Archives: Journal Articles

In 1976 India and China resumed their diplomatic interactions, which had been interrupted by the 1962 War. For the ensuing three decades both sides have been engaged in discovering a process that can identify the contours of a solution to the boundary question. The orthodox historiography of the post-1976 phase portrays India as a relatively intransigent actor still clinging to the past (pre-1962) and unwilling to truly explore a solution to the dispute. India is also painted as an unimaginative interlocutor, unable to offer proposals or counter-proposals; it is China that has supposed to have steered India toward a common position. This paper offers a nuanced corrective. India was not the only unyielding actor in this dyad; China too, despite its oft-expressed intent for a comprehensive settlement has been less than enthusiastic in translating its principles toward concrete proposals. Nevertheless, a modicum of progress has been attained, which is reflected in important bilateral agreements in the 1990s and 2000s. The author gets to the essence of the dispute and attempts to interpret the negotiating postures of both sides and conjectures why progress might have stalled since the mid-2000s.

The discourse based on reservations has attuned the political class to thinking about the welfare of marginalised communities almost on a single and not very productive dimension and has made political action for common problems difficult. It would be a tragedy if modern India became a project, not for transcending caste, but perpetuating it.

In December 2007, the international community adopted the Bali Action Plan which launched a process to reach an ‘agreed outcome’ on long-term cooperative action on climate change, with a scheduled end in Copenhagen, December 2009. The term ‘an agreed outcome’ suggests a lack of agreement on both the legal form that the likely outcome of this process could take, and the level of ambition that it should reflect. This lack of agreement continues to haunt the process. There are a range of legal form options for a new climate instrument — from a set of Conference of Parties decisions to a legally binding instrument, either to replace or supplement the Kyoto Protocol — and the choice between them for States is predicated primarily on political and strategic considerations. Nevertheless the legal status, procedural requirements, symbolic signalling effects and regime-building characteristics of different legal form options will play an important role in determining the legal form of the Copenhagen ‘agreed outcome’. This article identifies and explores the range of legal form options available to States in the negotiation process, and outlines the political and strategic considerations at play and will ultimately govern choice of legal form. This article argues that one of the most significant factors hindering substantive progress on a post-2012 climate agreement is what is characterized here as the ‘post-Kyoto stress disorder’, a lack of trust amongst some developing countries that industrialized countries will, given current and past form, honour their commitments, and/or take the lead in the new climate agreement. This article makes the case that post-Kyoto stress disorder will likely prevent certain legal form options from acquiring traction in the process and favour others.

On August 5th 2019, the newly elected Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) government in New Delhi moved the Indian Parliament to abrogate Article 370 and bifurcate the state of Jammu and Kashmir into two Union Territories. Months later, as the year came to a close, the Indian parliament passed a controversial amendment to India’s Citizenship Law. Several state governments came out in vocal opposition to the amendment, and some challenged the amendment in the Supreme Court. These events provided confirmation that the reelection of a majority BJP government has heralded far-reaching changes for India’s federal order, compounding shifts in the institutions and practice of federalism during Narendra Modi’s first term (2014–19). In this article, we assess the implications of the 2019 Lok Sabha elections for the future dynamics of federalism in the constitutional, administrative, and fiscal spheres under the second term Modi government.

On August 5th 2019, the newly elected Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) government in New Delhi moved the Indian Parliament to abrogate Article 370 and bifurcate the state of Jammu and Kashmir into two Union Territories. Months later, as the year came to a close, the Indian parliament passed a controversial amendment to India’s Citizenship Law. Several state governments came out in vocal opposition to the amendment, and some challenged the amendment in the Supreme Court. These events provided confirmation that the reelection of a majority BJP government has heralded far-reaching changes for India’s federal order, compounding shifts in the institutions and practice of federalism during Narendra Modi’s first term (2014–19). In this article, we assess the implications of the 2019 Lok Sabha elections for the future dynamics of federalism in the constitutional, administrative, and fiscal spheres under the second term Modi government.

The United Nations climate talks in Lima, Peru, were important as the last preparatory meet ahead of the Paris talks in late 2015,where a new global agreement tocombat climate change is to be negotiated. While few would characterise the “Lima Call to Climate Action” as a resounding success, given the deep differences that plague the climate negotiations, the Lima call represents progress and will stand countries in good stead as the drum roll for Paris begins.