Author: cprindia

A comparison of Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (MGNREGS) demand and supply of work between the first quarter of FY 2020, when the national lockdown was in place and the first quarter of FY 2021 when the second wave was at its peak offers a useful window into understanding the extent to which MGNREGS has provided robust support to rural India and the role of the Government in ensuring relief and protection to the vulnerable during the deadly second wave.

Demand vs Supply

In 2020, when the ravages of COVID-19 and associated policies became visible, the MGNREGS provided a much needed the lifeline to most of India’s rural poor. Budgets were enhanced significantly. In FY 2020-21 Rs. 1.1 lakh crore (including payments due)[1] was spent on the scheme. As many as 7.55 crore households[2] across the country were given work through the year. However, demand for work consistently outstripped supply. A clear indicator that rural distress and unemployment persisted despite the opening up of the Indian economy in June 2020 after the national lockdown was lifted and a relatively healthy growth in agriculture.

In 2021, as the second wave hit, rural India suffered this time from the combination of health and economic shock. Once States began to announce lockdowns, unemployment rates rose once again. In April and May 2021, the Centre for Monitoring the Indian Economy (CMIE) recorded national unemployment rates at 7.97 in April and 11.90 per cent in May[3]. Unemployment in rural India increased from 7.13 percent in April 2021 to 10.63 in May 2021[4]. However, unlike in 2020, MGNREGS work was not provided at the scale needed.

In the first quarter of 2020, when the national lockdown was in place, (months of April, May and June 2020), demand for work under MGNREGS rose to new highs, touching 4.47 crores in June, the highest of the year[5]. Despite this sudden, massive increase in work demand, the response was robust and work availability high. May in particular saw 3.73 crore households demanding work, and 88.5 per cent of this demand, or 3.3 crore households were provided work[6]. MGNREGS not only proved to be the most important entitlement protecting India’s workers, it also proved to be elastic. Expanding, at speed, when needed and contracting when demand was low. It is important to note however, that despite this expansion, demand consistently outstripped supply.

Conversely, for the same months of 2021, not only was overall demand for work lower than in 2020, but supply of works was even lower. In comparison to the high of 4.47 crore households who demanded work in June of the previous year, 3.5 crore households demanded work in June 2021 – the highest of the year so far (as on 8th July, 2021)[7]. Despite this lower demand for work, the overall supply of works has been even lower for May and June 2021 than in the same months of 2020. This means that even though fewer people were turning to MGNREGS in rural areas this year, lesser work (and therefore, income) was being provided under the scheme. In May 2021, 2.76 crore households sought work through MGNREGS[8], but only 2.22 crore households (80.3 per cent) received work[9]. While the figures for June 2021 continue to be revised, current numbers suggest an even starker difference in the work demand met between June this year and the last. States like Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, Bihar, and Tamil Nadu met much less demand for work in 2021 over these three months than they did last year[10]. In contrast, the proportion of unmet demand in Uttar Pradesh, Maharashtra, Kerala and West Bengal was higher last year than this.

 

High pending liabilities

One of the long persistent challenges with MGNREGS implementation has been the delays in payments from one financial year flowing into the next year, because of bottlenecks in fund availability. Many states start the new financial year with pending liabilities or unpaid wages or material costs that need to be paid off as soon as new budgets are announced and monies released at the start of the financial year. The problem with high pending liabilities is that new budgets allocations are used to meet these liabilities and governments’ resorts to rationing demand, creating a vicious cycle of delayed payments.

In the first quarter of FY 2021, this all too familiar pattern unfolded, except this time given high rural distress, the costs have been higher. Nation-wide, total pending liabilities for FY 2021 was Rs. 9,810 crores[13]. There are important State wise differences. Madhya Pradesh opened the financial year with pending liabilities amounting to 697.57 crores[14]. As on 15th July 2021, the State has already utilized 98.17 per cent[15] of its available funds. A similar pattern has unfolded for Chhattisgarh, Himachal Pradesh and Uttarakhand, all states with high liabilities of previous years, also registered high rates of fund utilization. Demand for work has not abated in these States. In the first quarter of FY 2021, unmet demand in Madhya Pradesh was 18,42,054, for Chhattisgarh, it was 9,05,930, and for Uttarakhand, it was 1,24,938 households respectively[16]. It is likely therefore that these states will once again close the year with high pending liabilities and indulge in demand rationing, unless budgets are expanded.

Bihar’s case remains unique here: despite high rates of unmet demand for work and pending liabilities, its utilization of the available funds stands at only 83.49 per cent[17].

State	% Utilisation (’21-’22)
Chhattisgarh	90.94
Tamil Nadu	64.7
Madhya Pradesh	98.17
West Bengal	57.8
Uttarakhand	92.09
Karnataka	63.59
Bihar	83.49

This pattern of high unmet demand (despite relatively lower ‘demand for work’ in 2021) and high utilization of funds is indicative of the fact administrative prioritization of providing ‘relief’ has been missing. In May 2020, the Government of India announced a relief package with substantially enhanced budget allocation for MGNREGS. This resulted an immediate increase in supply of MGNREGS works for much of rural India. Perhaps expecting the economy to be back on a recovery path in the FY 2021 budget, fund allocations were reduced from a total of Rs. 1,11,500 crores in FY 20[19] to Rs. 73,000 crores in FY 21[20]. Once the COVID-19 second wave hit, there was the expectation that MGNREGS would once expand to respond to the increased demand. However, this has not happened. It is often argued that budget allocations for MGNREGS are irrelevant because this is a ‘demand based’ program and funds are made available based on labour budget estimates provided from the ground. However, the reality is that when budget allocations are low, governments resort to rationing demand. Relatively low demand compression in 2021 is indicative of precisely this phenomenon. The fact that despite lower demand, work supply could not keep up is also indicative of the fact that claims that funds for MGNREGS are elastic are false. Low availability of funds inevitably means demand remains unmet thus undermining the ‘demand based’ entitlement that lies at the heart of the MGNREGS.

Looking forward

Last year, the COVID-19 lockdown-related distress mainly affected the non-agricultural sectors of the rural economy. The reasons for this was first, agricultural activities were exempted from any lockdown restrictions, and second, a very good monsoon. 2019 and 2020 were both surplus monsoon years and they produced bumper harvests. That, in combination with record MGNREGS person-days job generation, helped contain rural distress to an extent.

This year, the monsoon’s progress has not been up to initial forecasts. Unseasonal pre-monsoon showers (this May was the wettest May in 31 years) seemed to have disrupted normal heating patterns required for the formation of low pressure areas. As a result, the start of the monsoon season (June-September) saw an initial burst of high rainfall, only to stall after the third week of June. In fact, the northern limit of the monsoon has not moved at all since June 19 and only revived in mid-July. The Met Department’s latest forecasts suggest that the monsoon activity will revive from around July 10. But precious time has already been lost. The bulk of sowing of kharif crops happens between mid-June and mid-July. The crop sown after mid-July will not have enough time for vegetative growth, which will ultimately have a bearing on crop yields. Also, the enhanced possibility of the development of “negative Indian Ocean Dipole” conditions during July to September (most global climate models are predicting this) casts a cloud over the monsoon’s performance in the remaining part of the season.

There is thus a need to be proactive in pushing MGNREGS and planning for a sub-par agriculture year. The number of COVID cases is falling in rural areas and economies are slowly opening up. However, India is staring at the possibility of a long months of persistent rural distress. The time for action is now.

This note, part of the Understanding the Rural Economy series by CPR, has been authored by Yamini Aiyar, Avani Kapur and Harish Damodaran with research support from Ragini Rao Munjuluri and Samridhi Agarwal. Read other notes in the series:

FULL VIDEO OF LECTURE
RIGHTS

Watch the full video (above) of the lecture on ‘Hate Speech or the Speech We Hate’ featuring Salil Tripathi.

What constitutes hate speech and what makes it dangerous? The term hate speech has been defined loosely and takes different interpretations for the speaker and the listener. The speakers who express views forcefully believe they are expressing their right to speak freely. The listeners consider the speech they don’t like or agree with as hate speech. Laws impose restrictions on free speech in most jurisdictions, and litigation can restrict free expression of ideas. But sustained hate speech can kill – genocides begin with normalisation of hatred through speech – action follows later, as examples from Rwanda and Bosnia show. A new framework, which distinguishes between hate speech and dangerous speech can provide clarity to distinguish between speech that promotes hate and violence and the ideas we hate but are merely controversial, provocative, hurtful, shocking, and disgusting for some. Negotiating that space is the challenge for democracies in the age of the Internet.

Salil Tripathi is the Chair of the Writers in Prison Committee of PEN International, since 2015. He is an award-winning journalist and writer.

WATCH VIDEO OF THE CONSULTATIVE WORKSHOP
POLITICS

Watch the two-part video (Part 1 above) of a workshop, which discussed the findings of a two-year-long project called ‘Newly created states and Inclusive Development: The subnational political settlements of Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh’. The research was conducted collaboratively by CPR and the Effective States and Inclusive Development (ESID) research cluster at the University of Manchester, UK.

The research analysed the trajectories of development by the ‘sub-national political settlements’ in the states of Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh in two domains. These included mining and the provision of food subsidies through the Public Distribution System. Both formed in 2000, Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh are comparable for their high incidences of poverty, poor tribal populations, and vast reserves of mineral wealth.

Participants at the workshop included experts from the National Institute of Public Finance and Policy, ESID research centre, King’s India Institute etc.

READ THE PAPER BY KANCHI KOHLI
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE

This essay examines the role of India’s 2006 Forest Rights Act in the procedures that regulate transfer of forest land to large infrastructure projects. Specifically, it shows the gap between the legally mandated requirements and how these are implemented in project approval processes. This is illustrated through a case study of the coal mining approvals in the Hasdeo Arand forest region in the central Indian state of Chhattisgarh. The essay also outlines the different actors who have influenced the discourses on forest rights of Adivasi and other forest dwelling communities and what they identify as factors that challenge the implementation of this law on the ground. It juxtaposes this analysis in the context of the recent decision of the Supreme Court of India on eviction of forest dwellers and examines whether that would bring in any structural change in the way the law is implemented.

BLOG BASED ON NEW WORKING PAPER BY DEEPAK SANAN
ENERGY RESEARCH

The ongoing farmers’ agitation is a pointer to the stark global reality that successful reform programmes have been consultative and accompanied by a comprehensive outreach exercise designed to allay concerns of all stakeholders. Policymakers in the power sector would do well to carefully study the contours of the farmers’ agitation before going ahead with the ambitious reforms programme unveiled in May this year. A roll back of the proposed electricity reform (as a smaller sub text) is part of the demands being raised by the farmers.

Electricity reform was the first of the ‘lockdown reforms’ unveiled by the Government of India. The proposed amendments to the Electricity Act 2000, announced on 17th April, 2020 were followed by a letter from the Finance Ministry on 13th May, 2020 to fast forward action by states on some of the proposed amendments. Agriculture reforms came later but have of course taken centre-stage now.

There are several parallels in the two reforms initiatives. Many issues and tradeoffs are similar. Free markets and consumer choice versus the reality of market imperfections. Issues pertaining to the degradation of the environment, financial viability, prices, incomes and access, the roles of the centre and the states, fears, genuine or otherwise, of exploitation by faceless corporates, balancing the interests of consumers and producers.

In agriculture, the affected party quickly understood the body blow being dealt to them and began to rally its numbers to force a dialogue. A nationwide debate has begun. In electricity, possibly because the bill is still at the draft stage and that consequences may be more diffuse, less evident, seemingly more distant, the response has been more muffled. Still, the fact is that there are issues of import and that there is cause for concern, may be equally pressing in relation to this sector. There is an opportunity to introspect.

Evaluating recent proposals to reform the power sector in India is a paper that seeks to fill this gap by flagging facts and scenarios worthy of further debate and discussion. Through a simple scenario building exercise, this paper cautions that the parlous financial position of the distribution utilities after lockdown requires that “reforms” follow “recovery”. The concurrent roll out of stringent reform measures on several fronts during a period of severe financial stress could seriously impair the prospects of a viable power sector in the near future. This, in turn, will not only hamper our planned promotion of renewables- based electricity but act as a brake on the entire process of economic recovery. In designing the reform itself, lessons from the experience of earlier sectoral reform programmes and recommendations emerging from the limitations of the general architecture of central interventions need to be taken on board. The current exercise may hold no hope for an electricity sector in which the problems hold no easy answer.

Earlier this week, the Narendra Modi government extended the distribution of free foodgrains under the Pradhan Mantri Garib Kalyan Anna Yojana (PMGKAY) for another five months till November 2021. The move reinforced the primacy of “food” – more specifically, rice and wheat channeled through the public distribution system (PDS) – in its social safety net programmes during the current pandemic.

Till 2019-20, annual offtake of rice and wheat from the Food Corporation of India’s (FCI) godowns averaged hardly 62 million tonnes (mt); it actually fell from almost 66 mt to just over 60 mt between 2012-13 and 2017-18. Much of this comprised PDS rations under the National Food Security Act (NFSA) of 2013. This law, passed during the previous United Progressive Alliance (UPA) regime (https://bit.ly/3pChsfv), entitles 81.35 crore Indians to receive at least 5 kg of wheat or rice per month at Rs 2 and Rs 3 per kg, respectively. The annual foodgrain allocation under NFSA – which includes a higher 35-kg monthly ration for 2.37 crore families identified as “poorest of the poor” under the Antyodaya Anna Yojana – is estimated at nearly 55 mt.

Under PMGKAY, the NFSA beneficiaries were provided an extra 5 kg grain per month free of cost during April-November 2020. While that translated into an additional allocation of over 32 mt, actual lifting under PMGKAY, the Atmanirbhar Bharat Package (for returning migrant labourers) and assorted schemes launched in the wake of the Covid-19-induced lockdown last year totaled about 31.5 mt.

The chart below shows offtake of rice and wheat from the Central pool crossing an all-time-high of 93 mt during 2020-21, roughly 50% higher than the previous fiscal year. This was largely courtesy of PMGKAY, which has been re-launched this year as well, following the pandemic’s second wave. The Modi government initially allocated the 5-kg extra free grain per month to NFSA beneficiaries only for May and June 2021. But on June 7, the Prime Minister announced its extension up to Diwali, i.e. November. That is expected to, again, boost offtake by an estimated 28 mt in 2021-22.

Offtake is for fiscal year (April-March) and inclusive of lifting under other welfare schemes and open market sales.

Source: Department of Food and Public Distribution.

But it is not only food offtake that has hit an all-time-high. Government agencies have, as on June 9, procured 42 mt of wheat and 55 mt of rice from the 2020-21 crops. This, as can be seen from the next chart, has broken even the record 39 mt and 52 mt that got procured in the previous year. The Modi government has, in the post-pandemic period, both distributed as well as procured more rice and wheat than ever before!

rocurement is for crop year (July-June); figures for 2020-21 are as on June 9.

Source: Department of Food and Public Distribution.

While the spike in offtake is a result of the pandemic – free food has arguably been the single biggest relief intervention, ahead of even MGNREGA (another UPA legacy programme), for those worst affected by the economic disruptions after March 2020 – the increased procurement is, perhaps, a fallout of the movement against the Centre’s farm reform laws. The minimum support price (MSP) value of the paddy and wheat bought by government agencies since October 2020 – the three farm laws got passed the previous month – comes close to Rs 237,000 crore. Approximately 39% of that amount has gone to Punjab and Haryana, whose farmers have been at the forefront of the protests. The Modi government’s going all out to convince farmers, that its reform laws aren’t aimed at ending the MSP-based procurement regime, can be seen in paddy and wheat purchases from Punjab scaling new highs in the 2020-21 crop year. Record grain paddy procurement has been its strongest defense against allegations of being anti-farmer!

This links up with a third record. Even after the unprecedented 93 mt-plus offtake, stocks of rice and wheat in the Central pool crossed the 100 mt-mark for the first time on May 1, surpassing the previous high of 97.27 mt reached on June 1, 2020. The chart below shows that stock levels have been rising since 2017, reversing a declining trend of the preceding 4-5 years.

Stocks include rice equivalent of un-milled paddy.

Source: Department of Food and Public Distribution.

If stock accumulation has primarily to do with the political economy compulsions of MSP-based procurement, Covid-time distress has actually provided an opportunity for whittling down FCI’s massive grain mountain. FCI’s “economic cost” of procuring, handling, transporting, storing and distributing grains was estimated at Rs 39.99 per kg for rice and Rs 27.40/kg for wheat in 2020-21. The subsidy on the 31.5 mt of grains (20.8 mt rice and 10.7 mt wheat) distributed free of cost under PMGKAY and other special relief programmes would have, then, worked out to around Rs 112,500 crore. The actual cost, though, would have been lower, because FCI also incurs interest and storage expenses in holding excess stocks in its godowns. This “carrying cost of buffer”, pegged at Rs 5.40/kg in 2020-21, is saved even when grain is given out free. The corresponding annual savings on 31.5 mt would have been in excess of Rs 17,000 crore. Similar savings would accrue on the 28 mt additional grain allocations under PMGKAY for 2021-22.

Source: Department of Commerce.

Now is the final record: 2020-21 saw all-time-high PDS offtake, government procurement and stock buildup. It also saw the country exporting a record 19.8 mt of rice and wheat. On paper, virtually this entire quantity that got shipped out was grain procured from the open market. According to the department of food and public distribution, a mere 75,000 tonnes of wheat and 4,000 tonnes of rice were exported from the Central pool in 2020-21. This was wholly on “humanitarian grounds” through the Ministry of External Affairs.

Foodgrain exports from India have been significantly aided by the surge in international prices. The UN Food and Agriculture Organization’s Cereal Price Index hit a 95-month-high in May. While the hardening of global prices has definitely helped, the competitiveness of Indian rice and wheat may have also been enabled by recycled/leaked grain from the PDS (https://bit.ly/3vjVm2I). Given the massive quantities that were offered free/near-free under PMGKAY/NFSA, it should not surprise if some of this grain got diverted to the open market or even exports.

But at the end of the day, it is the abundant crop produced by farmers that has made all four records – PDS offtake, procurement, stocks and exports – possible even amidst the country’s worst pandemic in over a century.

Find all previous notes as part of the series here:

• Can rural play “savior” again? Agricultural seasons and COVID-19 waves by Mekhala Krishnamurthy and Harish Damodaran
• Where is food inflation headed? by Harish Damodaran
• Has MGNREGS Helped the Rural Economy in 2021? by Yamini Aiyar, Avani Kapur and Harish Damodaran
• Employment U-turn: Rural India is India’s main employer by Harish Damodaran and Yamini Aiyar
• Agricultural Households and Farming Income: An initial analysis of variations in income from farming and other sources among agricultural households in India by Harish Damodaran, Mekhala Krishnamurthy and Samridhi Agarwal
• Carbohydrates to proteins and back: How dietary and cropping diversification seems to have gone into reverse by Harish Damodaran, Mekhala Krishnamurthy and Samridhi Agarwal.
• Mapping India’s livestock economy by Harish Damodaran and Samridhi Agarwal.
• Unlocking the potential of Ganna Pradesh
• The Future of MSP by Harish Damodaran
• The Return of Food Inflation: Why its Different this time by Samridhi Agarwal and Harish Damodaran

RAJIV KUMAR PARTICIPATES IN PANEL DISCUSSION ON ET NOW
ECONOMY

Rajiv Kumar participates in a discussion (full video above) on ‘remonetising’ India, a Times Network initiative, after the expiry of the 50-day-deadline

READ THE BLOG BY SHYLASHRI SHANKAR
IDENTITY DISCRIMINATION POLITICS RIGHTS

The Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA) 2019, when viewed in combination with the Modi government’s intention to compile a National Register of Citizens (NRC) for India, will create a situation where being a Muslim and document-less could deprive one of citizenship rights. We may find more conversions out of Islam, and perhaps more takers for the Sangh Parivar’s ‘Ghar Wapsi’ programme. All this could occur even if the state governments in non-BJP ruled states do not cooperate with the Modi government on implementing the NRC. Ironically, it is the very process of democracy – elections and manifestoes – that will end up damaging the citizenship rights of the Muslim minority in India.

Let me explain how the combined threat of CAA and NRC could play out. Currently there are four ways to become an Indian citizen: birth, descent, registration and naturalisation. The Citizenship Bill of 1955 does not allow illegal migrants to acquire citizenship but the recent amendment allows non-Muslim minorities escaping persecution from three countries to do so.

The CAA welcomes Hindus, Sikhs, Christians, Parsis, Buddhists and Jains who arrived in India before 31 December 2014 to escape religious persecution as minorities in neighbouring Pakistan, Afghanistan and Bangladesh. All three happen to be Islamic states. The CAA, however, does not include Muslim minorities like the Rohingyas of Myanmar (with whom we share a border).

Let’s move to the NRC exercise. It is not yet clear what sort of documentary proof would be required to prove citizenship because the exercise would be conducted by state governments, and perhaps each state government could have its own specifications. Let’s assume that one of the documents is a birth certificate. UNICEF figures from 2012 report that about 40% of urban births and 65% of rural births are not registered in India. A similar picture is probably the case for the older generations. In Assam, reports suggest that large numbers (about 19 lakh people) did not possess the necessary documents in the recently conducted NRC exercise under the supervision of the Supreme Court. Detention camps have already been set up in Assam. ‘We want to root out illegal infiltrators coming from Bangladesh and other neighbours to other parts of India,’ the Union Home Minister Amit Shah has already said while defending their intention to carry out the NRC. He has also made public threats that those who cannot produce the necessary documentation will be herded into detention camps.

For a non-Muslim who may have lived in India for centuries but who doesn’t have a birth certificate, all is not lost. He or she can argue that they have no place to go or that they have fled these neighbouring countries to escape persecution (and have left their documents behind). But a document-less Muslim cannot make such an argument because the CAA does not include Muslim minorities. Being branded as an illegal and put in a camp would loom large in the realm of awful possibilities for such a person.

Wouldn’t the dispossessed have recourse to the courts? Would the courts stop the NRC process? Well, after the Ayodhya judgment which favoured Hindu claims over a disputed site, and in the face of the government’s contention that the NRC exercise is necessary in the interests of national security (an argument that usually ensures that the court favours the government in anti-terror cases), it seems a chancy business to rely on the court.

As for the constitutionality of the CAA, which has already been challenged, the Supreme Court judges will probably decide using the concepts of ‘intelligible differentia’ and ‘rational relation to the goal’ in Article 14 (equality before the law).

The specification of the minority communities in the CAA could be challenged in court on two grounds:

a) That citizenship eligibility of these migrants pertains to religious attributes and excludes ethnic and racial ones. Ahmedis and Shias of Pakistan suffer discrimination but will not be eligible under the CAA because they belong to the majority religion (though Ahmedis have been categorised as ‘non-Muslims’ by the Pakistani laws).

b) That the exclusion of ethnic attributes was deliberate in the Act because including it would allow Rohingyas (who are mainly Muslim) to apply for Indian citizenship.

The court’s response would depend on whether they immediately extend the persecution argument to more categories such as ethnicity, or accept the government’s assurance that it would do so in the future (a more likely scenario).

Opponents of the amendment could point out that the Constituent Assembly (CA) had vetoed the notion that India would be the homeland for Hindus. A CA member (P.S. Deshmukh) had proposed an amendment to include as Indian citizens every Hindu or a Sikh who was not a citizen of any other state because Hindus and Sikhs had no other country to look to for acquiring citizenship rights. The amendment was rejected by the majority.

The opponents of the CAA could also argue that the constitution framers wanted to ensure that independent India adhered to the principles of a secular State. They may point to the words of a CA member Alladi Krishnaswamy Ayyar: ‘We may make a distinction between people who have voluntarily and deliberately chosen another country as their home and those who want to retain their connection with this country. But we cannot on any racial or religious or other grounds make a distinction between one kind of persons and another, or one sect of persons and another sect of persons.’ Ayyar had gone on to explain that Article 5A, clause (a) of the draft constitution did precisely this: it provided for ‘all cases of mass migration-if I may use that expression-from Pakistan into India… We do not in that article make any distinction between one community and another, between one sect and another. We make a general provision that if they migrated to this country and they were born in India as defined in the earlier Constitution, then they will be entitled to the benefits of Citizenship.’

It is true that India’s constitution framers did not expect the articles dealing with citizenship to be set in stone. A CA member noted that the ‘articles dealing with citizenship are, therefore, subject to any future nationality or citizenship law that may be passed by Parliament. Parliament has absolutely a free hand in enacting any law as to nationality or citizenship suited to the conditions of our country.’ So there is nothing wrong in amending the Citizenship Act.

But when seen in tandem with the NRC exercise, the CAA is not simply an amendment to provide safe haven to persecuted minorities, none of whom are Muslim. It would be more precise to say that the CAA is pro-non-Muslim persecuted minorities. The NRC exercise is being conducted to find illegal migrants from neighbouring countries particularly Pakistan and Bangladesh (which also has the third largest Hindu population after India and Nepal). A possible impact of the NRC-CAA combine would be the following: A document-less Muslim in India who may have lived here for centuries may be more likely to be branded an illegal migrant, but without recourse to the CAA that a Hindu Bangladeshi migrant would have. Wouldn’t such an awful possibility create fear in the hearts of Indian Muslims?

Even worse, such fears, and perhaps even the reality of being stripped of citizenship are a result of the very democratic process that allows a victorious political party to make the claim that all its pledges are backed by the people’s mandate. But we all know that as voters, we may vote for a party without agreeing with all parts of its manifesto. In the 2019 UK elections, Labour party strongholds turned conservative because those voters preferred Boris Johnson’s stance on leaving Europe even though they may have championed the Labour party’s strategy for the economy. A similar argument can be made for voters who may have voted for Modi in 2019 on other issues. CAA and NRC may not have the endorsement of a majority of Indians but we have no way of knowing that unless we conduct a referendum.

More crucially, the CAA-NRC combine inflicts a deep wound on the constitution’s fabric. Even if the NRC exercise doesn’t happen, the damage would have been done to several fundamental rights including the right to practice religion. It would cause the ‘mischief of Partition’ to travel across decades. As a constitution framer said, ‘I see no reason why a Muslim who is a citizen of this country should be deprived of his citizenship at the commencement of this Constitution.’ But the CAA-NRC does precisely that by creating a fear psychosis among document-less Muslim citizens of India about their citizenship rights and about their ability to remain in their religion.

The views shared belong to individual faculty and researchers and do not represent an institutional stance on the issue.

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FULL VIDEO OF THE DISCUSSION
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

Watch the full video (above) of the discussion on ‘How East Differs from West? A Tale of Two Globalisations’, featuring Stephan Shakespeare, Pramit Bhattacharya and moderated by Rahul Verma.

Drawing on data from the YouGov-Cambridge Globalism project that consists of extensive multidimensional surveys conducted in 23 countries, the discussion centred around the changing geography of globalisation as it is not just shifting economically but also publicly. The pro-globalisation public consensus that used to characterise Western politics is essentially moving to the East. This raises an important question: has the traditional link between globalisation and the spread of Western liberal norms around the world been permanently broken?

Stephan Shakespeare is the CEO and Co-founder of YouGov. Pramit Bhattacharya is a Data Editor at Mint. Rahul Verma is a Fellow at CPR.

READ FINDINGS OF THE STUDY BY ACCOUNTABILITY INITIATIVE
HEALTH BUREAUCRACY

Researchers at the Accountability Initiative, Centre for Policy Research and the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) have published a Policy Note which estimates the potential costs to deliver a core set of direct nutrition interventions (DNIs) at scale (i.e. 100 per cent coverage) for the fiscal year (FY) 2019-20.

Background to the note
Outcomes of malnutrition such as stunting, anaemia, wasting, and low birth weight have remained persistently high in India (Menon et al. 2017). As part of India’s national strategy to address malnutrition and associated risks, a number of nutrition interventions are being implemented. These include nutrition-specific interventions such as the provision of food supplements, Iron and Folic Acid (IFA) supplementation during pregnancy, breastfeeding (BF) promotion, vitamin A supplementation in early childhood, and food supplementation, as well as nutrition sensitive interventions such as access to clean water, sanitation, etc.

At the Union government level, these interventions are delivered primarily through Centrally Sponsored Schemes (CSSs) – the Integrated Child Development Services (ICDS), POSHAN Abhiyaan, and the Pradhan Mantri Matru Vandana Yojana (PMMVY) under the Ministry of Women and Child Department (MWCD) and the National Health Mission (NHM) operating within the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare (MoHFW).

Despite these interventions, coverage remains variable, due to implementation challenges, and capacity, and financing gaps (Menon et al. 2017, Chakrabarti et al. 2019). Although overall use had improved and reached marginalised groups such as disadvantaged castes and tribes, the poorest quintiles of the population were still left behind, especially in the largest states that carry the highest burden of undernutrition.

This Policy Note is based on a study that carried forward research on costing for nutrition interventions, notably work by Menon et al. (2016). The methods followed by Menon et al. (2016) were adapted in this policy note to calculate the cost of providing interventions at full coverage.

₹20,796 crore ($3.03 billion) was required to provide food supplements at-scale for for adolescent girls out-of-school, pregnant women, lactating mothers, children aged 6 months to 3 years, and severely underweight children

How can this note be used?

The costs provided here can be used by policy-makers for planning and budgeting. The objective of budgeting is to estimate revenues required and likely expenditures, as well as to determine future funding needs. Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, resources have to be rapidly re-prioritised. The findings from this note can facilitate such discussions as well. Cost estimates can contribute to a more informed debate on resource allocation priorities (WHO, 2003), and help make choices clearer for policymakers.

Therefore, the findings of this note can feed directly into the planning and budgeting cycle. The cost estimates across interventions for each state can be used at the ICDS Annual Programme Implementation Plan meetings, NHM Programme Implementation Plan meetings, planning for supplementary budgets especially under NHM, as well as in planning governance reforms across sectors to improve implementation. These meetings will be crucial in re-allocating funds in July 2020, accounting for COVID-19. Therefore, the findings of this note can equip various stakeholders with the required information to ensure adequate financing for nutrition interventions.

Findings

The study found that at 2019 population estimates, India should have spent at least ₹38,571 crore in 2019-20, across Union and State governments, and across ministries and departments to fully finance a set of core DNIs, at scale.

We estimated that in FY 2019-20:

To deliver counselling at scale, ₹1,373 crore ($200 million) was required (Figure 1). This included counselling for the promotion of breastfeeding, complementary feeding, and water, hygiene and sanitation practices. Of all categories, Behavior Change Communication (BCC) interventions were the least costly.
To provide food supplements at scale, ₹20,796 crore ($3.03 billion) was required. This included supplementary food for adolescent girls out-of-school, pregnant women, lactating mothers, children aged 6 months to 3 years, and additional rations for severely underweight children.
For maternity benefit cash transfers at scale, ₹9,260 crore ($1.35 billion) was required. It was to be delivered under two conditional cash transfer schemes – PMMVY (₹6,637 crore) and Janani Suraksha Yojana (JSY) (₹2,623 crore).
For the distribution of micronutrient supplements and deworming tablets at scale, ₹1,019 crore ($148 million) was required. This included IFA and deworming for adolescent girls, pregnant women, and lactating mothers; deworming for pregnant women; vitamin A, IFA, zinc, and deworming for children.
For health interventions at scale, ₹6,123 crore ($892 million) was required. This included immunisation of children (₹3,542 crore), providing insecticide treated bed nets to pregnant women (₹146 crore), treatment of severely malnourished children at Nutrition Rehabilitation Centres (NRC) (₹2,403 crore), and drugs for treatment of diarrhoea for children (₹31 crore). A detailed breakup of these costs by intervention is given in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Annual costs of delivering nutrition interventions at scale, in ₹ crore

In the context of the current COVID-19 pandemic and economic crisis, it is critical to ensure equitable and adequate resources for nutrition. Union government and ministries are likely to reassess allocation requirements in the coming months. Our findings indicate that India should have spent at least ₹38,571 crore in 2019-20, and it is imperative that in 2020-21 and beyond, spending on nutrition will need to be benchmarked at least at this level, or beyond.

References

Chakrabarti, S., Raghunathan, K., Alderman, H., Menon, P., and Nguyen, P. 2019. India’s Integrated Child Development Services programme; equity and extent of coverage in 2006 and 2016. Bulletin of the World Health Organization.
Menon, P., McDonald, C.M., and Chakrabarti, S. 2016. Estimating the cost of delivering direct nutrition interventions at scale: national and subnational level insights from India. Maternal and Child Nutrition (Supplement 1): 169–85.
Menon, P., Nguyen, P.H., Mani, S., Kohli, N., Avula, R., and Tran, L.M.. 2017. Trends in Nutrition Outcomes, Determinants, and Interventions in India (2006–2016). POSHAN Report 10. International Food Policy Research Institute, New Delhi.
WHO. 2003. Making choices in health: WHO guide to cost-effectiveness analysis. Geneva: World Health Organization.