Carbon emissions—and hence fossil fuel combustion—must decline rapidly if warming is to be held below 1.5 or 2 °C. Yet fossil fuels are so deeply entrenched in the broader economy that a rapid transition poses the challenge of significant transitional disruption. Fossil fuels must be phased out even as access to energy services for basic needs and for economic development expands, particularly in developing countries. Nations, communities, and workers that are economically dependent on fossil fuel extraction will need to find a new foundation for livelihoods and revenue. These challenges are surmountable. In principle, societies could undertake a decarbonization transition in which they anticipate the transitional disruption, and cooperate and contribute fairly to minimize and alleviate it. Indeed, if societies do not work to avoid that disruption, a decarbonization transition may not be possible at all. Too many people may conclude they will suffer undue hardship, and thus undermine the political consensus required to undertake an ambitious transition. The principles and framework laid out here are offered as a contribution to understanding the nature of the potential impacts of a transition, principles for equitably sharing the costs of avoiding them, and guidance for prioritizing which fossil resources can still be extracted.
Suggested Citation: Kartha, S., Caney, S., Dubash, N.K. et al. Climatic Change (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-018-2209-z
The language of transformational change is increasingly applied to climate policy, and particularly in climate finance. Transformational change in this context is used with respect to low-carbon development futures, with the emphasis on mitigation and GHG metrics. But, for many developing countries, climate policy is embedded in a larger context of sustainable development objectives, defined through a national process. Viewed thus, there is a potential tension between mitigation-focused transformation and nationally driven sustainable development. We explore this tension in the context of operationalizing the Green Climate Fund (GCF), which has to deal with the fundamental tension between country ownership and transformational change. In relation to climate finance, acceptance of diverse interpretations of transformation are essential conditions for avoiding risk of transformational change becoming a conditionality on development. We further draw lessons from climate governance and the development aid literature. The article examines how in the case of both the Clean Development Mechanism and Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions, there has been limited success in achieving both development objectives and ‘nationally appropriate’ mitigation. The development aid literature points to process-based approaches as a possible alternative, but there are limitations to this approach
The Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission is an ambitious programme to build infrastructure in Indiaâ??s cities and towns. However, the mission does not sufficiently recognise that the core urban deficit is not the lack of infrastructure but the lack of local self-governance.
Out of India’s 46 billionaires in 2012, 20 had drawn their primary source of wealth (at least originally) from sectors that can be classified as “rent-thick” (real estate, construction, infrastructure or ports sectors, media, cement, and mining). The remaining 26 billionaires had drawn their primary source of wealth from “other” sectors (IT/software, pharmaceuticals and biotech, finance, liquor and automotives, etc). Overall, 43% of the total number of billionaires, accounting for 60% of billionaire wealth in India, had their primary sources of wealth from rent-thick sectors. Indian capitalism seems to have two faces. Does international experience provide a guide?
The fight against corruption is central to the good governance agenda of development organizations around the world. However, this article argues that anti-corruption efforts in countries with politically active militaries present a paradox: Corruption clearly can undermine democratic institutions, but so can anti-corruption campaigns. Both domestic and international actors are hesitant to point out corruption in the military due to its revered status as the protector of the country. Yet, in not criticizing they help perpetuate an asymmetry in which politicians are seen as corrupt and incompetent, while the military is viewed as disciplined and incorruptible.
This article uses the case study of the Bangladesh 2007-08 military coup–and to a lesser extent, similar recent coups in Pakistan and Thailand–to show how militaries have not only justified “good governance” coups on anti-corruption grounds, but used charges of corruption to carry them out. It further argues that although good governance rhetoric is potentially destabilizing to democracy in these countries, it can also empower the judiciary, as the military seeks out judicial validation to show that it is providing better, and in many ways more “legal,” governance than civilian politicians. The article ends by calling on anticorruption advocates to adapt a more politically savvy strategy that does not ignore military corruption and focuses on institutions, processes, democratic elections, and consistent prosecution of low-level actors.
This article analyses the evolving Indian case law con- cerning water, with a special focus on the fundamental right to water, as well as issues related to control over water, and the links between environment and water. While courts have long engaged with water law, activities in recent years have been particularly important because of the introduction of water sector reforms and water law reforms that seek to reshape the water sector. The response of courts to these devel- opments is particularly important. However, there has been no unified response to ongoing changes as Indian courts have given varying responses to the variety of cases submitted to them.
This article is divided in four main sections. The first section focuses on some of the principles underpinning water sector reforms that have been highlighted in existing national and international policy documents. This provides the conceptual background to understand the legislative changes introduced in the section. The latter section focuses on a limited number of regulatory changes that have been proposed in recent years to put the water law framework in line with proposed policy initiatives. The third section provides a general analysis of the law and policy changes that have been introduced. The last section provides some pointers for moving beyond existing reforms with a view to correct some of the perceived shortcoming of existing water law reforms.
Water law is at a crossroads. Its basic structure and principles are being challenged by the increasingly global dimension of water issues. Yet, neither the international framework nor national water laws acknowledge the intrinsic links between the global water cycle and access to water at the local level. Water law must be reconceived around a broader understanding of water while being allowed at the same time to shed its old sectoral framework that makes little space for integration with other related areas of law such as environmental and human rights law.
The Indus Treaty between India and Pakistan has acquired a reputation internationally as a successful instance of conflict resolution. It has been working reasonably well despite a difficult political relationship between the two countries and was not abrogated even during periods of war. It appears to have survived the recent crisis as well.
Background
In India, men are more likely than women to have active tuberculosis but are less likely to be diagnosed and notified to national tuberculosis programmes. We used data from standardised patient visits to assess whether these gender differences occur because of provider practice.
Methods
We sent standardised patients (people recruited from local populations and trained to portray a scripted medical condition to health-care providers) to present four tuberculosis case scenarios to private health-care providers in the cities of Mumbai and Patna. Sampling and weighting allowed for city representative interpretation. Because standardised patients were assigned to providers by a field team blinded to this study, we did balance and placebo regression tests to confirm standardised patients were assigned by gender as good as randomly. Then, by use of linear and logistic regression, we assessed correct case management, our primary outcome, and other dimensions of care by standardised patient gender.
Findings
Between Nov 21, 2014, and Aug 21, 2015, 2602 clinical interactions at 1203 private facilities were completed by 24 standardised patients (16 men, eight women). We found standardised patients were assigned to providers as good as randomly. We found no differences in correct management by patient gender (odds ratio 1·05; 95% CI 0·76–1·45; p=0·77) and no differences across gender within any case scenario, setting, provider gender, or provider qualification.
