Author: cprindia

Summary

The YouGov-Mint-CPR biannual surveys are conducted by Mint in association with YouGov India and Centre for Policy Research. This collaboration began in 2018 with the aim of assessing the beliefs, choices and anxieties of India’s young urban population.

The 12th round of this survey was conducted in July 2024, with 10,314 respondents across more than 200 towns and cities. In this latest round, 45% of the respondents were post- millennials (born after 1996) and 39% were millennials (born between 1981 and 1996).

In the last few months, the findings from this 12th round were published in Live Mint in a seven part series. Four of these articles were authored by Rahul Verma (Fellow, CPR) and Melvin Kunjumon, and have been summarised below. The full survey is linked here.

 

Polls and Perceptions: The 2024 Lok Sabha Election

The findings of the 12th YouGov-Mint-CPR Millennial Survey conducted in July 2024 found little change in BJP’s approval rating in urban India with 46% respondents choosing it as their most favoured party, while Congress trailed at 15%. 

The BJP garners its lowest proportional support from economically disadvantaged groups, and scheduled castes and tribes. In terms of voter outreach, the BJP fared better (with one-third respondents responding positively) than Congress (reaching slightly less than a quarter respondents). 

On Rahul Gandhi’s emergence as a serious opponent, slightly more than half the respondents reacted favourably. When asked about the INDIA bloc’s ability to mount an effective challenge to the BJP in the incumbent government, about two-fifths responded in favour as against 29% in December 2023. The data suggests that the BJP’s public appeal has weakened among the lower socio-economic strata and that Modi’s popularity may have peaked. 

 

Democracy Check

The second set of findings deals with determining the people’s faith in the electoral machinery. When asked about the fairness of the 2024 Lok Sabha elections, 58% people confirmed their faith while 42% responded negatively. A significant number of respondents, about every 3 in 5, supported the continued use of EVMs dismissing the allegations of rigging.

On being questioned whether the media gave favourable coverage to the BJP during its election campaign 54% respondents agreed, while 46% believed the coverage was fair. Surprisingly half the surveyed BJP supporters also affirmed that the media favoured the BJP. 46% respondents questioned the integrity of exit poll projections and claimed that the forecasts were fraudulent.

One-third respondents maintained that holding multiple elections was unresourceful, while another one-third held that staggered elections strengthen democracy. 41% of BJP supporters viewed multiple elections as wasteful, against only 24% of Congress supporters.

The survey findings are indicative of how party affiliations shape popular perceptions on electoral issues. BJP supporters exhibit greater trust in ECI, EVMs and exit polls, while Congress supporters are more likely to be skeptical.

 

Social Media and Politics

Another data set found that Politics was the 5th most popular topic on social media among respondents after Lifestyle, Science and Technology, Sports, and General Entertainment. 

Similar to the previous round (conducted in December 2023), educated younger respondents with high incomes and strong partisan leanings tended to be more active in political discussions on social media. However, the latest round conducted right after the 2024 Lok Sabha elections, found an increase in negative interactions online, with the sharpest increase among post-millennials, from 34% to 41%. Respondents belonging to minority groups were more likely to report online harassment. 

The respondents also showed a trust deficit in social media influencers and posts along with Whatsapp messages for information. Newspapers were the most trusted, followed by TV channels.

 

A Welfarist Budget?

The concluding survey focused on understanding the opinions of urban Indians on governmental budgetary priorities. The survey asked respondents to give their preference from paired policy questions. 70% participants favoured investment in free healthcare and education for the poor over public infrastructure, and prioritised rural development to building big, global cities. 

To gauge these preferences, the survey asked respondents to allocate a hypothetical government budget of 100 Rs. across public hospitals and schools, creation of government jobs, investment in public infrastructure, growth of big businesses, and direct cash transfers to the poor. The results showed that respondents least preferred cash transfers and were the most favourable to improving conditions of governments schools and hospitals.

Finally, the survey also tried to assess whether people associate personal economic anxieties with the performance of the government. To the question of whether it is harder to find jobs across demographics, respondents reported that compared to the survey conducted in December 2022, finding jobs was harder in 2024. 

 

Source Table 4a in Annual Survey of Industries 2021-22: https://mospi.gov.in/sites/default/files/publication_reports/ASI%20Volume%20I%202021-22%20%20Final.pdf

There has been a long-running discussion about the low and falling female labour force participation, especially in the non-farm sector. Simultaneously, it has been claimed that industrial growth in India has not been labour intensive. So, the question arises – does the nature of industrial growth, whether it is capital or labour intensive, affect the gender composition of the workforce, e.g., do capital intensive industries have fewer women workers?

To answer the question, we turn to the Annual Survey of Industries, which collects information from a relatively formal group of industries, i.e., units with ten or more workers (with power), or twenty or more workers without power, registered under Sections 2(m)(i) and 2(m)(ii) of the Factories Act, 1948 or the Bidi & Cigar Workers (Conditions of Employment) Act, 1966. Some large units registered under other acts are also included but, the survey excludes small unregistered units.

Within this group of units, the figure above shows that industries that have a high share of women in directly employed (i.e., non-contractual) women workers, e.g., garments (28%) textiles (16%), food (13%), tobacco (6%), leather (6%), and electronics (2%) do indeed have lower capital intensity (the available data does not allow us to investigate this for contractual workers[1]). Industries where the share of women is above average (dotted line) all have a capital intensity of less than ₹ 0.2 lakh per worker. The figures in parenthesis show the share of women employed in that industry to total female employment and these six industries together employ over 70% of the female workforce (which is why the average is where it is, though many industries have lower shares).

So, the answer is yes, capital intensive industries do indeed employ fewer women and that an increase in labour intensive manufacturing may have the additional benefit of boosting female labour force participation.

---

1. It is possible that that the regular workers are more likely to be male and if so, the use of regular workers understates the female-intensity of the workforce, but unless this varies systematically across industries, the conclusion would continue to hold.

Bibek Debroy (1955-2024)

Around mid-2002, I managed to airdrop myself onto the lap of Prof Bibek Debroy (1955 – 2024) as his ‘colleague’ at the Rajiv Gandhi Institute for Contemporary Studies (RGICS) where he was the Director. For a little while I was apprehensive and wondered how long he (‘Bibek’ to his friends) would tolerate me for I was not his choice. Within a couple of weeks he put me at ease and I spent the next four years working closely with him. He very quickly integrated me into the Institute’s work and much later he was also instrumental in bringing me to CPR, once again to be his colleague!

The reports of his death tried to measure the void he left behind and the obituaries by well-meaning scholars are gratifying. More can be added from his public persona but what about the man, Bibek Debroy? Though he walked in the corridors of power and privilege and rubbed shoulders with the rich and famous, he never lost the common touch. And he could be affectionate and caring to people he worked with; he would find nice things to say about his employees who were below the hierarchy.

For two decades, Bibek was my friend and mentor, and also a teacher who never lectured his ideology down my throat. But, truth be told, as the years passed by, thanks to him, I understood the value of limited government, not so much as an article of faith, but as the least detrimental system. The canard that he supported anti-people policies wouldn’t hold much water because the man was decent enough and intelligent enough and ‘pro-people’ enough to advocate liberal policies, firmly believing that they would help people.

He was always reserved, even in his unguarded moments; he wouldn’t reveal much about himself, nor would he ask others about theirs. For people closer to him, he was caring, offering a way out in delicate situations. A minor health issue? Why not take some German-made homeo drops, usually that of Adel brand’s?

We are deeply anguished by the commentary in the media casting aspersions on CPR’s integrity, objectivity and its commitment to engage with ideas that matter to the nation.

This reportage betrays ignorance of CPR’s provenance, its passion for evidence-based policy research, its rich traditions of accommodating multiple perspectives, promoting debates to inform policy thinking and shaping public discourse.

These qualities have built CPR’s reputation across the world for impartiality, probity and penchant for encouraging diverse views.

CPR has always strived to strengthen India and its institutional processes. We also take our obligation to promote public interest very seriously. We have already appealed against the allegations in the courts. We reaffirm our complete faith in the country’s judicial processes.

 

Source: https://www.mospi.gov.in/sites/default/files/publication_reports/ASI%20Volume%20I%202021-22%20%20Final.pdf
(Table 4a)

The share of contract workers in organised Indian industry is rising relatively rapidly. From just under 22% percent in 2001-02, it has risen to over 40% in 2021-22.  But the share of contract workers differs across industries, from well over half in industries like beverages (54%) and the production of salt (67%) to less than one fifth in garments (12%) and textiles (18%).

This information can be found in the Annual Survey of Industries (the latest version being 2021-22) brought out by the Industrial Statistics wing of the National Statistical Office. There is also a lot of other information in the document, one of which is wages paid to the workers 

So, does the variation in the use of contract workers differ across industries because of the difference in cost of workers (wages) across them? The figure above plots the average annual worker wage (this includes both contractual and non-contractual workers) versus the extent of use of contract workers. As can be seen, the extent of contractualisation appears to rise with the increase in wages. This is to be expected if contract workers cost less than regular workers, with a rise in wages leads to substitution of regular workers by contract workers.  

Of course, there are many other factors that will determine the extent of contractualisation, which will emerge in a fuller analysis, e.g., the extent of embedded skills in workers. An industry where such worker-specific human capital is high will have more difficulty substituting regular workers by contract workers. Industries with such worker-specific human capital are also likely to pay workers more and this will lead to an association of higher wages with lower contractualisation, the opposite of the posited relationship. The fact that it is not evident may indicate that such effects may not have a strong impact.

---

 1. It should be noted that the inclusion of contract workers would reduce the average wage in industries with high share of contract workers and would bias the data against the hypothesis. The fact that the relationship remains evident despite this indicates a strong underlying relationship. Information on wages paid to contract workers is available in what is called the unit level data but accessing that is a too complicated an exercise for this blog, which focuses on readily available data. There are existing works that examine such data in detail, e.g. Singh, Bir (2023) India’s Informal Economy Contractual Labour in the Formal Manufacturing Sector Routledge, London.

CONTEXT

Four decades ago, I studied industries of Dhampur, a small town of about 29,000 inhabitants located in the rich agriculture region of western Uttar Pradesh, for my doctoral research. I revisited Dhampur in early 2024 with the intention of starting a longitudinal study of the same small town, which now has a population about 1 lakh and an area of 3.87 sq km. I was curious to know: How has the industrial structure of Dhampur town changed over 40 years? Have the industries in the town evolved in response to the change in demand and technology? Is there greater diversification in industrial production than before?

INDUSTRIAL LANDSCAPE

Industries often locate in the rural-agricultural areas adjacent to urban settlements, predominantly to get cheaper and larger parcels of land and also to benefit from the infrastructure and services of the town by remaining in close proximity to it. Therefore, I had considered industries located within the municipal area as well as in the rural areas falling within 5 km radius of the town as the industries of the Dhampur town at both points of time.

After extensive survey of industries conducted in Dhampur in the first half of 2024, it became clear that the industrial landscape of the town has gone through major transformation over the four decades. The fact that the total number of industrial units located in Dhampur increased from 43 in 1979-80 to 63 in 2023-24 didn’t appear to be a surprise. The new units being established in keeping with the increasing population size of the town conforms to an expected pattern of positive change over time. What was the real revelation is that, only 4 of the currently functioning industrial units have been in existence since 1979-80 and 59 are newly established units, which excludes some industrial units that may have opened and closed down during this long span of four decades that we do not have a record of. Such a large number of industrial units closing down and even a larger number of new units being set up is clear indicator of industrial vibrancy of a small town, which indicates the presence of a significantly large group of entrepreneurs who are able take risk to venture into new types of industrial production responding to the market demand as well as technological changes.

INDUSTRIAL STRUCTURE

The major changes in the industrial structure of Dhampur town over four decades are summarized into the following four broad categories: industrial expansion, industrial decline, industrial transformation and emergence of new industries:

1. Industrial Expansion: There are four groups of industries that show a notable increase in the number of units of production although the nature of manufacturing and processing that existed at these two time periods is significantly different. A part of this increase can also be contributed to some family-run businesses getting split into two independent units after division of joint families and their assets in the succeeding generations:

   i. Manufacture of food products: In 1979-80, 4 of the 9 food manufacturing industrial units were involved in grain and oil milling. In addition, there were 3 sugar and Khandsari (unrefined sugar and Gur making) units, and 2 ice factories. In 2023-24, of the 16 food producing industrial units, sugar and gur making continued to have a significant share of manufacturing space with 4 units, including the Dhampur Sugar Mills Ltd., which also has Green Power, Ethanol, and Ethyl Acetate as its major allied products. Of the new industries that have come up in this category, 3 are making ice cream, 3 bakery products and Puri Namkeen making packaged snacks. All 4 of the earlier grain milling units have closed down whereas 2 new oil mills have come up, namely Bharat Food Products and Himalaya Enterprises. Other new kinds of food products include glucose syrup making by Gulfro Starch Sugar Pvt. Ltd., cashew nuts processing by Odisha Food Products, and animal feed processing by Kisan Agro Foods.

   The Dhampur Sugar Mills Ltd. established in 1933 continues to be the leading industrial unit in the town. It also increased its annual sugar production manifold from 0.29 lakh tons in 1979-80 to 3.06 lakh tons in 2023-24, while bringing the number of workers employed on a regular basis down from 1268 in 1979-80 to 1181 in 2023-24 by investing in labor saving modern technology. Its transformation also includes closing down two of its subsidiary units producing Craft Paper and Straw Board that used its waste material or bagasse and diversification into the production of ethyl acetate and ethanol, bagasse-based production of renewable power, and country liquor at the present time.

   ii. Manufacture of metal products and parts: The number of industrial units in this group have increased from 7 to 15 during this period and which produce a range of iron products, such as utensils, other household items, large commercial pots and pans, door and window frames, parts of sugar crushers and mills machinery and agricultural implements. Increase in the number of units in this industry is also because of some families and businesses splitting and engaging in the production of the same kinds of goods as they have the required traditional skills to do so.

   iii. Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products: In 1979-80, there was only Dhampur Yeast Company that produced a chemical product. Of the 5 units currently producing chemicals, Dhampur Chemicals, a standalone subsidiary of Dhampur Sugar Mill, is the largest unit that produces Country Liquor. In addition, there are 2 soap and detergent making units, 1 fertilizer making and ARHL Chemical Works producing assorted chemicals.

   iv. Manufacture of wood and wood products except furniture: This type of industry is engaged in sawing and planing of wooden logs. In 1979-80, there was only one such unit by the name of Lala Janaki Sharan. This unit was split into two family-owned enterprises which are currently owned by his descendants Sushil Kumar and Sunil Kumar. One new unit has also been established called Shahid Hasan and Sons.

   2. Industrial decline: The groups of industries that have completely disappeared or significantly declined in number are:

   i. Manufacture of paper, paper products, printing and publishing: All 5 units that were found to be there at the earlier time of the study have closed down. These included the two sub-units of the Dhampur Sugar Mills Ltd. producing Craft Paper and Straw Board as well as 3 printing presses, namely, National Printing Press, Singhal Press and Copy Manufacturing, and Bharat Press.

   ii. Manufacture petroleum and coal products; The 3 units involved in making coal cakes predominantly used as domestic fuel for Anghithis (coal cooking stove) have closed down, most probably due to easy accessibility to cheaper and cleaner gas stoves.

   iii. Manufacture of non-metallic minerals products: The number of units coming under this category has declined significantly from 7 in 1979-80 to 3 in 2023-24. Dharam Prakash Aggarwal & Sons making bricks continues to be in operation in present time. The only micro abrasive unit as well as all 3 lime producing units and 2 refined Sulphur rolls making units that existed in 1979-80 have closed down. The two newly established current units are: Surya Microns Pvt. Ltd. producing micro abrasives and Creative Concrete producing concrete blocks, and precast compound walls and cement grills.

   3. Industrial transformation: Though Manufacture of textiles shows a stable existence during this period in terms of almost the same number of operating units, but it has transformed in character from 5 small handloom producing units to 4 large cooperative structures subcontracting spinning, weaving to a number of household-based producers in the nearby villages, including Shri Gandhi Ashram Kendriya Vastra, Maanvi Khadi, Khadi Gramodyog Vikas Mandal and Khadi Gramodyog Ashram. Another example of industrial transformation is shifting from making traditional iron tools and cane crushers to manufacturing of other machinery and equipment including turbines, namely HR Engineering Works and MS Engineering Works. These two firms are also an example of the metal’s unit owned by Hazi Kadar Baksh Imamuddin in 1979-80 becoming two independent engineering works owned by their successors.

   4. Emergence of new industries: Of the 14 new types of industrial units that have been observed to emerge in 2024 survey, 4 are making wooden and steel furniture, 3 are manufacturing beverages, 2 are plastic bag making, 2 are rubber footwear making, 1 is making E-Rickshaws and parts, 1 is making electronic speaker and 1 is making electric bulbs and fans.

The industrial structure of Dhampur has indeed undergone a major transformation over the four decades, which further reinforces the industrial vibrancy argument of a small town.

CONTEXT

Four decades ago, I studied the industries of Dhampur, a small town located in the rich agriculture region of western Uttar Pradesh, for my doctoral research. I have revisited Dhampur in early 2024 with the intention of starting a longitudinal study of the same small town, which now has a population about one lakh and an area of 3.87 sq km. I was curious to know: How has the industrial structure of Dhampur town changed over 40 years? How many old industrial units are still functioning? Are there significant numbers of new industrial units? Can the industrial base of a small town be identified as stable, declining, transient or vibrant? 

TYPOLOGY

Longitudinal study of the industrial base of any settlement requires a theoretical framework defining broad topologies. The following four typologies that could well represent the trend in the changing industrial structure of any small town like Dhampur can be visualized as: 

1. Stable: Same industrial units or the same type of industries operating over time even if the units are different.
2. Declining: Some old industries close down and not many new come up.
3. Transient: Short-lived industries keep coming up and closing down at a fast rate.
4. Vibrant: Some old industries close down but several new industries come up responding to the changing market demand.

FINDING

The recent field visits to Dhampur have revealed that there is a major change in the industrial structure of the town, which can be summarized as follows: 

• In 1979-80, there were 43 industrial units in Dhampur and their number appears to have increased to 63 in 2024, of which 4 are old industrial units that are still functioning and 59 are newly established units. A large number of industrial units closing down and even a larger number of new units being set up is indeed a phenomenal change in the industrial structure of the town that seems to efficiently respond to the market demand as well as technological changes. 
• The net increase in the number of industrial units with the expanding town size in itself is an indicator of vibrancy in the industrial base of Dhampur, even if some industrial units may have been established and closed down during this long span of four decades that we do not have a record of.
• Large numbers of new industrial units being set up and many of these units have been established by new entrepreneurs. This is also indicative of the existence of a strong entrepreneurial class of people in Dhampur that is quick to respond to changing demand for industrial products. 
• Notably, the Dhampur Sugar Mill has not only continued to dominate the industrial scene of the town at both points of time, it has expanded significantly with about 16 times increase in its annual cane crushing capacity: from 2.38 lakh tons to in 1979-80 to 39.01 lakh tons in 2022-23. 

Therefore, Dhampur can be clearly identified as a small town with a vibrant industrial structure, anchored by a large sugar producing firm, which plays an important role in its economic growth. 

What do we mean by water-centric urban planning and governance? Urban water security challenges are no longer merely about access to water, but also coping with floods, water quality and other climate change induced risks. For some time, there has been a recognition that statutory urban planning needs to be re-imagined and that existing town and country planning (T&CP) laws and practices need to be reconsidered to address some of these complex challenges. The latter imperative has been further bolstered by NITI Aayog, which recommended forming an apex committee at the state level to undertake review of the existing T&CP laws and other relevant urban development legislation. In continuation, Ministry of Housing and Urban Affairs (MoHUA) and its recent High-Level Committee (HLC) on Urban Planning have acknowledged that the current laws are inadequate, and there is a need for reconsidering the urban planning laws, frameworks, and practices to address contemporary needs and emerging risks. 

As a first step to addressing this, in this blog, we have attempted to locate the statutory urban planning instrument, the Master Plan, in the broader legal and institutional ecosystem of water governance. Given the attention Delhi’s water has received this summer, and with the flooding season upon us, we take up the case of Delhi Master Plan. In the diagram, we have mapped the relevant legal and institutional ecosystem of the Master Plan to get a sense of the complexity involved in pursuing water-centric urban planning in Delhi. The schematic diagram above reveals the multiple interactions and interlinkages of the Delhi Master Plan with other laws and institutions. This may not be exhaustive but provides an idea of what it means to pursue a water-centric Master Plan. Clearly, water-centric plans cannot be prepared in isolation, but must consider various laws, institutions operating at different scales, and varying authority. 

For example, urban flood management involves complex coordination mechanisms between the India Meteorological Department (IMD) and the Central Water Commission — federal bodies; the DDA — an autonomous body under the jurisdiction of the central government; the Upper Yamuna River Board (UYRB) — an inter-state agency; the Irrigation and Flood Control Department (IFCD) and the Delhi Jal Board — both of which are under the government of the NCT Delhi; and finally the Municipal Corporation at the local level. These institutions are guided by different legislation and functional mandates; together, they determine Delhi’s response and subsequent outcomes during flood incidences. You can locate most of these institutions in the above diagram. 

The key takeaway is that to strengthen water-centric urban planning, we need statutory Master Plans that take into account multiple multiscalar institutions and legal frameworks. How can we move towards this?

This blog is part of an ongoing project on Rejuvenating India’s Rivers, in collaboration with the National Mission for Clean Ganga (NMCG).

Source: https://m.rbi.org.in/Scripts/AnnualPublications.aspxhead=Handbook%20of%20Statistics%20on%20Indian%20States

Since 1991, market forces have had a greater say in the spatial distribution of economic activity, compared to earlier days of industrial licensing and other policies that directed the location of enterprises. So, which states have gained from this change, and which have lost?

The Reserve Bank of India publishes the Handbook of Statistics on Indian States. Table 25 in the Handbook is the Per Capita Net State Domestic Product at Current Prices. I took this data and ranked every state from 1993-94 to 2021-22 by using various editions of the Handbook. The result is in Figure 1 (if you are wondering how there is data for Telangana when it did not exist before 2014, the answer to that will have to wait for another day).

Punjab, the state that feeds India, has seen the largest decline in rank since the nineties. From being no. 5 in 1993-94, it slipped to no. 8 in 2008-09 and then collapsed to no. 19 in the next ten years, by 2018-19, where it is in 2021-22.

By contrast, Gujarat has had a relatively stable experience. It was no. 8 in 1993-94, had a slight decline to no. 10 in 2009-10 and that is where it was in 2021-11. Occasionally, it has slipped to no. 12 and 13 but it has risen back again. Its per capita GSDP in 2021-22 is just 3.7% less than that of the state/UT at no. 8 (its original rank in 1993-94).

Two states stand out in their success, Karnataka and Telangana. But, it is important to note when the rise starts. Between 1993-94 and 2009-10, its rank barely changed, moving from no. 17 to no. 18. Likewise, Telangana moved from no. 18 to no. 17 over 1993-94 and 2007-08. But, since then, they have zoomed up the ranks and now stand at no. 6 and no. 5 respectively. Other states that have done well are Odisha and Tripura, who have moved up from the bottom of the charts to the middle. The recent years are seeing a lot of change in the ranks of states, both up and down. India is definitely on the move, but states are moving at different speeds.

Why this difference? A definitive answer to that is still awaited.

Universal Access Levy amount available for Universal Service Obligation

Source: https://usof.gov.in/en/fund-status

The other day I was examining a PhD proposal that was looking at bridging the digital divide,
when I wondered what had happened to India’s universal service obligation (USO) fund.
Sure enough, it was still around and quite easy to find online, but what I found surprised me
a little.

The USO Fund was created to support the Universal Service Support Policy 2002, to ensure
telecom access to all. It came into being in 2003, through the Indian Telegraph (Amendment)
Act, 2003. The revenue for the USO Fund is raised through a ‘Universal Access Levy’
(UAL), which is currently 5% of the Adjusted Gross Revenue earned by all the operators.
The USO Fund is an attached office of the Department of Telecommunications (DoT),
Ministry of Communications. The Administrator, USO Fund is appointed by the Central
Government.

Not only was the fund there, as the figure shows, it had, as of the end of last financial year, a
balance of ₹ 79,638 crore, i.e., almost $ 10 billion. In the last ten years, the balance in the
fund has increased over 2.3 times. Since its inception, it has collected about $ 20 billion (at
current exchange rates) and disbursed about half of it. However, as shown in the figure, in
recent years, disbursements from the USO Fund has been between 5% and 10% of the
available balance. In 2022-23, it received ₹12,694 crore but spent only ₹3500 crore. Last
year, it received ₹18188 crore and spent ₹7676 crore, i.e., it is spending less than the
interest it might have earned on its accumulated funds (which, surprisingly do not seem to
earn interest!).

This appears odd given the objective of spreading digital public infrastructure and becoming
a trillion dollar digital economy in three years. It is not that there are no projects, there are
many (https://usof.gov.in/en/ongoing-schemes). So, is the UAL excessive compared to the
requirements or is there a different explanation? Is the Administrator worried that disbursing

funds to the two major private telecom operators would attract undesirable attention?
Whatever be the reason, it is time rescue the USO Fund from its current obscurity.