A busy summer for Mr Modi

15 June 2016

As Narendra Modi visited Iran in May, and completed a five nation tour (Aghanistan, Qatar, USA, Switzerland, Mexico) in June, CPR faculty analyse what these visits mean, with a special focus on Iran and the US:

G Parthasarathy writes in the New Indian Express that in signing the Chabahar deal with Iran, allowing India access to West and Central Asia through the Iranian port of Chabahar, Mr Modi has marked an important milestone in building a partnership with Iran, bypassing Pakistan. While this is a positive signal, India cannot take anything for granted, and must build on this beginning in the coming months.
In the Takeaway from Tehran, Srinath Raghavan similarly writes that the recent visit by Mr Modi may have given India another opportunity to craft a strategic relationship with Iran, and increase its influence on West Asia, but the challenge lies in the delivery.
In When will the U.S. accommodate India’s strategic interests?, Brahma Chellaney writes that despite the symbolism of warming ties between India and the US, India’s strategic interests are yet to be accommodated by the US, including India’s inclusion in the NSG, where China has emerged as the main political opponent. In spite of promising to facilitate India’s admission in the NSG, the US has invested little political capital in furthering this.
In India & US: aligning rhetoric & reality, Shyam Saran analyses the various dimensions of Mr Modi’s visit to the US, and asserts that the compelling logic of a strategic Indo-US partnership will endure in a complex and uncertain world, even if the trajectory of the expected outcomes may vary.
Srinath Raghavan too analyses the implications of Mr Modi’s visit to the US and the joint statement released, writing in The Wire that even though Modi ‘has gone further than any previous prime minister in positioning India in the strategic orbit of the US’, India continues to remain the weaker player, and has failed to factor in the likely reactions of adversaries like China.
In Embracing Washington comes with a price, Bharat Karnad also deconstructs Modi’s U.S. policy at various levels, writing that ultimately even as Western leaders will be friendly, they will advance their own national interests, leaving ‘India to wax eloquent about shared democratic values’.

A Chequered Brilliance: The Many Lives of V K Krishna Menon by Jairam Ramesh

About the Book

This is a compelling biography of one of India’s most controversial and consequential public figures. V K Krishna Menon continues to command our attention not just because he was Jawaharlal Nehru’s confidant and soulmate but also for many of his own political and literary accomplishments. A relentless crusader for Indian independence in the UK in the 1930s and 1940s, he was a global star at the United Nations in the 1950s before he was forced to resign as defence minister in the wake of the India-China war of 1962.

Meticulously researched and based entirely on new archival material, this book reveals Krishna Menon in all his capabilities and contradictions. It is also a rich history of the tumultuous times in which he lived and which he did so much to shape.

The question and answer session that followed can be accessed here.

A Clarion Call for Just Jobs: Addressing the Nation’s Employment Crisis

4 June 2019

By Sabina Dewan

India’s labour market is ailing. Addressing of the employment crisis has been mired in a raging debate over the scale of job creation, the availability of data, and which sources and indicators – unemployment or productivity and wages – accurately reflect the state of the job market. The new government has an opportunity to move beyond this debate, acknowledge what ails the labour market, and take measures to address the crisis.

What are the Challenges?
Only one in two Indians of working age, 15 years and above, participate in the labour force.1 Only about one in four women of working age, 23.3%, enter the labour market.2 Female labour force participation has been declining since 2004 when it was 42.7%.3 This drop can be attributed to several factors ranging, for instance, from girls staying in education longer and delaying their entry into the labour market, to the ‘middle income effect’. A lack of demand from female friendly industries, such as apparel and footwear, and continuing social disapproval are both important factors.4 Other culprits include migration and the nuclearization of families where there are fewer women in the household to contribute to domestic work. Female or male, low labour force participation is a loss of precious productive potential.

Unemployment is also a loss of productive potential. Recent data suggests that unemployment rose to 6.1% in 2018.5 A rise in unemployment can largely be explained by the fact that more young people are acquiring an education.6 With education comes the expectation of a better job. Those who can afford to educate themselves also tend to be in a position to wait for the right job to come along.

Whether one buys the hotly contested unemployment figures or not, the possibility of a growing trend in unemployment is a matter of concern; but arguably more pressing, certainly in terms of the scale of the problem, is the issue of underemployment. The quality of jobs is as important as the quantity of jobs, and in India more people struggle with the former than the latter.

Most people in India cannot afford to be unemployed; they have to work to sustain themselves. Among those who are working, informal employment as a share of non-agricultural employment was 68.4% in 2018.7 Informal employment usually entails the sharing of low-productivity work, with poor wages and the absence of social protection.8

India’s 361 million youth between the ages of 15 to 29 represent just under 27% of the country’s population.9 Inspired by the narrative of an emerging market economy with high levels of economic growth, India’s youth have rising aspirations. Yet economic trajectories are not built just on aspirations and potential, but also on opportunity. Many of India’s youth face constraints in terms of opportunity arising out of low household income, caste, tribe, gender, special needs or religion. The inequality of opportunity in one’s younger years manifests in an inequality of outcomes in adulthood.10

Enrolment rates have increased,11 but learning outcomes remain weak,12 especially for youth from vulnerable backgrounds.13 Skills training, especially short-term programmes, cannot compensate for years of poor education. Training may help a young person get a job, but without the requisite levels of education and soft skills cultivated early on, these programmes are unlikely to offer economic mobility and career pathways.

If these challenges go unaddressed, the nation will squander its demographic advantage. This brief window, where the working age population constitutes a rising share in the total population with a relatively smaller dependent population, will slam shut in approximately two decades from now.

What Can these Challenges Be Addressed?
The nation needs a National Employment Strategy that will lay down specific goals in the following three areas:

Generating productive and well-remunerated jobs, which entails making public allocations to support sectors that absorb more labour
Making enduring, long-term investments in human capital through good quality education, skills and on-the-job training
Strengthening labour market institutions – including thoughtful reform of labour regulations, the implementation of a statutory minimum wage, and provision of social protection, especially universal healthcare
Ministries should submit annual action plans laying out how they intend to realize the goals set out by the National Employment Strategy. The plans should follow a standardized template specifying (i) concrete actions, (ii) resourcing, (iii) metrics for success and (iv) timelines. These plans should be submitted to an appointed individual in the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) – a ‘Senior Officer In-Charge’. Consolidating the plans under the PMO will also ensure coordination and coherence across different players. In the next five years, the National Employment Strategy should focus on the following.

Box 1: Raising Productivity in Agriculture
With 44% of the employed in agriculture, it is the most labour intensive, though the least productive, of the nation’s sectors. The common definition of structural transformation refers to a reallocation of economic activity away from agriculture to higher value-added sectors such as manufacturing and services. But transitioning such a large number of workers out of agriculture and quickly finding them gainful employment in other sectors is unlikely. A more realistic transformation could be one in which the focus is on improving productivity (and consequently wage levels), especially in agriculture. Increasing productivity is a better way to reduce unit labour costs than reducing wages.

Short-term cash transfers to farmers are the flavour of the season, but these address the symptom, not the cause. More effective would be investments in irrigation, energy and transportation infrastructure for rural areas, which will alter cropping patterns towards more labour-intensive and higher value crops. Programmes to ensure competitive pricing of inputs such as fertilizer and revising skewed subsidy structures are key. Addressing price volatility to give farmers access to fair compensation for their produce, coupled with a regulatory framework that breaks the culture of labour contracting and middlemen in farm employment, will help agriculture become more productive and also attract, absorb and retain more labour. Finally, providing access to land records and real crop insurance, especially to small-scale farmers, will also help protect them in case of a crisis, environmental or otherwise.

1. Generating productive and well-remunerated jobs by focusing on sectors that absorb more labour: Labour-intensive manufacturing

​When seen through a jobs lens, the composition of growth matters even more. In addition to improving productivity and wages in agriculture (Box 1), the nation needs an industrial policy that fosters labour-intensive manufacturing. The National Employment Strategy should call for the formulation of an industrial policy that propels us beyond an ad hoc smattering of industrial parks and estates, special economic zones, or model townships, to undertake a series of steps to enable the growth of manufacturing firms, especially small ones with potential.

Sectors such as agro-processing can be labour intensive and can boost both agriculture and manufacturing, but this requires developing domestic value chains and associated infrastructure. The industrial policy should actively address issues ranging from land clearances to access to power and tax incentives to help bolster manufacturing firms, especially small ones with the potential to grow.

In addition to developing modern domestic value chains, the nation’s industrial policy should ascertain how to support the export capacity of firms and encourage participation in global value chains. This calls for a reassessment of current tariff structures, especially the inverted duty structure, to make manufactures more competitive. We must also leverage trade agreements and regional integration to gain market access and stake claim in relevant value chains.15

The latter investments in manufacturing will spawn services in sectors such as logistics and transport. These sectors will be increasingly critical for job creation in the coming years. All of these steps must be embedded in sound physical and energy infrastructure, both of which will themselves absorb labour. The government should adopt a methodology to measure the potential economic impact and multiplier effects of a given infrastructure project, especially with regard to its potential to facilitate direct and indirect employment. This should be a criterion in targeting public investment accordingly.

2. Make enduring, long-term investments in human capital: Education, skills and private sector engagement

If generating more labour market demand is one side of the coin, the other is making necessary investments in human capital. A National Employment Strategy should lay out a plan to make enduring, long-term investments in human capital through good quality education, followed by skills and on-the-job training.

The Ministry of Human Resource Development and the Ministry of Skills Development and Entrepreneurship should be merged to establish an effective school-to-skills-to-work continuum instead of separate education and skills silos. Skills training, especially short-term programmes, cannot compensate for a lack of quality basic education. As such, spending just 3% of GDP on education is inadequate;16 we must allocate at least 6% to this most critical priority, making sure that the most vulnerable populations have equal access to quality learning. But equally important as more spending is reform of the current system to include, among other things, a greater focus on cultivating employability in school.17

As school curricula are reviewed, they must also consider nurturing employability in age-appropriate ways. Soft skills, from hygiene to confident communication, must be fostered from early ages. As a child progresses through secondary school, exposure to a range of trades such as the basics of growing food to cell phone repair, basic woodworking and beauty and wellness can instill adaptability, awareness and a work ethic. This form of ‘multi-skilling’ goes beyond the currently limited models of vocational education in secondary schools. These practices do not have to detract from a focus on the basics: reading, writing and arithmetic; rather, they can root learning in practical application. All children in school, regardless of gender or other social groupings, should be exposed to a multitude of similar trades. Gender stereotyping in skills training is a disservice to the individual and to the mission of creating better employment for more people.

Another glaring gap in the current ecosystem is that training has been largely supply driven. Efforts to properly align training to the needs of the labour market have been deficient, and effective private sector engagement is lacking. Both of these must be rectified if the skills training system is to be operative.

First, market demand must drive skills training across providers. For this, there is a need to map demand such that the method not only examines the anticipated growth of certain large, formal sectors, but is also fine-tuned to take stock of the registered and unregistered enterprises of different sizes and in different geographies to align job seekers to the wide range of jobs that do exist.

Second, there is a need to reform the Sector Skills Councils (SSCs) to more effectively engage the private sector. The private sector is essential for on-the-job training, apprenticeships and internships; it is also critical for understanding market demand and the qualifications needed for different job roles. It is a valuable source of information to understand how demand projections may change in subsequent years: that is, which sectors will need how many workers, and when? This is particularly important as technological change alters the way people live and work at an unprecedented pace.

Yet the current channels for engaging with the private sector – the SSCs – have been inadequate; their efficacy has been marred by factors including endemic corruption, inability to conduct assessments and certifications effectively, and turf battles with other SSCs and stakeholders. The existing National Skill Development Policy needs to be updated and fine-tuned to, among other matters, reform the SSCs.

Box 2: Reforming Sector Skills Councils
There is a need to clearly delineate the functions of the SSCs, including their specific role in assessments, certification and utilization of the Qualification Packs and associated National Occupational Standards. Based on the clear and specific functions ascribed to the SSCs, there should be guidelines that clearly state which regulatory bodies the SSCs answer to. They should be required to routinely self-report on their structure, composition and performance. This should include reporting on accounts in a timely and transparent manner. SSCs should be responsible for a revenue generation model that disassociates revenue from assessment, certification and QP-NOS utilization. They should reinforce (though not implement) compliance with existing labour and wage regulations. Each SSC should present a concrete plan for detailed demand mapping and employer engagement. These are a few ways in which the SSCs can be reformed to be more effective.
3. Strengthen labour market institutions: Toward a simpler labour code, a national floor minimum wage, universal social protection and better data

Labour regulations are a subject of charged debate – one that seems perpetually inconclusive. The disagreement over whether these laws constitute rigidities that stymie firm and employment growth notwithstanding, most stakeholders agree that there is a need to simplify the existing labyrinth of Indian labour regulations. A clear and consistent labour code is inviting for business and investment. A National Employment Strategy should facilitate the simplification and rationalization of the nation’s labour laws.

Minimum wages that serve as a floor, to ensure that all workers can afford to meet their basic needs, is a necessary part of a successful wage regime. Labour market regulations have to strike a balance between efficiency and equity. India’s national floor level minimum wage was instituted in 1996,18 but it is non-binding. That is, it has no statutory backing under the Minimum Wages Act, or elsewhere. It is merely an advisory floor limit for the state governments to align their wages to. A successful wage regime is one that is enforceable and provides compensation ladders; it is established through sound industrial relations and collective bargaining, and is periodically adjusted to ensure that wage growth aligns with changes in productivity and prices. This is what we need.

Social protection is about more and better workers – the complement to the ongoing quest for more and better jobs. To this end, basic social protection – health, pensions, maternity, death and disability benefits – should be made available to all through a combination of affordable social insurance and public provision of services, especially healthcare, that allow universal access. Currently only about 7% of the labour force has social insurance; even workers in some organized sector enterprises lack social insurance.19

Healthcare is perhaps the biggest concern when it comes to building a productive workforce with economic mobility. That public spending on health – for a country of over 1.3 billion that boasts high levels of economic growth – is barely over 1 percent of GDP is unconscionable.20 Millions are one healthcare emergency away from crushing debt and poverty. A National Employment Strategy should call for a simplification of the wide web of existing social insurance schemes, and pave the way towards government support for universal healthcare; this is an imperative for a healthy labour market. As technology, migration and urbanization upend traditional employment models, increasing the prevalence of contract and other flexible categories of workers, social protection becomes delinked from employment, which further reinforces the argument for public provision of universal healthcare.21

Data and evidence from the field must underpin the National Employment Strategy. ‘The lack of reliable estimates on employment in recent years has impeded its measurement and thereby the Government faces challenges in adopting appropriate policy interventions,’ wrote the government’s Chief Economic Advisor Arvind Subramanian in the 2016-2017 Economic Survey.22 The Survey goes on to acknowledge the many limitations of India’s labour market data including ‘partial coverage, inadequate sample size, low frequency, long time lags, double counting, conceptual differences and definitional issues’.

Efforts to gather more data more regularly and frequently with a consistent methodology, and making the results public, are central to the success of a National Employment Strategy. Subsequent Strategies will be strengthened as more time series data becomes available to accurately assess labour market trends. Any data analysis must be textured with qualitative research that can yield nuances and insights, which are as important as those from broad-brush quantitative data.

A National Employment Strategy also needs political will and resources. Given the urgency of addressing the jobs crisis before the demographic window closes, the Strategy cannot be held hostage to an arbitrary fiscal deficit ceiling. Beyond how much a government spends, the composition of spending matters. That is, spending on the aforementioned areas is more likely to contribute to growth and to a wider distribution of its benefits than other forms of expenditure. In addition, there is a need to reassess existing tax and subsidy regimes to ensure that they are progressive, and that they garner more resources to realize the Strategy’s goals.

Suchha vikas will take work. Whether salaried or self-employed, whether on family farms or in manufacturing facilities, people across India’s culturally and politically diverse landscape rely on their work to earn a living, to fulfil family and social obligations, and to satisfy the aspirations that drive and motivate them daily. Politics and policy must take the necessary measures to deliver just jobs; India’s progress depends on it.

Other pieces as part of CPR’s policy document, ‘Policy Challenges – 2019-2024′ can be accessed below:

The Future is Federal: Why Indian Foreign Policy Needs to Leverage its Border States by Nimmi Kurian
Rethinking India’s Approach to International and Domestic Climate Policy by Navroz K Dubash and Lavanya Rajamani
India’s Foreign Policy in an Uncertain World by Shyam Saran
Need for a Comprehensive National Security Strategy by Shyam Saran
Time for Disruptive Foreign and National Security Policies by Bharat Karnad
Multiply Urban ‘Growth Engines’, Encourage Migration to Reboot Economy by Mukta Naik
1 Annual Report: Periodic Labour Force Survey (2017/2018) National Statistical Office. Government of India
Available at:
http://www.mospi.gov.in/sites/default/files/publication_reports/Annual%2…
18_31052019.pdf?download=1
(Labour force participation rate (LFPR) is here defined as the total number of employed and unemployed persons in the country out of the total population above 15 years of age.)
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid
4 S.N. Roy and P. Mukhopadhyay, ‘What Matters for Urban Women’s Work: A Deep Dive into Falling Female Labour Force Participation’, CPR, 2019.
5 Annual Report: Periodic Labour Force Survey (2017/2018) National Statistical Office. Government of India
Available at: http://www.mospi.gov.in/sites/default/files/publication_reports/Annual%2…
6 S. Dewan, ‘Is the unemployment crisis for real?’ The Hindu, 15 February 2019, https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/is-the-unemployment-crisis-for-re….
7 Annual Report: Periodic Labour Force Survey (2017/2018) National Statistical Office. Government of India
Available at: http://www.mospi.gov.in/sites/default/files/publication_reports/Annual%2…
8 Annual Report: Periodic Labour Force Survey (2017/2018) National Statistical Office. Government of India
Available at: http://www.mospi.gov.in/sites/default/files/publication_reports/Annual%2…
Percentage of workers engaged in proprietary and partnership (P & P) enterprises among workers (ps+ss) engaged in non-agriculture and AGEGC sectors 2017-18 (PLFS)
S. Dewan and D. Prakash, ‘The Evolving Discourse on Job Quality from Normative Frameworks to Measurement Indicators: The Indian Example’, CSE Working Paper, January (2019: Centre for Sustainable Employment, Azim Premji University, 2019), cse.azimpremjiuniversity.edu.in/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/Dewan_Prakash_Job_Quality.pdf.
S. Dewan, ‘Job creation: Not “how many”, but “how good” ’, Economic Times, 1 March 2018, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/blogs/et-commentary/job-creation-no….
9 ‘World Population Prospects: The 2017 Revision’, Population Division, Department of Economic and Social Affairs (United Nations, 2017), custom data acquired via website.
10 M. Rama et al., ‘Addressing Inequality in South Asia’ (World Bank, 2015).
11 ‘U-Dise Flash Statistics, 2016-2017’, School Education in India (xxxxxx: National Institute of Educational Planning and Administration, 2018), http://udise.in/Downloads/Publications/Documents/Flash_Statistics_on_Sch….
12 Ibid.; ASER, ‘Annual Status of Education Report (Rural)’ (xxxxxx: xxxxxx, 2018), http://img.asercentre.org/docs/ASER 2018/Release Material/aserreport2018.pdf.
13 S. Dewan, X. Khan and X. Taneja, report forthcoming.
14 Labour Bureau, ‘Report on 5th Annual Employment-Unemployment Survey (2015-16), Volume 1’.
15 Exports to Jobs, 2019, http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/255821551109391137/pdf/134845-….
16 ‘Analysis of Budgeted Expenditure on Education 2013-14 to 2015-16’ (Ministry of Human Resource Development, Government of India,), https://mhrd.gov.in/sites/upload_files/mhrd/files/statistics-new/ABE2013….
17 S. Dewan and U. Sarkar, ‘From Education to Employability’, JustJobs Network, 2017.
18 ‘Report on the Working of Minimum Wages Act, 1948 for Year 1996’ (Labour Bureau, Ministry of Labour and Employment, 1996).
19 S. Mehrotra, ‘Laying the Foundation of a Just Society: Why Extending Social Insurance to All is an Economic and Moral Imperative’, Presentation, 2017. Social insurance here refers to pensions, maternity, death and disability benefits.
20 ‘Health Sector Financing by Centre and States/UTs in India, 2015-16 to 2017-18’, compiled by National Health Accounts Cell, Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, Government of India, https://mohfw.gov.in/sites/default/files/HEALTH%20SECTOR%20FINANCING%20B….
21 Several South East Asian nations have carved out the fiscal space to provide universal healthcare to their populations in recent years. The system can be a combination of a contributory and government-subsidized scheme. In the context of India, the latter inevitably calls for collapsing other existing programmes and reforming taxation policies to garner more revenue to this end.
22 2016-2017 Economic Survey, https://www.indiabudget.gov.in/es2016-17/echapter.pdf.

A Competition for Urban Land, Policies towards Informal Settlements in Lebanon, Cambodia and Syria

17 August 2017

Watch the full video (above) of the talk by Valérie Clerc, where she discusses precarious settlements, which are home to nearly one billion people across the world.

Through this talk, Clerc analyses urban policies pertaining to these informal settlements, which have not often followed the recommendations of international institutions, advocating the legalisation and improvement of living conditions in such precarious spaces.

Valérie Clerc is a Research fellow at the French National Research Institute for Sustainable Development – IRD, and a member of the CESSMA Centre for Social Sciences Studies on Africa, America and Asia in Paris.

The Q&A session that followed can be accessed here.

A Conversation with Olivier Mongin, Author of ‘City of Flows’

13 November 2019

Watch the full video (above) of the conversation with Olivier Mongin, co-organised by Centre de Sciences Humaines (CSH), Institut Français India (IFI) and CPR. The author was in conversation with Senior Visiting Fellow, Marie-Hélène Zérah and related his work to the Indian urban environment and introduced perspectives from her involvement with the research collective on subaltern urbanisation.

The starting point was Olivier Mongin’s book City of Flows (‘La Ville des flux’, published in 2013), which reflects on the trajectory of cities in an era of globalisation. For him, there is an ongoing ‘de-territorialisation’ process in the cities, which avoids regulation, because of their integration into a vast global movement materialised by flows. He argues in favour of the urgent need to rethink urban values, which have taken various forms and semantics through history, and which are vital to envision a more integrative future for cities.

Olivier Mongin, is an essayist and publisher, with a multidisciplinary background in history, anthropology, and literature and was the editor of the journal Esprit from 1988 to 2012.

The question and answer session that followed can be accessed here.

A Just Jobs Index for India: How do Indian States Fare in the Creation of Just Jobs?

2 August 2019

Watch the full video (above) of the launch of ‘A Just Jobs Index for India: How do Indian States Fare in the Creation of Just Jobs?’ by CPR and JustJobs Network (JJN).

India’s ailing labour market threatens the fragile optimism that underpins the nation’s aspirations. Urgent action is required to create a more job-rich economy that harnesses the productive potential of India’s population and raises living standards for all.

To further this critical policy imperative, JJN, with support from the Azim Premji University, has developed a JustJobs Index (JJI) – a comprehensive, data-driven tool to measure the quantity and quality of jobs – at the state level in India. This index, the first of its kind to measure both the quantity and quality of jobs, broadens the discourse on employment beyond the incomplete metric of unemployment. The report analyses the factors driving state-level rankings.

Panellists at the launch included:

Amitabh Kant, Chief Executive Officer, NITI Aayog
Dilip Chenoy, Secretary General, Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI)
Partha Mukhopadhyay, Senior Fellow, CPR
Anurag Behar, Vice Chancellor, Azim Premji University and CEO, Azim Premji Foundation
Sabina Dewan, President and Executive Director, JustJobs Network and Senior Visiting Fellow, CPR
The Index and the report can be accessed here.

A Pilot Study of Estimating Out-Of-School Children in India

30 November 2016

Why is the study important?

The numbers of out-of-school children (OOSC) put out by various official sources in India, show wide variations. For instance, the Ministry of Human Resource Development (MHRD) survey by Social and Rural Research Institute – Indian Market Research Bureau (SRI-IMRB) estimate of this figure is around 6 million, while for the same year 2014, the National Sample Survey (NSS) figure is around 20 million.

The problems lie not just in the definitions of OOSC used by different sources but also in the systems of collecting and collating data as well as the methods of estimation used by each source:

For instance, all school-based information defines an out of school child as one that is enrolled one year and not the next and/or continuously absent for a certain period of time. Household level data of never enrolled is not included in these estimates. Besides, school data is collected only by teachers who may have a conflict of interest in relation to some indicators, such as inflating student attendance for purposes of mid-day meal allocations and or preserving their own jobs, which are dependent on enrolment figures. Teacher may also be under pressure from parents to not strike names of children off the records.
Drop-out rates, which are estimates based on subtracting days of continuous absence over a period of time from the enrolment figures also vary from state to state (two weeks of absence in Karnataka to three months in Gujarat). This makes inter-state comparisons extremely difficult.
Further, these estimates do not take into account sporadic or irregular attendance, which is known to be very high in most rural schools.
Finally household level data on never enrolled also tends to be highly inaccurate due to i) lack of records on births and deaths and, ii) each data collection agency posing the question in a different way, eliciting a different response from the household. Lack of standardisation across basic indicators thus obscures the data count.
These anomalies call for a closer look at the issues around estimation of OOSC, particularly the attendance patterns of children, with special emphasis on sporadic or irregular attendance, as that has an impact on learning levels as well. With learning outcomes dominating the policy discourse on education, unpacking the links between attendance and learning and its distribution across social categories is therefore important.

This study of out-of-school children was undertaken in order to understand the phenomena of OOSC through an intensive micro-study of all children in a single Gram Panchayat (GP or Panchayat).

How was the study conducted?

It is based on a household survey that provides the population of children in the GP who attend schools located within the boundaries of the Gram Panchayat, as well as a survey of all enrolled children in schools located within the GP.

This enables a mapping of children from the household survey data and school data to obtain a final sample of children from the Panchayat attending schools located in the Panchayat. Thereafter the attendance of these mapped children is tracked through the course of one academic year by making bi-weekly visits (before and after the serving of the Mid-Day Meal (MDM)) to capture attendance patterns of the children.

The study surveys every school age child in the selected Panchayat, who attends school in the Panchayat region, with the intention of:

delineating OOSC by gender, social category and other household factors that might have an impact on attendance rates;
deciphering the attendance patterns and hence the extent of real drop -outs among children according to gender and social category.
The major emphasis of the current study is thus to provide a methodological framework to broaden the scope of defining OOSC by highlighting important issues that have hitherto been neglected in the estimation and analysis of out of school data.

Findings from the study:

The tracking of attendance and the patterns it discerns tells us the following:

Irregular or sporadic attendance is a huge phenomena–more than twice the number of children who recorded continuous absence are actually sporadically absent–but not recorded in the official figures related to OOSC.
Children who are never enrolled constitute an ‘invisible’ category as far as the system is concerned, as they are not recorded in any official document within the education system.
Extremely poor birth registration records exacerbate the problem of invisibility of children not in school.
There are wide variations in the attendance of children from different social groups, including gender, which need further research in order to develop strategies for mainstreaming them.
Various pressures–both at the societal and the school level–have led to overstating attendance of children in the school records to the detriment of children and their chances of improving their learning levels. This is reflected in the difference between the school records and head count data collected during the survey.
Policy implications of the study findings:

The survey results in several policy implications. These include:

First, a better data regime, that accounts for OOSC in a more robust as well as realistic manner, taking into account sporadic absence as well as the invisible children;
Second, adjusting the school calendar to align it with the agricultural cycle of the area permitting children who are needed by the families in peak season to do so, without disrupting their education;
Third, management of a local database by the Panchayat for purposes of data validation as well as tracking basic indicators such as student and teacher attendance, in addition to improved birth and death registration. For some indicators, community authentication would be helpful to check for anomalies that creep in, especially in instances where teachers may have an incentive in misreporting. While this authentication may not be very precise, it would help to red flag some figures, which could then be cross checked using more rigorous methods.
Fourth, developing an early warning system to help identify children at the risk of dropping out so that the school administration and community may take steps early on to prevent the eventual dropping-out of the child.
The full report can be accessed here.

The views shared belong to individual faculty and researchers and do not represent an institutional stance on the issue.

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A Relook at Infrastructure

Image Source: Dhiraj Singh | Bloomberg
5 July 2019

The cost and reliability of electricity and logistics is a major drag on our manufacturing ambitions. Sewage from our cities is killing our rivers. Yet, infrastructure has fallen off the policy radar, despite continuing challenges – evident most vividly in the financial sector’s non-performing assets. What is wrong and how can we fix it? We outline the key actions that need to be taken in the major sectors to make the sector financially viable and support our economic goals.

Electricity

Today, when our installed capacity is a multiple of our expressed demand (which, admittedly, may be less than our need), the objective of 24X7 power supply to consumers – whether industrial, residential or commercial – at efficient and competitive prices, should be within reach. What is stopping us?

Many of the challenges in power have been addressed elsewhere by other colleagues, so I will be brief here. Renewable energy capacity in India has grown rapidly – as befits the progenitor of the International Solar Alliance. Installed capacity of wind, solar, small hydro (less than 25MW) biomass and other such sources have grown seven fold from 11,125MW (8% of grid capacity) in March 2008 to 77,642 MW (22% of grid) in March 2019.

The share of generation from these sources is now 9%. Yet, the share of thermal sources, primarily coal, remains at 78% – except that it now operates at an inefficient 60% plant load factor instead of 74% in 2008. We have been running to stay in place. The rising share of renewables has replaced the lack of growth in large hydro sources, an outcome which may admittedly have other environmental benefits. Integrating the full spectrum of non-fossil fuel resources into the grid is thus more difficult than just increasing capacity of renewable sources. So, we may get to our 175 GW capacity target and yet not achieve much in terms of transforming the carbon-intensity of our electricity supply.

Gas plants, the vaunted mitigators of climate elsewhere, remain almost unutilised – running at just about one fifth of their capacity, less than half of levels ten years ago, largely because current tariff and access regimes make them uncompetitive and they have no fuel supply. Our troubles with domestic gas exploration – KG D-6 for example – has led to relative stasis in gas related investment. Even as the LNG market is being increasingly delinked from oil, with recent prices in Asia dropping to multi-year lows1, our terminals remain underutilised and under-connected. A world where a gas plant can import fuel, land it at a convenient terminal and transport it to its plant by paying an access charge to a network operator seems very far away.

There is one root cause: DISCOMs that do not collect money for power they sell. This one cause has many other manifestations – protective regulators who are reluctant to allow open access, tariff regimes without time-of-day prices, overgenerous feed-in mandates for renewable power, lavish cost-plus tariffs for legacy centrally owned plants with priority power purchase agreements with states, etc.

Given the complicated mess that our power sector has been in over the past many years, spanning all governments, transcending this will need a number of actions, across the generation, transmission and distribution segments. I advocate three, focused on tariffs.

First, industrial and commercial tariffs need to fall, leading, hopefully, to a spurt in jobs. They are much more than the cost of supply, ostensibly to subsidise residential and agricultural consumers.

We cannot kill industries to keep DISCOMs alive. The network has the technical capacity to achieve this objective – especially for industries that receive power at higher voltages. DISCOMs have used their universal supply mandate as an excuse to prevent industries from accessing competitively priced power. Allowing DISCOMs to even procure incremental power and supply them at competitive prices to paying industrial consumers is in the realm of state governments. The alternative is open access – part of our electricity legislation for several years – but limited in its application by our state electricity regulators, a short-sighted approach to protecting DISCOMs.

Second, residential and agricultural tariffs can be rationalised, and in some segments, raised. In the era of direct benefit transfers and income support schemes, price subsidies have outlived their utility. The reduction in fiscal support to the DISCOM can be redirected to targeted consumers as a cash transfer, to insulate them from the effects of the rise in tariffs. A more rational tariff regime may also lead finally to complete metering (one can trace exhortations to meter all feeders back to twenty years ago), and a credible accounting of electricity consumption.

Third, we need to extensively expand time of day pricing. Today, those that consume low cost baseload power bear the burden of higher price peaking (and other) power because of averaging of tariffs. This is being debated for a long time is even used in some segments in some states. It can also make the gas plants, at a time of low LNG prices, competitive, reducing our carbon footprint.

These tariff actions will create the enabling conditions for ensuring that our grid is no longer bankrupt. There will still be much work to revitalise DISCOMs and address the hysteresis of long years of embedded political economy constraints, before they can be made viable. But, this is a better way than UDAY and the creation of a national distribution company, which is a heart bypass, without changing unhealthy habits. At most, if necessary, the Union can support the states in DISCOM reform by advancing bridging loans to tide over revenue shortfalls in the initial stages, if any.

There are many other areas for action. These include enabling a network that can integrate renewable power at the scale it is being envisaged; rationalising and modernising our coal plants – the capacity glut allows us to take some of them offline, temporarily, or even permanently, if necessary; streamlining our gas pipeline grid and pricing to allow gas plants to compete and provide balancing capacity for a renewable heavy grid, etc., etc. There are also many actions that need to be taken to grow an energy related manufacturing sector. But, all of that is only possible when the final cash generating end of the sector – distribution – is viable and healthy. It is time we took this head on.

Telecom

The telecom sector, bar one firm, seems to be struggling despite increasing use, so much so, that one wonders whether the public monopoly before telecom liberalisation will return in a different avatar. Despite rapid growth and the spread of smartphones, we are yet to ensure that a seamless network covers our country with both reliable data and voice. Why are we in this situation?

One major reason is that spectrum is mispriced. It should be virtually free in sparsely populated rural areas. Unless there is congestion, there is no reason to price it. Yet, our current spectrum pricing model makes rural spectrum as expensive as that in cities. This is because Licensed Service Areas (LSAs) are congruent with telecom circles, i.e., states, mixing areas that are both abundant and scarce in spectrum. This does not allow rural spectrum to be separated and affects spectrum availability across the LSA. Auctions are not necessarily efficient if the good being sold is incorrectly bundled. Instead, spectrum needs to be defined in much smaller geographical units (see Box).

If one moves to define and sell spectrum over smaller geographical units, aggregate revenue may remain the same but places with excess spectrum may get more service providers. But, even if it falls, one must question whether the rationale for spectrum allocation is to raise fiscal resources or whether it is to expand connectivity across the country.

Another reason is that telecom services may be priced below economic cost, an issue for the sector regulator and Competition Commission of India to examine. If even the growing firm is sustained more by infusions outside the sector than its own surplus, then, as 5G becomes the standard, whether Huawei’s or Qualcomm’s or whoever’s – China has already awarded licenses to four firms – we may find that Indian telecom sector is too under-resourced to adopt the new technology. This would not be a good outcome. Cheap prices now is too high a price to pay for outdated technology later.

Finally, our Universal Service Obligation Fund was supposed to bring data to our rural communities and transform their access to education and health. Yet, instead of schoolchildren learning from high bandwidth rich digital content, they are addicted to low bandwidth social media separating one from the other. Aadhaar often falters, as biometric machines cannot access stable data connections.

Logistics

Twenty years ago, the government levied a rupee of cess on petrol and diesel, to fund national highways, rural roads and, lest one forget, rail over bridges. The humble but path-breaking cess of 1999 is now the monster eight rupee road and infrastructure cess that no one protests paying. Why, then is our logistics still so outmoded?

Highways

There has been substantial investment in highways in the last administration. The adoption of models like Hybrid Annuity reversed a slump caused by concession models that transferred excessive risk to the private sector, who, regardless had bid aggressively for projects. Public sector banks lent to them on the back of projected cash flows that never materialised. Post the Lehman crisis in 2008, banks were left holding unfinished projects. Most of these have now been restructured and restarted. However, the sector still to solve three challenges:

(a) Barrier free movement for freight road traffic – trains, after all, are not stopped at state borders
(b) Ensuring maintenance of the national highway network
(c) Avoiding white elephant highways, while retaining an appropriate risk-reward framework
For a long time, open road tolling was not possible because offenders could not be identified, absent a national vehicle number database. Now we have one – VAAHAN – and we have e-way bills too. Can we remove all our toll plazas and move to toll gantries, beginning with high traffic routes?

For highways on the BOT model, on annuity or hybrid annuity concessions, there is a built-in mechanism to penalise operators for poor maintenance. Is that working? What about highways on a BOT-capital grant model or those being tolled by NHAI? As the highway network expands and begins to age, a transparent mechanism to monitor and maintain the quality of roads needs to be rolled out.

Finally, hybrid annuity models do not transfer traffic risk to the private concessionaire. As the network grows beyond the obvious congested routes, there is a risk that roads will get built where there is no traffic, even in the near future. To forestall this, we should switch to concession models that limit the transfer of periodic traffic risk, but still retain transfer of lifetime traffic risk – like Least Present Value of Revenue models. For this, we need to familiarise our financial institutions with such methods.

PMGSY: Rural Roads

The construction of 600,000 plus kilometres of rural roads, over the last twenty years, across governments of different political persuasion is testimony to the consensus over rural connectivity. Many states now have supplementary rural roads programmes financed from their own budgets. It has undoubtedly played a major role in moving our workers off the farm, to new activities and locations. The maintenance of this network should now be our primary concern. The initial PMGSY contracts had a built in maintenance period, many of which have now concluded. An institutional mechanism to maintain the PMGSY network needs to be put in place. One model can be the performance based CREMA contracts of Argentina, broadly similar to the initial PMGSY contracts, but for rehabilitation and maintenance, with penalties for not meeting performance outcomes.

Railways

Even the lowest tariff freight train makes more money than the Rajdhani. We need to shift the conversation around Railways from passenger to freight – a critical logistics function essential to support manufacturing. Currently, track capacity is exhausted running passenger trains. In the short term, it is necessary to: (a) prioritise signalling investments on a war-footing to expand capacity and (b) rationalise passenger trains, by combining capacity and retiring trains.

In order to determine which trains to retire, the Railways needs to develop the ability to cost each train, which it currently does not do. The passenger subsidy numbers bandied about are an artificial construct and an over-aggregated exercise. Developing this costing methodology is a priority.

The Dedicated Freight Corridors should also free up capacity by taking traffic away from existing lines. The transport of coal, which still makes up about half of Railway’s traffic, will slow down or even decline as coal power is reduced and produced progressively at the pithead. Can Railways fill this freed-up capacity with other cargo, containerized or otherwise, and with revenue generating passengers? Can it become a logistics company from a mere transporter from one station to another? The strategy that is chosen will have implications for number and types of locomotives and rolling stock. The e-commerce parcel segment is a good way to start this transformation. It will force the Railways to deal with inter-modality, a necessary ingredient for its medium term survival.

Suburban passenger services are urban public service obligations. This activity needs to be separated and costed and then funded separately, as for example the urban metro rail projects.

Finally, the Railways needs financial engineering. Today, a huge portion of its revenue is spent on pension benefits for its retirees. This is an obligation that will progressively reduce over time, as the effect of the National Pension Scheme begins to show. Railways can restructure this predictable liability to reduce its current expenditure and free up resources for investment. Will it do so?

Port

Today, JNPT is quite possibly no longer the Indian port that handles the most containers. That position is likely held by Mundhra, a port owned by the Adanis, connected by a joint venture rail track to the Delhi-Mumbai rail corridor. Mundhra has an unfair advantage – it can decide its prices, JNPT cannot. The tariffs at our major ports (i.e., those owned by the Union government) are determined by the Tariff Authority for Major Ports, an anachronistic holdover in a competitive sector. The Tariff Guidelines notified this year are a far cry from the price flexibility that Mundhra enjoys.

Not only are the tariffs rigidly determined, the structure of our major port concessions are designed to make it costly for our traders to transport. Between a third and a half of the tariff is shared with the government, depending on the port and berth, since the gross revenue share is the bid parameter. It means that tariffs could be reduced by half in some cases and the port would still be viable. Like spectrum, this is again an instance where the urge to raise fiscal resources prevailed over the need to ensure competitive logistics costs for our industry. It is time to take three actions.

First, disband institutions like TAMP, treat ports as a competitive sector, with tariff freedom for operators and improved competition oversight. This should be accompanied with a move away from a revenue share concession structure to a fixed concession fee.

Second, invest in port connectivity to spur inter-port and intra-port competition. The rising share of non-major ports indicates that there is growing inter-port competition, even with problems in road and rail connectivity. Added to this is intra-port competition, when there are multiple operators in a port.

Third, we need to re-examine our approach to coastal shipping. Our eastern ports, together with ports in Bangladesh, Myanmar and Thailand, can act as a sea-bridge to our northeast and integrate our industry with South East Asian value chains. The Bay of Bengal will buzz with crisscrossing ships.

Together, these actions, across road, rail and ports, along with regulatory action and investment to facilitate multi-modal transport, will reduce our logistics costs and make industry more competitive.

Water Treatment

Every major city in India kills at least one river. Even as Chennai dries and Mumbai drowns, Delhi blithely pollutes the Yamuna. Our farms mismanage water and our cities poison it. Yet, with the possible exception of the National Mission for Clean Ganga, there is little programmatic effort – like the National Highways Authority for India for highways – to preserve our rivers and water bodies.

This is not just a matter of building sewers and sewerage treatment plants – a significant portion of such treatment capacity lies unused. We also need to consider the reckless destruction of even groundwater resources by industries that dispose their waste underground, aided by incapacitated pollution control boards – the corridor from Vatva to Vapi rivals the worst polluted areas of China – and the damage caused by chemical run-off from overuse of pesticides and fertilizer in agriculture.

More than inland waterways, river inter-linking and large dams, we need focus on wastewater.

The Digital Future

Even as we address these basic issues, digital technologies are changing the way infrastructure is provided, operated, charged for and maintained across sectors. These technologies permit services to be delivered more efficiently, less expensively, use less resources, cause less damage to the environment and reach a wider user base. This will not happen automatically or quickly but the process can be accelerated with an appropriate mix of regulatory mechanisms and financing tools.

The availability of funds is not the constraint that will restrain growth of digitally enabled infrastructure. The challenge is to design projects to balance risk and reward in a way that providers are incentivised to serve users well, while financiers are insured from the realisation of uncontrollable risks.

One such financial risk is the fast-obsolescing nature of these technologies, where yesterday’s cutting edge is tomorrow’s discard. This structural risk can slow down the adoption of socially beneficial technologies. Slow adoption can also be engineered by those who will lose their investments from new technologies. This will need public action in terms of financing models and regulatory oversight.

Conclusion

Our infrastructure models are still operationally inefficient, financially fragile and future-unready, both in terms of technology and the environment. For too long – across governments – we have focused on making money from infrastructure rather than seeing it as a service that can power growth and enable the transformation of India. If we did manage to convince our private sector to invest enough to get us to 8%+ growth, we will hit a wall of infrastructure constraints. We have lived too long off our earlier investment in the past few years. We cannot do so any longer.

1 Henry Hub, the US local benchmark and increasingly an alternative basis, vis-à-vis oil, for export pricing, has stayed below USD 3 per mmbtu for three fourths of the time over the last five years.
2 This is to avoid situations where spectrum trading leads to licences that are too small to be practical, resulting in inefficient use of spectrum and unnecessary administrative costs.

A Study of informal sector migrants in Delhi and Hyderabad

3 August 2016

Watch the full video of the workshop (above), where the speakers present preliminary insights on the intimate lives of first and second generation rural-to-urban migrants in Delhi and Hyderabad.

These initial insights, as part of their ongoing project ‘The City and Country: Towards a Poetics of Informal Economies in Contemporary India’, strive to bring humanistic insights to existing political economy scholarship on migration and employment.

The two-part question and answer session that followed can be accessed here: Part 1, Part 2