic artefact- the circular. In practice, the circular acts as the official order or notice giving directions regarding any work, discussion or meeting that the bureaucracy undertakes. In an environment where officials are already inundated with more work than they can cope with, the lack of a circular implies an absence of legitimacy – used both as an escape clause, and a way of discerning the relative importance of the person/task at hand. So is the circular only a directive or a tool for crafty bureaucrats to wield based on convenience?

Lastly, How Important Are Deadlines In The Bureaucracy? delves into the management of a multi-layered, diffused and a highly interdependent public bureaucracy. What does the race to meet deadlines look like in the bureaucracy? What are organisational repercussions if a deadline is missed?

In all, the public bureaucracy, like any other organisation, has a vocabulary, work culture and an internal logic that is unique to itself. You can view the complete set of the series here.

In the next six weeks, Bihar will elect 243 members to its state assembly. The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) looks to continue its momentum in Bihar from a sweeping victory in the 2014 national election, while once bitter enemies, Janata Dal United (JD(U)) and Rashtriya Janata Dal (RJD), have banded together to try to stop BJP’s ascent.

In this piece, we summarize the changes that have taken place in Bihar since 2010, and use data from the Election Commission of India (ECI) to provide a perspective on broad trends from the 2010 and 2014 elections. We pay particular attention to the relevance of the “caste arithmetic” of wooing different caste groups for electoral outcomes in Bihar.

Bihar since 2010

In 2010, the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) in Bihar, comprised of BJP and JD(U), virtually swept the state election, winning 206 of the 243 seats. Since then, Bihar has seen a spectacular reconfiguration of party alliances.

The 2014 election saw BJP and JD(U) parting ways over the selection of Narendra Modi as prime ministerial candidate, with BJP picking new partners and JD(U) running alone. The BJP alliance won 31 of 40 constituencies, with the JD(U) winning just two. Then chief minister (CM) of Bihar, Nitish Kumar of JD(U), resigned after taking responsibility for his party’s poor show. In his stead, JD(U) appointed Jitan Ram Manjhi, a leader for vulnerable “Mahadalits”, as the CM. However, when Nitish Kumar sought to return as CM, Manjhi was forced to leave his post.

Since then, a disaffected Manjhi has formed his own party, the Hindustani Awam Morcha (HAM), joining hands with BJP in NDA. The Lok Janshakti Party (LJP), previously breaking with NDA in 2002 while calling BJP a communal party, has come back to NDA. Fearing the ascent of BJP, once opponents, JD(U) and RJD led by Nitish Kumar and Lalu Prasad Yadav, respectively, have formed a pre-electoral coalition with the Congress Party to fight against the BJP-led NDA in this election.

The 2014 National Election: The NDA in a Dominant Position

Like much of India, Bihar strongly supported BJP (and NDA) in the 2014 national election. Although the election was contested in larger parliamentary constituencies in 2014, the ECI provides a vote breakdown by smaller state assembly constituencies (ACs) of the 2014 polls. The AC-wise analysis provides a benchmark of the popularity of each party just one year ago.

In 2014, NDA, comprised of BJP, LJP and Rastriya Lok Samta Party (RLSP), was the leading vote-getter in 172 out of 243 ACs in Bihar. Of these 172 ACs, RLSP won 17, LJP won 34, and BJP won 121 ACs (almost a simple majority). By contrast, RJD, JD(U), and Congress won 32, 18, and 14 ACs, respectively. To understand party performance, we calculate the strike rate for selected parties in 2014, i.e., the percentage of ACs contested by the party in which the party was the top vote-getter.

The strike rates of each of the major parties challenging NDA fell below 20% in 2014, with RJD and Congress displaying strike rates of 19.5% and 19.2%, respectively, and JD(U) winning a paltry 7.8% of the ACs in which it contested. By contrast, the parties forming NDA in 2014 (all of which have returned under the NDA banner) had strike rates of at least 65%, with BJP and LJP displaying strike rates of 66.5% and 79.1%, respectively, and RLSP winning a nearly perfect 94.4% of the constituencies in which it contested. Importantly, the strike rates of BJP’s coalition partners are even higher than BJP, showing their indispensability to NDA.

How Much Does Vote-Splitting Matter?

It has been argued that in 2014 NDA benefitted significantly from vote-splitting between JD(U), who contested the election alone, and the coalition of RJD and Congress (UPA). That is, in most constituencies both JD(U) and one of RJD or Congress each fielded a candidate. Perhaps NDA would have fared much worse in Bihar if voters didn’t distribute their votes across these two NDA-opposing candidates. In order to test this hypothesis, we coded landslide victories in 2014, where the winning party had a larger vote share than the next two parties combined. The NDA won 79 constituencies by a landslide in 2014, clustered mostly in western Bihar, with the BJP getting over half of its victories (61) by landslide. In other words, even if the coalition of RJD, JD(U), and Congress were allowed to field two candidates and take their combined vote share, they still would have lost to NDA in 79 constituencies in 2014. By contrast, JD(U), RJD, and Congress recorded 5,5, and 6 landslide victories, respectively, largely clustered in the Muslim-heavy northeastern part of the state.

If NDA can continue its electoral dominance in a significant share of its 79 landslide constituencies, it will be tough to beat. NDA’s success in 2014 is not a simple case of vote-splitting, and its opposition must make significant inroads into NDA’s electoral base to win the election.

Comparing 2010 and 2014: Wither Caste-Party Outcomes?

When we compare the electoral results in 2010 to the AC-level data in 2014, the immense amount of electoral volatility in Bihar becomes apparent. Only 30.9% of ACs were won by the same party in 2010 and 2014. The standard caste narrative posits that there are “dominant castes” at the constituency level who act as kingmakers. While these castes may switch partisan allegiances, there are purported to be strong caste-partisan affinities such as Yadav support for RJD and upper caste support for BJP. Empirically, this implies that parties like RJD and BJP should consistently stand for election and win in the same sets of constituencies, thereby displaying significant incumbency advantages.

Yet, we find a different picture. RJD increased its tally of ACs from 22 in 2010 to 32 in 2014, but it only held on to 7 of the 22 ACs it had won in 2010. By contrast, 23 of the ACs the RJD won in 2014 were actually won by NDA in 2010. BJP had a strike rate of over 50% in constituencies where RJD had won in 2010, significantly higher than RJD’s strike rate in the same constituencies. In 2014, BJP had a strike rate of 70.1% in constituencies it won in 2010, but this was not significantly higher than its overall strike rate of 66.5%. In short, constituencies won by RJD and BJP in 2010 did not carry a discernible caste advantage for re-election.

While caste matters a lot to voters, it may not translate neatly into electoral outcomes. Although voters may prefer to vote for someone of their own caste, many parties select candidates from the same dominant caste group at the constituency level, thereby splitting the caste vote. This may be one reason the BJP has selected many Yadav candidates in the upcoming election. Second, Bihar’s electorate is young, with 56% of voters under the age of 40. This is a population that is less likely to be beholden to traditional caste boundaries and more focused on generating economic opportunities. Bihar exhibits significant electoral volatility, while caste is static. Electoral outcomes are, thus, more likely driven by variable issues such as economic and development concerns.

Conclusion

Our data suggests that NDA is in a stronger position going into the 2015 Bihar election. However, three additional factors could well turn this around. One, it is important to remember that the electorate can shift quickly. Support for parties often swings heavily during a campaign because voters receive a lot of information about parties and candidates at once. Two, national parties like BJP may be more appealing in a national election, but this appeal may not translate as cleanly to the state level. Three, people in Bihar seem satisfied with Nitish Kumar’s tenure as chief minister, and NDA will have to make a convincing argument that it can govern better than him. At the same time, our analysis suggests that the coalition of JD(U), RJD, and Congress will have to do more than banking on the caste vote in order to win the election.

There are two additional “joker-in-the pack” variables. While in most cases this is primarily a contest between the two alliances, the presence of third party candidates (whether from the Left alliance, the Samajwadi Party or Asaduddin Owaisi’s All India Majlis-e-Ittehad-ul Muslimeen (AIMIM)), could well determine close contests between the two alliances. And young voters of Bihar are likely the pivotal group in this election. Who gets their vote, is likely to win Bihar.

We thank Devesh Kapur for helpful comments in writing this piece.

We have furnished a dataset & labels  collated from publicly available ECI data, which was used for the analysis in this piece. All data errors are our own.

The Scaling City Institutions for India: Sanitation (SCI-FI) programme and the Accountability Initiative (AI) at the Centre for Policy Research organised a workshop and conference on Sustainable Sanitation: Evidence and Practice on 11-12 December, 2017 at India Habitat Centre, Delhi.

Held on 11 December as a closed door event, the workshop invited policymakers, practitioners, and government officials tasked with overseeing the daily implementation of government sanitation schemes (including both aspects of the Swachh Bharat Mission (SBM) – rural and urban) for in-depth deliberation and debate on sanitation programmes in India.

The conference, held on 12 December as a discussion amongst a wider group, deliberated on the lessons from the previous day’s workshop, as well as a broader set of themes surrounding the conceptualisation, implementation, and future prospects of sanitation programmes in India. The conference included a special focus on sustainable waste management and Faecal Sludge Management (FSM).

The conference was divided into the following sessions:

• Part 1 (full video above)
  • Opening Session: Challenges and Opportunities for Community Approaches to Sanitation
  • Session 2: Current Understandings of Swachh Bharat Mission (Gramin) implementation
• Part 2 (can be accessed at this link)
  • Session 3: Inclusive City-Wide Sanitation in Swachh Bharat Mission (Urban) and AMRUT
  • Session 4: Panel Discussion on lessons from research and implementation experience

The conference report can be accessed here.

Listen to Barun Mitra (above) talk about the Forest Rights Act of 2006 as he shares his experiences of working with grassroots communities and civil society organisations working on the ground, contextualising his work within the larger framework of property rights.

The talk was organised by the Land Rights Initiative at Centre for Policy Research.

Despite the enactment of successful policy reforms, India is struggling to translate legislative successes into effective gains for citizen groups. Drawing on his extensive field research on forest and land rights, Prakash Kashwan argues about the importance of integrating external social, political and economic factors within the understanding of institutional change to ensure effective delivery.

Listen to the full talk (above) by Prakash Kashwan, and visit the event page for the full presentation.

Watch the full video recording (above), where Mike Raco discusses his paper on diversity planning in London, how it is conceptualised in urban policy frameworks, and its implications for citizens and policy priorities. He argues that diversity narratives are underpinned by radical ambiguities, and discusses both pros and cons.

To listen to the lively discussion that followed, tune in to the Q&A session here.

Watch the full video (above) of the fourth discussion in the series on the central features of populism and cronyism, and their consequences for economic and social development, featuring Michael Walton and James Crabtree.

Populism has emerged in various forms in many parts of the world in recent years. While it is typically associated with an anti-establishment and anti-elite narrative, it is striking how it often coincides with cronyism – favored  relations between the state and (some) big business.

The talk draws on both an ongoing comparative study of state-business relations in India, Egypt, Turkey and South Africa and secondary literature on the history and contemporary features of cronyism and populism.

Michael Walton teaches at the Harvard Kennedy School, and is a Senior Visiting Fellow at CPR. James Crabtree is a writer, journalist and author living in Singapore. He is currently an associate professor of practice at the Lee Kuan Yew School at the National University of Singapore, and a senior fellow at the school’s Centre on Asia and Globalisation.

The question and answer session that followed can be accessed here.

About the CPR-TCPD Dialogues

This was the fourth event in the CPR-TCPD Dialogues on Indian Politics series, launched in a partnership between Centre for Policy Research and Trivedi Centre for Political Data (TPCD) at Ashoka University. This is a monthly event that brings together academicians, policy and political practitioners, and civil society actors to grapple with important social and political issues in India. It provides a forum for intellectually rigorous, non-partisan commentary to strengthen public discourse on politics in India. In these polarised times, debates on politics in India have tended to be increasingly noisy, blurring the lines between critical engagement and partisan endorsement. This dialogue series is an effort to carve out a space for critical, nuanced engagement to understand the changing dynamics of Indian political parties, the impact of new and emerging social movements and the use of new instruments of mobilisation in our polity.

Listen to the full audio recording (above) of the talk by Sheila Jasanoff, where she discusses the historical context of the contrasting stance of the US and the EU on the GM crops debate. Jasanoff elaborates on how the US policymakers dismiss the European reaction as based in scientifically ungrounded fears, while the European anti-GM forces view the US posture as founded on inadequate science.

Additionally, visit the event page to access the presentation.