Author: cprindia

In the last week, Jharkhand’s state government inaugurated its first fleet of electric cars for official government use. Launched with much fanfare and coverage, the chief minister, energy secretary, and JBVNL (the state’s main discom) MD were all in attendance at an event in which Ranchi joined the ‘energy revolution’. Yet the installation of charging stations around JBVNL offices and the procurement of electric vehicles is a strange ambition for a city which is still plagued by regular power cuts, even in some of its most affluent neighbourhoods. In a state where almost half of all households are still without power, this event is yet another public relations exercise overshadowing the state’s more fundamental energy problems. Jharkhand’s power problems originate from three key areas: financial distress, capacity problems and out-of-state conflicts.

Jharkhand has had a history of low tariffs, high technical and commercial losses, and high external dependency due to a lack of in-state generation. Almost seventy percent of JBVNL’s power purchase costs come from Central generators, or entities like the Damodar Valley Corporation (DVC). From the latter, the cost of power tends to be unusually high, accounting for a large portion of JBVNL and the Energy Department’s overall expenditure. While the PPAs with DVC will expire in a few years, for now JBVNL has been stuck with both high-power procurement costs and major problems in recovering dues and preventing theft. A severe shortage of working capital over the last decade has led to the state’s discom frequently defaulting on or delaying dues to generators; it is barely capable of maintaining manpower, procurement pipelines and the existing grid infrastructure.

In the last six months, the JSERC approved major increases (between Rs. 1.90-3.15) in retail tariffs across almost all categories of domestic and commercial consumers, both rural and urban. In a departure from almost a decade of JSERC rulings, the most recent tariff orders sweepingly simplified JBVNL’s existing tariff schedule and also declared its intent to eventually dispense with the massive cross-subsidies that had been in place from industry to domestic and agricultural consumers. Not surprisingly, the government soon stepped in with a large financial compensation package to JBVNL so that rural customers would be minimally affected by these hikes. While this is a commendable move towards improving the financial situation of the JBVNL, much like the previous UDAY scheme all it really does is move liabilities from the discom to the state government; a temporary bandage as opposed to the deep surgery needed to fix the state’s power problems.

The crisis in the state’s electricity bureaucracy is just as worrying. Despite the many promises made to the Central government associated with UDAY, accusations of meter tampering, graft, and preferential treatment in the granting of industrial power connections are rife among the state’s power bureaucracy. Not long ago, an open and shut case of industrial power theft was dismissed in the Ranchi High Court because JBVNL engineers failed to collect sufficient evidence, leading to the discom MD admitting that “[O]ur engineers lack proper training and skills to gather evidence to prove industrial power thefts. This combined with the rapid spread of subcontracting for many basic functions has left the state discom with little credibility of actually accomplishing the grandiose expectations of the Central government’s electrification schemes before the next election.

To be fair, the state’s discom has not been the sole cause of electricity problems in Jharkhand. Because of the language of the DVC Act, 1948, the DVC is responsible for power supply to seven districts in Jharkhand for more than 11 million residents. Because of the protracted financial disputes with Jharkhand leading to the withholding of power, and its underinvestment in distribution infrastructure, the DVC was recently hauled up by the National Human Rights Commission for failing to perform its statutory duty in those seven districts. Such overlapping jurisdictions and the inability for the state government and its politicians to resolve these disputes over the last decade and a half has meant that much of Jharkhand is still very far from the utopian vision of Power for All.

Unless Jharkhand is able to shed (or renegotiate) its legacy contracts, complete its within state generation projects, and generate some reserves of working capital for JBVNL, it is difficult to see the light at the end of the tunnel. Until then, selling dreams of electric cars seems like a cruel joke to the tens of millions of citizens who watch the car zooming by at speed, ignoring them as they are left in the dark.

Rohit Chandra recently completed his doctorate at the Harvard Kennedy School. His work focuses on state capitalism and energy policy, and he is currently writing a book on India’s coal industry. This research is based on work presented in full in the book Mapping Power, edited by Navroz K Dubash, Sunila S Kale, and Ranjit Bharvirkar.

Op-Eds in the Mapping Power Series:

• Reform is All About Getting the Politics Right
• How to Reform Uttar Pradesh’s Troubled Power Sector
• Consumers Upfront in Tale of Two Reforms in Andhra
• Taking Two Steps Forward, One Step Back
• Karnataka’s Power Politics
• AAP and the Politics of Power in Delhi
• New Trends Demand New Strategies in Maharashtra
• The Story Behind Uttarakhand’s A+ Performing Discom
• Electricity Distribution in Gujarat: A Sustainable Energy Future Roadmap?
• Power Politics at Play
• The Saga of the Subsidy Trap in the Tamil Nadu Power Sector

More details about the Mapping Power Project can be accessed here.

Into the 1990s, West Bengal’s sultry summers meant interminable power cuts and fewer than one in five rural households had electric lighting. Today, by contrast, villages across the state are electrified and Bengal’s utilities boast a shelf of prestigious awards. Nonetheless, there are also dark clouds on the horizon as financial losses once again start to mount – thanks most recently to a 23% cut in electricity bills for this year’s Durga Puja displays.

West Bengal’s journey shows that escaping a low-level equilibrium in the power sector is possible, but sustaining a virtuous circle of payment and performance is often difficult. The temptation for political interference in the day-to-day operation of power utilities is ever present. Though the CPI(M) had governed West Bengal since 1977, its electricity record had been unimpressive. All this changed when the nominally socialist administration revised its economic strategy in order to court private investment. Reliable power would be a pillar of the new pro-industrial turn.

In the early 2000s, a team of senior bureaucrats and consultants began electricity reforms. Well aware of the failures of privatisation and deregulation in other states, they developed their own incremental reform path. Outside Kolkata, utilities remained under public ownership, but managers were granted greater autonomy. Officials hoped to further “reduce the human element” of corruption and inefficiency through computerisation and performance monitoring throughout the workforce. The ultimate goal was profitability, which would guarantee the utility’s independence.

This model looked surprisingly similar to another very different and more famous case: Gujarat. Both emphasised improved utility governance, technical solutions, and winning over employee unions. Both rejected outright privatisation and sought to minimise citizen participation in their electricity regulatory process. Together, these cases suggest that public sector reforms may offer a pragmatic alternative to controversial electricity liberalisation.
While popular opposition had stymied power reforms elsewhere in India, Bengali policymakers also benefitted from a series of favourable factors. Earlier, land redistribution meant that there was no powerful farmer lobby to block tariff hikes.

Like the BJP in Gujarat, the CPI(M) was able to call upon its political dominance and disciplined, centralised structure to manage dissent. The results were impressive. From losses of ~1,009 crore in 2001— more than a third of total expenditure — West Bengal was one of only three states with profitable utilities in 2011. Rural household electrification rose from 20.3% in 2001 to 98% today. Yet, as early as 2010, there were ominous signs that utility independence was under threat.

While the CPI(M)’s embrace of economic reforms had brought rewards in the electricity sector, state violence over land acquisition in Nandigram and Singur created a groundswell of popular discontent. Intensifying competition between the CPI(M) and Trinamool Congress, in turn, increased the temptation to meddle in the power sector in order to win votes. Combining quarterly billing data with satellite images of nighttime lights across West Bengal, a recent working paper by the economist Meera Mahadevan shows this politicisation at work. She finds that the new Trinamool government rewarded constituencies it narrowly won in 2011 with faster electrification and systematically lower bill collection. Billing data from these areas is full of suspiciously round numbers, she argues, suggesting it has been manipulated. Key posts in the electricity regulator were also left vacant, undermining its power of oversight, while tariff hikes were delayed.

Traces of utility independence nonetheless remain. The original reformers mobilised to ensure tariff rises in 2012. After the 2016 state elections, which Trinamool again won handsomely, tariffs were once again allowed to rise. The new government has also ushered in an impressive expansion of rural electricity access. As Lok Sabha elections approach, though, tariff hikes have been blocked despite increasing utility costs. Utilities therefore face mounting financial losses, threatening their ability to invest in the sector’s continuing growth. Eventually, consumers will pay the price.

Classic theories developed in the West suggest that democratic competition makes politicians more likely to deliver collective goods. West Bengal’s ambivalent trajectory— two step forwards and one step back— suggests instead that intensifying competition encourages short-term strategies that undermine the power sector’s longterm health. A similar pattern is visible even in wealthier states like Tamil Nadu and Punjab, where fierce partypolitical competition has driven the expansion of populist subsidies and spiralling utility debts. Conversely, oneparty dominance may give politicians the confidence to take unpopular decisions like cutting subsidies or cracking down on theft.

Today, the Trinamool regime looks dominant, its CPI(M) rival a spent force and the BJP still playing catch-up. Will the administration therefore decide to take a long-term view and end interference in the power sector? Previous experience suggests that this depends on how politicians perceive the likely risks and rewards. If consolidating electoral strength remains the key concern, as it seems presently, they will continue to reward new voters with cheap electricity and turn a blind eye to power theft.

If ensuring robust industrial and revenue growth becomes the priority, the long-term benefits of high-quality electricity may begin to outweigh the perils of short-term dissatisfaction. As citizens begin to expect 24/7 power in Kolkata and beyond, they may start holding politicians to this higher standard. In the longer term, then, popular pressure will become the guarantor rather than the enemy of a virtuous cycle in the power sector.

Elizabeth Chatterjee is a politics lecturer at Queen Mary University of London. This research is based on work presented in full in the book Mapping Power, edited by Navroz K Dubash, Sunila S Kale, and Ranjit Bharvirkar.

This article was published in the comment section of the Hindustan Times on 20 September 2018, and can be accessed here. 

Op-Eds in the Mapping Power Series:

• Reform is All About Getting the Politics Right
• How to Reform Uttar Pradesh’s Troubled Power Sector
• Consumers Upfront in Tale of Two Reforms in Andhra
• Karnataka’s Power Politics
• AAP and the Politics of Power in Delhi
• New Trends Demand New Strategies in Maharashtra
• The Story Behind Uttarakhand’s A+ Performing Discom
• Electricity Distribution in Gujarat: A Sustainable Energy Future Roadmap?
• Small Gains Behind Mounting Losses in Jharkhand
• Power Politics at Play
• The Saga of the Subsidy Trap in the Tamil Nadu Power Sector

More details about the Mapping Power Project can be accessed here.

Mapping Power: The Political Economy of Electricity in India’s States, edited by Navroz K Dubash, Sunila S Kale and Ranjit Bharvirkar, provides the first comprehensive analysis of the politics of electricity distribution across fifteen Indian states. The book examines why, despite several decades of reform, India’s electricity sector remains marked by financial indebtedness and an inability to provide universal, high quality electricity for all. In chapters written by scholars of politics and electricity, the book traces the power sector in states as diverse as Andhra Pradesh, West Bengal, and Jharkhand. Through these state narratives, the authors argue that attempts to depoliticise electricity reforms are misplaced. Instead, they argue, successful electricity reforms in India depend on linkages with electoral gains.

The book was launched in September 2018 by Suresh Prabhu (former Union Minister of Commerce & Industry and Civil Aviation), Jairam Ramesh (Member of Parliament), Narendra Taneja (National Spokesperson, BJP), and Dr Pramod Deo (former Chairman, Central Electricity Regulatory Commission). Since then, it has been reviewed by:

• Ramesh Matham: ‘Mapping Power — The Political Economy of Electricity in India’s States’ review: Grid shortfall,’ The Hindu

“The 15 articles serve as a one-stop shop for information about the power sector’s tryst with politics and are quite interesting… In as much as it zooms-in into the relationship between politics and the power sector in fifteen big states, the book is timely and useful, because the Electricity Act is going nowhere.”

• Kaveri Iychettira: Volume 40, Number 4 of The Energy Journal (p. 260), IAEE’s Energy Economics Education Foundation

​“This book is an ambitious and substantial contribution to current day thinking on the challenges of India’s power sector. It is methodologically well-grounded in relevant theory and data… The focus on states contributes to bridging a crucial gap that exists in literature today, as most existing studies on India’s electricity sector address the country level. This work is a vital contribution towards not just informing India’s policy pathways, but also towards a methodological blueprint to understand the levers that drive electricity sector development across much of the developing world.”

• Ajay Shankar: ‘Politics in Power Sector Reforms,’ Business Standard

​“The editors have done commendable pioneering work in bringing the “political economy” to the centre of the analytical framework, which is an overdue course correction in the study of the electricity sector in India.”

The launch of Mapping Power was followed by a technical panel discussion with Professor D V Ramana (Professor, Xavier Institute of Management Bhubaneshwar), Aditi Phadnis (Political Editor, Business Standard), and Shantanu Dixit, the Group Coordinator of Prayas (Energy Group). Read more about the Mapping Power book discussion event hosted by the Centre for Policy Research and Oxford University Press here.

To learn more about the state-level politics of electricity in India, check out the Mapping Power blog series:

• Reform is All About Getting the Politics Right
• How to Reform Uttar Pradesh’s Troubled Power Sector
• Consumers Upfront in Tale of Two Reforms in Andhra
• Taking Two Steps Forward, One Step Back
• Karnataka’s Power Politics
• AAP and the Politics of Power in Delhi
• New Trends Demand New Strategies in Maharashtra
• The Story Behind Uttarakhand’s A+ Performing Discom
• Electricity Distribution in Gujarat: A Sustainable Energy Future Roadmap?
• Small Gains Behind Mounting Losses in Jharkhand
• The Saga of the Subsidy Trap in the Tamil Nadu Power Sector

The electricity sector in Tamil Nadu has the third highest generating capacity, has achieved near total electrification of all its households, and can boast of the highest capacity for renewable electricity generation among the Indian states. At the same time, in terms of financial performance, Tamil Nadu’s power sector has been among the worst performing three utilities in the country in recent years.

During the fifties and sixties, in spite of having significant expansion of rural electrification and also subsidising the consumption of rural consumers, the utility was able to generate a modest surplus without any subvention from the state government. However, since 1970 -71 it has been incurring losses on account of the subsidised rates for electricity to certain consumer groups, as required by the state government. The state government’s subvention provided to the utility was adequate to compensate for this till 2000 – 01 after which it has been inadequate.

Between 2008 and 2012 severe power shortages were witnessed and the utility was able to meet only two-third of the maximum demand. The industrial sector bore the brunt of this shortage and while Chennai suffered two hour power cuts for a period of time other areas faced 12 to 14 hours of power cut. A higher proportion of the energy sold to the consumers came from power purchased at a higher cost compared to the cost of TNEB’s own generation. For the period 2002-03 to 2014-15 the subvention from the government covered only 29 per cent of the utility’s losses, on an average. The cumulative amount of uncovered losses at the end of 2014-15 was close to Rs. 90,000 crores. TNEB’s debt burden was about 50 per cent of the state’s debt in 2013-14.

Figure 1: Average Cost of Service and Average Revenue Realised (Source: Power Finance Commission Reports). 

After the legislation of the Electricity Act in 2003, TNEB was among the last states to unbundle and the unbundling is only cosmetic. The Tamil Nadu Electricity Regulatory Commission (TNERC) was constituted in 1999 but was without a Chairman till 2002. The members and staff of the Commission have mostly been chosen from ex-TNEB employees. The TNERC its first tariff order issued in 2003, directed TNEB to get all consumption metered, including those of agricultural pumps and huts, within three years and to issue new connections only on a metered basis. As of 2017 this has not yet been implemented. Between 2003 and 2010, TNEB did not seek any tariff revisions and did not submit the mandatory Annual Revenue Requirements. The regulatory process is thus subject to ‘state capture’ and the deeply ailing state utility is protected from any effective competition.

The continuously deteriorating financial position of the utility has adversely impacted the cost and the quality of access in the state. In addition, the indiscriminate subsidies have created significant negative externalities by promoting unsustainable use of groundwater and have also eroded the competitiveness of the industrial sector due to the double burden of cross subsidies and power cuts imposed on them.

Why and how did all this come to pass in a sector whose financial performance was good till the seventies, within a state that had good economic and human capabilities? The answer requires an understanding of the evolution of the power sector in Tamil Nadu as institutionalised through the provisions in India’s Constitution, its Directive Principles for State Policy and relevant legislations, and as shaped by state level political economy aspects relating to its governance. In particular, the interplay between group interests, political aspirations, technological factors, and the nature of control afforded to the state government over this sector have influenced, and in turn have been influenced by the performance outcomes in this sector.

The problems started in the sixties when the green revolution happened. The increased risks and unequal economic impact of green revolution on the farming community gave rise to a well organised peasant movement that managed to avail a lot of concessions from the state governments. Subsequently, the sector became a means to gain political popularity and financial rents at the same time, by subsidising consumers in an indiscriminate manner, while the utility went deeper and deeper in the red. There is a path dependency in this process that seems to be difficult to escape. Having gone down this path, both vested interests and competitive politics constrain the political will to reverse the trend and the sector seems to be caught in a subsidy trap.

Hema Ramakrishnan is a faculty Member at the Madras School of Economics. This research is based on work presented in full in the book Mapping Power, edited by Navroz K Dubash, Sunila S Kale, and Ranjit Bharvirkar.

Op-Eds in the Mapping Power Series:

• Reform is All About Getting the Politics Right
• How to Reform Uttar Pradesh’s Troubled Power Sector
• Consumers Upfront in Tale of Two Reforms in Andhra
• Taking Two Steps Forward, One Step Back
• Karnataka’s Power Politics
• AAP and the Politics of Power in Delhi
• New Trends Demand New Strategies in Maharashtra
• The Story Behind Uttarakhand’s A+ Performing Discom
• Electricity Distribution in Gujarat: A Sustainable Energy Future Roadmap?
• Small Gains Behind Mounting Losses in Jharkhand
• Power Politics at Play

More details about the Mapping Power Project can be accessed here.

This year Uttarakhand’s state electricity distribution company (discom) was awarded an A+ by the Ministry of Power for its strong performance. This is an impressive achievement. Every year the Ministry of Power evaluates the financial and technical performance of India’s state discoms, giving each a rating between A+ and C. The Uttarakhand Power Corporation Limited (UPCL) was the only discom outside of Gujarat to secure an A+ rating. Only five of forty-one state discoms in India were given the top mark.

Uttarakhand’s power sector has undergone a remarkable transformation over the last two decades, to arrive at the position today where the state’s lone public discom is able to out-perform most of its peers around the country. At the root of this transformation have been two crucial elements: plentiful cheap hydro power coupled with rapid industrialisation in the state. Together these have been a golden combination for Uttarakhand. With cheap power and plentiful industry revenue, the UPCL has been able to improve its financial performance. This has happened even while the UPCL continues to report high commercial losses among non-industrial consumer groups.

When setting out as a newly formed state in 2000, Uttarakhand was under-developed, with low levels of industry and subpar electricity transmission infrastructure. Shortly after the state was formed, the UPCL’s industry users made up 21 percent of consumption, and the discom was reporting aggregate technical and commercial (AT&C) losses of 54 percent. The consumer mix and loss levels were akin to neighbouring Uttar Pradesh, from which Uttarakhand was carved-out. Yet while Uttar Pradesh has seen little change in its power sector situation in the years since, Uttarakhand’s power sector was soon to be on a path of transformation.

First, Uttarakhand had inherited a large amount of hydro power generation capacity. In 2003, the total energy available to Uttarakhand was 5,300 million units, while the state’s requirement was just 3,900 million units. In 2003, the newly set-up Uttarakhand Electricity Regulatory Commission (UERC) capitalised on this advantage, ordering a reduction in electricity tariffs. In its first tariff ruling, it significantly reduced the tariff that the UPCL had to pay the state’s hydro power generation company, which allowed it to then order the UPCL to reduce the tariffs that it charged to all consumer groups, except farmers. This firmly established Uttarakhand as a low tariff state, attractive for industry.

Second, in 2003 the Government of India launched an industrial policy for Uttarakhand and Himachal Pradesh, which included generous tax and central excise benefits to industry investing in the state. The policy was a huge success. Between 2000 and 2011, the number of factories in the state more than tripled. The result of this was that a favourable consumer mix was won for the UPCL. By 2011, industrial consumers contributed 63 percent of the UPCLs revenue, even while they only made up 1.1 per cent of its customers. Industry revenue is important, because industry users pay higher tariffs, cross-subsidising discom losses made supplying domestic and agricultural consumers at lower tariffs.

Plentiful cheap hydro power and a large revenue stream from industrial consumers transformed the position of the UPCL. In 2016-2017 the UPCL’s reported AT&C losses of just 16.28 percent. Power cuts in Uttarakhand are limited, universal electrification has been achieved, and the state government does not subsidise electricity tariffs.

Figure 1: Revenue Mix in 2016-17

The UPCL has been able to secure its A+ rating even as clear problems remain. Beyond industry consumers, AT&C losses associated with all other users in the state were 27 percent in 2016-2017. In seven distribution divisons, AT&C losses are in excess of 30 percent, including Roorkee where they are 36 percent. For years the UPCL has moved slowly to deal with these losses. Every year the UERC orders the discom to act on high levels of provisional billing, to replace mechanical meters and defective meters, and to claim outstanding arrears. Each year the UPCL makes little progress on these problems.

Having a state discom ranked A+ for its performance makes Uttarakhand an outlier state in terms of its power sector. Looking to the future, several road bumps lie in view. Rapid economic growth and industrialisation in the state has meant that electricity demand has risen fast. Yet there has been insufficient cheap hydro power capacity added to meet this demand. Instead, the UPCL is increasingly purchasing much more expensive gas-based generation. This is feeding through to higher tariffs. Coupled with this, central government incentives are now expiring which brought many industry players to the state. Industrial consumption over recent years has decreased marginally in Uttarakhand. The UERC puts this down to growing use of open access mechanisms that allow industry to buy power from generators outside the state, the installation of rooftop solar, and the effects of energy efficiency programs. If Uttarakhand fails on providing quality and reliable supply of power at competitive rates then industry consumption may fall further. In such a scenario, the UPCL’s performance is likely to suffer, and its A+ rating will be at risk.

Jonathan Balls is a New Generation Network (NGN) Post-Doctoral Scholar at the Australia India Institute, University of Melbourne, Australia. This research is based on work presented in full in the book Mapping Power, edited by Navroz K Dubash, Sunila S Kale, and Ranjit Bharvirkar.

Op-Eds in the Mapping Power Series:

• Reform is All About Getting the Politics Right
• How to Reform Uttar Pradesh’s Troubled Power Sector
• Consumers Upfront in Tale of Two Reforms in Andhra
• Taking Two Steps Forward, One Step Back
• Karnataka’s Power Politics
• AAP and the Politics of Power in Delhi
• New Trends Demand New Strategies in Maharashtra
• Electricity Distribution in Gujarat: A Sustainable Energy Future Roadmap?
• Small Gains Behind Mounting Losses in Jharkhand
• Power Politics at Play
• The Saga of the Subsidy Trap in the Tamil Nadu Power Sector

More details about the Mapping Power Project can be accessed here.

Watch the full video (above) of the talk by Nicolas Bautès where he discusses the various social and legal strategies adopted by different actors in the context of urban restructuring in the Port zone of Rio de Janeiro, with focus on the particular case of landmarking Pedra do Sal, an Afro Brazilian historical and religious monument located in this zone.

Through the claims of inhabitants who have faced the consequences of historical injustice as well as the current urban reforms, Bautès discusses ways informal power games, social pressure and intimidations permeate the harbor district as it undergoes profound structural changes, and operate decision making processes, influence speculation and promote economic benefits through producing and marketing heritage.

Nicolas Bautès is Research Fellow at the Department of Social Sciences of the French Institute of Pondicherry, and works in the field of urban studies, social and political geography.

The question and answer session that followed can be accessed here. Find all the available videos of our previous workshops, here.

Watch the full video (above) of the talk by Priya Deshingkar, based on research conducted in different locations in Africa and Asia (including India), to understand the conditions in which low-skilled migrants are recruited and employed.

In this talk, Deshingkar highlights the often complex and contradictory outcomes of migration, and the difficulties this creates for dichotomies of forced and free labour.

The Q&A session that followed can be accessed here.

Watch the full video (above) of the talk by Priya Deshingkar, based on research conducted in different locations in Africa and Asia (including India), to understand the conditions in which low-skilled migrants are recruited and employed.

In this talk, Deshingkar highlights the often complex and contradictory outcomes of migration, and the difficulties this creates for dichotomies of forced and free labour.

The Q&A session that followed can be accessed here.

Watch the full video (above) of the seminar by Dr Tanya Zack where she presents a photo essay on ‘Making Do in a Crowded City: Infrastructure Facing up to In-migration in Johannesburg’s Inner City’.

Johannesburg’s modernist infrastructure was built to last and is highly flexible. Buildings and spaces in many parts of the city have been informalised, and appropriated for uses and densities that exceed the limits of official plans and policies. These are the spaces where people are making do for themselves. Sometimes these ways of living and of making a living are survivalist. It’s a place where life happens under extreme and hazardous circumstances and survival is chanced and carved from inadequate, stressed infrastructure. And often they are entrepreneurial. And they are the places where innovation and learning emerge. In-migrants extract from the city, exploit its infrastructure, but they also adapt it and, in this way, may lay the foundation of a new city form.

The photo essay combined documentary visuals with narrative, relying on combination of sensitive observational narrative and first person insights to provide an intimate view into the particular intersection of people with infrastructures in the inner city. These are contextualised views, grounded in ethnographic documentary work that has formed the basis of the photo book series ‘Wake Up This is Joburg’.

Dr Tanya Zack is a South African urban planner, writer and reflective practitioner who straddles the worlds of planning practice, policy, academia and creative writing.

This is the 17th in a series of the Community of Research and Practice (CORP) seminar planned by the Scaling City Institution for India: Sanitation (SCI-FI: Sanitation) initiative. This seminar series seeks to provide a platform for discussing the experiences of the researchers and practitioners on urban sanitation.

Watch the full video (above) of the discussion on ‘Making Sense of the December 11 Results’ featuring Gilles Verniers and Neelanjan Sircar, moderated by Yamini Aiyar, as part of the CPR-TCPD (Trivedi Centre for Political Data, Ashoka University) Dialogues on Indian Politics.

The state elections in Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Telengana and Mizoram are the last electoral tests for before the 2019 general elections. What do these results say about the state of strength of both national parties? How does the Congress-TDP alliance prefigure future opposition alignment? What do we learn about the verdict returned by voters in the three Hindi belt states governed by the BJP? These were some of the questions that two elections experts – Neelanjan Sircar and Gilles Verniers – addressed by diving into the outcomes’ data.

Gilles Verniers is Assistant Professor of Political Science, Ashoka University and Co-Director of the Trivedi Centre for Political Data.

Neelanjan Sircar is Assistant Professor of Political Science, Ashoka University and Visiting Senior Fellow at CPR.

Yamini Aiyar is President and Chief Executive at CPR.

The question and answer session that followed can be accessed here.

About the CPR-TCPD Dialogues

This was the sixth event in the CPR-TCPD Dialogues on Indian Politics series, launched in a partnership between Centre for Policy Research and Trivedi Centre for Political Data (TPCD) at Ashoka University. This is a monthly event that brings together academicians, policy and political practitioners, and civil society actors to grapple with important social and political issues in India. It provides a forum for intellectually rigorous, non-partisan commentary to strengthen public discourse on politics in India. In these polarised times, debates on politics in India have tended to be increasingly noisy, blurring the lines between critical engagement and partisan endorsement. This dialogue series is an effort to carve out a space for critical, nuanced engagement to understand the changing dynamics of Indian political parties, the impact of new and emerging social movements and the use of new instruments of mobilisation in our polity.