Author: cprindia

HOUSEHOLD DATA COLLECTED BY CPR ON ENERGY USE
ENERGY RESEARCH

This database contains household – level data on socio-economic and demographic characteristics, appliance ownership, energy use behaviour and awareness. The survey was conducted over two phases (baseline, endline) in affordable housing in the city of Rajkot, India in February and July 2017. It was part of Centre for Policy Research’s ‘Integrating Energy and Climate Objectives in Indian Cities’ project funded by the Swiss Agency for Development and Co-operation’s CapaCITIES project. The data has been anonymised.

This database will be uploaded shortly. To register interest please fill out this form.

To read more about our work in cities, visit our cities and buildings project pages.

IN CONVERSATION WITH YAMINI AIYAR, AVANI KAPUR AND PADMAPRIYA JANAKIRAMAN
FISCAL DEVOLUTION SOCIAL SECTOR SCHEMES BUDGET

BUREAUCRACY
The Accountability Initiative (AI) at CPR has conducted extensive research on fiscal devolution in two separate studies—one that focuses on the effects of the Fourteenth Finance Commission recommendations on state finances, with a particular focus on effects on social sector investments. And a second study that focuses on understanding the fiscal devolution to rural local governments through a case study of fund flows to Gram Panchayats in one district in Karnataka.

Findings from the studies will be shared at a seminar on 3rd June with several stakeholders, including from the government of India. In the run-up, Yamini Aiyar, Avani Kapur, and Padmapriya Janakiraman from AI share their insights (below) on the importance and relevance of these studies, providing a glimpse into critical findings.

Is fiscal devolution a brave new move by the current government?

Yamini: As you know fiscal devolution means devolution of power and responsibilities from national government to sub-national governments. Constitutionally, the government is mandated to set up a Finance Commission (FC) every five years to determine the share of financial resources between the union and the state governments.

In 2013, the government constituted the Fourteenth Finance Commission (FFC). The FFC recommendations, accepted by the Government of India in February 2015, are an attempt to re-align the constitutionally mandated responsibilities of state governments’ with adequate financial resources. To do this, the FFC recommended enhancing tax devolution (of the pool of resources shared between the centre and the states) to state governments from 32 per cent (Thirteenth Finance Commission) to 42 per cent from the years running 2015 through 2020.

There is a long standing precedent that the government of the day whole-heartedly accepts the recommendations of the Finance Commission. However, it must be said that there was a dissenting note that suggested a slower approach for devolution in the FFC report submitted in February, 2015, but the government chose to overlook that.

So while in its implementation the fiscal devolution being undertaken by the current government is new, it is to be noted that this was not a move made by the government, but was recommended by the FFC.

Can you tell us more about the research undertaken by the Accountability Initiative (AI) on fiscal devolution?

Yamini: In 2015 after accepting the recommendations of the FFC, the Government of India presented its budget. In its budget presentation, in order to create the fiscal space to enhance tax devolution to state governments, it significantly cut down funds provided to states through Centrally Sponsored Schemes (CSS).

Let me explain how this works—there are different modes through which money is transferred from the Government of India to the states: i) taxes (determined by FC); ii) grants and aid (determined by FC); iii) central assistance to states (determined by the erstwhile Planning Commission, and now coordinated by the line ministries). Central assistance is essentially money tied to priorities identified by the centre, with mechanisms for implementation also largely identified by the centre. Over time, these became a critical source of financing social policy in India.

So what the government has done in the budget is to reduce the funds provided through central assistance (primarily CSS) to enhance tax devolution. While the cuts makes sense constitutionally, since the constitutional responsibility to provide services funded through CSS lies with the states, in practice over the last decade, a large number of these functions were re-appropriated by the centre. So in cutting back the CSS, the centre, in theory, gave the states the choice to prioritise funds the way they would like to in line with their constitutionally aligned responsibilities.

Yet, the move raised an important question. Key social sector services in India, are in many ways, a national responsibility, including education, health, social protection etc. And it is the Government of India, which has signed up to the global Sustainable Development Goals to ensure these are nationally realised. So the question raised was how does one ensure that these national priorities are fulfilled if the centre is not financing these key activities (through CSS)? In addition, many state governments too began worrying if the cuts in the CSS would have a significant impact on the fiscal space available to them to invest in the social sector programmes?

In order to answer these questions, we decided to examine state budgets so as to understand what is actually happening at the state level. It is important to say that given the vagaries of how budgeting takes place in India, the true picture of the investment pattern in this changed scenario will only come to light a few years down the line, because the Government of India and the state governments report on actual expenditure at a two-year lag . Moreover, it is important to take a long term view on such foundational changes to the country’s fiscal architecture.

Therefore the results of our study must be seen as indicative rather than definitive, and it is also important to note that the process of transition will always have teething problems. In that sense the findings are a sign of how states are beginning to adjust to the changed devolution. They also provide us a benchmark with which to track state expenditure over the remaining period of the FFC implementation, so that we have evidence with which to debate the effects of devolution four years from now.

Can you share key findings from the examination of these state budgets in light of the questions raised?

Avani: We studied state budgets from 19 states, and interestingly, despite initial reservations, here is what we found:

All 19 states saw an increase in funds transfer, which means that the cuts in CSS were offset by the increase in tax devolution.
Further, even as the centre cut back on funds through the CSS, throughout the year, the Government of India passed a number of supplementary budgets. Consequently, in effect there was no significant reduction in the amount of funds traditionally transferred through CSS; in fact most states saw an increase compared with the previous financial year.
At the all India level, union government transfers to states saw an increase of less than 1% of GDP between 2014-15, and the 2015-16 revised estimates. When we studied it state-wise, all states received at least 20 percent more from the union.
Importantly, we have not seen any drop in expenditure on social sector schemes in these states.
You also conducted a study on fiscal devolution to local governments, especially Panchayats. Can you tell us more about this?

Yamini: The devolution story in India began with the path-breaking 73rd and 74th constitutional amendments (in 1992), when the Parliament committed India to devolving significant powers and responsibilities to a third tier of the elected local government. Over the years, anyone who is familiar with the evolution of the local government system in India will be aware of the fact that the actual devolution of key powers and resources, commonly referred to as the funds, functions, and functionaries, has been limited at best, leaving Panchayats and local municipalities with very little authority and financial resources to fulfill their constitutional mandate.

Despite this, there is very little empirical data that can actually tell us what is happening at the Panchayat level as well as at the local municipality level. More importantly, the key stakeholders (the elected representatives) themselves have very little idea of what powers and resources should be devolved to them, and what actually does get devolved to them.

To address this problem, we began in 2014 a micro-level analysis of trends in fiscal decentralisation to rural local governments (Panchayats) in the state of Karnataka.

Can you share key findings of this micro-level analysis in Karnataka?

Padmapriya: Through a detailed exploration of the Karnataka state budget and an expenditure tracking exercise that focuses on 30 Gram Panchayats (GP) in Mulbagal Taluka, Kolar district, this study tracks trends in fiscal decentralisation in the state, and attempts to identify the specific quantum of monies spent in the jurisdiction of Gram Panchayats contrasted with the money that Gram Panchayats actually receive. Here is what we found:

A significant proportion of money that should be devolved to Panchayats is in fact appropriated by the state government. To explain this further—the total budgetary allocation for Karnataka in the Financial Year (FY) 2014-15 was Rs 1, 50,379 crore (Budgeted Estimates). Based on an analysis of functions devolved to Panchayati Raj Institutions (PRIs), as mandated by the Karnataka Panchayati Raj Act 1993, our study estimates that approximately 33% of the total budget ought to have been devolved to PRIs. However, in actual fact, the state budgeted an allocation of only 17% of its total budget for expenditure by PRIs.
Consequently, Gram Panchayats are accountable for a miniscule proportion of the total monies spent in their political constituencies. Our survey found that the average expenditure (including all administrative and Panchayat activity) within a single GP in Mulbagal in FY 2014-15 was approximately Rs 6 crore. However, only 3% or Rs. 20 lakh of this amount was spent directly by a GP.
Worse, GPs are unaware of the nature and extent of funds spent in their own jurisdiction. This makes it impossible for GPs to track and hold authorities accountable for such expenditure.
Finally, even money that GPs are expected to receive directly from the centre into their accounts are being slowly re-appropriated by the state.
​You then took the findings of this case study in Karnataka back to various stakeholders. Can you share their responses to it?

Padmapriya: We shared the findings with: i) policy makers at the state government level, ii) Gram Panchayat Unions in Karnataka; iii) the Ministry of Panchayati Raj at the centre. At all levels, the response was very encouraging:

At the state level, the planning department, finance department, and the treasury have responded proactively by taking some of our recommendations on board, including tracing all the expenditure at the location where it occurs, which will help in aggregating data to a GP.
The Gram Panchayat Unions had never been given information of this nature. About 16 Gram Panchayats from North Karnataka have now come forward to do a research of this kind thus enabling them to track expenditures in their jurisdictions.
The Ministry of Panchayati Raj was very receptive as well, and we are in conversation with them to explore if such a study can be replicated in other states.
To learn more about the seminar on 3rd June, access the dedicated page here.

The PAISA for Panchayat policy brief (summary version) can be accessed here and the full report can be accessed here.

The State of Social Sector Expenditure in 2015-16 report can be accessed here.

The full videos of the seminar held on 3rd June, where findings from the studies were shared with various stakeholders, can be accessed here.

A FIELD ANALYSIS BY NEELANJAN SIRCAR, BHANU JOSHI AND ASHISH RANJAN
ELECTION STUDIES POLITICS

In their second piece on the Assam elections, drawing on their extensive field work in Lower Assam, which has a heavy concentration of Muslims, CPR researchers Neelanjan Sircar, Bhanu Joshi and Ashish Ranjan unpack the complex contours of the Muslim vote in Assam.

Their analysis argues that the preferences of Muslims in the region defy any simple characterization. They debunk the idea of a well-coordinated, consolidated Muslim vote bank that will decide the fate of the elections in the state, sharing insights on the competing political appeals the Congress, the AIUDF, and even the BJP (in special cases), hold for a Muslim population divided by region, language and patterns of religious practice.

Read the full paper here.

IN CONVERSATION WITH LAVANYA RAJAMANI
PARIS AGREEMENT CLIMATE RESEARCH

What is the Paris Agreement?

The international climate change regime consists of the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the 1997 Kyoto Protocol and the decisions taken by Parties under these instruments. Although these instruments are important first steps towards addressing climate change and its impacts, they are widely regarded as inadequate to meet the climate challenge. The Convention and its Kyoto Protocol do not include greenhouse gas (GHG) mitigation obligations for developing countries, some of which, like China, now have emissions to rival developed countries. And, several developed countries have withdrawn from the Kyoto Protocol, in particular its second commitment period.

At the Durban Conference in 2011, Parties to the UNFCCC launched a process, known as the Ad-Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (ADP), to negotiate a new climate agreement by 2015 that would come into effect from 2020. The 2015 Paris Agreement is the result of this four-year negotiating process, and is expected to govern, regulate and incentivise the next generation of climate actions.

Why is the Paris Agreement significant?

The Paris Agreement represents a historic achievement in multilateral diplomacy. Negotiations rife with fundamental and seemingly irresolvable disagreements wound their way to a successful conclusion in Paris on 12 December 2015. These negotiations, driven by unprecedented political will–over 150 heads of States attended it–were expected to reach an agreement. However the fact that they reached a finely balanced and robust agreement, despite the many crisscrossing red lines of Parties, is a testament to the powers of multilateral diplomacy.

The Paris Agreement is significant for the political will it harnessed and for the sense of ownership it instilled in all countries. Unlike the divisive Kyoto Protocol, the Paris Agreement places requirements on all Parties in relation to GHG mitigation and adaptation to the adverse effects of climate change. 189 states covering over 95% of global emissions have submitted nationally determined contributions in the context of the Paris Agreement.

What are the key pillars of the Paris Agreement?

The Paris Agreement contains aspirational long-term goals of stabilising temperature rise (‘well below 2°C’ and to aspire to 1.5°C) that provide a direction of travel for the climate change regime. It combines these long-term temperature goals with binding obligations of conduct for States in relation to GHG mitigation, including obligations to communicate nationally determined contributions every five years, and to pursue domestic measures to achieve them. States have autonomy in the form and stringency of their contributions but States are expected to ensure that their successive national contributions represent a progression from their previous ones.

These contributions are paired with an oversight system consisting of three components–a transparency system which ensures countries are doing what they agreed to do, a global stock take process that periodically assesses collective progress towards the Agreement’s long term goals, and a compliance system that facilitates compliance with the Agreement.

Such an ambitious framework, applied uniformly, would have acted as a straitjacket for developing countries like India. But the Paris Agreement, in a negotiating coup for India, is firmly grounded in the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities. The agreement is peppered with references to this principle, particularly the crucial articles that set the long-term temperature goal and frame the implementation of the entire agreement. Further, the agreement recognises that the global temperature goal must be achieved in the context of sustainable development and poverty eradication, and that developed countries should lead in mitigation efforts and continue to provide financial resources to developing countries. It also clearly recognises that enhanced support for developing countries will allow for higher ambition in their actions.

For more on the key pillars of the Paris Agreement, see ‘Ambition and Differentiation in the 2015 Paris Agreement: Interpretative Possibilities and Underlying Politics’ (2016) 65 International & Comparative Law Quarterly 493.

Is the Paris Agreement a legally binding agreement?

The Paris Agreement is a ‘treaty’ under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. It is a legally binding instrument that will apply to those states that have expressed their consent to be bound by means of ratification, acceptance, approval, or accession. Although the instrument is a legally binding one, provisions within it have differing legal character, some with greater legal force and authority than others.

The legal character of a provision refers to the extent to which the provision creates rights and obligations for Parties, sets standards for State behavior, and lends itself to assessments of compliance/non-compliance and the resulting visitation of consequences. If the provisions of the Agreement are examined through these lenses, it is clear that many of the obligations contained in the mitigation and transparency sections of the Agreement are binding obligations, albeit of conduct rather than result. And, many of the provisions in the adaptation section, for instance, are soft obligations or merely hortatory.

For more on the legal character of the provisions of the Paris Agreement, see ‘The 2015 Paris Agreement: Interplay Between Hard, Soft and Non-Obligations’ (2016) 28(2) Journal of Environmental Law 337-358.

Does the Paris Agreement recognise the human rights implications of climate change?

It is now ‘beyond debate’ that the adverse effects of climate change will, in their severity, threaten a range of human rights, including the rights to life, health, food, and housing. There is also a dawning recognition that measures taken to mitigate and adapt to climate change have the potential to impinge on human rights. Even with nationally determined contributions from 189 States, the chances of stabilising temperature increase at 2°C or 1.5°C–at which level the adverse effects of climate change are manageable–are limited.

The need to prepare for severe adverse effects, recognise their impact on threatened human rights and to address these, is gathering tremendous significance. Yet, until recently, no legally binding international climate instrument explicitly recognised the existence of intersections between human rights concerns and climate change. The 2015 Paris Agreement, in a marked departure from earlier climate change instruments, contains an explicit reference, albeit in the preamble, to human rights. In addition it recognises special interests and vulnerabilities, and is implicitly attentive to the need to create enabling socio-economic conditions for the effective protection of human rights.

For more on the human rights dimensions of the Paris Agreement, refer to the upcoming book chapter by Lavanya Rajamani, titled, Human Rights in the Climate Change Regime: From Rio to Paris and Beyond, in John Knox and Ramin Peja (eds), The Human Right to Environment (forthcoming 2017).

What are the implications of this agreement for India?

The Paris Agreement requires India to submit its national contribution every five years, ensuring that each contribution is a progression on the previous one. It also requires India to report periodically on its actions to achieve and implement its contribution. In addition, India should ‘strive’ to submit long-term low-GHG development strategies within which these national contributions will sit.

These requirements, albeit process requirements, will press India to think more thoughtfully and strategically about its energy, environment and development policy, and translate this strategic thinking into directed interventions domestically. It will also require India to significantly enhance its capacity to collect and generate rigorous data–data that can stand the test of international technical expert reviews–on the achievement and implementation of its national contributions.

India needs to participate proactively and thoughtfully in the post-Paris negotiations. Although the Paris Agreement agreed on the broad contours of the oversight system, much of the detail is yet to be negotiated. India has a compelling interest in having a rigorous oversight system.

India and its economic growth are vulnerable to climate change. In the absence of a rigorous oversight system, India will be left with an imperfect method of ensuring that other countries are keeping their promises, the world as a whole is moving in the right direction, and countries are sharing the burden equitably.

In relation to transparency, India needs a system that is rigorous yet tailored to India’s capacity constraints. In relation to the global stock take process we need consideration of equity. India could introduce benchmarks–qualitative and quantitative–in the global stock take process. In assessing collective progress towards long-term goals, this would cast light on the relative sharing of responsibilities between Parties.

This is key for countries like India with limited historical responsibility for climate change, low per capita emissions, high energy poverty and much of our growth ahead of us. It is only if we participate thoughtfully in the post-Paris negotiations on the oversight system that we will have a system that strikes the right balance between rigour for all and flexibility for those who need it, like India.

When is the Paris Agreement expected to enter into force? And, by when should India ratify this agreement?

The Paris Agreement will enter into force when 55 countries accounting for 55% of total GHG emissions have ratified or otherwise accepted it. Ratification of the Paris Agreement, like its signature on April 22 by a record-breaking 175 countries, including India, signals a sense of ownership, commitment, good faith and continuing engagement. There is gathering momentum towards early entry into force of the Paris Agreement. Twenty countries have ratified the Agreement, several others including Australia, Canada, China and the US have promised to ratify in 2016. Brazil and the EU have pledged to initiate domestic processes to do so.

India’s ability to participate effectively in the post-Paris negotiations will be influenced by its approach to the ratification of the Paris Agreement. The French and the Moroccans (hosts of the 2015 and 2016 Conferences) have reassured States that those who do not ratify the Paris Agreement immediately will not be excluded from the creation of the Paris rule-book. However, the grace period is unlikely to extend beyond 2017.

There will inevitably emerge a distinction between those who have ratified or are in the process and those who have not. India should ratify, engage and be part of the virtuous cycle of ever-increasing engagement. In any case there is a limit to how much we can extract in diplomatic terms for our ratification given entry into force will not hinge on India’s emissions. The Agreement will enter into force when 55 countries accounting for 55% of global emissions have ratified or otherwise accepted the instrument. India’s emissions are only 4.1% of global emissions (for entry into force purposes). But, our early ratification could generate good will that will enhance our ability to influence the post-Paris agenda.

THE THIRD ARTICLE IN A FOUR-PART SERIES ON INDIA’S AIR POLLUTION IN THE HINDUSTAN TIMES
AIR POLLUTION ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE

Do we know what pollutes Delhi/NCR air and the surrounding region? The answer is a very highly qualified ‘yes’. We know enough to inform action now, even while it is important to keep filling in the knowledge gaps. While there are multiple pollutants, in this article we focus on PM 2.5 or very small particles that experts agree are a major health hazard in India.

In examining sources, one fact stands out: There are at least four discrete sectors that each substantially contribute to Delhi’s pollution (see figure): industry; transport; biomass and waste burning; and dust. Delhi’s air problem is so hard to solve in part because it is not a single problem; it is a 4 X 25% (+/-10%) problem, with at least four implications.

First, because Delhi’s air is already about 13 times the WHO safe levels, we have to make progress on all these sources if Delhi’s air is to be made safe. Even completely removing one or two of these sources will not achieve the objective.

Second, because all sources have to be addressed, it is pointless to debate which source is more or less at fault. At different times different sources predominate — crop burning in October, dust in the summer, transport year around — but on an annual basis, all are important. As a result, for Delhi’s citizens to point accusing fingers at farmers, or transport interests to point fingers at industry, and vice versa, ignores the data — all sources have to be reduced. Also, arguing whether most sources are within-NCR or largely outside NCR is also irrelevant — both must be addressed.

Third, a positive feedback loop — successful actions leading to public support for more action — is extremely hard to build. For example, a heroic effort to limit truck traffic may lead to reduced emissions, but this may not be perceptible; trucks are only a portion of all transport, which is only a quarter of all pollution. Wind and other atmospheric conditions further complicate matters. As a result, painful and disruptive measures may be successful but not appear so, and arouse a backlash. To counter this requires public patience and clear management of public expectations.

Finally, a sector-by-sector approach to solving Delhi’s air has the greatest chance of success — each distinct sector and sub-sector has different technical, regulatory and political characteristics. For example, power plants require high-level regulatory and enforcement solutions, while transport needs attention to behaviour and public procurement to enable a shift to public transport. The political context will also vary: crop burning is linked to agrarian politics, while construction dust involves powerful contractors and poor construction labour. The institutional scale will also differ: industries are regulated by pollution control boards, while RWAs can play a role in managing local waste burning. Air pollution solutions need to be based on understanding source sectors, even while keeping the larger picture in mind.

This point is underscored by a deeper dive into each source sector:
Industry sources are a large share (25-43%) of emissions year-round. About half of these are industrial emissions such as cement and brick kilns, where the main challenge is monitoring and enforcement. The other half are related to power plants and diesel gen-sets that require enforcement but in the longer run rest on cleaner energy sources.

Transport – passenger and freight — accounts for 20-30% of emissions year-round and is growing rapidly with vehicle ownership. For both, infrastructure is needed but for passenger transport, behavioural change is critical.

Biomass and waste burning comprise 20-38% and includes crop burning, waste burning, and household kitchen burning. Crop residue burning is highly seasonally specific and peaks in October; IIT-Kanpur’s study suggests it accounts for 26% of winter emissions. Waste burning is disaggregated throughout the city, but also includes site-specific municipal waste burning in landfills. Household use requires a transition to cooking gas.

Dust includes both construction dust from within NCR and long-range transport of dust from the arid surroundings of Delhi and beyond. Dust is a bigger share of emissions in the summer than in winter; TERI’s study suggests it accounts for 38% of summer emissions.

Air pollution in Delhi-NCR is a complex problem. Addressing it requires urgent, but also deliberate action, in keeping with the nature of the problem. We must recognise we are dealing with a multi-headed problem, that progress on all sources is needed, that we may not see progress immediately but should stay the course, and that solutions need to be tailored to the specific characteristics of each pollution source.

Navroz K Dubash is a Professor at Centre for Policy Research. Sarath Guttikunda is the Founder of Urban Emissions (India), an independent research group, issuing three-day air quality forecasts for all 640 districts in India.

This article is the third in a four-part series on India’s air pollution. The original article, which was published in the Hindustan Times on December 21, 2018, can be found here. For more information on CPR’s work on air pollution, visit the Clearing the Air? project page.

In this Series:

Understanding the Curse of Air Pollution (1/4)

Public Health in India a Casualty of Air Pollution (2/4)

Delhi has a complex air pollution problem (3/4)

Air pollution: India’s waking up, but there’s a long way to go (4/4)

FULL VIDEO OF TALK
URBAN GOVERNANCE URBAN ECONOMY URBAN SERVICES

Watch the full video (above) of the talk by Banashree Banerjee, where she describes the rapid changes that have taken place in Myanmar over the last eight years.

In the talk, Banerjee discusses how the switch to democratic governance, shift to a market economy, and internal regional harmony – in quick succession – led to sharp growth of the overall economy as well as the cities of Myanmar, particularly Yangon.

Banerjee is an independent urban planner and an associate staff member of the Institute for Housing and Urban Development Studies, Rotterdam.

The Q&A session that followed can be accessed here.

Read related articles by Banashree Banerjee (and co-author Maartje van Eerd) on building local planning capacity as well as empowering migrant communities to secure housing in Yangon.

CPR FACULTY AND RESEARCHERS ANALYSE
ECONOMY

As the Prime Minister’s move to demonetise 500 and 1000 rupee notes to curb black money continues to play out in the country, find below a curated analysis by CPR faculty.

In You have been warned, Pratap Bhanu Mehta writes how demonetisation ‘threatens to institutionalise a new kind of politics’, based on the three central elements of ‘personification, puritanism and punitive imagination’.

Rajiv Kumar writes in The Quint on how the demonetisation of high denomination currency is a ‘game-changer and puts the Indian economy on a radically-diferent trajectory’. In yet another interview to The Hindu Business Line, Kumar explains the benefits of demonetisation for the Indian economy.

G Parthasarathy writes that the move has a positive impact on terrorism by removing counterfeit currency from the market smuggled by Pakistan to ‘its ‘terrorist assets’ in India’.

In Why demonetisation notification is illegal and violates the Constitution, Namita Wahi questions and analyses the legality of the move, and explores it in greater depth in another piece in Live Law. She further breaks it down in the eighth episode of CPR’s podcast ThoughtSpace here.

In Will Modi do a Morarji or a Pandit-ji, Srinath Raghavan historically contextualises demonetisation, while in another article in Livemint, he argues that demonetisation is an ‘unarguably regressive move’ when judged by the standard of whether it advances human freedom or not.

In For informal workers, notebandi equals paisabandi, Mukta Naik, Eesha Kunduri and Manish share findings from a two-week long intensive survey they conducted on how workers in the informal sector were coping with the impact of demonetisation. A more detailed analysis of their findings can be accessed in the seventh episode of CPR’s podcast ThoughtSpace here.

In an earlier episode of the podcast Curbing black money or welfare shock?, Rajiv Kumar analyses the economic fallouts of demonetisation.

In an article in Civil Society, Sanjaya Baru explains how demonetisation is primarily a political move, and that ‘in the end, the politics of demonetisation will trump its economics’.

ACCESS THE WORKING PAPER BY PERSIS TARAPOREVALA
URBAN GOVERNANCE

The newly elected federal Government of India launched the Smart Cities Mission in 2015 with the stated purpose of improving the governance and infrastructural deficiencies that plague Indian cities. Missing, however, in the new programme was a cohesive understanding of a smart city. While the government documentation repeatedly implies infinite liberty for cities to self-define their understanding of ‘smartness’, the actions demonstrate that there is a larger idea of ‘smartness’ that the federal government seeks to implement. It is at this disjunction, between the rhetoric and practice of the Mission, that this paper finds its core research question – ‘What constitutes a smart city in India?’

The Smart Cities Mission stands at a proposed budget of over INR 200,000 Crore (INR 2,000 billion) for 99 cities with a combined population of almost 100 million people and could have a significant impact on the lives of Indians. The magnitude of the project and its potential to affect the lives of citizens as well as the governance and financial structures that regulate municipal life necessitate that the concept of the smart city in India be illuminated. Given the sheer vagueness of the Mission, the core of the paper focuses on providing an empirical reading of the Mission, singularly through government documentation, and delineates the following trends – 1) that the project categories are similar to former urban renewal programmes however individual projects in the Mission are more likely to focus on revenue generation; 2) sources of finances move rapidly from ambitious market-oriented processes back to more traditional state-sponsored urban regeneration plans; 3) the Mission claims to bolster local government but in practice seems to recentralise power away from municipal bodies to state-level bureaucrats; and 4) the Mission claims to represent the voice of its citizenry however the Mission utilises processes of participation that are deeply problematic and benefit privileged sections of society.

The working paper argues that it is imperative for the government and the citizens of India to understand the mechanics of the Mission in order to ensure clarity, accountability and to question whether the current structure of the Mission will achieve its stated goal of improving the governance and infrastructural deficiencies of urban India.

The research has generated a detailed working paper and a compact policy brief.

BLOG SERIES BASED ON A CROSS COUNTRY STUDY ACROSS INDIA, INDONESIA AND MYANMAR
LAND ACQUISITION SOUTH ASIA

As persons affected with land use change grapple with displacement, loss of livelihood and environmental degradation, it becomes clear that they are rendered extremely vulnerable. In their fight for rights, as they employ multiple strategies to make their voices heard and influence decisions of those with power, it becomes important to understand their struggle that displays critical thinking, collective agency and pragmatism.

This blog discusses various stories of such struggles from India, Indonesia and Myanmar. These stories present a granular account of how land use change decisions result in varied set of impacts experienced for years, how these experiences turn into long standing land conflicts, the efforts made by affected communities to seek remedies and the counter efforts they face as governments and projects protect their investments and try to retain control over the narrative of growth and development.

India

Shree Maheshwar Hydro Power Dam, Madhya Pradesh

Maheshwar dam project has seen several investors pulling out of it.

The Maheshwar dam is built in Nimad, the South western region of the state of Madhya Pradesh, 2 km upstream from the town of Mandleshwar. The project is part of the Narmada Valley Development Plan under which 30 large and 135 medium-sized dams have been planned in the Narmada valley. With a generation capacity of 400 Megawatts, the dam put nearly 60,000 acres of extremely fertile agricultural land and over 20 villages under full or partial submergence. A large mass movement, comprising the local communities, farmers and environmental and human rights activists, has been protesting against the project as well as against the NVDP (Narmada Valley Development Plan) in general. The struggle in Maheshwar has been going on for more than 20 years.

Gevra Mines, Chhattisgarh

After March 2019, EAC will evaluate the pollution control measures of Gevra mines and based on it, will decide if the project should continue.

With over 10,000 million tonnes of deposits, the Gevra coal mine is the single largest source of power grade coal in India. The mine has been in operation since 1981, and land acquisition for the project dates back to 1979 with subsequent acquisitions in 2001 and 2009. There have been grievances that the acquisition has led to forced relocation, loss of livelihoods and insufficient compensation. People who were displaced have been resettled to colonies set up very close to the mine, and they complain of water contamination and pollution. In 2012, when it spread over an area of 4942 acres, it was the largest open cast mine in India. Still continuing to be the largest mine, today it has double the land area and spans across 9884 acres (4000 hectares) of land in Korba district of Chhattisgarh. Following an expansion of its production capacity, efforts to acquire more land began in 2014. On May 2, 2016, Korba witnessed a massive protest by SECL (South Eastern Coalfields Limited) against land acquisition for mining. Around 679 people from 41 villages protested at the site of the Gevra Mines. These villagers were all farmers who demanded jobs, rehabilitation and compensation as per the amended Land Acquisition Act. There is a proposal to further increase the capacity of Gevra Mines up to 70 MTPA (Million Tonnes Per Annum) in the near future amidst all the existing unaddressed grievances.

Myanmar

Myaung Pyo resists water woes

Original location of Myaung Pyo village has been razed to extract tin.

Heinda Tin mine in Tanintharyi Region of Myanmar has been in operation since the British Times. After the take-over of the mine by the Thai Company Myanmar Pongpipat and Mining Enterprise, a state-owned company, in 1999, the villagers of Myaung Pyo filed complaints of its ill effects. In 2012, the village was flooded due to the breakage in the mine’s tailing ponds and streaming of sediments from the mine into the local creek. The villagers filed a lawsuit against the mine and demanded compensation for the damages to their property. Alongside, the villagers have been engaging the regional level government to ensure that the mine complies with environmental safeguards. Approaching the company, administrative complaints, lawsuits and international redress—the villagers are reaching out to all possible avenues where mitigation of ill impacts and compensation for past damages is possible.

Thilawa residents brace for upcoming land transformation

Farmers, who would lose land in the second phase of development of the SEZ, hope to be compensated fairly for their losses.

The Thilawa SEZ (Special Economic Zone), located approximately 25 kilometers south of Yangon between Thanlyin and Kyauktan townships, is spread over an area of 2,400 hectares. First phase of the project (spread over 400 hectares) has led to forced displacement of 68 families. The compensation given to them was inadequate and the relocation site lacks basic amenities. The farmers, united as Thilawa Social Development Group (TSDG) reached out to Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), the project financer, seeking improvements in the relocation site. While the impacts of the first phase are yet to be addressed, second phase of the project has begun. Alongside, individual factories are coming up on the land acquired for the project in the first phase. The land users and SEZ authorities are negotiating compensation for land acquisition in the second phase. In June 2017, 39 families were trapped because the Thilawa town officials had erected a wall around their homes claiming that the land belonged to the government.

Indonesia

Illegal Oil Palm Plantation of Rejeki Alam Semesta Raya in Kapuas

PT RASR has turned the land that was used by community members for planting rubber into an oil palm plantation.

PT RASR initiated oil palm plantation on 7000 ha of community land in Kapuas district of Central Kalimantan. The land was in use by the locals for cultivation of rubber and fishing. This led to an income loss for them. Farmers organised themselves in a group of affected farmers, demonstrated outside the company office and different government offices, registered formal complaints with the Regent and parliament of the district. In violation of the forestry law, the company also took over land in protected forest. This and people’s complaints led to cancellation of company’s permission to use the land. Despite all this, the company continued to work people’s land and forestland in question. After a series of failed mediations, some of the aggrieved farmers decided to reclaim their lands. Since 2016, the farmers have been harvesting oil palm on their lands on and generating income from the activity. However, they still seek a formal recognition from the government of their right over their land.

Community response to Arjuna Utama Sawit’s oil palm operations in Katingan district

Danau Bulat lake is silting up due to drainage canals built by PT AUS

In 2008, PT Arjuna Utama Sawit (AUS) took over land belonging to inhabitants of eight villages of the Katingan district in Central Kalimantan. The local community was using this land for horticulture plantations. PT AUS not only violated the moratorium on use of peatlands, it also dug canals and planted oil palm in peatland forest area as well. It dumped the waste from its oil palm factory into a nearby lake and the Katingan river. The company, although promised plasma agreements to the community, has yet to deliver on the same. Initially, the community did not protest the land grabs aggressively, but later on tried to reach out to the company and bring government’s attention to illegalities committed by the company. However, the company continued its operation ignoring communities’ complaints and efforts. In October 2017, the community members from one of the villages blocked work in PT AUS’s plantation area. They demanded execution of the promised plasma agreements and full details of the plasma scheme provided by the company.

PT AKT: The Biggest mining company of Borneo

PT AKT and PT Marunda Graha use Barito river for transport of coal extracted from over 40,000 hectares of land in Murung Raya

PT Asmin Koalindo Tuhup (AKT), the largest coalmine of Borneo took 2000 hectares of land from six villages of the Murung Raya regency of Central Kalimantan. The villagers, under pressure from the company, agreed to relinquish their agricultural lands at a price much lower than the market rate. Mining activities have led to contamination of the local water sources, the Hingan and Kohung rivers. Villagers have raised their concerns with the company and with local government departments. On losing their land-based livelihoods, the villagers had hoped that the mine would give them employment. In absence of state-sponsored basic infrastructure, they also expected facilities such as clean water, better healthcare arrangements and education from AKT. However, their hopes and expectations have only been met with empty promises. As of January 2018, the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources of Indonesia had cancelled its agreement with AKT. In such a scenario, it is unclear who will take responsibility of remedying environmental destruction, offsetting loss of livelihoods and ensuring reclamation of land from which the coal has been mined out.

This is the fifth blog based on the study carried out by the CPR-Namati Environmental Justice Program, and supported by a grant from IDRC, Canada.

The other pieces in the series can be accessed below:

Understanding the Impacts of Land Use Change
Understanding the Strategies used to address the impacts of Land Use Change
Understanding the Outcomes and Remedies sought for impacts of Land Use Change
Detailed Studies of cases of Land Use Change Conflicts: Part I
The study reports on India, Indonesia and Myanmar including the above-mentioned case studies in full and an overview of the study’s methodology and findings can be accessed here.

BLOG SERIES BASED ON A CROSS COUNTRY STUDY ACROSS INDIA, INDONESIA AND MYANMAR
LAND ACQUISITION SOUTH ASIA

As persons affected with land use change grapple with displacement, loss of livelihood and environmental degradation, it becomes clear that they are rendered extremely vulnerable. In their fight for rights, as they employ multiple strategies to make their voices heard and influence decisions of those with power, it becomes important to understand their struggle that displays critical thinking, collective agency and pragmatism.

This blog discusses various stories of such struggles from India, Indonesia and Myanmar. These stories present a granular account of how land use change decisions result in varied set of impacts experienced for years, how these experiences turn into long standing land conflicts, the efforts made by affected communities to seek remedies and the counter efforts they face as governments and projects protect their investments and try to retain control over the narrative of growth and development.

India

Shree Maheshwar Hydro Power Dam, Madhya Pradesh

Maheshwar dam project has seen several investors pulling out of it.

The Maheshwar dam is built in Nimad, the South western region of the state of Madhya Pradesh, 2 km upstream from the town of Mandleshwar. The project is part of the Narmada Valley Development Plan under which 30 large and 135 medium-sized dams have been planned in the Narmada valley. With a generation capacity of 400 Megawatts, the dam put nearly 60,000 acres of extremely fertile agricultural land and over 20 villages under full or partial submergence. A large mass movement, comprising the local communities, farmers and environmental and human rights activists, has been protesting against the project as well as against the NVDP (Narmada Valley Development Plan) in general. The struggle in Maheshwar has been going on for more than 20 years.

Gevra Mines, Chhattisgarh

After March 2019, EAC will evaluate the pollution control measures of Gevra mines and based on it, will decide if the project should continue.

With over 10,000 million tonnes of deposits, the Gevra coal mine is the single largest source of power grade coal in India. The mine has been in operation since 1981, and land acquisition for the project dates back to 1979 with subsequent acquisitions in 2001 and 2009. There have been grievances that the acquisition has led to forced relocation, loss of livelihoods and insufficient compensation. People who were displaced have been resettled to colonies set up very close to the mine, and they complain of water contamination and pollution. In 2012, when it spread over an area of 4942 acres, it was the largest open cast mine in India. Still continuing to be the largest mine, today it has double the land area and spans across 9884 acres (4000 hectares) of land in Korba district of Chhattisgarh. Following an expansion of its production capacity, efforts to acquire more land began in 2014. On May 2, 2016, Korba witnessed a massive protest by SECL (South Eastern Coalfields Limited) against land acquisition for mining. Around 679 people from 41 villages protested at the site of the Gevra Mines. These villagers were all farmers who demanded jobs, rehabilitation and compensation as per the amended Land Acquisition Act. There is a proposal to further increase the capacity of Gevra Mines up to 70 MTPA (Million Tonnes Per Annum) in the near future amidst all the existing unaddressed grievances.

Myanmar

Myaung Pyo resists water woes

Original location of Myaung Pyo village has been razed to extract tin.

Heinda Tin mine in Tanintharyi Region of Myanmar has been in operation since the British Times. After the take-over of the mine by the Thai Company Myanmar Pongpipat and Mining Enterprise, a state-owned company, in 1999, the villagers of Myaung Pyo filed complaints of its ill effects. In 2012, the village was flooded due to the breakage in the mine’s tailing ponds and streaming of sediments from the mine into the local creek. The villagers filed a lawsuit against the mine and demanded compensation for the damages to their property. Alongside, the villagers have been engaging the regional level government to ensure that the mine complies with environmental safeguards. Approaching the company, administrative complaints, lawsuits and international redress—the villagers are reaching out to all possible avenues where mitigation of ill impacts and compensation for past damages is possible.

Thilawa residents brace for upcoming land transformation

Farmers, who would lose land in the second phase of development of the SEZ, hope to be compensated fairly for their losses.

The Thilawa SEZ (Special Economic Zone), located approximately 25 kilometers south of Yangon between Thanlyin and Kyauktan townships, is spread over an area of 2,400 hectares. First phase of the project (spread over 400 hectares) has led to forced displacement of 68 families. The compensation given to them was inadequate and the relocation site lacks basic amenities. The farmers, united as Thilawa Social Development Group (TSDG) reached out to Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), the project financer, seeking improvements in the relocation site. While the impacts of the first phase are yet to be addressed, second phase of the project has begun. Alongside, individual factories are coming up on the land acquired for the project in the first phase. The land users and SEZ authorities are negotiating compensation for land acquisition in the second phase. In June 2017, 39 families were trapped because the Thilawa town officials had erected a wall around their homes claiming that the land belonged to the government.

Indonesia

Illegal Oil Palm Plantation of Rejeki Alam Semesta Raya in Kapuas

PT RASR has turned the land that was used by community members for planting rubber into an oil palm plantation.

PT RASR initiated oil palm plantation on 7000 ha of community land in Kapuas district of Central Kalimantan. The land was in use by the locals for cultivation of rubber and fishing. This led to an income loss for them. Farmers organised themselves in a group of affected farmers, demonstrated outside the company office and different government offices, registered formal complaints with the Regent and parliament of the district. In violation of the forestry law, the company also took over land in protected forest. This and people’s complaints led to cancellation of company’s permission to use the land. Despite all this, the company continued to work people’s land and forestland in question. After a series of failed mediations, some of the aggrieved farmers decided to reclaim their lands. Since 2016, the farmers have been harvesting oil palm on their lands on and generating income from the activity. However, they still seek a formal recognition from the government of their right over their land.

Community response to Arjuna Utama Sawit’s oil palm operations in Katingan district

Danau Bulat lake is silting up due to drainage canals built by PT AUS

In 2008, PT Arjuna Utama Sawit (AUS) took over land belonging to inhabitants of eight villages of the Katingan district in Central Kalimantan. The local community was using this land for horticulture plantations. PT AUS not only violated the moratorium on use of peatlands, it also dug canals and planted oil palm in peatland forest area as well. It dumped the waste from its oil palm factory into a nearby lake and the Katingan river. The company, although promised plasma agreements to the community, has yet to deliver on the same. Initially, the community did not protest the land grabs aggressively, but later on tried to reach out to the company and bring government’s attention to illegalities committed by the company. However, the company continued its operation ignoring communities’ complaints and efforts. In October 2017, the community members from one of the villages blocked work in PT AUS’s plantation area. They demanded execution of the promised plasma agreements and full details of the plasma scheme provided by the company.

PT AKT: The Biggest mining company of Borneo

PT AKT and PT Marunda Graha use Barito river for transport of coal extracted from over 40,000 hectares of land in Murung Raya

PT Asmin Koalindo Tuhup (AKT), the largest coalmine of Borneo took 2000 hectares of land from six villages of the Murung Raya regency of Central Kalimantan. The villagers, under pressure from the company, agreed to relinquish their agricultural lands at a price much lower than the market rate. Mining activities have led to contamination of the local water sources, the Hingan and Kohung rivers. Villagers have raised their concerns with the company and with local government departments. On losing their land-based livelihoods, the villagers had hoped that the mine would give them employment. In absence of state-sponsored basic infrastructure, they also expected facilities such as clean water, better healthcare arrangements and education from AKT. However, their hopes and expectations have only been met with empty promises. As of January 2018, the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources of Indonesia had cancelled its agreement with AKT. In such a scenario, it is unclear who will take responsibility of remedying environmental destruction, offsetting loss of livelihoods and ensuring reclamation of land from which the coal has been mined out.

This is the fifth blog based on the study carried out by the CPR-Namati Environmental Justice Program, and supported by a grant from IDRC, Canada.

The other pieces in the series can be accessed below:

Understanding the Impacts of Land Use Change
Understanding the Strategies used to address the impacts of Land Use Change
Understanding the Outcomes and Remedies sought for impacts of Land Use Change
Detailed Studies of cases of Land Use Change Conflicts: Part I
The study reports on India, Indonesia and Myanmar including the above-mentioned case studies in full and an overview of the study’s methodology and findings can be accessed here.