Introducing Metamorphoses – Talking Technology

A JOINT INITIATIVE BY NITI AAYOG, INDIA INTERNATIONAL CENTRE (IIC), AND CENTRE FOR POLICY RESEARCH (CPR)
TECHNOLOGY

Metamorphoses is a modest effort to try and bridge the gap between digital technologies, which are transforming our lives, and our understanding of their multiple dimensions. It will unfold in a series of nine interactions covering different aspects of the digital revolution. The keynote on May 2, 2018 by Professor Yochai Benkler, Berkman Professor of Entrepreneurial Legal Studies at Harvard Law School & faculty co-director of the Berkman Klein Center for Internet and Society at Harvard University, will look at the big picture – exploring the nature of technological change and its interplay with individual and social attitudes.

The following sessions will attempt to demystify the unique jargon through which new technology is projected on to our lives. Further sessions will delve into issues relating to data privacy and cyber security as well as the emerging legal regime to regulate this critical domain.

This series will examine the impacts of digital technologies on the human psyche and on societies – exploring ways in which some of the negative elements may be mitigated. There will be a peep into the future – of what machine learning and artificial intelligence may bring to human experience – and the moral and ethical dilemma associated with these.

The objective of Metamorphoses, which seeks to assemble acknowledged thought leaders from India and abroad, is to inform and educate society about both the power of new technologies to change our lives for the better but also to alert ourselves to the risks that are attached to them. Risks that must be confronted and overcome as the future continues to unfold before our eyes relentlessly.

The idea behind Metamorphoses – unpacking the paradox of digital transformation

Our world is in the midst of rapid and unprecedented transformation driven by the accelerating advance of scientific thought and technological innovation in multiple domains, which are increasingly interlinked through digital processes. In no other era of history has mankind acquired the power, as it has today, to order life with a sense of deliberate agency.

The scale and speed of technological change is bringing immense benefits to humankind, generating instruments that can help eliminate poverty, disease and hunger. For example, the internet is making it possible, as never before, for cultures to interact, engage as well as share information, experiences and solutions across national boundaries, making this truly an era of knowledge. Similarly, greater understanding of the biology of the human brain and organising patterns among neural networks are leading to advances in artificial intelligence.

Yet, it is also true that technological advance is running ahead of the capacity of the human mind to comprehend and adapt to it. The adaptive capacity of societies as a whole is even less. More critically, the platforms used for communication and engagement have also become the purveyors of hate and exclusion. They are diminishing both privacy and human dignity. While digital technologies can empower the individual by expanding democratic freedoms, in the hands of a predatory state, these may become an instrument of subjugation.

We are, therefore, living a paradox.

The growing disconnect between technological advance and its impact on individuals and society at large is the defining challenge of the digital age. Individuals and societies, therefore, need to comprehend both the positive and negative aspects of the digital revolution and be in an informed position to manage this paradox.

Join us in this journey of metamorphosing

We hope that Metamorphoses will impart useful knowledge about our digital inheritance. But more importantly, we hope that this knowledge will lead to wisdom without which we may end up with mechanisms without meaning.

We look forward to you joining us on this journey of multiple explorations and interacting with us through our social media platforms, including twitter, facebook, and our blog.

The Metamorphoses team of NITI Aayog, India International Centre (IIC) and the Centre for Policy Research (CPR).

Is it the end of participatory coastal planning?

PART 2 OF A SERIES ON ‘COASTAL REGULATION’ BY THE CPR-NAMATI ENVIRONMENT JUSTICE PROGRAM
COASTAL GOVERNANCE ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE RIGHTS

The Environment Ministry has put the CRZ Notification, 2011 through one review, eight amendments and two clarifications since 2014; mostly without any public participation.

This piece can also be accessed in: हिंदी

History of CRZ Notification

The Indian coastline has been protected by the Coastal Regulation Zone (CRZ) Notification since 1991. However, it has also been a space to set up development projects and commercial activities through the construction of ports, thermal power plants and Special Economic Zones. Coastal lands are also in high demand by resorts, hotels and real estate projects. Between 1991 and 2001, through a series of amendments to the Notification, the coasts were opened for all these activities. By 2002, the CRZ Notification had witnessed 20 amendments and it became a complex piece of legislation difficult to comprehend and implement. To piece together all these amendments in one document and also to acknowledge the coastal communities’ rights of using the coast, the notification was replaced with Coastal Regulation Zone Notification, 2011.

Coastal Regulation Zone Notification (CRZ), 2011

CRZ Notification, 2011 was a result of numerous consultations with different stakeholders all along the coast and dialogues between policy makers, civil society organisations, fisher groups and coastal communities. What came out of the process was a negotiated document, which tried to balance different interests and concerns. While it made State Coastal Zone Management Authorities responsible for the implementation of CRZ Notification in their respective jurisdictions, it gave a limited role for state governments in the process of project appraisals and coastal planning (See our report on CZMAs for details). While different actors may have varied opinions on the outcome of the process, there is a unanimous view that the process of drafting the CRZ Notification, 2011 embraced the principles of transparency and public participation in policy making.

Changes to the CRZ Notification, 2011

In June 2014, the Ministry of Environment, Forests and Climate Change (MoEFCC) constituted a committee under the chairmanship of Dr Shailesh Nayak, the then director of the Ministry of Earth Sciences to review the CRZ Notification, 2011. The mandate of the committee was to suggest measures to address the concerns raised by state governments, iron out any ambiguities within the CRZ notification and bring ‘procedural simplification’. The committee consulted the state governments and submitted its report to the Ministry in January 2015. Adhering to its Terms of Reference strictly while examining the notification, the committee did not take on board anyone else’s views (see this analysis for details). The committee made a presentation before the erstwhile Environment Minister Prakash Javadekar in early November 2014 and from that month onward, the CRZ Notification, 2011 has been subject to a series of amendments and clarifications. Download the full report to read the recommendations of the Committee, as well as read the analysis of the recommendations of the CRZ review committee to understand its impacts and its link with the changes being undertaken by the government since November, 2014.

The first in the series was an amendment to transfer powers to appraise certain projects from the MoEFCC to the State Environment Impact Assessment Authorities. Both the review and then this subsequent amendment prove that the Ministry’s efforts at decentralisation are limited only till the state level. The District level coastal committees (DLCCs), though recommended to be constituted under the CRZ Notification, are yet to be fully functional in states such as Goa, Kerala and Odisha. The amendment did not pay any attention to this point. This abandonment of DLCCs becomes particularly grave because they are the only institutions that give an opportunity to coastal communities to participate in decision making for the coasts (See this article to understand how DLCCs have been disregarded in coastal governance).

The Second amendment that was proposed on 11 December, 2014, and was finalised on 17 February, 2015, allowed reclamation in water areas of the CRZ for construction of monuments and memorials. Environmentalists and fisherfolk raised concerns regarding impacts of this change on marine ecology and fisheries through submissions to the Ministry. Since this amendment was finalised within a week after the usual period of 60 days of seeking public comments on the draft, how many of these submissions were read remains a question.

In the same month even before the above-mentioned amendment was finalised, another amendment was made (without seeking any public comments) to allow certain relaxations to tourism projects in urban areas of CRZ. These relaxations included lifting the ban on withdrawal of groundwater from near the coast, and doing away with the requirement of maintaining a path between two tourist structures to access the beach, etc.

In February 2015, the MoEFCC also issued a circular that stated that temporary constructions that are essential but secondary to an activity that has been approved for the coast can be carried out even if they are not explicitly mentioned in the clearance letter. The MoEFCC clarified that such temporary constructions cannot be considered violations.

In March the same year, observing that the preparation of new management plans for the coast as per the CRZ Notification, 2011 was taking time, the MoEFCC extended the validity of the existing plans. The new plans were to replace the plans made 15 years ago (in 1996) under the old Notification of 1991.

In the same month, came a draft amendment that proposed to extend the local town and country planning norms to coastal cities and towns. This meant that coastal cities and towns, despite their vulnerability to natural disasters, could have buildings of as much height and have as many floors as their inland counterparts. This amendment was finalised in June 2015 (implications of this amendment are discussed here).

In June 2015, the MoEFCC proposed one more amendment that allowed reclamation of the seabed for roads while the CRZ Notification, 2011, in its original form, allowed roads to be built only on pillar like structures called stilts so that they would have minimum effect on the sea currents and cause less damage to marine ecology. Despite opposition from fisher groups, citizens, environmentalists and urban planners, this amendment came through in December 2015 (amendments introduced till this time have been discussed here).

The Ministry issued another circular that expanded the definition of the term ‘foreshore facilities’ mentioned in the CRZ Notification, 2011. It stated that the term includes shipping related secondary activities such as marinas, ship repair yards, dry docks, shipbuilding yards and ship lifts. This clarification permitted these activities in the coastal regulation zone.

Another extension to the existing coastal zone management plan came in March 2016 (See details of challenges concerning coastal planning here).

Last in the series of amendments and clarifications, was a draft amendment in April 2016 that proposed to lift the restriction on the construction of sewage treatment plants in ecologically sensitive areas of Greater Mumbai. It also allowed temporary tourism structures such as shacks to remain erected during the monsoon months in Goa. The original Notification required them to be removed during these months to keep to their temporary status and to avoid them from becoming permanent facilities. Also, to prevent any delay in appraisals it proposed that the concerned environment department would be responsible for appraisals in the event of delay in the reconstitution of coastal zone management authorities when their term expires. This Notification is yet to be finalised.

In March this year, to further update the appraisal process, the MoEFCC initiated a separate web-portal for CRZ clearance. It also announced training on using the web-portal for the members of the coastal zone management authorities – institutions responsible for implementation of the CRZ Notification.

In the same month, there have been news reports of an impending new Notification that would replace the existing CRZ Notification, 2011. As per the news reports, it will permit more tourism and commercial projects in the CRZ (Read the first piece in this series for an analysis of the implications of these changes).
If analysed together, these changes indicate three trends: opening of coasts for more commercial and tourism projects; fast-tracking and streamlining of the appraisal process; and allowing state governments a bigger role in coastal decision-making. However, these changes have been made without any public consultation or they have ignored the concerns raised by the coastal communities and local people in submissions sent to the Ministry. The suggestions made in these submissions have had no impact on the process of policy making as the final notifications are almost the same as the drafts put out for public comment. From the process followed by the Ministry in changing the CRZ Notification, it appears that the era of participatory coastal planning is over.

he other pieces in this series can be accessed below:

Is the Current Demonetisation Legal?

NAMITA WAHI, FELLOW AT CPR, EXPLAINS
ECONOMY RIGHTS POLITICS

The Supreme Court is presently hearing several public interest petitions challenging the constitutional validity of Ministry of Finance notification number S.O. 3407(E).

Issued on November 8, 2016, the notification declared that 500 and 1000 rupees notes ceased to be legal tender as of midnight on that day. This “demonetisation” notification permitted unlimited deposit of the now illegal 500 and 1000 Rs. notes by people into their bank accounts, and over the counter exchange of the notes upto a limit of Rs. 4,000, subject to review after 15 days. The notification also imposed limits on both ATM and bank withdrawals of cash. Since then, the government has through executive order made many changes to the applicable limits. The Preamble to the notification stated that the objective of the notification was to eliminate fake currency used for financing terrorism and to address the problem of “unaccounted money” in the economy.

According to some estimates, 86% of Indian currency was in the now illegal Rs. 500 and 1000 notes. Since 68% of all transactions in India are cash transactions, drastically restricting the use of 86% of the currency has predictably thrown the country into a state of chaos. Notwithstanding the government’s efforts to ensure that banks can service the currency needs of the people, endless queues at banks, reports of slowdown of trade and business in the economy, and more than 50 reported deaths have led many to question the wisdom of this move and its efficacy in achieving its objectives vis-à-vis the costs to the people and abridgement of their rights. The Supreme Court likely will not entertain arguments regarding the efficacy of demonetisation since it has repeatedly expressed its deference to the government on policy matters. It must however decide the legality of this move. The demonetisation notification is illegal because it goes beyond the scope of what is permitted under the Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934, (“RBI Act”), the stated source of authority for the notification. There is also a prima facie case of direct and indirect abridgement of fundamental rights to movement (Article 19(1)(d)), trade or business (Article 19(1)(g), livelihood and in certain cases life (Article 21), the right to equality (Article 14), and the constitutional right to property (Article 300A).

It is clear that section 26(2) of the RBI Act empowers the government to demonetise, that is, to declare any series of notes as illegal tender. Therefore, that part of the notification which merely declares that “Rs. 500 and Rs. 1000” notes cease to be legal tender is permissible under section 26(2). In fact, the government twice before, in 1946 and 1978, carried out demonetisation lawfully, with the same goal of addressing unaccounted money. But neither the RBI Act, nor the Banking Regulation Act, 1949, empower the government to impose restrictions on cash withdrawals or deposits in the manner it has been done, and to discriminate between holders and non holders of bank accounts, as the present notification has done. Such actions require an authorising legislation, either an Act of Parliament or an Ordinance. Both in 1946, and in 1978, similar actions were authorised by an ordinance. The failure to issue an ordinance to provide the legal basis for the demonetisation notification this time renders the demonetisation exercise illegal. Even if the act of demonetisation is severed from the restrictions placed on people’s access to their cash and bank accounts, the latter stipulations are both illegal and unconstitutional on several counts.

First, Article 13 of the Constitution provides that the state shall not pass any law or issue any notification that violates the fundamental rights of the people. In Madan Mohan Pathak v. Union of India, the Supreme Court held that “public debts” are property and “the extinguishment of such a debt owing from the state amounts to compulsory acquisition of that debt”. Such compulsory acquisition must be for a public purpose and upon payment of compensation. In Jayantilal Ratanchand v. RBI, in the context of the 1978 demonetisation, the Supreme Court held that insofar as the demonetisation wiped out the RBI’s debt to the bearer of notes declared illegal, it constituted compulsory acquisition of property. Under Article 300A, the state may deprive an individual of property only pursuant to the authority of law, that is, by an Ordinance or an Act of Parliament. The Supreme Court has held that even a temporary deprivation of property can constitute deprivation within the meaning of this provision. The government’s failure to issue an Ordinance (since Parliament was not in session at the time of the demonetisation) to extinguish its debt to the people thereby depriving them of their property impermissibly violates Article 300A. Of course, even if the demonetisation had been sanctioned by an Ordinance, the Court would investigate if it met a public purpose and whether those who were deprived of their property were reasonably compensated. Here the Court would likely hold in light of Jayantilal that the Ordinance fulfilled a public purpose but there is a strong claim that the rationing of currency done by the government constitutes a form of creeping expropriation for which there has been no compensation, and that might nevertheless violate Article 300A.

Second, the extraordinary hardship caused by the demonetisation ordinance has impacted fundamental rights to trade, business and livelihoods of vast sections of the population and even the right to life of those who have died. While the government may “reasonably” restrict the rights to trade, business and livelihood of the people in the interests of the “general public”, the burden is on the government to show that such restrictions are reasonable. The test of reasonableness is whether the measure was necessary to achieve the government’s objectives, and whether less risky, less harmful alternatives were available. In Saghir Ahmad v. State of UP, the Supreme Court held that the reasonableness of a law must be assessed in terms of its “immediate effects” on the affected population. Unlike the 1978 demonetisation exercise that impacted only 1% of currency held, the 2016 demonetisation measure insofar as it impacts an estimated 86% of total currency has had severely punitive effects on many sections of the population, daily wage earners, those without bank accounts, those dependent on the informal cash economy for the major source of their trade and livelihood. The notification is unconstitutional for violating their fundamental rights under Articles 19 and 21.

The notification also discriminates between holders and non-holders of bank accounts. While the government may argue that such a classification is necessary to achieve their objectives of eliminating unaccounted money, insofar as the government failed to ensure that 100% of the population had bank accounts prior to the issuance of this surprise notification, the classification may be assailed as arbitrary and violative of the right to equality under Article 14.

We live in a country governed by the rule of law, and not by the rule of men. The objectives of the demonetisation notification may be laudable, whether the notification will achieve those objectives is debatable. But, as it exists, the demonetisation notification is illegal and unconstitutional.

Is the Urban Future Metropolitan? Big Cities in Urban Systems

4 January 2019
Is the Urban Future Metropolitan? Big Cities in Urban Systems
FULL VIDEO OF PANEL DISCUSSION AS PART OF CPR DIALOGUES

 

Watch the full video of the panel discussion on ‘Is the Urban Future Metropolitan? Big Cities in Urban Systems’, organised as part of CPR Dialogues, featuring Fedor Kudryavtsev, Kazuo Nakano, Ivan Turok, Stéphanie Tawa Lama-Rewal, chaired by Partha Mukhopadhyay.

India’s slow pace of officially recognised urbanisation has been a cause of despair for many.

The nature of India’s urban transformation is not just the classic movement of people from village to city – rather, it is as much about the morphing of place, as farming communities in diverse locations move haltingly away from agriculture to a diverse mix of non-farm activities. Anchored by a historically stable system of urban settlements that have now coalesced into more than five hundred cities of more than 100,000 people, this is a process of urbanisation that goes beyond the concentration of people in, and the fascination with, large urban agglomerations. Urban growth in smaller Indian towns has been ‘vibrant’, an adjective usually reserved for the metropolis.

CPR’s work on urbanisation has been as much about this process of transformation itself as much it has about the metropolis – it has looked at the change in the urban structure, the nuances of growth drivers in the smaller towns, the governance of the regions that surround the large metropolises the institutions of service provision and the lives of citizens in the big cities themselves – their travails, their urbanity and their successes.

What we find is not a story of hierarchy – of vibrant agglomerations dominating a fading system of small towns – but of symbiosis and circulation, of networks and interconnections that underpin an urban transformation which at first sight, appears sui generis to India. But is it?

Around the world, even as many celebrate the benefits of agglomeration, others question the future of the metropolis. Can an urban form born out of Fordist assembly line, high volume manufacturing adapt to a world of mass customisation and Industry 4.0? How large should metropolises be to deliver on the promise that innovation will bloom from serendipitous interaction? Will they be able to provide the pathways out of poverty for the masses making the move out of agriculture into non-farm work? How will they relate to the rest of the system of human settlements, to smaller towns and rural hinterlands, far and near? And, are they better positioned for a climate friendly urban transition or will a more dispersed urban system less resource intensive?

To interrogate this proposition, this panel brings together researchers across Moscow, Johannesburg and Sao Paulo. The BRICS countries are at very different stages of the urbanisation process arrived at through diverse trajectories. Brazil and Russia have completed their urban transition – indeed they were majority urban over 50 years ago while South Africa crossed that milestone 30 years ago.

How do these large metropolises engage with other large cities and the smaller urban settlements? What is their rural hinterland? What does it mean for one in ten Russians to live in Moscow? How does Sao Paulo relate to the 38 other municipalities that comprise the Região Metropolitana de São Paulo? While much of Johannesburg’s migration originates in nearby Mpumalanga, over a third comes from far away provinces like Eastern Cape. What does all this mean for how India will urbanise?

Even as we engage with the oncoming disruptions of Industry 4.0 and Society 5.0, do we need to think in terms of systems, in which we try to comprehend outcomes in the richness of their linkages? The panel explored these, and other approaches, as it examines the claim of India’s sui generis urban transformation.

Partha Mukhopadhyay is a Senior Fellow at CPR.

Fedor Kudryavtsev is associated with the Moscow Institute of Architecture.

Kazuo Nakano is associated with the Universidade Federal de São Paulo.

Ivan Turok is associated with the Human Sciences Research Council, Pretoria.

Stéphanie Tawa Lama-Rewal is a Research Fellow at the Centre d’Études de l’Inde et de l’Asie du Sud (CNRS-EHESS), Paris.

The question and answer session that followed can be accessed here.

An article by Partha Mukhopadhyay and Mukta Naik in the Hindustan Times (print partner for CPR Dialogues) can be accessed here.

Access key takeaways about the Dialogues by Ivan TurokKazuo Nakano and Stéphanie Tawa Lama-Rewal.

Watch all other sessions of the Dialogues below:

JAGA MISSION – Participatory Slum Upgradation Programme

WATCH A SHORT FILM
LAND PLANNING HOUSING

The Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi under its initiative ‘Scaling City Institutions for India: Land Planning and Housing (SCI-FI: LPH)’ is pleased to announce the signing of a MOU on September 28, 2020 with the Housing & Urban Development Department, Government of Odisha.

Through this ground breaking partnership, SCI-FI: LPH aims to support the JAGA Mission in its second phase to integrate the urban poor settlements into the city fabric by upgradation of basic facilities and services. This will in turn lead towards progressive realisation of the JAGA Mission’s broader vision of a Liveable Habitat for all.

SCI-FI: LPH at CPR will be the knowledge partner to help with systematic planning for “slum freeing” and “slum proofing” and will collaborate to undertake pilots and support the scaling up of this programme. While supporting HUDD and the JAGA Mission in transforming the slums into liveable habitat, it will endeavour to document the learnings from the entire process for other states and cities across the country. This project is supported by the Omidyar Network India.

As a first step under this MoU, a Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) has been prepared by SCI-FI: LPH for Slum Upgradation and Delisting. The SOP is formally launched via videoconferencing with remarks by the Honourable Chief Minister, Government of Odisha on Monday, September 28, 2020.

STATE LEVEL LAUNCHING OF SLUM UPGRADATION PROGRAMME FOR ACHIEVING SLUM FREE CITIES THROUGH VIDEO CONFERENCING (Date: 28.09.2020 Timing: 11.30 AM)

11.30 AM – Welcome address by Principal Secretary to Government, H&UD Department.

11.33 AM – Screening of video on ‘Parichaya’ and dedication of 116 Parichaya (Multi-Purpose Community Centres) in 116 Slums in 30 ULBs by Hon’ble Chief Minister.

11.37 AM – Screening of video on slum upgradation programme.

11.40 AM – Release of SoP document on commencement of slum upgradation programme by Hon’ble Chief Minister.

11.42 AM – Signing of MOU between Housing & Urban Development Department and Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi for supporting the Slum upgradation programme as Knowledge Partner.

11.45 AM – Address by Hon’ble Minister, Housing & Urban Development from Balasore Collectorate V.C. Hall.

11.48 AM – Commencement of distribution of 1,05,000 LEC by Hon’ble Chief Minister.

11.51 AM – Address by Hon’ble Chief Minister.

11.55 AM – Vote of thanks by Joint Mission Director, Jaga Mission.

By adopting this SOP the Government of Odisha, has bridged a key gap in national and state policy on housing options for the urban poor, by introducing “slum upgrading”, i.e. statewide upgradation of basic infrastructure in slums to bring the slum neighbourhood infrastructure at par with the rest of the city. The land rights and entitlement exercise along with the slum upgradation exercise will allow the delisting of slums in the city and bring the poorer neighbourhoods within the city planning and governance process, statewide.

Watch the short movie demonstrating the continuous efforts of the Government of Odisha in ushering growth-oriented and inclusive reforms in diverse socio-economic spheres. Through this SOP, the government aims to lay down the integral steps to fostering community participation, by involving slum residents in urban planning and local development process promoting decentralised decision-making at various levels of urban governance. This SOP document will lay the foundation for further affirmative actions with respect to improved tenure security, housing and adequate access to basic services, thereby promoting the over-arching objective of achieving slum-free and slum-proof cities in Odisha.

K C Sivaramakrishnan – Chairman, Centre for Policy Research, passes away

CREMATION AT LODHI ROAD ELECTRIC CREMATORIUM ON FRIDAY, MAY 29, 2015 AT 4.30. PM
OBITUARIES

It is with profound grief and sadness that we announce the passing away of Mr K.C. Sivaramakrishnan, Chairman, Centre for Policy Research. The cremation will take place at Lodhi Road Electric Crematorium on Friday, May 29, 2015 at 4.30. pm. This is an immeasurable loss to CPR and the wider community. We can take some consolation from his extraordinary achievement in so many fields and we know he will be lighting up heaven as he lit up this earth.

Key facts about Karnataka election results explained in numbers and charts

DATA ANALYSIS BY NEELANJAN SIRCAR (SENIOR FELLOW, CPR), ROSHAN KISHORE (HINDUSTAN TIMES) & HOW INDIA LIVES
ELECTION STUDIES

A last-minute blitz by Prime Minister Narendra Modi helped the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) surge ahead of the ruling Congress in Karnataka assembly elections, but it fell just short of the magic figure.

A mapping of election results on top of data that characterises the socio-economic make up of constituencies throws up interesting details on how certain sections of voters clinched it for the winners. Here are three voting patterns seen in Karnataka.

Urban seats 35/71

There are 71 constituencies where more than 35% of the population was living in urban areas. The BJP won 15 such seats in 2013. In 2018, it increased its count to 35. Meanwhile, the Congress saw its tally in such seatsshrink from 42 to 30 seats.

Dalit seats: 31/82

There are 82 constituencies where Dalits comprised over 20% of the population. In 2013, the BJP won only 9 of these seats. This time, they won 31, mostly at the expense of the Congress, whose tally fell from 49 to 34.The JD (S) saw its count in such seats fall from 17 to 15.

Minority seats: 36/78

There are 78 constituencies in Karnataka where the share of minorities in the population was above 17%. The BJP increased its haul in such seats from 19 to 36. The Congress went from 45 to 35—a decline but not of the same level as in Dalit and urban seats.

Irrespective of who forms the government, the results are a boost for the BJP as it has managed to get more seats than the Congress and bury the ghosts of the defeat it suffered in the 2013 assembly elections. Three factors can explain this success.

The announced alliance between the Congress, JD(S), has left the BJP seething. But this kind of an alliance would never been necessary had there been a pre-electoral understanding between these two parties. While the JD(S) wins many seats in South Karnataka, it often plays spoiler outside of the region.

We defined JD(S) as a spoiler when it finished third or lower but had a greater vote share difference between the Congress’ and BJP vote share. In effect, these are the seats the JD(S) has no chance of winning but has enough votes to push the second place party over top. Thirty-one of the 43 seats in which JD(S) plays spoilers are in Bombay, Central, or Hyderabad Karnataka – areas with heavy Lingayat populations that came back to the BJP this time. There was little bias in whose fortunes the JD(S) spoiled. Of the 43 seats in which JD(S) was spoiler, the Congress won 23 and BJP bagged 20. (Graphic text: Neelanjan Sircar)

Blow to incumbents

The Congress got fewer seats than the BJP though its vote share was nearly two percentage points higher than the saffron party’s. A look at seats where incumbents lost, which may have hurt the Congress more than the BJP because the former had 122 seats.

Sixteen ministers from the Siddaramaiah government failed to secure a win from their constituencies

The Siddaramaiah government’s decision in March to grant the status of a minority religion to the Lingayat community backfired with the Congress emerging as the biggest loser. The Congress had banked on the support of the influential mutts (monasteries) of the community to back its decision and help sway a significant chunk of Lingayat votes in its favour. But it managed to win just 39 of the 104 seats in the Mumbai-Karnataka, Hyderabad-Karnataka and Central Karnataka regions where the community is dominant, a significant reduction from the 67 seats it won in 2013.

BJP dominates India and how

The Karnataka assembly election results reconfirm the dominance of Narendra Modi-Amit Shah leadership in national politics.

The data analysis has been carried out by Neelanjan Sircar, Senior Fellow, CPR, Roshan Kishore from Hindustan Times and How India Lives. The original article appeared in Hindustan Times.

Key Findings of the Status of Policing in India Report – A Study of Performance and Perceptions

FULL VIDEO OF DISCUSSION
RIGHTS POLITICS

Watch the full video (above) of the discussion on ‘Key Findings of the Status of Policing in India Report – A Study of Performance and Perceptions’, featuring Dr Vipul Mudgal and Prof Sanjay Kumar.

The Police is the most visible face of the State. Indian police forces are riddled with problems of corruption and misuse of authority, and are often seen as stooges of the parties in power. The idea of police reforms in India remain a distant reality as no action has been taken despite 12 years having passed since the landmark Supreme Court judgment of Prakash Singh vs Union of India. The police and paramilitary forces often seem to work as private armies of politicians and political parties in power across the ideological spectrum. Their writ seems to run everything from arrests to acquittals and from appointments to transfer and postings, irrespective of court orders and constitutional provisions.

The Status of Policing in India Report (SPIR) 2018- A Study of Performance and Perceptions is one of the first attempts to scientifically study police performance and its interaction with the public. It is a rigorous study of the performance and perception of the police in India. It covers close to 16000 respondents in 22 states on parameters like citizens’ trust and satisfaction levels, discrimination against the vulnerable, police excesses, infrastructure, diversity in forces, state of prisons and disposal of cases etc.

Dr Vipul Mudgal is an activist, journalist and a media scholar. He is the Director and Chief Executive of Common Cause and also heads the Inclusive Media for Change. Prof Sanjay Kumar is currently the Director of The Centre for the Study of Developing Societies (CSDS).

K C Sivaramakrishnan: God’s own civil servant

A REMEMBRANCE
OBITUARIES

K.C. Sivaramakrishnan, IAS, chairman of the Centre for Policy Research, passed away on May 28. His life surpassed all measures of excellence, achievement and character. A conventional biography would be impressive enough: An IAS officer who exemplified the best that the service was meant to be, in knowledge, dedication and integrity. He served in various positions: chief executive, Calcutta Metropolitan Authority, secretary in the ministries of commerce and urban affairs. After retirement, he embarked on a career as a scholar, publishing a dozen significant books and reports, mainly on urbanisation, which would be the envy of any scholar. But this biography does not do justice to his achievement.

KCS, as he was known, was the kind of individual indispensable to the foundations of modern India. His integrity and thoroughness as a civil servant were exemplary. But unlike the encrusted reputation of civil servants (which he made fun of in a characteristically humorous and self-deprecating book, The Enduring Babu), his conduct as a civil servant was to facilitate and enable, rather than block and slow down things. In a disposition that he carried over to scholarly life, he never presumed to know and always insisted on learning more. But, most importantly, it is hard to think of a modern scholar or civil servant whose career was so insistently bound up with the fundamental architecture of Indian democracy; an architecture we have waylaid at our peril.

In his work and life, that architecture of democracy had four pillars. The first, unusual among civil servants, was an unremitting faith in the primacy of representative democracy. He did probably the most laborious and outstanding work on delimitation, to ensure that the idea of equal representation was not lost. The second pillar was a farsighted belief in the power of decentralisation and the role of local bodies. He was one of the architects of the 73rd and 74th Amendments, and his passion for local government informed almost everything he did. He published numerous books on the subject including, most recently, Courts, Panchayats and Nagarpalikas, which examined the ways in which courts have shaped the architecture of local governance. In his most recent work on mega-city governance, he candidly acknowledged the ways in which a moth-eaten 74th Amendment had stymied the future of urban governance. He argued for democracy over bureaucracy, participation over exclusion, and the fitness of administrative structures to the task at hand with rare depth, knowledge and precision.

The third pillar of a democratic future was cities. He was one of the earliest articulators of a vision for city governance, beginning with his work in developing industrial townships like Durgapur and Asansol, through to his work in rehabilitating refugees during the 1971 war in Calcutta.

Although his work focused much on the legal forms and administrative structures of cities, every single report and book of his is informed by a profound sense of the dynamism of cities and their complex social and economic structures. His most recent work on mega cities (including chairing the commission for a new capital for Andhra Pradesh) highlighted the complex dynamic unfolding in the relations between regions and cities, and was prescient in recognising the kinds of tensions brewing around our cities.

The fourth pillar of his work on democracy was profoundly infused with his personality. Behind his baritone voice and towering presence was a truly democratic personality, infused with the lightness, joy and diversity only a democratic personality could conjure. He had a killer sense of humour that had the power to dissolve conflict rather than exacerbate it. He was fiercely independent, deferring to no authority or threat, and nurtured that quality in institutions he shepherded. He had strong views. But he never imposed them, and often nurtured a kind of agonal difference. He cared about everyone he encountered. He combined in his persona the dream liberal arts sensibility we talk about but rarely achieve — the knowledge of several languages, a deep and cultured interest in art and music, a passion for knowledge ranging from law to economics, a sense of civic duty and dialogue across generations. Democracy for him was the affirmation of life.

He may also have been the last of the great Nehruvians. He chided Nehru for ignoring local government. But he had a commitment to building a modern state, a deep interest in institutions, an interest in modernity, made richer by a sense of the past, a sense of India above region, religion and caste, and a concern for a civilisational linkage that could perhaps one day, again, transcend the barriers Partition created. He left too soon. And the only explanation can be that God needed an exemplary civil servant for himself, since modern India seems to no longer have any use for this kind.

– Pratap Bhanu Mehta, writing in the Indian Express on 29 May 2015

Introducing CPR Views – Overhauling ‘babu’ culture in India?

CPR FACULTY REACT TO NEW GOVERNMENT POLICY ON ‘LATERAL ENTRY’ INTO HIGHER ADMINISTRATIVE POSITIONS
BUREAUCRACY CPR VIEWS

India’s bureaucracy is in urgent need of reform. As Prime Minister Modi himself has often said ‘India cannot march through the 21st century with the administrative systems of the 19th century’. The government’s recent move to introduce a policy for lateral entry, especially domain experts from the private sector, into joint secretary level positions, is an important step in the direction of reform. The move has however generated a lot of public debate.

In this first edition of ‘CPR Views’ CPR faculty and experts, many of whom have significant experience working within government, share their comments on this key development.
Yamini Aiyar,
President and Chief Executive, CPR

‘In principle, I welcome the idea of lateral entrants into the bureaucracy. It is now a widely acknowledged truth that the art of governance is becoming increasingly complex, and this complexity requires a degree of expertise that a career generalist may not have. As a career policy wonk, and self-professed expert (as most of my think tank colleagues are), I can’t but argue for the importance of domain “expertise” in policy making!

But from the perspective of what ails India’s bureaucracy, it is worth considering if lack of expertise is the primary illness or whether the problem lie elsewhere? To my mind the core failing with bureaucracy in India is not the lack of expertise. Frankly, we under-estimate the capacity and capability of our IAS in public debates on bureaucracy. Moreover, in discussions on the bureaucracy’s need for domain expertise, we have rarely considered the fact that the government is adept at seeking expertise when required. In my view, the government has been quite effective at bringing in “experts” and seeking expert advice from a wide gamut of actors – NGOs, activists, think tanks and private sector specialists are all part of government committees and discussions where advice is regularly sought and given, in abundance. In my profession we are often asked about the “impact” we make on policy making. I often worry that we have too much impact because our government has outsourced all the thinking to us “experts”. As a result, policy making is becoming far too technocratic and domain specific even as policy challenges increasingly require inter-sectoral approaches and most importantly, political engagement.

The real challenge in our governance today is one of institutional design and organisational culture. Our bureaucracy is set up for a very limited set of functional domains – and as these have expanded – moving from mere regulation and delivery of statutory services to market development, delivering citizen rights, changing entrenched social behavior, managing and enforcing contracts – we have never asked ourselves the question of whether a top-down, centralised narrowly trained system can in fact deliver on these complex tasks.

India’s bureaucracy is, as Lant Pritchett argues, designed for “thin” tasks – logistical tasks (like running a post office) that can be monitored based on “thin” information (has the letter reached). Thin systems define performance in simple, thin terms. Yet, as the role of government has expanded, expectations of performance have changed. Government in the 21st century has to perform a range of what Pritchett calls “thick” tasks – transaction intensive activities that require significant discretion in decision making. Governance today is not about building a road it is also about maintaining it, it isn’t about building a school but ensuring that students learn, it is about developing and maintaining complex public-private relationships. These are a range of tasks where performance cannot be reduced to thin metrics. Monitoring teacher performance is one example – where thin metrics like teacher qualifications or syllabus completion simply cannot capture the complexity of what goes on inside a classroom. Performance of a teacher ought to be determined on the nature of the multiple interactions teachers have with students inside the classroom. This is a “thick” activity that requires teachers to assess their context and modify their behavior accordingly.

Thus, the real failure with governance in India today is that we assume that “thin” systems can in fact perform “thick” tasks. We expect the government to be iterative, innovative, nimble and most importantly deliberative. Yet, we have paid scant attention to the structures, systems and culture within the government and never asked whether these systems are in fact aligned with the tasks at hand. Bringing an “expert” into a broken system is unlikely to fix the problem. At best, experts will be like Islands – which is, in my view, the role that many like Vijay Kelkar, Montek Ahluwalia (names that are doing the rounds currently as examples of why lateral entry is important) played. And at worst, they will get lost in the fundamental, structural problem that India’s governance system faces today.

In the end there are no short cuts. We have to fix the roots of the problem. Lateral entry is, to quote Abhijeet Banjerji, no more than “putting band aid on a corpse”.’

T R Raghunandan,
Advisor to the ‘Accountability Initiative’ at CPR and a former Joint Secretary

‘I welcome the idea of lateral entry into the government. The higher levels of bureaucracy are largely a monopoly of civil servants, mostly from the IAS (Indian Administrative Services), but there is no logical reason why that should be so. Monopolies eventually do not provide any incentive for excellence. Lateral entrants are likely to be ignorant of the labyrinthine processes of governance, which insiders worship without question. They are likely to bring in fresh ideas and a greater motivation to see them through to their implementation.

Detractors of lateral entry often refer to the robustness of the ‘system’ that screens talent within the civil services, to ensure that the best reach the top. However, those within this system know that often, its objectivity is distorted by tribal loyalties and biases. Therefore, the ‘system’ is sufficiently moth-eaten for reasonable people to not regret its demise.

Yet, the process envisaged for lateral entry, as it is configured at the moment is seriously flawed. The government has advertised for a few posts, laid down a few conditions of experience, sought for a rather low academic qualification – only a graduate level standard – and indicated that the selection will be done after an ‘interaction’ with a selection committee. This is a recipe for confusion and corroborates some of the fears of naysayers. For example, many fear that lateral entry could become a revolving door for corporate interests to come in and tweak policies to their advantage, or for cronies of the political party in power to hold critical positions in key ministries.

There are practical problems too, with the process envisaged. The civil services, still has a lustre attractive enough to motivate lakhs of aspirants to apply for the entrance exam and run the gauntlet of a three stage, year-long selection process. It is therefore not unlikely that at the very least, many thousands will apply for the advertised lateral entry positions. The selection process will be overworked and its veracity questioned, if it is only confined to an interview like process by a selection committee. Given the constitutionally mandated primacy of the UPSC (Union Public Service Commission) to undertake the selection of senior civil servants, it is also likely that the process of lateral entry may be questioned on legal grounds.

Yet, how long will this rejection of outsiders continue? Professionals outside the government are befuddled with the bureaucracy. Their feeling that they could do better if given a chance, is growing stronger by the moment. The lateral entry window, once opened will not be shut. Competent outsiders will not give up the pressure for lateral entry once they taste blood.

Therefore, in my view, opposing lateral entry is not the right way forward. The focus must be on how to improve the rigour and objectivity of the lateral entry selection process. Furthermore, in the larger context of reforming the civil services and ensuring that the best talent reach the top, lateral entry is but one instrument. There are other ideas that could be tried, such as more objective and open screening processes for picking people to rise in the service, or picking officers for higher level positions such as Additional Secretaries and Secretaries from an internal pool of talent and experience, rather than going almost entirely by seniority.

All in all, even though the current process of lateral entry is seriously flawed, this idea is not going to die. It is a desirable one and it should be carried out much better than as envisaged at present.’

D Shyam Babu,
Senior Fellow, CPR
Domain experts, like salt, must be used sparingly. Less may be bad but more will be a disaster. The adage ‘excess of anything is bad,’ is true even if the thing in question is good and desirable. The Centre has decided to induct non-IAS government officers as well as personnel from the private sector as joint secretaries through lateral entry, in other words, through the side door. The government is now accepting applications for ten such posts. Since one of the aims of the policy is to ‘augment manpower,’ the trickle may soon turn into a downpour.

We can surmise three considerations that might have informed the policy. One, IAS officers are ‘generalists’ and hence unsuited to manage technical or highly specialised areas of governance. Two, non-IAS persons, especially from the private sector, are less enamoured by cumbersome bureaucratic procedures that clog the wheels of development, and will put the country on a fast-track. Three, the interaction between the rule-bound IAS and goal-oriented outsider will result in cross pollination of ideas, cultures and temperaments.

We would celebrate the day when these hopes have become a reality. But, meanwhile, some reality check may be warranted.

One, what is assumed to be a problem is not a problem. Democratic governance is conservative by nature and any talk of radical change is a mere rhetoric. India is no exception. We want our officials to be accountable and diligent. Due diligence must take primacy over efficiency. Where is the evidence to prove that our senior officers are inefficient or lack domain expertise? It is a different matter if they are corrupt or in collusion with their political bosses.

Two, we are making too much of domain expertise. Though our public universities and research outfits are run by the so-called domain experts, they are no founts of either efficiency or fresh ideas. It’s less said the better about the private sector.’

Keshav Desiraju,
Board Member, CPR and former Health Secretary

‘Joint Secretaries (JS) in the central secretariat come mainly from the IAS but also from other services. They bring field experience, especially in the nitty-gritty of the state-subjects, healthcare, primary education, agriculture, rural development, women and child development, land revenue and management, and forest management. They also bring an understanding of how a federal structure works and how political priorities are set. They have also, all, sworn allegiance to the Constitution of India.

Given India’s realities, it is possible that most have not had the time to develop a specialisation. However, many are first class candidates. When they become JSs in Delhi, working often in policy areas of which they have no direct experience [Environment & Forests, Steel, Mines, Coal, Economic Affairs, Civil Aviation, Commerce] they need to learn the details but a five year tenure has enabled many to acquire full control. The current proposal is to bring in JSs into ten ministries, nine of which are in this category. In principle, officers of the regular services coming to these posts will need to upgrade skills and develop subject matter expertise. Even where they know their subjects, they will need to learn the craft of policy making.

Lateral entrants have been suggested as a breath of fresh air and inspired thinking after the stuffiness of the babu. They are probably more skilled at quantitative methods and presentation, better educated, and with better English. They have probably worked in more orderly work environments, have enjoyed security of tenure, have been assessed better at their performance and have probably been held more accountable for the jobs they have been entrusted with. Some of them may even be very good.

Some of these skills can be taught even if it may take longer for the work environment to change in government settings. What the lateral entrants lack is a knowledge of the context in which government functions. They do not bring a knowledge of the field, they do not have experience of working with elected representatives, and they do not know how party politics at the state and district levels can impact on an officer’s performance. They do not also have experience of working in an environment where objectives are hazy, tasks unspecified and the responsibility is total. Hence, what IAS officers do should not be undervalued.

Lateral entrants work on short term contracts. They may perform well but when they leave they take their experience with them without contributing to the process of building institutional knowledge. In any case, the system has already provided for non-service experts in many departments; ICAR in Agriculture, ICMR and DGHS in Health or the specialist cadres in the science ministries. These bodies have to be improved.

There are also JSs, many from the IAS, who are lazy, incompetent, ill-motivated and corrupt. That is not a problem which lateral entry will solve. It is also not necessarily the case that highly qualified lateral entrants will not misuse their positions.

India has followed a conventional approach to recruitment to the public services. The Union and State Public Service Commissions seek to identify potential and, as of the present, the UPSC is still one major constitutional body, which has not been majorly tainted. Candidates are assessed on the basis of what they know to which the Commission brings its sense of how they are likely to perform. Lateral entrants are to be recruited on the basis of proven performance. Their subject matter expertise is not in doubt. What is not so clear is their understanding of deprivation, bias and the lack of opportunity. There is a fear that lateral entrants will seek IT based solutions to all problems of human development. IT is an invaluable tool and we must push for much greater use of IT applications in all spheres of development, in the management of data and in assisting evidence-based policy making. But IT applications are not in themselves the answer.

Ten positions within the entire secretariat are not going to make a big difference. It may even do some limited good. The positions are open to serving officers as well, which is a good way of encouraging specialisation. However, if the practice is to spread we must ask whether it will be subject to the rules of reservation. In the name of professional expertise we cannot ignore a constitutional requirement.

There is also the fear that lateral entrants will be brought in on the basis of ideology or commitment to the political parties in power. While it is true that many officers from the IAS and other services become closely aligned with one party or the other, and some, indeed, with several parties over the course of their careers, our system has not so far actually placed persons in executive positions on the basis of ideology and nothing else.

There is much to be done in the area of civil service reform, recruitment, training, promotion, etc. However all that is peripheral to the crucial issue of the use and abuse of power. How much responsibility, and consequently power, will an elected government delegate to unelected civil servants? Can a responsible civil servant be assured by the government she serves of physical and professional protection from elements within the party constituting that government? Can an officer be assured by her government that political and civil servant corruption will not be tolerated?

Conscientious serving officers learn, in hard times, to remain true to themselves and to the people of India. These are situations which lateral entrants to government service do not need to confront.’

G Parthasarathy,
Honorary Research Professor, CPR, and former Indian diplomat

Recruitment to All India Services was conceived in the years immediately following independence. The aim was to see that the bureaucracy across the States of a diverse India was drawn substantially from people outside the State, so that the higher echelons could ensure that partisan considerations of caste and religion did not dominate day to day administrative issues, ranging from law and order to economic development projects.

The system, however, has become corrupt from top-down. Significant corruption emanates from the highest political levels. The bureaucrat tends to emulate his political masters, making the entire system rotten. Eliminating political level corruption requires primary emphasis.

The Civil Service Cadres need to get in early in their career, into areas of specialisation, such as Law and Order/Security, Development, Social Issues and Finance. Any system of lateral recruitment promotes, casteism, corruption and nepotism. Lateral entry should be only for highly specialised jobs, effected through transparent procedures and organisations not subject to political, caste or religious prejudices of preferences. These posts should be normally for a three-year-tenure, though in some very special cases this could be extended to five years.’