Author: cprindia

Earlier this week, the Narendra Modi government extended the distribution of free foodgrains under the Pradhan Mantri Garib Kalyan Anna Yojana (PMGKAY) for another five months till November 2021. The move reinforced the primacy of “food” – more specifically, rice and wheat channeled through the public distribution system (PDS) – in its social safety net programmes during the current pandemic.

Till 2019-20, annual offtake of rice and wheat from the Food Corporation of India’s (FCI) godowns averaged hardly 62 million tonnes (mt); it actually fell from almost 66 mt to just over 60 mt between 2012-13 and 2017-18. Much of this comprised PDS rations under the National Food Security Act (NFSA) of 2013. This law, passed during the previous United Progressive Alliance (UPA) regime (https://bit.ly/3pChsfv), entitles 81.35 crore Indians to receive at least 5 kg of wheat or rice per month at Rs 2 and Rs 3 per kg, respectively. The annual foodgrain allocation under NFSA – which includes a higher 35-kg monthly ration for 2.37 crore families identified as “poorest of the poor” under the Antyodaya Anna Yojana – is estimated at nearly 55 mt.

Under PMGKAY, the NFSA beneficiaries were provided an extra 5 kg grain per month free of cost during April-November 2020. While that translated into an additional allocation of over 32 mt, actual lifting under PMGKAY, the Atmanirbhar Bharat Package (for returning migrant labourers) and assorted schemes launched in the wake of the Covid-19-induced lockdown last year totaled about 31.5 mt.

The chart below shows offtake of rice and wheat from the Central pool crossing an all-time-high of 93 mt during 2020-21, roughly 50% higher than the previous fiscal year. This was largely courtesy of PMGKAY, which has been re-launched this year as well, following the pandemic’s second wave. The Modi government initially allocated the 5-kg extra free grain per month to NFSA beneficiaries only for May and June 2021. But on June 7, the Prime Minister announced its extension up to Diwali, i.e. November. That is expected to, again, boost offtake by an estimated 28 mt in 2021-22.

Offtake is for fiscal year (April-March) and inclusive of lifting under other welfare schemes and open market sales.

Source: Department of Food and Public Distribution.

But it is not only food offtake that has hit an all-time-high. Government agencies have, as on June 9, procured 42 mt of wheat and 55 mt of rice from the 2020-21 crops. This, as can be seen from the next chart, has broken even the record 39 mt and 52 mt that got procured in the previous year. The Modi government has, in the post-pandemic period, both distributed as well as procured more rice and wheat than ever before!

rocurement is for crop year (July-June); figures for 2020-21 are as on June 9.

Source: Department of Food and Public Distribution.

While the spike in offtake is a result of the pandemic – free food has arguably been the single biggest relief intervention, ahead of even MGNREGA (another UPA legacy programme), for those worst affected by the economic disruptions after March 2020 – the increased procurement is, perhaps, a fallout of the movement against the Centre’s farm reform laws. The minimum support price (MSP) value of the paddy and wheat bought by government agencies since October 2020 – the three farm laws got passed the previous month – comes close to Rs 237,000 crore. Approximately 39% of that amount has gone to Punjab and Haryana, whose farmers have been at the forefront of the protests. The Modi government’s going all out to convince farmers, that its reform laws aren’t aimed at ending the MSP-based procurement regime, can be seen in paddy and wheat purchases from Punjab scaling new highs in the 2020-21 crop year. Record grain paddy procurement has been its strongest defense against allegations of being anti-farmer!

This links up with a third record. Even after the unprecedented 93 mt-plus offtake, stocks of rice and wheat in the Central pool crossed the 100 mt-mark for the first time on May 1, surpassing the previous high of 97.27 mt reached on June 1, 2020. The chart below shows that stock levels have been rising since 2017, reversing a declining trend of the preceding 4-5 years.

Stocks include rice equivalent of un-milled paddy.

Source: Department of Food and Public Distribution.

If stock accumulation has primarily to do with the political economy compulsions of MSP-based procurement, Covid-time distress has actually provided an opportunity for whittling down FCI’s massive grain mountain. FCI’s “economic cost” of procuring, handling, transporting, storing and distributing grains was estimated at Rs 39.99 per kg for rice and Rs 27.40/kg for wheat in 2020-21. The subsidy on the 31.5 mt of grains (20.8 mt rice and 10.7 mt wheat) distributed free of cost under PMGKAY and other special relief programmes would have, then, worked out to around Rs 112,500 crore. The actual cost, though, would have been lower, because FCI also incurs interest and storage expenses in holding excess stocks in its godowns. This “carrying cost of buffer”, pegged at Rs 5.40/kg in 2020-21, is saved even when grain is given out free. The corresponding annual savings on 31.5 mt would have been in excess of Rs 17,000 crore. Similar savings would accrue on the 28 mt additional grain allocations under PMGKAY for 2021-22.

Source: Department of Commerce.

Now is the final record: 2020-21 saw all-time-high PDS offtake, government procurement and stock buildup. It also saw the country exporting a record 19.8 mt of rice and wheat. On paper, virtually this entire quantity that got shipped out was grain procured from the open market. According to the department of food and public distribution, a mere 75,000 tonnes of wheat and 4,000 tonnes of rice were exported from the Central pool in 2020-21. This was wholly on “humanitarian grounds” through the Ministry of External Affairs.

Foodgrain exports from India have been significantly aided by the surge in international prices. The UN Food and Agriculture Organization’s Cereal Price Index hit a 95-month-high in May. While the hardening of global prices has definitely helped, the competitiveness of Indian rice and wheat may have also been enabled by recycled/leaked grain from the PDS (https://bit.ly/3vjVm2I). Given the massive quantities that were offered free/near-free under PMGKAY/NFSA, it should not surprise if some of this grain got diverted to the open market or even exports.

But at the end of the day, it is the abundant crop produced by farmers that has made all four records – PDS offtake, procurement, stocks and exports – possible even amidst the country’s worst pandemic in over a century.

Find all previous notes as part of the series here:

• Can rural play “savior” again? Agricultural seasons and COVID-19 waves by Mekhala Krishnamurthy and Harish Damodaran
• Where is food inflation headed? by Harish Damodaran
• Has MGNREGS Helped the Rural Economy in 2021? by Yamini Aiyar, Avani Kapur and Harish Damodaran
• Employment U-turn: Rural India is India’s main employer by Harish Damodaran and Yamini Aiyar
• Agricultural Households and Farming Income: An initial analysis of variations in income from farming and other sources among agricultural households in India by Harish Damodaran, Mekhala Krishnamurthy and Samridhi Agarwal
• Carbohydrates to proteins and back: How dietary and cropping diversification seems to have gone into reverse by Harish Damodaran, Mekhala Krishnamurthy and Samridhi Agarwal.
• Mapping India’s livestock economy by Harish Damodaran and Samridhi Agarwal.
• Unlocking the potential of Ganna Pradesh
• The Future of MSP by Harish Damodaran
• The Return of Food Inflation: Why its Different this time by Samridhi Agarwal and Harish Damodaran

RAJIV KUMAR PARTICIPATES IN PANEL DISCUSSION ON ET NOW
ECONOMY

Rajiv Kumar participates in a discussion (full video above) on ‘remonetising’ India, a Times Network initiative, after the expiry of the 50-day-deadline

READ THE BLOG BY SHYLASHRI SHANKAR
IDENTITY DISCRIMINATION POLITICS RIGHTS

The Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA) 2019, when viewed in combination with the Modi government’s intention to compile a National Register of Citizens (NRC) for India, will create a situation where being a Muslim and document-less could deprive one of citizenship rights. We may find more conversions out of Islam, and perhaps more takers for the Sangh Parivar’s ‘Ghar Wapsi’ programme. All this could occur even if the state governments in non-BJP ruled states do not cooperate with the Modi government on implementing the NRC. Ironically, it is the very process of democracy – elections and manifestoes – that will end up damaging the citizenship rights of the Muslim minority in India.

Let me explain how the combined threat of CAA and NRC could play out. Currently there are four ways to become an Indian citizen: birth, descent, registration and naturalisation. The Citizenship Bill of 1955 does not allow illegal migrants to acquire citizenship but the recent amendment allows non-Muslim minorities escaping persecution from three countries to do so.

The CAA welcomes Hindus, Sikhs, Christians, Parsis, Buddhists and Jains who arrived in India before 31 December 2014 to escape religious persecution as minorities in neighbouring Pakistan, Afghanistan and Bangladesh. All three happen to be Islamic states. The CAA, however, does not include Muslim minorities like the Rohingyas of Myanmar (with whom we share a border).

Let’s move to the NRC exercise. It is not yet clear what sort of documentary proof would be required to prove citizenship because the exercise would be conducted by state governments, and perhaps each state government could have its own specifications. Let’s assume that one of the documents is a birth certificate. UNICEF figures from 2012 report that about 40% of urban births and 65% of rural births are not registered in India. A similar picture is probably the case for the older generations. In Assam, reports suggest that large numbers (about 19 lakh people) did not possess the necessary documents in the recently conducted NRC exercise under the supervision of the Supreme Court. Detention camps have already been set up in Assam. ‘We want to root out illegal infiltrators coming from Bangladesh and other neighbours to other parts of India,’ the Union Home Minister Amit Shah has already said while defending their intention to carry out the NRC. He has also made public threats that those who cannot produce the necessary documentation will be herded into detention camps.

For a non-Muslim who may have lived in India for centuries but who doesn’t have a birth certificate, all is not lost. He or she can argue that they have no place to go or that they have fled these neighbouring countries to escape persecution (and have left their documents behind). But a document-less Muslim cannot make such an argument because the CAA does not include Muslim minorities. Being branded as an illegal and put in a camp would loom large in the realm of awful possibilities for such a person.

Wouldn’t the dispossessed have recourse to the courts? Would the courts stop the NRC process? Well, after the Ayodhya judgment which favoured Hindu claims over a disputed site, and in the face of the government’s contention that the NRC exercise is necessary in the interests of national security (an argument that usually ensures that the court favours the government in anti-terror cases), it seems a chancy business to rely on the court.

As for the constitutionality of the CAA, which has already been challenged, the Supreme Court judges will probably decide using the concepts of ‘intelligible differentia’ and ‘rational relation to the goal’ in Article 14 (equality before the law).

The specification of the minority communities in the CAA could be challenged in court on two grounds:

a) That citizenship eligibility of these migrants pertains to religious attributes and excludes ethnic and racial ones. Ahmedis and Shias of Pakistan suffer discrimination but will not be eligible under the CAA because they belong to the majority religion (though Ahmedis have been categorised as ‘non-Muslims’ by the Pakistani laws).

b) That the exclusion of ethnic attributes was deliberate in the Act because including it would allow Rohingyas (who are mainly Muslim) to apply for Indian citizenship.

The court’s response would depend on whether they immediately extend the persecution argument to more categories such as ethnicity, or accept the government’s assurance that it would do so in the future (a more likely scenario).

Opponents of the amendment could point out that the Constituent Assembly (CA) had vetoed the notion that India would be the homeland for Hindus. A CA member (P.S. Deshmukh) had proposed an amendment to include as Indian citizens every Hindu or a Sikh who was not a citizen of any other state because Hindus and Sikhs had no other country to look to for acquiring citizenship rights. The amendment was rejected by the majority.

The opponents of the CAA could also argue that the constitution framers wanted to ensure that independent India adhered to the principles of a secular State. They may point to the words of a CA member Alladi Krishnaswamy Ayyar: ‘We may make a distinction between people who have voluntarily and deliberately chosen another country as their home and those who want to retain their connection with this country. But we cannot on any racial or religious or other grounds make a distinction between one kind of persons and another, or one sect of persons and another sect of persons.’ Ayyar had gone on to explain that Article 5A, clause (a) of the draft constitution did precisely this: it provided for ‘all cases of mass migration-if I may use that expression-from Pakistan into India… We do not in that article make any distinction between one community and another, between one sect and another. We make a general provision that if they migrated to this country and they were born in India as defined in the earlier Constitution, then they will be entitled to the benefits of Citizenship.’

It is true that India’s constitution framers did not expect the articles dealing with citizenship to be set in stone. A CA member noted that the ‘articles dealing with citizenship are, therefore, subject to any future nationality or citizenship law that may be passed by Parliament. Parliament has absolutely a free hand in enacting any law as to nationality or citizenship suited to the conditions of our country.’ So there is nothing wrong in amending the Citizenship Act.

But when seen in tandem with the NRC exercise, the CAA is not simply an amendment to provide safe haven to persecuted minorities, none of whom are Muslim. It would be more precise to say that the CAA is pro-non-Muslim persecuted minorities. The NRC exercise is being conducted to find illegal migrants from neighbouring countries particularly Pakistan and Bangladesh (which also has the third largest Hindu population after India and Nepal). A possible impact of the NRC-CAA combine would be the following: A document-less Muslim in India who may have lived here for centuries may be more likely to be branded an illegal migrant, but without recourse to the CAA that a Hindu Bangladeshi migrant would have. Wouldn’t such an awful possibility create fear in the hearts of Indian Muslims?

Even worse, such fears, and perhaps even the reality of being stripped of citizenship are a result of the very democratic process that allows a victorious political party to make the claim that all its pledges are backed by the people’s mandate. But we all know that as voters, we may vote for a party without agreeing with all parts of its manifesto. In the 2019 UK elections, Labour party strongholds turned conservative because those voters preferred Boris Johnson’s stance on leaving Europe even though they may have championed the Labour party’s strategy for the economy. A similar argument can be made for voters who may have voted for Modi in 2019 on other issues. CAA and NRC may not have the endorsement of a majority of Indians but we have no way of knowing that unless we conduct a referendum.

More crucially, the CAA-NRC combine inflicts a deep wound on the constitution’s fabric. Even if the NRC exercise doesn’t happen, the damage would have been done to several fundamental rights including the right to practice religion. It would cause the ‘mischief of Partition’ to travel across decades. As a constitution framer said, ‘I see no reason why a Muslim who is a citizen of this country should be deprived of his citizenship at the commencement of this Constitution.’ But the CAA-NRC does precisely that by creating a fear psychosis among document-less Muslim citizens of India about their citizenship rights and about their ability to remain in their religion.

The views shared belong to individual faculty and researchers and do not represent an institutional stance on the issue.

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FULL VIDEO OF THE DISCUSSION
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

Watch the full video (above) of the discussion on ‘How East Differs from West? A Tale of Two Globalisations’, featuring Stephan Shakespeare, Pramit Bhattacharya and moderated by Rahul Verma.

Drawing on data from the YouGov-Cambridge Globalism project that consists of extensive multidimensional surveys conducted in 23 countries, the discussion centred around the changing geography of globalisation as it is not just shifting economically but also publicly. The pro-globalisation public consensus that used to characterise Western politics is essentially moving to the East. This raises an important question: has the traditional link between globalisation and the spread of Western liberal norms around the world been permanently broken?

Stephan Shakespeare is the CEO and Co-founder of YouGov. Pramit Bhattacharya is a Data Editor at Mint. Rahul Verma is a Fellow at CPR.

READ FINDINGS OF THE STUDY BY ACCOUNTABILITY INITIATIVE
HEALTH BUREAUCRACY

Researchers at the Accountability Initiative, Centre for Policy Research and the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) have published a Policy Note which estimates the potential costs to deliver a core set of direct nutrition interventions (DNIs) at scale (i.e. 100 per cent coverage) for the fiscal year (FY) 2019-20.

Background to the note
Outcomes of malnutrition such as stunting, anaemia, wasting, and low birth weight have remained persistently high in India (Menon et al. 2017). As part of India’s national strategy to address malnutrition and associated risks, a number of nutrition interventions are being implemented. These include nutrition-specific interventions such as the provision of food supplements, Iron and Folic Acid (IFA) supplementation during pregnancy, breastfeeding (BF) promotion, vitamin A supplementation in early childhood, and food supplementation, as well as nutrition sensitive interventions such as access to clean water, sanitation, etc.

At the Union government level, these interventions are delivered primarily through Centrally Sponsored Schemes (CSSs) – the Integrated Child Development Services (ICDS), POSHAN Abhiyaan, and the Pradhan Mantri Matru Vandana Yojana (PMMVY) under the Ministry of Women and Child Department (MWCD) and the National Health Mission (NHM) operating within the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare (MoHFW).

Despite these interventions, coverage remains variable, due to implementation challenges, and capacity, and financing gaps (Menon et al. 2017, Chakrabarti et al. 2019). Although overall use had improved and reached marginalised groups such as disadvantaged castes and tribes, the poorest quintiles of the population were still left behind, especially in the largest states that carry the highest burden of undernutrition.

This Policy Note is based on a study that carried forward research on costing for nutrition interventions, notably work by Menon et al. (2016). The methods followed by Menon et al. (2016) were adapted in this policy note to calculate the cost of providing interventions at full coverage.

₹20,796 crore ($3.03 billion) was required to provide food supplements at-scale for for adolescent girls out-of-school, pregnant women, lactating mothers, children aged 6 months to 3 years, and severely underweight children

How can this note be used?

The costs provided here can be used by policy-makers for planning and budgeting. The objective of budgeting is to estimate revenues required and likely expenditures, as well as to determine future funding needs. Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, resources have to be rapidly re-prioritised. The findings from this note can facilitate such discussions as well. Cost estimates can contribute to a more informed debate on resource allocation priorities (WHO, 2003), and help make choices clearer for policymakers.

Therefore, the findings of this note can feed directly into the planning and budgeting cycle. The cost estimates across interventions for each state can be used at the ICDS Annual Programme Implementation Plan meetings, NHM Programme Implementation Plan meetings, planning for supplementary budgets especially under NHM, as well as in planning governance reforms across sectors to improve implementation. These meetings will be crucial in re-allocating funds in July 2020, accounting for COVID-19. Therefore, the findings of this note can equip various stakeholders with the required information to ensure adequate financing for nutrition interventions.

Findings

The study found that at 2019 population estimates, India should have spent at least ₹38,571 crore in 2019-20, across Union and State governments, and across ministries and departments to fully finance a set of core DNIs, at scale.

We estimated that in FY 2019-20:

To deliver counselling at scale, ₹1,373 crore ($200 million) was required (Figure 1). This included counselling for the promotion of breastfeeding, complementary feeding, and water, hygiene and sanitation practices. Of all categories, Behavior Change Communication (BCC) interventions were the least costly.
To provide food supplements at scale, ₹20,796 crore ($3.03 billion) was required. This included supplementary food for adolescent girls out-of-school, pregnant women, lactating mothers, children aged 6 months to 3 years, and additional rations for severely underweight children.
For maternity benefit cash transfers at scale, ₹9,260 crore ($1.35 billion) was required. It was to be delivered under two conditional cash transfer schemes – PMMVY (₹6,637 crore) and Janani Suraksha Yojana (JSY) (₹2,623 crore).
For the distribution of micronutrient supplements and deworming tablets at scale, ₹1,019 crore ($148 million) was required. This included IFA and deworming for adolescent girls, pregnant women, and lactating mothers; deworming for pregnant women; vitamin A, IFA, zinc, and deworming for children.
For health interventions at scale, ₹6,123 crore ($892 million) was required. This included immunisation of children (₹3,542 crore), providing insecticide treated bed nets to pregnant women (₹146 crore), treatment of severely malnourished children at Nutrition Rehabilitation Centres (NRC) (₹2,403 crore), and drugs for treatment of diarrhoea for children (₹31 crore). A detailed breakup of these costs by intervention is given in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Annual costs of delivering nutrition interventions at scale, in ₹ crore

In the context of the current COVID-19 pandemic and economic crisis, it is critical to ensure equitable and adequate resources for nutrition. Union government and ministries are likely to reassess allocation requirements in the coming months. Our findings indicate that India should have spent at least ₹38,571 crore in 2019-20, and it is imperative that in 2020-21 and beyond, spending on nutrition will need to be benchmarked at least at this level, or beyond.

References

Chakrabarti, S., Raghunathan, K., Alderman, H., Menon, P., and Nguyen, P. 2019. India’s Integrated Child Development Services programme; equity and extent of coverage in 2006 and 2016. Bulletin of the World Health Organization.
Menon, P., McDonald, C.M., and Chakrabarti, S. 2016. Estimating the cost of delivering direct nutrition interventions at scale: national and subnational level insights from India. Maternal and Child Nutrition (Supplement 1): 169–85.
Menon, P., Nguyen, P.H., Mani, S., Kohli, N., Avula, R., and Tran, L.M.. 2017. Trends in Nutrition Outcomes, Determinants, and Interventions in India (2006–2016). POSHAN Report 10. International Food Policy Research Institute, New Delhi.
WHO. 2003. Making choices in health: WHO guide to cost-effectiveness analysis. Geneva: World Health Organization.

WATCH FULL VIDEOS OF PRESENTATIONS AND SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSION
SANITATION

NITI Aayog and CPR held an open seminar on May 22, the first of a series, on measuring open defecation communities in India under the Swachh Bharat Abhiyan (SBA). Watch the full video above of the two presentations on i) how Nadia became the first open defecation free district in West Bengal, and ii) how the questions around the evaluation of open defecation free communities should be framed.

A rich discussion followed with questions on why toilets were not used, the need for behaviour change, availability of water, the size of the toilets, using women as change agents, and more answered by the panel. Watch the full discussion here: Q&A Session

Additionally, for a full seminar report, and access to complete presentations, visit the dedicated page.

VISUAL TIMELINE OF THE COURSE BY THE ACCOUNTABILITY INITIATIVE

There are limited opportunities for Civil Society Organisation staff and aspiring development practitioners in rural India to build their conceptual skills on governance. Accountability Initiative’s course – Hum Aur Humaari Sarkaar – is a step to bridge this capability gap. In mid-March, the first ‘open’ course was conducted in Jaipur, Rajasthan. Applications were invited from all over the state. After a selection process, staff from 6 NGOs and students from leading state universities were accepted into the course. All exhibited potential to effect positive change by actively monitoring the way public services are delivered.

To give the participants the conceptual skills they need to engage with the government system, course curriculum is based on evidence from Accountability Initiative’s research and features hands on practical tips. Their lessons included: planning and budgeting at the Gram Panchayat level, understanding the complexities of the bureaucratic set-up responsible for service delivery, and the financial architecture of government schemes. Cutting edge academic theory on public administration and finance informs the course.

READ THE BLOG SERIES
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE

In June 2014, the Ministry of Environment, Forests and Climate Change (MoEFCC) constituted the Shailesh Nayak (SN) Committee to review the Coastal Regulation Zone (CRZ) Notification 2011. While it was reportedly done in response to state governments’ concerns regarding coastal development, it opened up several contentious issues for diverse opinions. This was despite the fact that so far, the environment ministry has not disclosed the overall road map of the proposed reform. See details here, here and here.

Over the years, the contentious issues have received views from various actors- industries, real estate, construction and tourism sectors, fisher groups, coastal citizens, academics and NGOs. Presented Below are those contentious issues of coastal regulation along with a selection of views on those. These views have been collated from the file notings and a list of comments on the draft CRZ Notification 2018 received from the MoEFCC in October 2018 through a Right to Information (RTI) application. Find these documents here and here.

Width of No Development Zone in rural areas

The CRZ Notification, 2011 delineates the first 200 m of the CRZ III (rural) areas as No Development Zone (NDZ). The SN Committee suggested that there should be a differential CRZ that is based on population density. It recommended that CRZ III areas with a population density of 2161 per sq km and higher should have an NDZ of 50 m and areas with a population density of less than 2161 per sq km should have an NDZ of 200 m width.

Views from within the Ministry

Two officers who reviewed the suggestions of the SN Committee in 2015 had different opinions on the matter. One officer accepted the suggestion of having a population density based NDZ, the other felt that a population based distinction was not required as ‘urbanisation is a dynamic process’.

The difference of opinion on this issue continued despite the change in officers in charge of revising the notification. In fact, consensus on qualification of those rural areas (CRZ III) that should have a narrower NDZ didn’t come by till the end of 2017. At that time one officer felt that the recommendation of the SN committee should be retained, however another officer contended that declaration of a panchayat as an urban local body was a better criteria. Under the CRZ Notification 2011, urban areas are not required to maintain an NDZ.

Holding a similar view, a different officer in November 2017 dropped the suggestion of the SN Committee from the draft that was presented before the Prime Minister’s Office. He argued that the state government could reclassify the areas with densities ‘high enough’ as municipalities/urban areas.

Views from the submissions on Draft CRZ 2018

While within the ministry, the basis of permitting a reduced NDZ in certain rural areas was discussed at length, outside the ministry many fisher groups, NGOs, panchayath and industry representatives asked for a uniform NDZ all across- representations from tourism and real estate sectors and some gram panchayats asked for a considerably reduced NDZ and fisher groups, NGOs and citizens’ groups demanded that the originally stipulated 200 m wide NDZ be retained. Below is a selection of suggestions on the subject as received by the ministry.

Hazira Machhimar Samiti, Gujarat; Pavity Jinwar Kodi, Mumbai; Harbadevi Machhimar Sarvodaya Sahkari Society, Mumbai; Machhimar Samaj Sangh Palghar, Maharashtra and Dakshinbanga Matsyajibi Forum, West Bengal objected to the reduction of the NDZ. In fact, Hazira Machhimar Samiti demanded that the NDZ should be more than 200 m.
St Estevam Biodiversity Management Committee, Goa conceded that there shouldn’t be any reduction in the NDZ. Biodiversity Management Committees are constituted by the local bodies at the village and municipality level. They are constituted under the Biodiversity Act 2002 for the conservation and management of biological diversity of an area.
State Vice President of BJP, Daman & Diu and three other representatives of the party from the state opined that Diu should have an NDZ of 20m.
Representative from the Oberoi group advocated for an NDZ of 20 m. President of the Navayuga Engineering Company Ltd. Stated: ‘NDZ is against development.’
Paduvary Grama Panchayath, Karnataka requested that a uniform NDZ of 50 m should apply in CRZ III areas.
Candolim Residents and Consumer Forum sought a reversal to a uniform 200 m NDZ. Goa Foundation, an NGO active in Goa demanded the same.
World Travel & Tourism Council, India Initiative contended that in thinly populated rural areas, an NDZ of 100 m should apply.
Gujarat Chemical Port Terminal Company Limited stated in its submission that the NDZ should not apply in notified industrial estates and investment regions.
School of industrial fisheries, Cochin University of Science & Technology objected to the reduction of NDZ and stated in its submission: ‘NDZ reduction may trigger displacement and migration of traditional communities.’
CRZ along tidal influenced water bodies

The CRZ Notification 2011 in its Clause (ii) mandates that along estuaries, creeks and other tidal influenced water bodies connected to the sea, a CRZ of 100m or width of the water body, whichever is less applies. The notification also states that the distance upto, which the zone applies, is till a point upto which the tidal effects are observed. Tidal effect is established if salinity of 5 parts per thousand is observed in a water body in the driest period of the year. Since the sea and the water bodies connected with the sea share the same habitat and biodiversity, the clause was added as a measure to protect the coastal biodiversity and livelihoods that are dependent on it. Both these issues received divergent opinions within and outside the ministry.

Width of the CRZ along tidal influenced water bodies

Views from within the ministry

While reviewing the SN Committee report, two officers in the MoEFCC suggested in 2015 that a CRZ of 50 m or width of the water body whichever is less would suffice. Different drafts considered by the ministry also had varying proposals on the subject. Those have been summarised in the table below.

Various drafts & reports CRZ Width
Shailesh Nayak Committee Report 2014 100m; 25 m1
Draft Integrated Marine and Coastal Conservation Notification (IMCC), 2015 25m
Draft CRZ Notification 2018 50m
* The SN originally stipulated Committee retained the width in its suggestions but in the draft CRZ Notification that it recommended, width of the NDZ had become 25 m.

Views from the submissions on Draft CRZ 2018

Additional Chief Secretary of Kerala opined that CRZ around tidal influenced water bodies should be 30 m.
Bombay Environmental Action Group and Sabuj Mancha, environmental NGO from Maharashtra and West Bengal respectively asked for a reversal to original 100 m of CRZ around the tidal influenced water bodies.
Machhimar Sehkaari Sanstha Navi Mumbai noted that reduction in CRZ width around water bodies was ‘against the spirit of CRZ Notification.’
Edavanakad Gram Panchayath of Vypin islands in Ernakulam district of Kerala sought a CRZ of 30 m around tidal influenced water bodies.
Surat Builders’ Association and Real Estate developers’ Association suggested that CRZ for tidal influenced water bodies should be 30 m where there is no bund or retaining wall and 15 m where there is a bund.
City and Industrial Development Corporation of Maharashtra, Navi Mumbai suggested that bunds made by villagers should not be considered as tidal influenced water bodies and no CRZ should apply there.
Most submissions as mentioned in the table compiled by the MoEFCC do not provide reasons for their suggestions. Sometimes, reductions have been sought for tourism development; an individual mentioned that reduction in CRZ along the creeks will release large stretches of land for affordable housing. Those who have criticised the reduction have opined that it would put additional strain on the coast and harm coastal ecology and traditional livelihoods.

Length of the CRZ along tidal influenced water bodies

Views from within the Ministry

The draft IMCC Notification that was being considered by the ministry in the year 2015 had a clause that limited the length of the CRZ along tidal influenced water bodies up to a length of 1 km from the mouth of water body into the sea. However, in the subsequent drafts, the ministry reverted to the original salinity criteria to determine the length of the water body up to, which the CRZ would apply. Read about the different drafts in the first blog post of the series.

Views from the submissions on Draft CRZ 2018

Additional Chief Secretary of Kerala suggested that the CRZ along a water body should be limited to 1 km in urban areas and 3 kms in rural areas.
Varapuzha Gram Panchayath of Ernakulam, Kerala opined that CRZ limit should not exceed beyond 8 km form the mouth of the estuary. Advocate Ebenser C L from Cochin shared a similar view with the MoEFCC in his submission.
FSI and FAR for buildings in CRZ II areas

The CRZ Notification 2011, freezes the Floor Space Index (FSI) and Floor Area Ratio (FAR) for buildings in the CRZ II (urban) areas to the level of 1991. This was done to ensure that there was ample open space around the buildings in coastal areas. This would reduce the pressure on the coast and their vulnerability to natural disasters. In contrast to the CRZ Notification, 2011, SN Committee recommended in the report that FSI and FAR should not be fixed at the level of 1991 for buildings in CRZ II. But in the draft notification that it suggested FSI/FAR were not mentioned explicitly.

Views from within the Ministry

In 2015, one officer accepted the suggestion of the committee to defreeze FSI and FAR for buildings in CRZ II. But another officer suggested that along with this change a coastline conservation program should be implemented. He added that project proponents should fund this ‘as the coastline will witness the growth of infrastructure’. He also suggested that a setback of 5-10 m from the HTL should be protected. In the draft CRZ Notification 2018, FSI and FAR for buildings in urban areas is no more fixed at the 1991 level but it is as applicable on the date of the notification. Also, the additional requirement of coastline conservation programme is not there.

Views from the submissions on Draft CRZ 2018

Kalpataru Limited, a real estate company and Builders Association of Mumbai sought that FSI and FAR are changed from time to time according to the changes in the local town and country planning regulations. 8-10 coastal citizens demanded the same.
Essel Infraprojects and Mumbai Association of Realtors suggested that the permitted FSI for buildings in urban coastal areas be increased.
Cavelossim Villagers’ Forum, Goa conceded on the other hand that FSI/FAR restrictions should not be relaxed. Machhimar Sahkari Sanstha Maryadit, Navi Mumbai and Prakriti NGO, Puri, Odisha suggested the same.
Hotel Association of Puri shared in its submission that regulations with respect to FSI/FAR were not clear.
Coasts are one of the most vied landscapes due to their trade, industry and tourism potential, livelihood dependence, scenic beauty and conservation value. However, these interests often come with contradictory visions for the coasts and different set of expectations from the coastal legislation. In the last four years these differences have become starker as only certain actors have been taken on board while charting the road map for the coasts. The CRZ revamp series so far has shared the details of discussion within and outside of the ministry on CRZ regulation and brought home the point that coastal regulation is an issue of public interest. It has also emphasised on the significance of granting opportunities for a genuine public review of the coastal law in reconciling the differences. This last blog post of the series, by drawing attention to the crucial and unresolved aspects of the coastal regulation, echoes once again the need for a wider dialogue on the law.

FULL VIDEO OF THE DISCUSSION
URBAN ECONOMY URBAN GOVERNANCE

Watch the full video (above) of the discussion on ‘Fractal Urbanism: Residential-segregation in Modernising India‘ featuring Andaleeb Rahman.

The presentation showed how residential caste-segregation is independent of city size, using the first-ever large-scale evidence of neighbourhood-resolution data from 147 of the largest cities in contemporary India (the sample includes all cities in India with at least 0.3 million residents in 2011). This analysis sheds new light on one of the central conundrums in Indian urbanism — the persistence of caste segregation across the country, and across cities of varying sizes. It documents how patterns of residential caste segregation in the largest metropolitan centres with over 10 million residents closely track patterns in much smaller cities that are nearly two orders-of-magnitude smaller. This finding punctures a hole in one of the central normative promises of India’s urbanisation — the gradual withering of traditional caste-based segregation. These national findings are complemented by a unique census-scale micro-data containing detailed elementary caste (jati) information for nearly five million urban households in Karnataka. The analysis provides further fine-grained evidence of how segregation within the wards at census-block scales accounts for a significant part of the city scale patterns of segregation and is a central driver of ghettoisation of the most spatially marginalised groups in urban India — Muslims and Dalits. The authors offered several hypotheses and explanations and discussed implications for urban planning, policy, as well as broader modernisation theories.

Andaleeb Rahman is currently a Postdoctoral Associate at Cornell University. His research interest lies in the area of food policy and ethnic politics.

The question and answer session that followed can be accessed here.

As Kashmir continues to be on the boil for over 60 days now, a factual trajectory of the history of the state and its conflict (from 1947 till 2006) is captured in this primer by the late B G Verghese of CPR.

The primer was written with the objective of educating people, given the lack of easily accessible literature on the subject, and presents the central story of the Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) conflict post 1947–in a series of snapshots.

From the history of its invasions, coups, and accession, to the account of the UN resolutions, to the resulting Indian, Pakistani and Chinese territorial control of the erstwhile princely state of J&K in 1949, the following wars, the many attempts at the peace process–including the origins of the plural, multi-ethnic and multi-lingual tradition of Kashmiriyat–the primer is an important reference point for understanding and contextualising the current situation of the state.

A visual timeline of the highlights from the primer can be accessed above.