Author: cprindia

By Shyam Saran

The states of India which share the Himalayas are also its principal sentinels. Adaptation to climate change must become an integral part of their development strategies. The special vulnerabilities of this ecologically fragile region need to be recognized, as much as its rich natural resources in terms of forests, water wealth, biodiversity and tourism potential. While a number of long-term measures are included as part of the National Action Plan on Climate Change, 2008, several key and urgent interventions are vital to prevent the further degradation of the Himalayan ecology and to preserve their life-sustaining role for millions of our citizens. This includes those residing not only in the Himalayan states, but also in the entire Indo-Gangetic Plain. It is the perennial rivers arising from the snow mountains that sustain livelihoods in the plains. The new government must prioritize the safeguarding of the fragile ecology of the Himalayas among the issues requiring urgent attention.

Sustainable Urbanization in Mountain Habitats
The cities in the Himalayan mountainous zones are increasing in size and number. They exhibit the same degradation that plagues our cities in the plains: growing dumps of garbage and plastic, untreated sewerage, chronic water shortages, unplanned urban growth, and heavy pollution from increasing vehicular traffic. This phenomenon will only exacerbate the impact of climate change. The following immediate interventions by all the concerned states, supported by the Union government, are necessary:

(i) Town planning and adoption of architectural norms
Given the ecological fragility of mountainous areas, it is imperative to halt the unplanned growth of new settlements. Instead, there should be consolidation of existing urban settlements to be governed through land-use planning incorporated in a municipal master plan. These designated settlements would be provided with all basic urban facilities, such as water supply, waste disposal and power, before further civilian growth is permitted. State authorities will prescribe regulations taking into account the particularities of the local ecosystem, including seismic vulnerability, the need to respect local aesthetics and harmony with nature, and the optimum population load the settlement can sustain, given the availability of water and power. Consolidation of urban settlements would also preclude the need to construct a larger number of road links to a multiplicity of destinations, which would cause further damage to the fragile ecology.

There are 12 Himalayan towns included in the Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission (JNNURM), which could serve as models in this regard.

Further action points may include:

(a) Municipal by-laws to be amended, wherever required, to prohibit construction activity in areas falling in hazard zones or across alignments of natural springs, water sources and watersheds near urban settlements. There will be strict enforcement of these by-laws, including through imposition of heavy penalties and compulsory demolition of illegal structures.

(b) The National Building Code will be revised by the central government, in consultation with the concerned state governments, to take into account the specific requirements of urban settlements in the Himalayan zone, including recommendations on the use of local materials and local architectural practices.

(c) The state governments concerned will set up state-level urban arts councils, under relevant legislation, to oversee the implementation of the National Building Code for mountain areas and of respective master plans for designated urban settlements.

(d) The compulsory use of solar water heaters, rainwater harvesting and appropriate sanitation facilities will be incorporated in the National Building Code and municipal by-laws in the concerned states.

(e) Construction activity will be prohibited in catchment areas of cities, including along mountain lakes and other water bodies. Their feeder channels will also be kept free of building activity.

In order to enable these decisions to be implemented urgently, it is necessary to draw up, as soon as possible, a comprehensive state-wide inventory of such water resources and their channels, which could then be declared fully protected zones.

(ii) Solid waste management
The following policy directives could be considered:

(a) The use of plastic bags should be banned in all hill towns and villages. This has been done with commendable success in the states of Himachal Pradesh and Sikkim.

(b) Potable local water, certified by a designated state authority, may be provided through all commercial outlets, such as local shops and restaurants. This would  discourage the use of bottled water, which adds to toxic plastic litter in hill towns and along trekking routes. This has been done successfully in Leh and promotes local employment. More recently, the use of water ATMs to dispense clean drinking water at affordable rates is being popularized and would be especially suitable in hill towns, pilgrim centres and tourist locations.

(c) Each state must establish facilities for the composting of biodegradable household waste and recycling, and reuse of other types of waste. This may be done through public-private partnership wherever feasible. This will be followed by amendments to municipal by-laws that make the segregation of household waste mandatory, to be accompanied by a focused awareness and public education campaign.

(d) An appropriate state tax or levy on all major commodities using plastic and/or non-biodegradable packaging that enter hill towns must be explored. This will create incentives to manufacturers of these goods to use/develop environmentally friendly packaging.

Promotion of Sustainable Pilgrimage

The following measures to promote the healthy and sustainable development of religious pilgrimage to the many sacred and holy sites scattered all over the Himalayas may be considered:

(i) A comprehensive inventory of key pilgrimage sites in each state would be drawn up, which would include analyses of the ecological capacity of each site, based on its location and fragility. The Union government will assist in this exercise, which would be carried out by multidisciplinary teams including engineers, scientists, ecologists, cultural anthropologists and respected NGOs.

(ii) In advance of the results of the above exercise,  a plan must be developed to harmonize the inflow of pilgrims with the local environment’s capacity to cater to the needs of pilgrims. These include the sources of several Himalayan rivers, sacred lakes and forest groves. The selected sites would be listed through public consultation and consensus, and publicly announced. There may also be restrictions on the months of the year when these sites would remain open, to allow recovery of the ecology during the off-season, or on the numbers of visitors. Uttarakhand, for instance, has recently issued guidelines restricting the daily number of pilgrims to the Gangotri glacier (Gaumukh) to 150. In this context, plans to allow year-long access to high-altitude pilgrimage sites at Badrinath and Kedarnath should be abandoned.

(iii) The construction of roads should be prohibited beyond at least 10 km from protected pilgrim sites, thereby creating a much-needed ecological and spiritual buffer zone round these sites. These areas, like national parks and sanctuaries, could be maintained as special areas with minimal human interference, respecting the pristine nature of these sites. Where there are existing roads within the 10-km buffer, vehicular traffic should be allowed only beyond this limit.

(iv) Each designated pilgrimage site should have a declared buffer zone where development activity will be carefully regulated. Local communities residing in or around these sites must be given a role in the management of the buffer zone and encouraged to benefit from pilgrimage activities through providing various services to pilgrims. This has been tried out with some success in the Periyar Tiger Reserve in Kerala.

(v) At all entry points to designated buffer zones, pilgrims will be advised to take back all waste, in particular non-degradable items. Provision may be made to sell them waste collection bags, which could be made by local communities using local   materials. Such waste may be collected and sorted out at special collection points outside the buffer zone, for disposal. A fee may be charged for the same.

Commercial and Adventure Tourism
The measures listed for regulation of pilgrim traffic in the Himalayan zone would also apply, to a large extent, to the promotion of ecologically sustainable tourism in the Himalayan region as a whole. The following interventions may also be considered:

(i) Homestead tourism could be promoted in this area and commercial hotel tourism of the three- to five-star variety discouraged or prohibited. Local communities will be encouraged and enabled to provide homestead-based tourist facilities, through a package of incentives and capacity building. The successful experience with homestead tourism in Ladakh is a good example.

(ii) Each state will set up a homestead tourism audit and certification agency to promote standardized and quality practices in designated tourism zones. These would include key environmental guidelines, such as the use of solar energy, use of organic produce, recycling of waste, cleanliness and hygiene, courtesy, knowledge of local culture and landscape, among others. This will also help educate tourists about the importance of safeguarding the Himalayan ecology.

(iii) Recognizing the adverse impact on Himalayan ecology of unrestrained expansion in vehicular traffic, each state should impose an entry tax for vehicles entering important hill towns. A similar tourism tax or trekking charge may be levied for all ecologically fragile zones. The proceeds from such taxes should be used for creating better facilities (for example, clean toilets, tourist shelters) and for benefiting local communities.

(iv) Parking fees for private vehicles in hill markets and hill towns need to be raised substantially to discourage such traffic, thereby reducing both congestion and pollution. Each hill town will designate the central parts of the town as walking areas, with access provided by pollution-free electric or CNG buses.

Green Road Construction
Roads are the lifeline of this remote and inaccessible region. However, the construction of roads must fully take into account the environmental fragility of the region. The concerned state governments must consider promulgating, as soon as possible, the following guidelines for road construction in hill areas.

(i) Environmental Impact Assessment should be made mandatory for the construction of all state and national highways, and expressways of more than 5 km length, including in the extension and widening of existing roads. This will not apply to inter-village roads.

(ii) Road construction must provide for the treatment of hill slope instabilities resulting from road cutting, cross drainage works and culverts, using bio-engineering and other appropriate technologies. Cost estimates for road construction in these areas should henceforth include estimates on this account.

(iii) Plans for road construction must provide for disposal of debris from construction sites at suitable and identified locations, so as to avoid ecological damage and scarring of the landscape. Proposals for road construction must henceforth include cost estimates in this regard.

(iv) Hot mix plants must only be set up at least 2 km away from settlements. These sites should have a minimum open area of 200 sq metres and should be already devoid of vegetation.

(v) All hill roads must provide adequate roadside drains and, wherever possible, be connected to the natural drainage system of the area.

(vi) Alignment of proposed roads should avoid fault zones and historically landslide-prone zones. Where this may not be possible, adequate measures must be taken to minimize associated risks, in consultation with experts.

Water Security
The importance of the Himalayas as a natural storehouse and source of water must be acknowledged fully. The region is already under water stress, with the drying up or blockage of many water sources and natural springs. The following immediate actions are necessary:

(i) Each Himalayan state must initiate a state-wide programme for rejuvenation of Himalayan springs and protection of high-altitude lakes.

(ii) The government must provide legislative protection for mountain lakes, natural springs and key water sources, and prohibit construction activities along these water bodies.

(iii) Relevant bodies should inventorize mountain springs (active and dormant) and also carry out detailed geological mapping to identify spring recharge zones.

Building Environmental Awareness
(i) Local festivals and fairs must be utilized to spread environmental awareness, with the protection of the environment being linked to local cultures and festivals.

(ii) Central and state governments must together organize an annual festival of the Himalayas to celebrate local cultures, which demonstrate ways of sustainable living for resilient societies in harmony with the pristine nature of the Himalayas. This will also expose the rest of the country to the importance of the Himalayas in India’s national life.

Safeguarding the Himalayas: A National Endeavour
There are grave concerns about the challenge the country faces from the impact of climate change on the fragile and life-sustaining ecology of the Himalayas. This spectacular mountain chain is inextricably linked with India’s civilizational ethos and the spiritual and cultural sensibility of our people. It is necessary to initiate and develop a truly national endeavour to safeguard the pristine ecology of the Himalayas. A coordinated approach between the Union and state governments in the Himalayan states is imperative if we are to successfully meet this challenge. It is in this spirit that the prime minister should convene a meeting of the chief ministers of the Himalayan states. The deliberations at the meeting, and the adoption of certain urgent and specific guidelines and decisions, would be the first step in formulating a comprehensive and ambitious national mission for sustaining the Himalayan ecosystem. The prime minister and the chief ministers should meet annually to exchange views, share experiences, review progress and evolve practical and effective measures to make this national mission a success.

Other pieces as part of CPR’s policy document, ‘Policy Challenges – 2019-2024’ can be accessed below:

• The Future is Federal: Why Indian Foreign Policy Needs to Leverage its Border States by Nimmi Kurian
• Rethinking India’s Approach to International and Domestic Climate Policy by Navroz K Dubash and Lavanya Rajamani
• India’s Foreign Policy in an Uncertain World by Shyam Saran
• Need for a Comprehensive National Security Strategy by Shyam Saran
• A Clarion Call for Just Jobs: Addressing the Nation’s Employment Crisis by Sabina Dewan
• Time for Disruptive Foreign and National Security Policies by Bharat Karnad
• Multiply Urban ‘Growth Engines’, Encourage Migration to Reboot Economy by Mukta Naik
• Schooling is not Learning by Yamini Aiyar
• Clearing Our Air of Pollution: A Road Map for the Next Five Years by Santosh Harish, Shibani Ghosh and Navroz K Dubash
• Protecting Water while Providing Water to All: Need for Enabling Legislations by Philippe Cullet
• Interstate River Water Governance: Shift focus from conflict resolution to enabling cooperation by Srinivas Chokkakula
• Managing India-China Relations in a Changing Neighbourhood by Zorawar Daulet Singh
• Beyond Poles and Wires: How to Keep the Electrons Flowing? by Ashwini K Swain and Navroz K Dubash
• Regulatory Reforms to Address Environmental Non-Compliance by Manju Menon and Kanchi Kohli
• The Numbers Game: Suggestions for Improving School Education Data by Kiran Bhatty
• Safe and Dignified Sanitation Work: India’s Foremost Sanitation Challenge by Arkaja Singh and Shubhagato Dasgupta
• Female Labour Force Participation: Asking Better Questions by Neelanjan Sircar

Sustainable liquid and solid waste management systems safeguard the health of the community against diseases and infections, improving its physical and mental wellbeing. Since their introduction in 1954, rural sanitation programmes have evolved over the years and the latest iteration, Swachh Bharat Mission-Gramin (SBM-G), has been unprecedented in its focus, mandate and resource allocation towards meeting the goals of sustainable sanitation. Over its five-year run, its objective has expanded from the mere provision of a toilet facility to also include the institution of systems for Solid and Liquid Waste Management (SLWM) and prioritization of Open Defecation Free (ODF) villages for piped water supply schemes. For the former, the Mission has earmarked funds based on the size of the Gram Panchayat (GP), for example, INR 20 lakhs for GPs with 500 households and so forth. The latest Rural Sanitation Strategy, 2019-2029, further emphasizes these goals, along with those of ODF Sustainability.

In its response to the national thrust on access to a toilet facility under SBM-G, the state of Odisha made significant strides in augmenting coverage of individual toilets from 14% in 20112 to a purported universal coverage in 2019.3 The state now intends to establish SLWM systems for downstream management of liquid and solid waste – starting with issuing a state-level policy governing the subject – to leverage its current progress in the elimination of open defecation for sustainable sanitation outcomes. To inform such a policy of the onground situational needs, the Centre for Policy Research undertook a rapid assessment of the prevailing waste management landscape in three districts of the state. This report discusses the resulting findings relating to aspects ranging from community practices to the SLWM infrastructure capabilities existing in these regions.

KEY FINDINGS

Toilets increase, but quality flags

SBM-G rapidly enhanced the number of individual toilet facilities. Still, they lack in quality in many cases, especially among the constructions which involved external actors, such as NGOs, in the construction process.

Single pit, the singular winner

Single pits are the most commonly found on-site sanitation system, followed by twin pits and septic tanks. Functioning on the same principle as a twin pit, these, however, require mechanized emptying to be considered a safe technological option.

Twin pits, but only in name

Missing or inaccessible junction boxes, pits connected in series, and lack of user awareness regarding their maintenance, are holding back the potential of twin pits as the sustainable and affordable option in sanitation technology they have been envisioned as.

Infrastructure first, usage later

The predominance of single pits over twin pits, inadequate dissemination of user information dissemination concerning operation and maintenance (O&M), lack of associated services, viz. in-house water and desludging, and inadequate focus on behaviour change have led to low toilet usage.

Toilet usage, contamination or sanitation?

In a significant number of cases, households concomitantly rely on in-house borewells or handpumps located in the vicinity of toilet facilities. In these cases, factors such as the inherent vulnerability of the aquifer, a high water table, the proliferation of leaching pits, and unregulated setback between pits and wells have the potential to result in contamination of water supplies.

Greywater, but not in the backyard

In the absence of in-house water supply, communities usually perform chores such as bathing and washing at the water source, fetching and storing water at the premises only for drinking and cooking. The production and disposal of untreated greywater, therefore, needs addressing at both the household and settlement level.

Handpumps and borewells, unsanitary sites

In the absence of soak pits alongside handpumps and borewells, both public and private, the water stagnates at the site, creating an unhygienic environment susceptible to vector breeding.

Solid waste, the missing agenda point

Solid waste management is yet to be seen as a significant concern at the GP level. Organic waste is safely and productively managed at the household, while inorganics are dumped and/or burned. Centralized management systems are absent, with even dustbins at marketplaces a rarity.

Less agrarian, more plastic

The nature of the habitation dictates the type and quantity of waste generation, and the avenues available for recycling. The more urban habitations have greater penetration of FMCG products and in turn, generate more plastic waste – which the region is ill-prepared to handle.

Going forward, the state of Odisha should align its efforts for sustaining its ODF status with the key ascertained dimensions of toilet usage, viz. usable toilets accompanied by functional on-site sanitation (OSS) systems, reliable and convenient sources of water for toilet use, easy and affordable access to toilet maintenance services, and behaviour change. The universal access to and usage of a toilet facility is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the creation of clean and sanitized villages, protection of the health of communities, and the abatement and prevention of environmental pollution.

The state should account for variations in village characteristics, e.g. proximity to urban centres, nature of villages – whether more or less agrarian, socioeconomic variations at the settlement (hamlet) level, and also the household-level and community-level behaviours, in determining optimal solutions and strategies since they directly impact SLWM needs.

The full report can be accessed here.

This paper attempts to add to the given literature by undertaking a detailed analysis of school consolidation process in Rajasthan. It seeks to answer the following questions:

First, what are the specific criteria and conditions for closure of schools and their consolidation with other schools and whether they were adhered to by the state administration?

Second, whether school consolidation led to improvements in enrolment, availability of teachers, and essential school infrastructure facilities as mandated by the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education (RTE) Act, 2010.

The full working paper can be accessed here.

Context

The current global architecture for climate policy and action comprises of a multiplicity of actors, organisations, and operational modalities that differ from those originally anticipated in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).  The climate change arena is now widely populated by activities that are often outside the formal auspices of UNFCCC, including initiatives that are public, private and civil society based, operating at various scales and thereby involving different levels of governance. This scenario raises two important questions:

• What are the implications of such a fragmented climate regime?
• And, more specifically, what are the opportunities and challenges this architecture poses for a low-carbon technology transition in developing countries, in keeping with international climate objectives?

The multi-level climate governance framework lays out two dimensions of action and influence to implement low-carbon strategies. One, is between national governments and regional and local actors. And the second, is the learning, knowledge transmission and cooperation across regions and organisational boundaries. Together, coordinated interactions within this structure have the potential to narrow policy and other ‘gaps’ to help address the problem of climate change.

What is this research about?

The built environment in India is ideal to study the potential of multi-level governance, particularly since its policies often draw on international activity and knowledge to implement locally-specific low carbon solutions. In 2010, buildings accounted for 32% of total global final energy use, and 35% of total energy consumption in India. This has made the buildings sector a fast-growing market for low-carbon energy technologies.

The paper titled Deploying Low-Carbon Technologies in Developing Countries: A view from India’s building sector, co-authored by Khosla, and published in Environmental Policy and Governance, discusses this issue by examining two inter-related questions:

• How do (or don’t) low-carbon technologies get transferred and deployed in India’s built environment?
• And what implications can be drawn from the Indian case for effective low-carbon technology development and transfer for developing countries?

How was the research conducted?

Empirically, the paper draws on interviews with experts within and outside government, data from official building energy documents, and insights from supporting literature. It also draws on author experiences of direct involvement in the sector. For instance, co-author Ajay Mathur headed India’s Bureau of Energy Efficiency for almost a decade, and Khosla worked alongside the state of Andhra Pradesh for two years on building energy code adoption.

Key findings

The paper examines the coverage and nature of the multilevel linkages within India’s built environment from 2000-2015. Authors examine if the multilevel climate architecture can be leveraged to support technological change for desired outcomes in Indian buildings.

Table 1 presents a collation of key building energy technology activities and actors, and their respective governance levels. The table lists the different activities that comprise technological change: technology research and development (R&D); financial transfer to assist different stages of the technology cycle; capacity building and analytical support; policy designs and implementation.

Table 1. Activity map of low-carbon technological change in India’s buildings (2000-2015)

Three patterns characterise the nature of technological change in India’s low-carbon buildings.

• First, most activities flow through vertical linkages in a top-down (international → national → subnational) direction, as opposed to international processes and outcomes being shaped by national or subnational level activities. States or subnational bodies thereby seldom serve as ‘laboratories of experimentation’ or pioneers of policy initiation.
• Second, and a consequence of the largely top-down nature of activities, is the profusion of international actors engaging with this space in India. This international linkage is usually mediated by domestic actors, making it collaborative in scope. The expertise from various bilateral, multilateral and strategic partnerships, and additional groups has played an important role over the last decade and a half, and in most cases work is co-produced with local experts, civil society partners and national/state governments.
• Third, the activity patterns in Table 1 demonstrate a focus on the downstream stages of the technological cycle, i.e. on deployment. However, the other dimensions underlying technological change – technology R&D and financial transfer – have been less present in Indian buildings, even though both are important to advance technologies (the US–India R&D collaboration being a recent exception). This observation of a limited focus on the upstream parts (research, product development) of the technology cycle is consistent with the larger landscape of international collaborative and support activities.

Together, these patterns demonstrate the potential but also the limitations of working with the linkages between and across governance levels. The paper further discusses three factors that collectively help explain these patterns: the particularities of India’s federal structure; the constraints of capacity, which is typical of developing countries; and the growing policy linkages between energy and climate change stemming from the global climate debate. This discussion informs the subsequent policy recommendations for low-carbon technology transfer in developing countries more broadly.

Policy recommendations

• Adopting a ‘Need’-Driven Approach – Most developing countries prioritise economic and social development over investments in expensive low-carbon technologies. Technology transfer thus needs to be constructed around a collaborative and ongoing local assessment process, driven by developed and developing countries. Examples are green building designs that take into account local climatic conditions and occupant use patterns or policy delivery models that consider behaviour norms or financial realities of consumers. Engagement between developed countries and networks of local users, and with their private sector is equally relevant. Better country understanding of recipient priorities and capabilities (technologies, finance and knowledge), with ongoing local inputs, will be fruitful for international actors working in developing countries and also increase domestic buy-in.
• Differentiated Approach to Capacity Building: Most developing countries struggle with questions of capacity. While international funds often focus on capacity projects, these efforts rarely translate to a domestic critical mass. It is thus important to understand the kinds of capacity needed in order to build them – for instance, studies have shown that crucial ingredients of technology transfer are found rarely in ‘hardware’, but rather in people-embodied knowledge. More specifically, the research findings of this paper suggest that greater emphasis needs to be placed on building operational, strategic and organisational capacities.
• Strengthen Linkages and Integrate Agendas across Governance Levels: Developing countries can strengthen linkages and respective agendas across governance levels – to enable appropriate flows of knowledge regarding technology needs, possible solutions and delivery mechanisms, and allow resources to reach where they are most needed. For instance, developing countries can leverage the growing profusion of initiatives targeted at climate mitigation by investing in better coordination with international fora, communicating their specific needs and appropriately shaping the international agenda.  The linkages between the national and local levels are equally crucial, especially since the effectiveness of any climate programme ultimately depends on outcomes on the ground.

The publisher page from where the full paper can be purchased can be accessed here.

For a copy of the publication, contact climate.initiative.cpr@gmail.com.

This book documents Shri L P Singh’s lecture, delivered at the South Gujarat University in Surat 1986. It is a useful input in assuming both the role played by Sardar Patel and the evolution of the modern Indian state.

L P Singh emphasises that Sardar Vallabhai Patel played a crucial role in creating the post-independence nation in the precarious situation after the departure of the British. Even though his governmental tenure in Delhi was a relatively short one, he is considered one of the key architects of this phase. This interpretation of Sardar Patel’s role covered in this brief lecture points to the emergence of the administrative state in India. The strength and weakness of the Indian States have been of some debate in recent years and perhaps the debate will occupy more space as the adequacies and inadequacies of the state in India begin to affect our national growth and performance.

Mr Singh describes Sardar Patel as ‘the greatest statesman-administrator of Independent India’ and ‘ranks him with Ashoka and Akbar, as a unifier of the country’.

L P Singh, a Founder Member of the CPR was a former Home Secretary and former Governor of Assam and the North East.

Full book can be accessed here.

The series is titled ‘Plugging in: Electricity consumption in Indian Homes’.

Energy-demand interventions are important for shaping consumption patterns as India’s energy and technology infrastructure transitions. At the same time, implementation of demand-side solutions is not always straightforward because of the variety of influences on consumption decisions. In the final piece of this series, we initiate a discussion about the drivers of residential electricity consumption.

What conditions electricity use in homes? In particular, are there factors outside of the technological and physical aspects of the house structure and appliances that can have an impact on a household’s electricity consumption? We examine this question in low-income households in Rajkot, Gujarat. The sample provides a suitable context in which to undertake this study, because it contains identical home units, each with the same floor area and layout. This architecture allows us to control for the physical effects of the building, the floor area and the surrounding climate across the sample. The work is part of our ongoing study on energy use in low-income urban households under the CapaCITIES project.

Conventional understanding suggests electricity consumption is a function of building, technological and climate characteristics. Alongside, appliance ownership within a household is a key driver of how much electricity is used. Homes which own only lights and fans will have a different consumption pattern to homes that also own a refrigerator and television – as will be reflected in a different electricity bill between the two. Thereby, in order to control for the effect of appliance ownership on electricity use, we develop an appliances-asset index that ranks each household according to the appliances they own. That is, households with the same rank on the index own the same appliance, in the same quantity. In affordable housing units, the index can also serve as a proxy for economic class, as wealthier households tend to have more and more expensive appliances. Having now controlled for the major building, technological and climate drivers of residential electricity use, we compare the metered electricity consumption (from the utility) of homes that have the same rank on the asset index, to test how similar or different their consumption will be (Figure 1).

Figure 1: Variation in electricity bills for households as per their score on the appliances-asset index
Source: Residential electricity use in affordable homes (Khosla et al. in preparation)

Figure 1 provides interesting initial results. It shows a dramatic difference in the electricity bills of homes, even when they own the same appliances (displayed by the same rank on the appliances-asset index between -1.5 and 1.5). Further, when categorised according to the number of people within a home to account for differences that may arise from differing number of household members (either less than or more than three per home in the Figure), the large variation in the bill remains.

What explains this difference in the electricity bill of homes that own the same appliances, have similar number of people, the same floor area, are in buildings with similar physical characteristics, and under the same weather conditions?

The literature on household energy use offers a number of different factors that influence electricity consumption. Many of these are related to physical building characteristics, for instance, building age, materials, number of windows, etc. In addition, climate conditions are important drivers of how much electricity households consume to be thermally comfortable. And within the household, the area of the home, the number of people that inhabit it and the appliances owned are important determinants of how much electricity is consumed. Figure 1 is striking because in spite of controlling for all these aspects, the electricity bills of the homes are significantly different. This points to an important finding that human behaviour, or how people actually operate and use appliances, after they are purchased, is a key factor in driving electricity use. A better understanding of such human dimensions of energy consumption is particularly needed in the Indian context, where research on the role of behaviour and lifestyles in influencing household energy use is limited.

In addition to energy use behaviour, Figure 1’s electricity bill variation could also be a function of the age and efficiency of the appliances, which can be different even for the same appliance type, along with differences in the orientation of the buildings of the different households. Uncovering these details and developing an interdisciplinary understanding of the techno-economics of electricity consumption, with the social and cultural roots of behaviour patterns, is needed to better predict the interactions between people, buildings and technologies. This will enable better management of household electricity use, especially as the urban population grows and income levels rise. More so, such insights are necessary for informed future consumption projections and policy choices, to step away from traditional economic models that assume humans make rational, utility-maximising, everyday decisions and that appliance usage hours are uniform across individuals, an assumption that many studies make. Ultimately, understanding how individuals, households, and more broadly, societies, use or convert electricity has much to bear on the effectiveness of demand-side measures.

At the conclusion of this residential electricity series, we hope its different themes have provided new insight into the challenges and opportunities of electricity use in Indian homes. These have included trends and disparities in access and consumption across states; the impact of the country’s large LED lighting programme, including in affordable homes; the effectiveness of appliance standards and labels; the energy services demanded within affordable housing and more broadly, across the National Capital Region; metering appliance use patterns; and the role of energy use behaviour in influencing consumption. These findings drew from recently published work, and from new research that will be published shortly, all aimed at emphasising demand-side solutions for energy and climate change, within the context of development.

This piece is authored by Radhika Khosla at the Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi. 

We would be grateful for your feedback on this series and request you to answer this 2 minute anonymous survey.

This blog series is also available on the Prayas website here.

We will soon be compiling all the posts of this series into a document for future reference.

Other posts in this series:

• Electricity Consumption in Indian Homes
• Trends in India’s Residential Electricity Consumption
• India’s LED Lighting Story
• Illuminating Affordable Homes
• The Efficiency of Appliances
• Appliances used in Affordable Housing
• Electrifying the National Capital Region
• Exploring the different uses of household appliances

By Navroz K Dubash and Lavanya Rajamani

India has traditionally approached climate change as a diplomatic issue, insisting that the developed world – because of their disproportionate role in causing the problem – should lead the way in reducing emissions, and provide the developing world the finance and technology to do so. While this approach is entirely justifiable and has served India well in the past, there are compelling reasons for the country to rethink its approach to international and domestic climate policy. First, climate change is likely to have profound and devastating impacts in India, impacts that will make the task of development and poverty eradication considerably harder. Second, there are several cost-effective actions that India can take that serve its development as well as climate interests. Rethinking our approach would translate internationally into our joining, even leading, a ‘coalition of the willing’ that advocates for an ambitious and strong rules-based global climate regime. Domestically, it would translate into a proactive exploration of lower-carbon opportunities for growth that foster development, while investing in climate adaptation and resilience. Rethinking our approach at the international and domestic levels, however, calls for strong institutions for climate governance.

This paper, after a brief context setting section, lays out elements of an approach to international and domestic climate policy that is likely to serve India well in the long run.

Context

Climate change, often characterized as the ‘defining issue of our age’, is predicted to have profound ‘impacts on natural and human systems on all continents and across the oceans.’¹ These impacts are likely to cause devastation in India, a country with 7500 km of coastline, extensive tracts of low-lying areas, high population density, poor infrastructure and continued reliance on agriculture for livelihoods. With the 1°C warming that has already occurred since pre-industrial times, Himalayan glaciers have begun to retreat, and there has been a marked increase in the frequency and intensity of heat waves,²  droughts, extreme rainfall events³  and floods. If the world warms to between 2.6°C and 3.2°C, as the UN climate secretariat estimates it will based on current country pledges, this will have serious, pervasive and irreversible consequences for India – not just in terms of impacts on peoples and ecosystems, but also on economic growth, livelihoods and wellbeing. Climate change is predicted, for instance, to reduce agricultural incomes by 15-25% by the end of the century in India.⁴ 

International Climate Policy

India’s position in the international climate negotiations is set within larger geo-political developments that also inform and influence its broader foreign and energy policy. With the US retreat from the Paris Agreement, the Brazilian President Bolsonaro’s equivocation on it, and the defeat of the Labour Party in Australia which advocated strong climate measures, the momentum that led to the Paris Agreement has begun to dissipate. There is a leadership and imagination vacuum in global climate politics, which India could seek to fill.

For example, India could reach out to China, which has long been its negotiating partner in retaining differentiated responsibility, to forge a mutually beneficial alliance on the global solar energy transition. India leads the International Solar Alliance and provides a substantial market, while China has technological leadership in solar panels and storage technologies. Both countries are involved in the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank. As the Africa region develops its infrastructure, an India-China alliance could help provide a vision of and the technological and financial means for realizing a low-carbon yet cost-effective future. In addition, and consistent with this approach, India could seek to realize its potential as a leader of vulnerable nations.  Doing so would also be viewed favourably in the South Asia region, by vulnerable countries such as Bangladesh, Bhutan and Nepal. Notably, these measures allow India to be a climate leader even as it takes advantage of opportunities for economic and political gain; that is, they do not require the country to sacrifice economic gain and political position for climate policy.

Based on approaches such as these, India could join forces with others to form part of the ‘coalition of the willing’ in global climate politics. Such a coalition is a particular need at this juncture in the negotiations. With the conclusion of the Paris Rulebook negotiations in Katowice, Poland, in December 2018, the politically charged negotiations on obligations, rules and institutions are at an end, and the regime has shifted gears to the day-to-day business of implementation. The Paris Agreement builds on nationally determined contributions (or NDCs) from countries to reduce greenhouse gases, complemented by a normative expectation of progression and ‘highest possible ambition’ that calls for these contributions to be strengthened over time.⁵  These terms – ‘progression’ and ‘highest possible ambition’ – are not defined either in the Paris Agreement or its Rulebook. Further, while the Rulebook fleshes out informational requirements, and operationalizes an enhanced transparency framework, global stocktake, and implementation and compliance mechanism, it still preserves, out of political necessity, considerable flexibility, autonomy and discretion for states; this is particularly evident in their near-absolute control over the content of their NDC.⁶ States could choose to exploit this discretion and create a political and implementation drag in the process, or they could choose to progressively strengthen their NDCs, enhance the quality of the ex ante and ex post information they provide, and trigger a virtuous cycle of ever ambitious actions necessary to meet the temperature goal of the Paris Agreement. It is in India’s interest to be part of the ‘coalition of the willing’ – nations that seek to progressively strengthen their NDCs, and enhance their ability to meet the procedural requirements of the Paris Agreement and its Rulebook as well as the substantive objective of the climate change regime.

Specifically, first, India should provide information on its NDC, set against the larger context of its development aspirations and resource constraints.⁷ This information should include the planning processes the country has engaged in to reach its NDC, which in turn should include meaningful stakeholder consultations and attentiveness to the human rights impacts of climate change action or inaction.

Second, India should clearly explain how its NDC is fair and ambitious, and on what objective criteria and benchmarks. This approach would allow India to ask how these criteria and benchmarks could be applied to the NDCs of other countries as well, turning its long-held emphasis on the principle of equity in climate change negotiations into a practical and applied measure. It is by providing robust information in the context of its NDC that India can introduce into the global assessment of progress criteria and benchmarks which assess ‘relative fair shares’.

Third, in relation to ex-post tracking of progress in implementing its NDC,⁸  India should identify objective defensible indicators to assess its progress with its NDC, take proactive efforts to address capacity gaps in implementation and reporting, and gradually improve the quality, precision and detail of the information it provides. India’s implementation should demonstrate a high degree of ‘due diligence’ (best possible efforts) in meeting the objectives of its NDC.

Finally, in relation to the global stocktake process every five years,⁹ India should work with negotiating partners (such as South Africa) and vulnerable nations to ensure that the ‘hooks’ on equity in the Paris Agreement and the Rulebook are duly exploited. India should submit its vision of equitable burden sharing and ‘relative fair shares’ to enable a meaningful assessment, albeit a collective one, at the international level of progress towards the global temperature goal.

India’s ability to take a leadership position in this ‘coalition of the willing’ will require a substantial scaling up of the capacity and resources – human, financial, legal, research and institutional – it devotes to engaging in international negotiations, and complementary backchannel processes.¹⁰ The country’s delegations to the climate negotiations are considerably smaller than those of other nations of comparable size and stature. The composition of the delegations tend to favour bureaucrats rather than experts, and there are limited formal channels for national positions to be informed by outputs from the growing research community working in these areas in India. In rethinking our approach to climate policy, international and domestic, India must also rethink its engagement with experts, and the processes for doing so.

Ultimately, the effectiveness of the Paris Agreement, given its hybrid architecture, lies in the strength of the NDCs that parties submit. The strength of the NDCs will in turn depend on international processes that can catalyse more ambitious domestic actions, as well domestic political will and institutional capacity for formulating and delivering ambitious NDCs. It is to these domestic issues that we now turn.

Domestic Climate Policy

As the reality of climate change looms, and its impacts become more real, India – as is true of other countries – increasingly needs to view climate change as a developmental challenge, and not simply as a diplomatic one. Simply put, climate change will make development outcomes more challenging. For example, global pressures to limit greenhouse gases and the emergence of new technologies will make it more complicated for India to power its industries and provide electricity to its citizens in conventional ways. Agriculture, on which a substantial portion of the population still depends for livelihoods, may be particularly hard hit. Cities and coastlines may be subject to disruptions from climate-related events. Water cycles may be disrupted, and the timing and availability of water through rainfall and in India’s rivers may shift. And heat waves and shifting disease vectors will complicate the problem of ensuring public health. Climate change is not an isolated challenge to be addressed by one part of the government; it is a problem that requires mainstreaming of climate considerations through all sections of the government’s decision-making apparatus.

As this discussion suggests, the institutional requirements of managing climate change are considerable. In the last few years, India has begun planning for climate change – including through a National Action Plan, eight national missions covering adaptation and mitigation, and 32 state action plans and greater investment in scientific infrastructure. Yet, a deeper dive into these efforts reveal that the research and analytical capacity in each of these areas is weak, coordination is limited, implementation is patchy across these efforts, and the strategic thinking for truly transformative approaches is lacking.¹¹

Building the capacity of Indian states to address the complex challenges of climate change is but in its infancy. The country needs to go much further down this path, devising and implementing a robust institutional structure that can generate appropriate knowledge, design policy and infrastructure interventions, coordinate across sectoral line departments and across scales of governance, ensure accountability for implementation, and provide an interface to business and civil society groups. Development remains India’s number one priority. But development untouched by climate change is no longer possible. Addressing climate change adds to India’s problem of developing adequate state capacity. A forthcoming edited volume coordinated by the Centre for Policy Research, India in a Warming World, explores how India can truly internalize climate concerns in both its energy consumption and natural resource sectors so as to address climate mitigation and adaptation.

Mitigation

Climate change mitigation, or the limitation of greenhouse gas emissions, has always been tied to India’s global negotiating stance. If wealthier countries, and not India, are largely responsible for the problem, why should India undertake costly mitigation actions? A decade ago, the National Action Plan on Climate Change proposed exploring actions that lead to both development and climate benefits. This principle of ‘co-benefits’ has guided our actions since, but actions that meet this principle have not been fully pursued and developed. Here, India’s status as a late developer is an advantage: we have not, as yet, locked into energy production and consumption patterns, and so can take advantage of new technology and knowledge to build a lower carbon development path.

India’s cities provide a particularly good example.¹² The country is urbanizing rapidly, but much of urban India remains to be built. The next couple of decades afford an opportunity to set up cities where transport needs (and hence emissions but also congestion) are lower due to sensible planning that locates work and living spaces near each other; the travel needs that remain are met increasingly with high-quality public transport and walking (rather than private automobiles); new buildings are designed to need less cooling and heating through intelligent design. Planning processes for urban spaces need to be focused on the multiple objectives that a city should meet in these times – of livability, low congestion, efficient functioning and a small environmental footprint.

India’s electricity system provides another instructive case.¹³ Long ridden with problems of unreliability, poor service and loss-making, Indian electricity is likely to be shaken up by the recent steep decline in costs of renewable electricity to levels where it is competitive with coal power. However, the transition is likely to be turbulent, and create winners and losers. For example, industries may choose to shift to renewables thereby increasing the financial burden on distribution companies. Coal-mining regions may, over time, have to move to other industries.¹⁴

Notably, these changes are inevitable and are being driven by global technology trends, not by national climate policies alone. Recently, Tata Power became the most recent example of a company that is planning to pivot from coal to solar for economic reasons.¹⁵ But planning for this future under the rubric of a transition to a low-carbon economy could help unlock possible synergies between green power, energy access and energy security. Alternatively, failure to plan for this transition may be costly, particularly for the poor. Moreover, the likelihood of green, yet competitive electricity opens the door to electrifying other sectors, such as transportation and cooking. But the challenges involved in managing these transitions, in terms of hardware required, institutional rules and making sure potential losers are not left behind, are substantial and require immediate analysis and planning.

India’s cities and electricity sector are but two examples. Mitigation also encompasses transportation networks (including for freight), industries, agriculture, forest management and use, and food consumption patterns, to name a few. For India, a consistent approach – built around understanding the synergies and trade-offs across multiple development objectives and climate mitigation – needs to become part of the policy framework across these sectors.

Adaptation

It is increasingly clear that despite our best efforts, countries collectively are unlikely to mitigate sufficiently to avoid at least some – potentially significant – effects of climate change.¹⁶ India, perhaps even more than other nations, has to pay considerable attention to the adaptation and resilience of its economy and society.

Doing so is as complex as reducing greenhouse gas emissions, and perhaps even more so. For example, adaptation in agriculture requires preparing India’s agricultural systems for heat stress and unpredictable rainfall patterns against a backdrop of existing farmer distress, a creaky system of price stabilisation prone to rent-seeking, and highly inadequate insurance and risk management mechanisms available to farmers. In this context, large existing entry points into food security and employment, such as the public distribution system and the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee programme, could usefully be rethought and repurposed from the perspective of providing climate resilience. In brief, the scale and scope of potential climate impacts require mainstreaming of climate considerations systematically across development programmes, rather than an approach that rests on marginal band-aids.

In another example, India’s long coastline is particularly vulnerable to climate impacts.¹⁷ Climate change is likely to decrease the productivity of fisheries through changes in ocean temperature and acidity levels, already stressed by non-climate effects such as fertiliser run-off, with impacts on livelihoods of fisher communities. Because these effects are non-linear, beyond a point, coastal systems may be stressed beyond the point of recovery. In addition, extreme weather events and sea level rise are likely to reshape coastal zones and increase risks and costs of inhabitation on coasts. Addressing these challenges includes but goes beyond disaster preparedness. It requires, for example, coordinating the work of different departments, some of which have a protective mandate and others that seek to maximize production: these need to be harmonized around coastal resilience.

Apart from agriculture and coasts, urban areas, forests and water management also pose a complex challenge. In all these areas, the challenges of mainstreaming climate change are simultaneously scientific, economic, social and institutional.

Conclusion

As the spectre of climate change grows ever clearer, it is becoming increasingly obvious that pursuing development without internalizing climate change considerations risks ignoring a big piece of the puzzle. A central element of the new government’s agenda must thus be to internalize and mainstream climate considerations.

Fortunately, in relation to international policy, addressing climate change can also bring economic and political gains. It can enable India to work its alliances to become a leader in an impending global clean energy transition. And it opens possibilities for the country to become a political leader, notably of vulnerable nations.

Domestically, there is considerable work to be done. This involves rethinking India’s energy system in a world that prioritizes clean energy, including tackling the thorny question of remaking India’s problematic electricity distribution sector. To manage impacts on agriculture, coasts, cities, water and forests, the new government will need to invest in dedicated scientific and institutional capacity, tasked with internalizing the climate challenge and the implications climate change holds for development.

Other pieces as part of CPR’s policy document, ‘Policy Challenges – 2019-2024’ can be accessed below:

• The Future is Federal: Why Indian Foreign Policy Needs to Leverage its Border States by Nimmi Kurian
• India’s Foreign Policy in an Uncertain World by Shyam Saran
• Need for a Comprehensive National Security Strategy by Shyam Saran
• A Clarion Call for Just Jobs: Addressing the Nation’s Employment Crisis by Sabina Dewan
• Time for Disruptive Foreign and National Security Policies by Bharat Karnad
• Multiply Urban ‘Growth Engines’, Encourage Migration to Reboot Economy by Mukta Naik

¹ Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, ‘Summary for Policymakers’, in Climate Change 2014: Synthesis Report, Contribution of Working Groups I, II, and III the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, edited by Core Writing Team, R.K. Pachauri and L.A Meyer (Geneva, Switzerland: IPCC, 2014), 6. [hereinafter IPCC]
² In 2015, a heat wave in India killed more than 2000 people. See Stephane Hallegatte, Adrien Vogt-Schilb, Mook Bangalore and Julie Rozenberg, ‘Unbreakable: Building the Resilience of the Poor in the Face of Natural Disasters’ (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2017), 34.
³ O. Hoegh-Guldberg, D. Jacob, M. Taylor, M. Bindi, S. Brown, I. Camilloni, A. Diedhiou, R. Djalante, K.L. Ebi, F. Engelbrecht, J. Guiot, Y. Hijioka, S. Mehrotra, A. Payne, S.I. Seneviratne, A. Thomas, R. Warren and G. Zhou, ‘Impacts of 1.5°C of Global Warming on Natural and Human Systems’, in Global Warming of 1.5°C, edited by V. Masson-Delmotte, P. Zhai, H.O. Pörtner, D. Roberts, J. Skea, P.R. Shukla, A. Pirani, W. Moufouma-Okia, C. Péan, R. Pidcock, S. Connors, J.B.R. Matthews, Y. Chen, X. Zhou, M.I. Gomis, E. Lonnoy, T. Maycock, M. Tignor and T. Waterfield (Geneva, Switzerland: IPCC, 2018), 263.
⁴ Ministry of Finance, Government of India, ‘Climate, Climate Change, and Agriculture’, in Economic Survey 2017-18 (New Delhi: Government of India, 2018), 82.
⁵ Article 4(3), Paris Agreement, 2015.
⁶ Lavanya Rajamani and Daniel Bodansky, ‘The Paris Rulebook: Balancing Prescriptiveness with Flexibility’, International & Comparative Law Quarterly 68 (4) (forthcoming, 2019).
⁷ Article 4(8), Paris Agreement, 2015.
⁸ Article 13, Paris Agreement, 2015.
⁹ Article 14, Paris Agreement, 2015.
¹⁰ See, for a full discussion of legal capacity constraints and their substantive effects on India’s negotiating position, Lavanya Rajamani, ‘India’s Approach to International Law in the Climate Change Regime’, Indian Journal of International Law 57 (1) (2017).
¹¹ Vijeta Rattani, ‘Coping with Climate Change: An Analysis of India’s National Action Plan on Climate Change’ (New Delhi, India: Centre for Science and Environment, 2018); Navroz K. Dubash and Neha Joseph, ‘Evolution of Institutions for Climate Policy in India’, Economic and Political Weekly 51 (3) (2016): 44-54; Sudhir Chella Rajan and Sujatha Byravan, ‘An Evaluation of India’s National Action Plan on Climate Change’ (Chennai, India: Centre for Development Finance, Institute for Financial Management and Research and Humanities and Social Sciences, IIT Madras, 2012).
¹² Radhika Khosla and Ankit Bhardwaj, ‘Urbanization in the Time of Climate Change: Examining the Response of Indian Cities’, Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Climate Change 10 (1) (2018): e560, https://doi.org/10.1002/wcc.560.
¹³ Ashok Sreenivas and Ashwin Gambhir, ‘Aligning Energy, Development and Mitigation’, in India in a Warming World, ed. Navroz K. Dubash (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, forthcoming); Navroz K. Dubash, Sunila S. Kale and Ranjit Bharvirkar, eds., Mapping Power: The Political Economy of Electricity in India’s States (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2018).
¹⁴ Navroz K. Dubash, Ashwini K. Swain and Parth Bhatia, ‘The Disruptive Politics of Renewable Energy’, The India Forum, forthcoming.
¹⁵ Press Trust of India, ‘Tata Power to focus on clean energy, not to build new coal-fired plants: report’, The Hindu, 23 April 2019, https://www.thehindubusinessline.com/companies/tata-power-to-focus-on-cl….
¹⁶ IPCC, ‘Summary for Policymakers’, in Global Warming of 1.5°C, edited by V. Masson-Delmotte, P. Zhai, H.O. Pörtner, D. Roberts, J. Skea, P.R. Shukla, A. Pirani, W. Moufouma-Okia, C. Péan, R. Pidcock, S. Connors, J.B.R. Matthews, Y. Chen, X. Zhou, M.I. Gomis, E. Lonnoy, T. Maycock, M. Tignor and T. Waterfield (Geneva, Switzerland: IPCC, 2018).
¹⁷ Rohan Arthur, ‘Shoring Up: Climate Change and the Indian Coasts and Islands’, in India in a Warming World, ed. Navroz K. Dubash (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, forthcoming).